



CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN NIGERIA
ALTERNATIVE PERSPECTIVES
IN CRIMINOLOGY COLLECTION
Internationally, the search for solutions to socialconflict has resulted in reconsideration of traditional
approaches and the development of innovative harm
reduction based analyses that extend beyond the narrow
focus of conventional criminology. Contemporary
alternative perspectives in criminology range from
critical analyses of current punitive justice policies and
practices to explorations of non-punitive approaches
such as peacemaking, transformative justice, and penal
abolition.
This collection welcomes a range of theoretical
and practice-based contributions that challenge
established notions of punitive justice: from pre-colonial
approaches (e.g. Aboriginal Healing), ethnographic
studies, and harm reduction models to radical critiques
of contemporary models of social control.
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FOREWORD
Julia Sudbury
In August 2002 prison activists and scholars from the United
States, Canada, Australia, and across the African continent
travelled to Lagos, Nigeria, for the Tenth International Conference
on Penal Abolition (ICOPA X). Coordinated by Viviane Saleh-
Hanna, then a staff member at Prisoners Rehabilitation and
Welfare Action, the conference challenged those of us involved
in prison activism and research to examine our unstated Western
bias. Although often extremely knowledgeable about prison
systems and anti-prison movements in the United States,
Canada, and Europe, few of us knew anything about penal
systems in West Africa. Indeed, we had most commonly defined
the concerns, priorities, and goals of prison studies and anti-
prison activism with no regard for the experiences of scholars
and activists in the global South. Shortly before the conference
the US government issued a warning suggesting that American
visitors might not be safe in Nigeria, due to ethnic and religious
conflict, and that Nigerian Airways was not up to international
air safety standards, further discouraging travel. These warnings
remind us that the lack of scholarly and activist engagements
across the First World/Third World divide is a reflection
of broader ideological and structural forces. Despite the
shrinking of the globe and the emergence of a border-crossing
cosmopolitan elite, significant barriers remain to meaningful and
transformative transnational engagements in the field of prison
xxi
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studies and activism. Viviane Saleh-Hanna has therefore given
us an important gift by gathering in these pages the experiences
and analyses of African scholars, former prisoners, and human
rights activists.
Colonial Systems of Control is a groundbreaking collection
of essays. The book offers challenges for prison activists, and
proposes new directions and methodological approaches for
the field of prison studies. Viviane Saleh-Hanna brings together
Western and African scholars, former prisoners, and human
rights activists —a powerful approach that offers the reader
a range of perspectives from which to approach the topic.
The testimonies by former prisoners in particular provide a
humanizing glimpse of the microlevel struggles for survival of
criminalized African men and women, while the scholarly articles
address the macrolevel social, political, and legal context. But the
book is not just an analysis of what is wrong with the Nigerian
penal system. Instead, the authors offer two possible alternatives
to the status quo: a revitalization of traditional models of justice
based on African cultural principles and penal abolitionism, and
a model developed in Europe and North America but applied
here uniquely to the African context.
Nigeria is home to immense wealth, enormous poverty, a
decaying infrastructure, and blatant corruption. Lagos, a city of
twelve million people, mostly Yorubas, Igbos, and Hausas, is a
sprawling urban futurescape directly out of an Octavia Butler
novel. Despite the billions of dollars each year generated by oil
revenues, there is no reliable clean water, the roads are riddled
with potholes deep enough to swallow a car, and, since garbage
collection is infrequent, there are constant piles of smoking trash
at the sides of the road. Thousands of cars burn leaded gas and
churn out black fumes directly in the faces of the children selling
every product imaginable to the drivers stuck in constant "go
slows" (traffic jams). With the current government following
the International Monetary Fund's (IMF) neoliberal agenda, and
with widespread corruption of government officials, there is little
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hope of investment in roads, public transportation, water, or
electricity any time soon. Victoria Island is a walled oasis within
this urban mayhem. Reserved for "expats"—whites —and rich
blacks working for multinationals such as Shell and Chevron,
Victoria Island has modern restaurants, apartment blocks with
their own generators and water supply, swimming pools, and
expensive hotels.
Since the discovery of oil and the growth of incredible wealth
inequalities, avoiding armed robbers has become an everyday
part of life. It is not considered safe to drive outside town after
dark, and Nigerians returning home from working abroad are
frequently robbed. In desperation, communities have turned to
vigilante gangs such as the Bakassi Boys, who carry out extralegal,
on-the-spot executions of alleged culprits. In southeast Nigeria,
where oil revenues and corruption make political positions
goldmines, politicians are accused of having put the Bakassi
Boys on the payroll. In the north, communities have turned to
the harsh punishments given out under sharia law (traditional
Muslim law), such as stoning and cutting off a hand. At first
glance, we might be encouraged to believe that a study of prisons
in a setting so different from the North American context would
have little to teach a Western audience. It is critical, however,
that we do not approach these essays as if they illuminate a
fascinating yet distant experience, an exotic taste of otherness.
Rather we can read these essays as a subaltern commentary on
state violence, social control, inequality, and resistance. In this
sense scholars and activists in North America and Europe have a
great deal to learn from our Nigerian counterparts.
These essays make three critical interventions. First, they
introduce the concept of "penal coloniality" and provide a
detailed argument for understanding the emergence of prisons
in Africa as an integral facet of colonialism. Essays by Ume and
Saleh-Hanna and by Elechi demonstrate that precolonial systems
of justice were based on concepts that are largely absent in Western
models. These concepts included the belief that individuals who
committed offences were harming the community or the spirit
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world rather than the state; that such offences could be made good
through reparations to the affected family or community rather
than through punishment; and that family and kin networks
served as formal systems of social control, with banishment
from the family and community to be used only as a last resort.
The rise of the prison is then traced through the early and late
colonial eras, as well as the postindependence eras of military
and democratic rule. This genealogy demonstrates the shifting
function of imprisonment and its close connection to relations
of rule. By unpacking the history of the prison in this way, the
authors encourage the reader to think critically about the role and
function of prisons in contemporary societies. The Nigerian case
study provides an opportunity to step back from the apparent
inevitability and omnipresence of penal culture, and to study
a society without prisons, a core concept developed in abstract
terms by abolitionists in the West.
Second, these essays address the important issue of the
relationship between the contemporary global political and
economic order, the (neo)colonial state, and criminal punishment
in the global South. There is a tendency in the scholarship on
globalization to treat it as a new phenomenon arising entirely
out of economic restructuring in the West, and the need for
new markets and sources of labour. The authors gathered here
bring an African lens to the social problems associated with
globalization, and in so doing they establish the continuity of
political, economic, and social dominance and exploitation from
the beginnings of the trans-Atlantic slave trade through colonial
rule, continental independence in the 1960s, and contemporary
unequal global relations. The authors make a strong case that
coloniality continues, transformed from direct rule by external
colonial powers to oppression by an externally supported
government structured by colonial principles of violence,
militarization, and disregard for human rights. They argue
against the conceptualization of the African continent as being in
a state of postcoloniality and posit the colonial prison as evidence
of its continuation.
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The authors demonstrate that, at a local level, coloniality
and globalization take the face of corrupt prison guards stealing
rations meant for prisoners, police extorting bribes from terrified
families of detainees, women incarcerated for mental illness,
and soldiers imprisoned for complaining about poor conditions.
They demonstrate that we cannot, as observers of the African
continent often tend to, blame all the problems of poverty and
human rights abuses on African governance. Equally, we cannot,
as global justice activists tend to, ignore the abuses by African
governments while pointing fingers at powerful Western nations,
the IMF, and multinational corporations. Instead, this volume
powerfully demonstrates the seamless interweaving of the local,
national, and global, and finds the location of responsibility and
accountability for the suffering of Nigerian prisoners at multiple
levels.
Third, the essays gathered here address alternatives to
criminal punishment in West Africa. Having demonstrated that
prisons are a colonial invention that has little to do with African
cultural traditions or principles of social organization, the
authors come to the conclusion that alternatives must be found.
However, rather than simply exhorting the reader to imagine
a world without prisons, they provide concrete examples of
alternatives and pathways to social change. One direction for
change is to foster the development of indigenous justice models.
Models such as " sentencing circles" in Aboriginal communities
have been developed in Canada during the past decade, and there
has been a plethora of research evaluating their effectiveness.
However, there is little scholarship available outside the African
continent on indigenous justice models in Africa. The authors
make an invaluable contribution to scholarship on restorative and
alternative non-punitive justice models. The chapter on ICOPA is
particularly powerful because it documents the development of a
transnational coalition of activists and scholars, including youth
and former prisoners. This is the first detailed account I have
read that documents the use of penal abolitionist discourse and
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praxis in an African context. These essays answer an important
abolitionist question: if not prisons, then what?
In the United States the explosion in prison construction that
occurred in the past three decades has sparked intense interest in
whether prisons work, whose interests they serve, and what could
be used in place of prisons. Increasingly there is an emerging
consensus that US legislators have built themselves into a fiscal
and social crisis by investing ever-larger sums of public money
into incarceration and packing already overcrowded prisons
with more and more non-violent offenders. In California, for
example, the governor has recently declared a state of emergency
in the state prison system and started shipping prisoners to other
states, sparking a new round of debates about what can be done
about the prison system. In Canada federal officials have tended
to resist pressure to conform to US models of mass incarceration.
However, expansion and privatization have occurred at the
provincial level, and prison activists and the media have brought
public attention to the Americanization of Canadian criminal
justice, from the introduction of boot camps to the introduction
of US private prison companies to run a jail in Ontario.
Prisons are rapidly becoming what Angela Y. Davis (1981)
calls a panacea for all social ills, from mental illness and drug
addiction to homelessness and poverty. This reliance on
imprisonment touches not only the growing number of people
who have a family member or friend in prison, on parole, or on
probation, or who have experienced the criminal punishment
system firsthand, but also those impacted by cuts in education,
social services, and health care that occur as criminal justice
budgets spiral upward. This reliance affects our everyday lives
as we see formerly incarcerated youth and racialized minorities
recycled through our inner cities, with no resources or support
to establish a new life, gain employment, find housing, and
secure treatment for addiction or mental illness. Despite the
unsustainability of a social policy built on criminalization and
punishment rather than on social investment and community
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infrastructure, politicians from both sides of the spectrum have
been reluctant to envision real alternatives to mass incarceration.
Colonial Systems of Control invites us to question the notion that
caging people creates safety and to examine our assumptions
about the efficacy of (state) violence in preventing (criminal)
violence. It is a compelling and important book that will challenge
the way you think about safety, crime, and punishment.
REFERENCE
Davis, Angela Y. (1981). Women, Race, and Class. New York: Random
House.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION:
COLONIAL SYSTEMS OF CONTROL
Viviane Saleh-Hanna
A long dirt road begins with the casual barrel of a gun, guarding
a boundary, allowing selective access to outsiders and controlled
exit to insiders. The few outsiders who are allowed to step past
those guns and over the invisible, mysterious line in Kirikiri are
faced with tall concrete walls inflicting visible boundaries and
guns illustrating more clearly the visual and violent infliction
of control. All visible boundaries within the Nigerian Prison
'Service' grounds are accentuated by the binding green gates built
into the concrete walls, meant to function as points of transition
between the two worlds: the world inside Nigerian prisons and
the world outside them. The walls I see before me every time I
enter a prison, anywhere in the world, are not just walls. They
are symbols of degradation and violence; they are statements of
disregard and dehumanization; they are perpetrators of myth
and fear; and above all they are clear, concrete representations of
the inhumanity capable of emerging in the name of euphemized
humanities.
As I step beyond the gates and enter the world of prisons in
Nigeria, I am faced with prison officials in green uniforms trying
to maintain order among and control over convicted prisoners in
blue uniforms. This is simply a world of green uniforms trying to
keep blue uniforms behind the walls. Not as concrete but just as
visible is the struggle to control all physical, mental, and spiritual
undertakings. Colours mark power, not people: green uniforms
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taking shifts to monitor, control, and punish blue uniforms; blue
uniforms fighting to exist as human beings inside a beast-like
institution.
While I was in Nigeria, from October 2000 to November
2002, there were 142 prisons holding approximately 55,000
prisoners, sixty-two percent of whom were awaiting trial. While
20,000 prisoners (thirty-eight percent) had been convicted inside
a courtroom, approximately 35,000 prisoners were imprisoned
without legal representation or the chance to appear in court.1
Those 35,000 people did not always have prison uniforms;2 they
wore the clothes they had been arrested in and, as the years went
by, whatever clothes they had been able to get from those around
them. I met prisoners who had served up to ten years awaiting
trial and, if convicted, were not given "time served" recognition.
An ex-prisoner I worked with at the PRAWA3 office, a man
I knew as Papa, often spoke about the ten years he had spent
awaiting trial for a drug offence and the eight years he had been
sentenced to serve. He had spent eighteen years in prison.
It is important to note the differences in conditions between
awaiting-trial and convicted prisoners. It was clear that awaiting-
trial prisoners are the most undernourished and maltreated
people in most Nigerian prisons; in addition, the amount of
time spent in lockdown is much higher compared with that
for convicted prisoners. In the Kirikiri medium security prison
in 2002, about 2,000 prisoners (seventy-four percent) were
awaiting trial, while approximately 700 (twenty-six percent)
were convicted. Warehousing approximately 2,700 prisoners, the
Kirikiri medium security prison was originally built to imprison
about 700 people. Many awaiting-trial prisoners in this prison
told me they were given the chance to leave their overcrowded
cell blocks (holding up to seventy-seven people in one room built
to hold approximately twenty people) once a week for one hour.
The amount of food awaiting-trial prisoners receive is much
smaller compared with that for convicted prisoners, who already
do not get sufficient servings. These conditions were confirmed
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by prison guards, who added that the lack of resources and staff to
handle the thousands of prisoners necessitated such treatment.
In addition to the obvious injustice of loss of liberty suffered by
all prisoners, awaiting-trial prisoners are imprisoned without the
due process necessitated in a vengeful and violent criminal justice
system. Representing one of the most vulnerable populations
inside Nigerian prisons, awaiting-trial prisoners are subject to
extremely harsh living conditions for many reasons. Primarily,
and on the most concrete and logistical level, their maltreatment
is often assumed to stem from their lack of representation in
the Nigerian Prison Service budget: since they have not been
convicted in court, they do not hold official prisoner status and
are not represented in the budget.
Nigerian prison guards often claimed there was no option
other than to warehouse awaiting-trial prisoners in inhumane
conditions. Although this explanation (the lack of funds) may
appear logical at first, it is not. The penal system is a violent
system. How does putting more money into violence solve the
problems that stem from the inhumane confinement of people
inside cages? The United States has been throwing money at its
penal system, but it has not humanized its prisons, it has only
increased the number of people exposed to the inhumanity of the
system. In 2006 the US Department of Justice had a monstrous
budget of $20.3 billion.4 More than a third of this money,
approximately $7 billion, is spent on imprisoning people. In
addition,
the 2006 Budget includes $85 million to open three new prisons
(one high-security, one medium-security, and one secure
women's prison) and to expand two other facilities. When
fully activated, these prisons will add a total of 3,164 beds....
$37 million is provided to pay for the added costs for food,
security, medical care, and clothing of almost 4,300 inmates
in existing BOP [Bureau of Prisons] facilities, and $20 million
in initial funding is included for 1,600 new private contract
beds. While additional prison space is being added, the Budget
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continues a moratorium on additional new prison construction
until the bureau completes an evaluation of its existing low- and
minimum-security prison facilities for potential modification
to house higher-security inmates.5
An increased budget for prisons in the United States has naturally
and predictably resulted in the expansion of the prison system and
imprisonment rates. The current result is a system that oppresses
more people than any other penal system in contemporary and
historical societies.
As of 2006 the worlds population had reached 6.6 billion,6
meaning that the United States, with a population of almost 298
million,7 has 4.5 percent of the world's population. Also in 2006
the world prison population reached 9.3 million, with the United
States imprisoning 2,193,798 of those people. This means that the
United States houses 4.5 percent of the world's population and 23.9
percent of the world's prison population. Nigeria had a reported
population in 2006 of 131,859,7318 and a prison population of
approximately 55,000 people, meaning that Nigeria is home to
two percent of the world's population and under one percent of the
world's prison population. On comparing these statistics with the
rest of the industrialized world, imprisonment rates continue
to be disproportionately higher in the First World as compared
with Nigeria. While Nigerians were imprisoned at a rate of 51
per 100,000 in 2002, that year the "incarceration rate in Canada
was 116 per 100,000.... Canada's incarceration rate is higher than
the rates in many Western European countries such as Germany
(95), France (85), Finland (70), Switzerland (68), and Denmark
(64) but lower than those in England/Wales (139) and the United
States (702)."9 Agozino's (2003) suggestion that the West has much
to learn from the so-called Third World when it comes to justice is well
translated in these statistics. For these reasons, this book presents
the struggles and barriers of imprisonment in Nigeria while also
presenting African justice models and alternatives that are not
rooted in colonial responses to conflict.
Ironically, human rights violations that take place in Nigerian
prisons are often presented as related to budgetary constraints.
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Yet the increased funding for prisons in the United States has
done little to humanize a fundamentally inhumane penal
system. Evans (2005,218) explains that money put into the prison
system in the United States does not find its way into services
for prisoners; rather, it is channelled into "guards7 salaries and
allocations for increased security measures/7 These conditions
in the United States illustrate that putting more money into the
penal system is not a solution. Nigeria does not need to "cage
more people77 as the United States does. The issues defined from
within the confines of European penal rhetoric become questions
of funding the efficient brutalization of people either through
increased funding for imprisonment or through demonization
of Nigeria's inefficient use of cruelty in Nigerian prisons. This
line of questioning fails to address the fundamental brutality
of penal justice. The answer to these ill-defined problems lies in
fundamentally and collectively rejecting the notion that caging
and dehumanizing people through penal, colonial institutions of
control creates safer or more civilized societies.
From a perspective that questions these foundational issues
of violence as intrinsic to the functions of the penal system, the
struggles of Nigerian prisoners can be understood more accurately.
In almost all Nigerian prisons death in custody is common.
While there are no official statistics available, I witnessed many
convicted prisoners assigned the harrowing task of carrying out
for burial awaiting-trial prisoners7 corpses (sometimes decayed)
on rusted stretchers, wrapped in grey blankets. Many of these
casualties were young men. All the casualties I witnessed had
never been convicted. The issue again becomes a necessary and
serious look into abolishing violent institutions that claim to
provide justice as opposed to recoiling with shock and horror
when the penal system's brutality is brought to the surface.
Fundamentally, death in custody, although counterintuitive
to our humanity, is not counterintuitive to the penal system's
dehumanizing functions and foundational assumptions. Putting
a person to death through formal due process in the United States
or having a person die due to informal brutalities manifested
through Nigerian prison conditions produces the same result:
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the end of life as a result of state action. Whether this murder is
sanctioned by a court or meted out in a prison yard is not focal;
what is focal is the violent taking of life. The legal sanctioning
of violence does not negate the seriousness of violence. And it
certainly does not justify it. The legal sanctioning of violence
through the penal system works only to subdue people into
accepting that the state can and will use violence to implement
power over those who are disempowered in society.
In European, North American, and South Pacific societies
poverty determines imprisonment, but intersecting with
classism are racism and sexism that embody criminal justice
in industrialized nations. Penal systems are built on sexist,
racist, classist, ageist, and heterosexist foundations: the
institutionalization of these isms through penal justice results
in the unequal distribution of violent penal justice. The United
States represents the clearest case of institutionalized racisms
and sexisms as integral to penal system functions: "If current
trends continue, about one in three black males and one in six
Hispanic [more respectfully known as Latino] males born today
in the United States are expected to serve some time behind
bars" (Gottschalk 2006, 19). This extremely high incarceration
rate for men of colour in the United States exists in stark contrast
to the imprisonment rates experienced by white men: "African
Americans are imprisoned at more than ten times the rate of
their compatriots of European origin" (Wacquant 2001, 83).10 In
addition, "nationally women are the fastest growing sector of the
incarcerated population. The number of women in U.S. prisons
has risen more than eight-fold since 1980.... The total number of
women locked away in U.S. prisons and jails is now more than
double the entire prison populations of France and Germany"
(Gottschalk 2006,19). The repercussions of mass incarceration in
the United States have resulted in the daunting fact that "more
than 1.5 million children in the United States have a parent in state
or federal prison" (Gottschalk 2006,19-20). These high levels of
penal injustice have not been duplicated in Nigeria. Yet, despite
mass inhumanity in the United States, Africans continue to be
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expected to turn to the United States and Europe for advice and
guidance in the implementation of justice (Agozino 2003). This is
a white supremacist expectation, implying that Europeans and
their descendants in the United States, Canada, and Australia
hold information and skills that are superior to those of people
of colour when it comes to models of justice. In true white
supremacist approaches, evidence of superiority is not proven
but simply and unquestioningly assumed.
Intrinsic to white supremacist notions that criminal justice is
a superior form of control is the assumption that, without reliance
on European, centralized, and violent institutions of control,
society would inevitably erupt into chaos and self-combustive
violence. The same logic is present in the slave owner's psyche
through the belief that enslaving African peoples helped to save
their souls, and European war makers who colonized Africa
assumed that their exploitation and military occupation of African
lands could help to 'civilize' their peoples. Similarly, it is assumed
today that the lack of European models of justice and control in
Africa (or anywhere else in the world) would signify incivility
and violence. Setting aside the faulty yet assumed superiority of
white institutions, evidence has shown that European slavery,
colonialism, and now the penal system are violent, vengeful, and
exploitative institutions. Continuing to rely on the penal system
for control is a perpetuation of penal coloniality, a concept further
explored in Chapter 2. By implanting violence through criminal
justice, the penal system overwhelms society with intense amounts
of violence that obscure and bury actual violent issues between
people amid the rubble of institutionalized structural and penal
violence. The root of these issues is abstracted through faulty
assumptions that the law is objective, and that European forms
of violent penal justice are necessary and universal systems for
equitable social control. If so-called civilized societies are serious
about civilization, then white supremacy must be dismantled,
and this requires the abolition of penal coloniality. To dismantle
penal coloniality requires an analysis of who is most vulnerable
to penal oppression: populations that have historically been
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colonized and enslaved by Europeans are the most vulnerable to
penal colonialism.
While the average citizen is vulnerable to criminalization,
a powerful minority of the world's population benefit from
constructed immunities. In the same sense the majority of
the world's population residing on continents colonized by
Europe live in harsh conditions, while the minority in the
industrialized world live in comfort. 'The world's 500 richest
people have an income of more than $100 billion, not taking
into account asset wealth. That exceeds the combined incomes
of the poorest 416 million" people in the world (United Nations
Human Development 2006, 269; emphases added). In addition,
ninety percent of the people in the top twenty percent of global
income distribution live in OECD countries,11 while fifty percent
of the poorest twenty percent of the global income live in sub-
Saharan Africa (United Nations Human Development 2006,269).
The intersections of classism and racism that define power and
wealth globally underpin the penal system's role in maintaining
an enslaving and colonialist status quo.
To counter the constructed validity of this status quo, this book
presents the lived realities of people inside European, colonial
systems of control in Africa. In doing so this volume initiates a
process of humanization. The reader is given the opportunity
to open her or his eyes to the lived realities of the people in
Nigerian prisons. Their struggles and their stories emphasize the
contradictions of penal reform efforts in Nigeria. Central is the
understanding that efforts for reform reinforce colonialism and
need to be replaced with serious efforts to abolish penal forms of
justice. Human rights efforts funded through colonizing nations'
charitable funds will do little more than better equip the existing
Nigerian penal system to hide and justify penal brutalities. It is
the structure that is inhumane, and in Nigeria that inhumanity has
nowhere to hide.
This book highlights the penal system as manifested in
present-day Nigeria. In Chapter 3 Ume and I present a historical
account of when and how the penal system became implanted in
Nigerian societies. The roots of this system trace directly back to
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violent British invasions of West Africa. Chapter 4 by Agozino
documents the role that militarized control has played in creating
the current conditions suffered in Nigeria, importantly noting
that the first centralized military power in Nigeria was a British
one. Combined, the chapters in Section 1 provide an ideological,
historical, and sociopolitical understanding of Europe's abusive
and exploitative relationship with Nigeria. This backdrop is
necessary in the presentation of penal coloniality in West Africa.
Section 2 (Chapters 5 through 12) presents the voices of
Nigerian prisoners inside the Kirikiri maximum security prison
in Lagos State. This section is the heart of the book. From these
first published accounts of prisoners in West Africa we learn
about the brutalities inflicted through the European penal
system as it has come to function on West African soil. We are
able to access the complex and intertwining consequences of
racist colonial institutions and the corrupt African leaders who
maintain them. These leaders and administrators are carrying
on the legacies of colonialist exploitation through modernized,
more contemporary penal coloniality in the region. These
colonial oppressions can best be understood by those who are
forced to live them. Through the struggles of Eribo, Akporherhe,
Affor, Odibo, and Anagaba the reader can begin to conceptualize
the violence involved in the construction and implementation of
Europe's (and now North America's) primary model of criminal
justice.
Section 3 delves further into the complex oppressions of
penal coloniality, addressing the intersections of sexism, racism,
classism, and the overpowering conditions that are produced. In
Chapter 13 I provide details of the firsthand interactions I had
with different branches of the penal system in Nigeria during
the two years I spent there. Through these experiences I was
able to better comprehend the intersections between poverty,
youth, gender, and colonialism, and to expand my conceptions
of oppression to include both formal and informal methods of
unjust social control. In Chapter 14 Nagel provides a broader
context of gender in Africa as it intersects with penal coloniality.
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She provides examples of women in prison in Mali and Nigeria,
and ties their oppressions into the larger context of contemporary
globalization and human rights discourses. In this chapter, the
interrelationships between microlevel struggles resulting from
macrostructural oppressions are well illustrated. Agozino in
Chapter 15 provides empirical facts that aid in an expansion of
Nagel's analysis of multilevel struggles. He details the empirical
realities of women in prison in Nigeria, and emphasizes the need
to move toward a criminology that implicitly and consciously
functions to counter colonialism. Wrapping up Section 3, Agomoh
(Chapter 16) addresses the multiplicity of oppressions that are
exploited through penal coloniality by providing details of the
violence and inhumanity imposed on those who are mentally ill
in prison.
The first three sections of this book provide details and
contexts of the oppressions instituted through the power abuses
and hierarchies of penal coloniality. Yet the book would not
be complete without a section on how these brutalities and
oppressions are defied, for Foucault (1972) emphasized that
every site of power simultaneously produces sites of resistance.
Section 4 therefore addresses resistance to penal coloniality as
it has been implemented by women, musicians, students, and
disempowered members of diverse Nigerian societies. Chapter
17 presents forms of resistance used by women in northern
Nigeria who are oppressed through the Eurocentric and thus
implicitly misogynistic laws that regulate their access to wealth
and survival. Chapter 18 presents the life and struggles of
musician and activist Fela Anikulapo Kuti, and illustrates how
resistance through music can mobilize large masses against
military dictatorships and their violent repressions.
Section 5 represents an extension of this discourse on
resistance by providing more specific and concrete examples
of African transformative justice models that have been used to
compensate for the malfunctions and violence imposed through
European penal systems in Africa. In Chapter 19 Ume provides
examples of successfully implemented African justice models
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throughout Africa, and in Chapter 20 Elechi presents details of
the Igbo democratic systems of justice and community-centred
forms of social control. None of these models is presented
as flawless, but they are in essence and in implementation
community-centred and non-violent, and this is the starting point
in the conceptualization of a world that can function without
Europenal violence and coloniality.
The book concludes (Chapter 21) with a presentation
of European academic theories on penal abolitionism and
a summary of the tenth International Conference on Penal
Abolition held in Lagos in August 2002 (Chapter 22). These last
two chapters tie together the positive relationships that European
scholarship and people in the West can build with Africans
who continue to struggle with contemporary forms of colonial
control. The concluding section emphasizes that European and
Western industrialized societies have much to learn about the
implementation of penal abolitionism by looking to Africa for
practised and lived transformative justice.
In these concluding sections, we hope, the reader can
conceptualize not only a world without prisons but also a world
in which white and black nations (and the people within them)
can come together to implement solutions and reparations that
will initiate a healing process that effectively and necessarily
addresses historical colonialisms, contemporary exploitations,
and future potentials for humane and reciprocal coexistence.
These changes are necessary not only for those who suffer
within or live at risk of penal coloniality in Africa but also for
those who live in industrialized nations. The past few decades
have marked an increased punitive approach to social problems,
and this approach has resulted in a boom of prison construction
in the United States and quickly increasing imprisonment rates
throughout many industrialized Western nations. This trend has
a disproportionately high impact on young people of colour living
in societies structured on European and North American models
of democracy: "Canada... seems to have followed a pattern of
12 | Colonial Systems of Control
legislative change that appears similar to many other Western
countries, including Britain, Australia, and the United States.
In turn each of these jurisdictions have witnessed earlier child
welfare models of juvenile justice wither away under the weight
of punitive approaches to crime control that whet the public's
appetite for a crack-down.... 'Getting tough' now underpins the
administration of juvenile justice" (Hogeveen 2006, 51).
While in Nigeria, my understanding of the penal system as
one of the major oppressive structures in contemporary societies
was heavily reinforced. The stories and analyses presented in
this book are meant to expose the depths of the brutalities that
are the foundations of the penal system. The information shared in
this book is meant to serve not as a critique of Nigeria but more
broadly as a critique of the penal system. Nigeria happens to
be the setting in which I saw the extremes and was faced with
the violent capabilities of the penal system. Nigeria happened
to be the geographical and political context within which I
realized that any system capable of such brutality is in need
not of reform but of demolition. While most of the authors in
this book are African, they address European models of control.
Their analysis/it is hoped, will heighten readers' awareness of
the brutality encountered in Nigerian prisons, as a result of and
in direct correlation to European colonialism and the European
penal structures that have instituted criminal forms of justice all
over the globe. Those on the receiving end of oppression can best
explain the roots, experiences, and ramifications of oppression.
Those in prison can best explain imprisonment, and those who
have lived in colonized realities can best describe the connections
between history and the present.
NOTES
1 Statistics gathered through PRAWA. Aside from these figures, I
did not come across any official records on prison populations or
imprisonment rates.
2 In all-male prisons I did not see any awaiting-trial uniforms; in
the Kirikiri women's prison the awaiting-trial prisoners ironically
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wore green (the Nigerian Prison Service uniform colour), while the
convicted prisoners wore blue.
3 Prisoners Rehabilitation and Welfare Action is a Nigerian non-
governmental organization dedicated to the struggle for human
rights inside prisons throughout West Africa (including Nigeria,
Ghana, and The Gambia).




7 See https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/ print/ us.html.
8 See https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/ni.html.
9 See http://www.csc-scc.gc.ca/text/pblct/basicfacts/BasicFacts_e.
shtml#Context2. Figures for the United States are for incarcerated
adults only.
10 White men, though, are imprisoned at higher rates in the United
States than in any other democratic or industrialized nation.
11 The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development,
predominantly controlled by Europeans and their descendants,
is a governing body with thirty member countries. The OECD
functions to produce "internationally agreed instruments, decisions
and recommendations to promote the rules of the game in areas
where multilateral agreement is necessary for individual countries
to make progress in a globalized economy/' See http://www.oecd.
org/home/0,2605,en_2649_201185_l_l_l_l_l,00.html.
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To discuss penal coloniality in Nigeria, it is first necessary to
present the context in which Nigeria exists today. Colonialism
and the slave trade are major tenants in the recent history of the
country. The past is not the past as privileged people choose to
believe. The past is the foundation upon which contemporary
conditions of privilege or underprivilege are built. A complex
past has left Nigeria with complex contemporary demographics.
Structural oppression and economic exploitation functioned
officially in colonialism and slave trading through European
laws, but they also functioned unofficially through racial
demonizations and abstract academic cultural degradations. As a
result the official facts about Nigeria do not represent a complete
picture of the Nigeria I came to know and experience.
This Nigeria was both complex and honest. That honesty
resounded in the openness through which society functioned:
problems are not obscure, corruption is not shielded, struggles are
not hidden, and above all criminal justice is exactly that: a criminal
way to conduct justice. The criminal justice system addressed in
this book is a system of injustice, and it is wholeheartedly an
invention of European and North American governments and
their agents. Western institutions in Nigeria are naked. They
are unable to hide behind Western propaganda and illusions of
justice. I travelled across the Atlantic Ocean, and I lived in Africa,
and there I found the truth that is criminal justice.




Because colonialism is such a highly complex and intrusive
process, defining it and articulating the depths of its brutality
have been a struggle as difficult as the sociopolitical fight for
liberation from it. The definitions of colonialism presented in the
1950s continue to be highly relevant and accurate in capturing
what Africans experience today. Furnivall stated in 1956 that
"colonization originally implied settlement, but the tropics have
been colonized with capital rather than men, and most tropical
countries under foreign rule are dependencies rather than
colonies, though in practice both terms are used indifferently'7
(1). This understanding that imposed dependencies are forms
of colonialism seems to have disappeared in a world that
continually mistakes charity (by formerly colonizing entities)
for justice (for formerly colonized people). Also lacking is the
general understanding that physical withdrawal of Europeans
from African governance did not minimize but instead expanded
European and North American control over Africa.
In contemporary Africa and the diaspora there is
an understanding that colonialism has transformed into
neocolonialism. Nkrumah (1975, 199) explained that neocolo-
nialism is " imperialism in its final and perhaps its most dangerous
form." He added that the fundamental nature of neocolonialism
is "that the State which is subject to it is, in theory, independent
and has all the outward trappings of international sovereignty.
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In reality its economic system and thus its political policy [are]
directed from outside" (199). This definition of neocolonialism
has much in common with the dependencies described in 1956
by Furnivall. In that sense I question how the prefix neo can be
added to the word colonialism. Neo is a Greek word meaning
"new," and in defining neocolonialism Nkrumah defined new
transitions that further implanted European economies and laws
in the domination of West Africa. Inaccurate in this analysis
is not the definition he provided but the prefix he used —neo
assumes "newness." Conversely, colonialist strategies have
illustrated many policies and experiments in exploitation since
inception. What Nkrumah calls "neocolonialism" is in fact the
European decision to transition traditionally recognized forms of
colonialism into more sustainable, abstracted colonialisms based
on already practiced models that exhibited successes and profits
in non-settler colonies historically referred to as dependencies.
This expansion into more sustainable European colonialism
is evident in contemporary Africa. All over the continent
European colonial uniforms remain, once worn by white bodies
from Europe but now worn by black bodies in Africa. White
people still live in plush condos in Ikoye and Victoria Island in
Lagos, and their high socioeconomic status continues to be reliant
on the oppression of Africans and the exploitation of African
resources. Colonial institutions and white supremacist attitudes
remain. They are engrained in the functions of everyday life and
are legitimate in the eyes of the Nigerian government. Colonial
institutions continue to colonize and oppress Nigerian people.
Only within the realm of white supremacy can such exploitation
and abuse continue for 500 years. And only within the context
of white privilege can these exploitations change immensely in
language and so little in structure.
In Ngugi's (1982, 13-14) acclaimed novel Devil on the Cross,
European colonialism in contemporary Africa is accurately
presented through a recurring nightmare suffered by a central
character:
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And now Warnnga was revisited by a nightmare that she used
to have.... She saw first the darkness, carved open at one side
to reveal a Cross, which hung in the air. Then she saw a crowd
of people dressed in rags walking in the light, propelling the
Devil towards the Cross. The Devil was clad in a silk suit, and
he carried a walking stick shaped like a folded umbrella. On
his head there were seven horns, seven trumpets for sounding
infernal hymns of praise and glory. The Devil had two mouths,
one on his forehead and the other on the back of his head. His
belly sagged, as if it were about to give birth to all the evils of
the world. His skin was red, like that of a pig. Near the Cross
he began to tremble and turned his eyes towards the darkness,
as if his eyes were being seared by the light. He moaned,
beseeching the people not to crucify him, swearing that he and
all his followers would never again build Hell for the people
on Earth.
But the people cried in unison: "Now we know the secrets of
all the robes that disguise your cunning. You commit murder,
then you don your robes of pity and you go to wipe the tears
from the faces of orphans and widows. You steal food from the
people's stores at midnight, then at dawn you visit the victims
wearing your robes of charity and you offer them a calabash
filled with the grain that you have stolen. You encourage
lavishness solely to gratify your own appetites, then you put on
robes of righteousness and urge men to repent, to follow you
so that you may show them paths of purity. You seize men's
wealth, then you dress in robes of friendship and instruct them
to join in the pursuit of the villain who has robbed them/7
And there and then the people crucified the Devil on the
Cross, and they went away singing songs of victory. After
three days, there came others dressed in suits and ties, who,
keeping close to the wall of darkness, lifted the Devil down
from the Cross. And they knelt before him, and they prayed
to him in loud voices, beseeching him to give them a portion
of his robes of cunning. And their bellies began to swell, and
they stood up, and they walked towards Warnnga, laughing
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at her, stroking their large bellies, which had now inherited all
the evils of the world.
Ngugi wrote this book while imprisoned in Kenya. He was in
prison for using his literary genius to critique African governance
and the continuity of European corporate control of African
resources. While reflecting on colonialist control, Ngugi lays
out a nightmare describing the superficial transitions that have
taken place in Africa. He is defining not a neocolonialism but a
euphemized colonialism that is abstracted on superficial levels
and thus further engrained on more concrete levels. At the root
of this nightmare is the fact that African independence from
European colonialism has never been achieved. While societies
have changed due to European and Euro-American globalization,
these changes have not been, t according to the Eurocentric
evolutionary framework, for the better. Since so many of these
changes have not been tied to black liberation, the transition from
colonialism into neocolonialism signifies European transitions,
not African ones. In addition, the implication of newness may
apply to details of life (e.g., communication technology, the
growth of Eurocapitalism through globalization, etc.), but it
should never be mistaken for newness in structure. The 500-year-
old nightmare continues in Africa. Due to the euphemized nature
of contemporary colonialism, the struggle includes bringing this
nightmare into waking consciousness.
Articulating limitations imposed through neocolonialist
and post colonialist discourse, Farred (2001) presents an anti-
postcolonialist discourse with a " primary ideological loyalty"
that incorporates and renovates "the program of genuine social
transformation that undergirded the anticolonial struggle, even
as it attempts to make history under very different conditions"
(245). In anti-postcolonialist discourse, Farred critiques the
pitfalls of neo- and postcolonialist discourse while emphasizing
the need to identify the "new class of 'enemies'" (245). What
has changed, according to this discourse are "the terms of the
struggle"; as a result "anti-/postcolonialism has to address itself
to that. It is a mode of struggle that has to explain its genesis,
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be self-reflexive, 'permanently' vigilant about the project it is
(de/Constructing, and explicate how it came to constitute itself as
not only an oppositional mode of politics but a different political
formation. Most important, anti-/postcolonialism—as a history,
a series of practices, and a theory of resistance — has to become its
own political modality and discourse. It has to produce itself... as
a new form of politicized knowledge" (245).
In contributing to the anticolonialist struggle, I suggest that
a starting point be a more concise multidimensional articulation
of struggles against contemporary colonialisms. Post colonialism
implies that colonialism existed in the past. Neocolonialism is
broad, it is abstract, and it implies newness. I did not witness
historical colonialism or new colonialism in Nigeria. I witnessed
expansion and abstraction in who maintains the colonial status
quo. I saw the black businessmen in Ngugi's novel. They came
dressed in human rights caps looking to reform and strengthen
European criminal justice in Africa through foreign aid. They came
dressed in police uniforms reinforcing a status quo that keeps
poor people in prison. They came dressed in expensive Nigerian
clothes speaking of big changes but only exploiting those who do
not have power to self-determination. I came across these forms
of colonialism because I worked predominantly in the area of
criminal justice. Had I worked in a bank, or a corporate setting,
I am sure they would have come dressed in business suits, as
described by Ngugi.
For these reasons I use the term " penal colonialism" in
reference to contemporary conditions when discussing criminal
justice in Nigeria. In addition, I prefer to rely on terms such as
"economic colonialism," "political colonialism," "educational
colonialism," "cultural colonialism," "geographical colonialism,"
"spiritual colonialism," and "psychological colonialism" when
discussing other areas of colonial oppression. The violent reality
is that colonialism has infiltrated and dominated entire social
structures in Africa. In dealing with this violence we must first
articulate it in its entirety. To do so we must stop relying on
unidimensional languages.
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In the realm of penal coloniality, I start by stating the
obvious: colonialism was legalized by the same criminal system
that legalized slavery. So-called neocolonialism was legislated
through the same laws that legalized economic exploitation
of Africa. Contemporary criminal justice systems (in Nigeria
and the world over) were born out of a system that legalized
slavery and colonialism. Not being conscious of the racist and
violent foundations of the penal system restricts comprehension
of violence in Nigerian prisons and prisons everywhere else.
This lack of consciousness allows many to demonize Nigeria
(representing blackness) for its struggles, while ignoring Europe's
(representing whiteness) implicit role in this violence.
GEOGRAPHICAL COLONIALISM: CARVING UP
AFRICA FOR A EUROPEAN THANKSGIVING
Nigeria as a nation-state exists only because Europeans held a
conference in 1884-1885. The Berlin conference to divide Africa
was meant to minimize European bloodshed in competition over
African resources — it was a preventative strategy meant to avoid
World War I as the British Empire and the Prussian (German)
Empire (attempting to consolidate) competed for world
domination. In attempting to minimize European bloodshed
in this violent competition, Europeans sat down in Berlin and
savagely carved up Africa, allocating to each other different
pieces. This was done regardless of already existing social
structures, political economies, and ethnic societies.
As I travelled throughout West Africa, it became apparent
that current national boundaries were designed, not according
to ethnicity or already existing African nations (or empires, as
oral tradition records), but according to colonial interests and
access to shores for trading and commerce purposes. Starting in
Nigeria and moving west into the former French colony of Benin,
I found that the Yoruba nation extended beyond the boundaries
of Nigeria, along the southern coast, and that the Hausa nation
extended beyond Nigerian national boundaries and spanned the
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northern regions of neighbouring countries. The official lines had
been drawn vertically by colonialists, allowing access to the coast
for trading purposes, but the unofficial nations still exist through
language and practised traditions of people who live horizontally
across several colonially defined nation-state boundaries.
In 1572 Abraham Ortelius, one of the most famous European
cartographers and the producer of the first modern European
atlas, printed a map of Africa1 (outlined on the left below). A
similar map was published in 1707,2 illustrating that ethnic and
sociopolitical organization in Africa relied on horizontal designs
primarily defined by environmental conditions (coastal, Saharan,
tropical, and so on). While each major section had a multitude
of ethnicities within it, they were tied together in lifestyles and
social organizations that relied on environmental necessities.
After the imperialist Berlin conference in 1884-1885, Africa was
carved up vertically and excessively to allow Europeans access
to costal regions (outlined on the right below).
Each section of the map on the right was taken by a European
nation. As a result, already existing social structures and econo-
mies were destroyed. Intense military and imperialist domination
Map 2.1
Africa in the Sixteenth Century
Map 2.2
Africa in the Nineteenth Century
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ensued through a colonialism reliant on the fragmentation of
Africa. The racist and capitalist actions of Europeans over 100
years ago continue to define and impact Africa today. The map
on the right continues to be the posfcolonial or the neocolonial
continent. For this reason Nigeria (marked on the map on the
right with •) literally exists within European boundaries and
colonialist strategies. Living through those definitions for two
years reinforced to me that the past is never just the past.
NIGERIAN DEMOGRAPHICS: OFFICIAL AND
UNOFFICIAL FACTS
Here I present the resulting demographic composition of Nigeria.
The country was taken over by the British. It is important to note
first that Nigeria lies on a land mass of 924,000 square kilometres,3
making it more than three times the size of the United Kingdom,
with its land mass of 241,590 square kilometres.4 The countries
neighbouring Nigeria to the east (Cameroon) and the west (Benin)
were "taken" by the French, resulting in the division of ethnic
groups otherwise connected by language, tradition, history,
culture, and social organization. Replacing these similarities
and historically aligned societies, Nigeria now exists in a state
of disparity, working to represent and unify hundreds of ethnic
groups, all of which continue to be forced to surrender economic
and sociopolitical control to European and North American
banks, corporations, and foreign policies.
For these historical, geographical, and economic reasons,
Nigerian demographics are highly political and complex. The
numbers of people and the percentages of people that populate
the ethnic groups comprise a political hotspot since power (in an
assumed democracy) should be distributed according to majority
representation. As a result, depending on the source, numbers
change. The nation's population in western documents is
officially (and by "officially" I am referring to the CIA World Fact
Book but not deferring to its accuracy) reported at 133,881,703.5
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While living in Nigeria, I heard unanimous reports estimating
the population to be closer to and most likely exceeding 200
million. The Federal Republic of Nigeria reports a population
approaching 140 million.6 Western reports do state accurately
that Nigeria is "Africa's most populous country" but inaccurately
that it is composed of approximately "250 ethnic groups."7 Oral
history and information passed on to me while I was living in
Nigeria documented that more than 515 ethnic groups live in
Nigeria. The Nigerian Embassy reports at least 374 ethnic groups
living in the country.8
According to Western records and international politics,
"the following are the most populous and politically influential
[ethnic groups]: Hausa and Fulani (29%), Yoruba (21%), Igbo
(18%), Ijaw (10%), Kanuri (4%), Ibibio (3.5%), Tiv (2.5%)."91 do
not take these numbers too seriously since I am fully aware of
the political implications of these distributions. The fact is that
the number of people belonging to each ethnic group is not well
recorded. It is a highly controversial issue —so controversial that
in 2006, when the Nigerian government tried to conduct a census,
violence broke out, and many people refused to participate in
it.10 On one level, people do not trust governments, and thus
refused to submit information on ethnic affiliation and location.
This reluctance may be because the first so-called democratically
elected president of Nigeria to take office, Olusegun Obasanjo,
was a former military dictator (February 14, 1976, to October 1,
1979). He very reluctantly stepped down in the summer of 2007
after eight years in office. He was replaced by Umaru Yar'Adua,
General Shehu Musa Yar'Adua's younger brother. General
Shehu Yar'Adua was Obasanjo's deputy during his military
regime in the 1970s. On another level, the political ramifications
(especially in relation to the oil regions) would be massive if
documented ethnic groups (largely underrepresented in the
revenues gained from oil exports) in that region tried to claim
their share of profits. The only unanimously agreed-on statistic
in both Western and Nigerian records is that one out of every
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five Africans is Nigerian,11 making Nigeria the most populated
country in Africa.
According to mainstream politics in Nigeria, and according
to numerous discussions I had with Nigerians (from various
segments of governmental and non-governmental communities),
the three most influential and recognized ethnic groups are the
Yoruba, the Igbo, and the Hausa. This information is accurately
reflected in official Nigerian statistics as presented by the
Nigerian Embassy.12 This demographic is best understood
within the geographical divisions in the country relying
implicitly on the original organization of Africa, pre-carving by
Europeans. The vast majority of Nigerians (all whom I came in
contact with during my two years in the country) recognize that
the north is Hausaland, that the west is Yorubaland, and that
the east is Igboland. The oil region is referred to unofficially as
"south-south" and officially as the Niger delta. It is known to
belong to several influential ethnic groups, the most influential,
according to the people I spoke to, being the Ogoni and Ijaw
peoples, although these reports of majority population came to
me from members of those groups. Also worth noting is what
was unofficially referred to as the "middle belt," an area between
Igboland and Hausaland that was recognized as home to many
minority ethnic groups, the Tiv and the Fulani claiming the
majority of that minority. It becomes clear, as I attempt to present
the basic demographics of Nigeria, that it is a complex region
with many official uncertainties, and unofficial and very rich
traditions. There is unanimous recognition of the fact that Nigeria
is one of Africa's richest nations due mainly to high-quality
oil in the Niger delta, and to its size and population, dwarfing
surrounding West African nations. In stating that Nigeria is a
rich nation, I am not stating that these riches are reflected in the
lives of Nigerians. A monopoly of wealth, enforced through
economic colonialism, continues to exist, with the majority of
Nigerian wealth sustaining economies abroad.
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SPIRITUAL COLONIALISM
When presenting the religious demographics of the Nigerian
population, Western records state that Muslims make up
fifty percent of the population, that Christians make up forty
percent, and that ten percent of the population officially practise
indigenous beliefs.13 Many Christians in the country would
dispute these numbers, claiming that it is a fifty-fifty split. Many
Muslims have told me they comprise more than fifty percent of
the population, and, in reference to the ten percent who practise
traditional African religions, it became clear to me that the taboo
attached to African spirituality has forced many into secrecy.
Such taboos are direct remnants of colonialism and missionary
impositions on the region, and represent one of the many
dimensions of spiritual colonialism. In trying to understand the
religious dynamics in Nigeria, I found myself researching the
official statistics but listening closely to the records passed on
orally. Politically and socially, I found that ethnic affiliations and
loyalties transcended religious ones, especially within the context
of violent confrontations. These political and ethnic conflicts
were often referred to in Western mainstream media as religious
clashes. The ethnic and political contexts that overshadowed
almost all clashes, and transcended religious divisions, felt like a
nationally understood phenomenon but an internationally kept
secret.
LEGAL, POLITICAL, AND ECONOMIC
COLONIALISM
Historically, the Portuguese were the first to arrive in Nigeria.
By 1486 they had established major trading in ivory, gold, and
enslaved people. " After 1650, the Dutch, French and British trade
competition undermined the Portuguese" (Loew 1996,812). This
competition intensified as Europeans travelled farther inland.
In 1830, as Loew notes, the British Lander brothers "reached the
Niger River delta from the interior. By the mid-1800s [the Berlin
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conference came later], this penetration had led to major trade
links between north and south along the Niger and Benue rivers"
(812). After the conference in Berlin the British established a
monopoly in Nigeria. By 1879, Sir George Goldie had established
the National African Company, and in 1886
Goldie7 s group established a wide governmental and com-
mercial authority along the coast. Great Britain also established
the Oil Rivers Protectorate in 1885.... It was renamed the Niger
Coast Protectorate in 1893. At the same time, the threat of German
and French expansion from the north forced the consolidation of British
inland territories. In 1900 the British government withdrew the
Royal Niger Company's charter of 1886 and established the
Protectorate of Northern Nigeria. Frederick D. Lugard was
appointed high commissioner and assumed full responsibility
for Northern Nigeria. At the time, Northern Nigeria was a vast
territory with limited resources. Forced to rule the country
through the agency of its African leaders, Lugard's policies
gave rise to the method of "indirect rule" which became the
model for British colonial administration elsewhere in Africa....
In 1906, the British government established the Colony and
Protectorate of Southern Nigeria, including Lagos Colony,
and [the] Protectorate of Southern Nigeria existed separately
from 1906 to 1914, though both were administered as a single
unit. In 1914, the two regions were unified into the Colony and
Protectorate of Nigeria with Lugard as governor general.
Between World War I and World War II, regional animosities
emerged between the north and the south and between the
southwest and [the] southeast. Conflicting economic interests and
religious differences contributed to these animosities, though most
of the hostilities between the Yoruba, Ibo and Hausa were based on
ethnicity. Increasing pressures for self-government resulted in
a series of constitutions between 1946 and October 1960. The
constitution of 1954 firmly established the federal principle
and substantially reduced the powers of the governor....
Constitutional conferences in London in 1957 and 1958
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prepared the final steps and set the final dates for the change
from colonial self-governance to independence.... On October
1, 1960 Nigeria became the sixteenth African state to achieve
independence. (812-813; emphasis added)
As shown in the emphasized text of this Western version of
history in Nigeria, "the threat of German and French expansion
from the north forced the consolidation of British inland terri-
tories" and drove many of the policies associated with the
extraction of African resources for European gain. Lacking in
this version of history (and in many Western accounts of African
history) is the Berlin conference of 1885-1886. Also lacking is a
connection between European invasion and the redrawing of
boundaries in the conflicts that emerged between World War
I and World War II. Instead, Western history attributes these
conflicts to "religious and ethnic conflicts," void of European
interventions and economic monopolies. These attributions
continue to dominate conversations about conflicts in Nigeria.
This is one example of the continuity of colonial logic in the
construction of Nigeria through a Western lens. Since Euro-
defined independence of Nigeria in 1960, the country has had
twelve military and a few civilian) dicta tors. Olusegun Obasanjo
is the current (and officially first but unofficially second)
democratically elected president, as of May 29, 1999. He is
Yoruba, and his vice president, Atiku Abubakar, is Hausa. Over
the years, much like politics in the United States, Canada, and
Europe, ethnic representation in governance has not included
oppressed populations. In this sense, European colonialism has
succeeded in reproducing Westernized democracy in Nigeria.
Since each ethnic group in Nigeria has its own language,
culture, and traditions, the people of this former British colony
communicate with each other in English, emerging in various
forms throughout the country. Nigerian forms of English are
known as pidgin or broken English. The officially recognized
languages in Nigeria are English, Hausa, Yoruba, Igbo, and Fulani.
The unofficially recognized languages are British English for the
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privileged and broken or pidgin English for the masses, with
Lagos having a specific dialect of pidgin English encompassing
many Yoruba words and expressions. Hausa is predominant in
the north, Yoruba in the west (mainly southwest), and Igbo in the
east (mainly mideast). The number of languages aside from these
recognized languages is massive, with estimates ranging from
200 to more than 500.
PENAL COLONIALITY IN NIGERIA: OPPRESSING
THE POOR AND MAINTAINING THE COLONIAL
STATUS QUO
As illustrated above, the social structures of Nigeria were defined
by European laws meant to exploit Africans. As a result the
official legal system in Nigeria is based on "English common law,
Islamic Shariah law (only in some northern states), and traditional
law/'14 My work and experiences in West Africa brought me into
contact with all three segments of the legal system, and gave me
the opportunity to witness the mobilization of many community
forms of justice (some violent, most reconciliatory) to address
conflicts in ways that superseded the criminal justice system. For
good reason, the criminal justice system, with its roots heavily
embedded in European exploitation, is ideologically mistrusted.
Administratively, the criminal justice situation in Nigeria is best
described as inhumane, highlighted by the visible injustices
occurring through official and unofficial (yet highly visible)
criminal justice procedures.
Chomsky (1995) provides a Third World model through
which non-Western nations become structured after historical
colonialism has been implanted. He explains that this model
incorporates contemporary "sectors of great privilege [with]
growing numbers of people sinking into poverty or real misery,
and a superfluous population confined in slums or expelled to the
rapidly expanding prison system/' In Nigeria the penal system's
prison and police branches enforce a rapid criminalization
of poverty, while social conditions, historical contexts, and
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contemporary politics promote violence among ethnic groups: if
the people are fighting each other on a continuous basis, then the
government and the small wealthy class can continue to exploit
the country's massive resources with little opposition.
This is the role of penal justice in Nigeria: penal coloniality
promotes divisions and stigmas that keep poor populations in fear
of each other, thus unable to form a solidarity that can effectively
challenge oppressive conditions. These functions of the Nigerian
penal system15 are similar to the functions and roles of the
criminal justice system in the West; in Nigeria, these functions
felt and appeared more obvious. It seems like a straightforward
correlation found in a universal status quo: "the rich get richer and
the poor get prison" (Reiman 1990). In Nigeria this status quo has
foundations in generations of oppression and millions of dollars
spent on illegal land occupation, degradation, and control. What
appears to be a simple relationship is a complicated and highly
politicized structure that is not ambiguous in mission.
The reasons for brutalities and human rights violations were
clear to me in Nigeria's society of visible extremes. Nigeria was
transparent—the direct benefits of corruption and oppressions
were obvious, openly discussed, and understood by the average
person. While I was there, Nigeria was not a place of comfort
and superficial senses of security. It was a place where the rich,
the poor, those in prison, those not in prison, the employed,
the unemployed, the homeless, the landlords, the students, the
teachers, the cab drivers, the bank tellers, the market women, the
lawyers, the prison guards, the police officers, area boys (homeless
youths living near bus stops in each neighborhood), the human
rights activists, the government officials, and the journalists
all seemed to understand that government does not represent the
people, that the penal system does not exist to serve and protect the
people, and that the criminalization of the poor is a reality that is not
debatable. Yet, in facing all these indisputable realities, the people
continue to fight each other through ethnic conflicts and continue
to scapegoat street crime as the largest threat they face. Although
most of the people seemed to be aware of the corruption and
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oppression inflicted on them as a direct result of the Nigerian
government and the international corporations and nation states
it works with to exploit Nigeria's resources, it seemed that few
had the resources to fight back. I found myself coming face to
face with oppression, witnessing its intricate functions and its
truly disempowering demeanours. When day-to-day survival is
a struggle, and when history is so merciless, organized efforts of
resistance, although more vital than ever, become more difficult
and for many seemed to border on the impossible. These feelings
of hopelessness were often combatted in the lived resistance I saw
on a microlevel by prisoners who formed communities to help
each other in prison. Market women organized to resist police
brutality in the workplace. Bus drivers went on strike to protest
police extortion of bribes at each bus stop. On an individual and
at times communal level, I found hope. On a macrostructural
level, and on an international level, I am overwhelmed with the
immensity of exploitation. To deal with this I work diligently to
understand colonial domination.
WHAT IS COLONIALISM?
In attempting to study, or formulate an understanding of,
colonialism, I find myself asking questions and facing conceptual
barriers that are vague, difficult, and invisible, yet strong and
real. In a quest to understand the absence of self-determination
in Africa, I find it necessary to focus on the colonial justice system
there since it presents some of the most visible remnants of
colonial institutions. In searching for an accurate picture of what
colonialism is, I found Fanon's (1964, 81) assessment of Algeria
and the revolution against the French colonial government
illustrative: " Colonialism is not a type of individual relations
but the conquest of a national territory and the oppression of a
people: that is all. It is not a certain type of human behavior or
a pattern of relations between individuals. Every Frenchman in
Algeria is at the present an enemy soldier. So long as Algeria is not
independent, this logical consequence must be accepted/' Within
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the context of occupied territory, colonialism comes forth as a
dichotomizing force, enforcing oppressor and oppressed roles
and, in revolution, forming enemy and ally status. Within this
realm, I have come to see colonialism as the formal implementation
of war, international wars disguised as civil conflicts, occurring
within specified and foreignly defined national boundaries. An
extension of these dichotomies exists today, as Hecht and Simone
(1994,18) describe the current geographical boundaries as central
to an understanding of colonialism.
Considering that it was the European colonial governments
that defined these boundaries, the official languages16 of each
nation-state, and their existing political and social structures,17
it is important to place contemporary African nation-states
within this context. While physical occupation of the land has
legally ceased to exist, the co-optation of African social structures
continues to occur, not only institutionalizing oppression within
communities but also exploiting international relations while
destabilizing continental associations. Merry's (1991, 890)
assessment of colonialism presents an accurate summary of
such intricacies: "Colonialism is an instance of a more general
phenomenon of domination. Events that happened in the past,
such as those in the period of colonial conquest and control, can
provide insights into processes of domination and resistance in
the present/' Furthermore, Merry explains that an understanding
of colonialism allows for an assessment of "domination at the
periphery of the world system/7
Merry (1991) and Tamanaha (2001) present two definitions
of colonialism: one general and one narrow. Tamanaha's (2001)
general definition, which I find to be accurate, relates to an
assessment of the unequal distribution of power that occurs when
one group endeavours to impose its command on a group it has
defined as inferior. Merry's (1991, 895) narrow definition, which
encompasses a more traditional view of colonialism, asserts that
"the term refers to the European political, economic, and cultural
expansion into Latin America, Africa, Asia, and the Pacific during
the last four hundred years. Although similar processes have
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been going on for thousands of years, it is the recent European
expansion, intimately connected with the spread of capitalism
and the search for land, labor and markets, which has shaped
the contemporary world7'. Tamanaha's definition of colonialism
is the most relevant to the contemporary era because it is not
specific to geographical land occupations and is based within a
context of global power relations. It incorporates a definition that
allows for an assessment of the continued existence of colonial
institutions as a form of continued colonialism in Africa.
Cesaire (1972,13) presents an assessment of colonialism that
is painful, more heartfelt, and, in my opinion, more functional in
defining what the study of colonialism can achieve. He states that
the study of colonialism allows society to "dedvilize the colonizer,
to brutalize him in the true sense of the word, to degrade him, to
awaken him to buried instincts, to covetousness, violence, race
hatred, and moral relativism/' In conjunction with Cesaire's
switch of attention from colonized to colonizer, Hecht and Simone
(1994,18) assert that colonialism was as much about disordering
Africa as it was about ordering and stabilizing the West, claiming
that the consequences of colonialism must be studied both in the
destruction of African sociopolitical systems and in the settling
of the West more comfortably into itself today.
WHO ARE THE COLONIZERS?
Western European nations quickly come to mind when
colonialism is brought up: the British Empire in particular, with
some awareness of the colonial exploits of France, Spain, and
Portugal. In a more current context, the Americanization of the
Middle East, the wars in Palestine, Afghanistan, Lebanon and
Iraq, the overthrow of governments, and the implementation
of new democratic (i.e., US-compatible) structures in occupied
territories are forms of colonization but are seldom discussed in
mass media as such. The relationships between history and the
present do not often enter the conscious political and cultural
conversation. This is because colonialism has inappropriately
been relegated to historical categories.
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Although colonialism has been relegated to a historical
timeframe, like a mistake from the past, assumed to have ended
when the British Empire became less powerful in relation to
the American Empire, Cesaire explains otherwise: "I make no
secret of my opinion that at the present time the barbarism of
Western Europe has reached an incredibly high level, being only
surpassed, it is true, by the barbarism of the United States....
And I am not talking about Hitler, or the prison guard, or
the adventurer, but about the 'decent fellow' across the way
[believing that society has progressed and civilized itself], a
sign that cruelty, mendacity, baseness, and corruption have
sunk deep into the soul of the European bourgeoisie" (1972,
26). It is not only the extreme regimes of the past that imposed
brutality and oppression. Hindsight is important in noting such
extremities. But a true understanding of history and the cycles of
mass violence the West is participating in with Africa illustrate
that present conditions and wars are also brutal, violent, racist,
exploitative, and colonial.
The imposed historical connotations of colonialism have
several implications. First, they place colonialism in a safe space,
allowing colonial tenets and practices to continue —but outside
the reach of contemporary criticism. Historical connotations
function to disallow the colonized territories to point mainstream
fingers at history, bringing to light the true cycle of power, and
the continued degradation and exploitation of colonial practices.
Second, they place contemporary colonizers in a more righteous
position of power, making their actions void of historical context
and thus more difficult to assess according to learned lessons,
thus perpetuating and enforcing global cycles of violence. In
reflecting on these cycles, Bourdieu's (1991,163-164) assessment
of symbolic power is applicable: "Without turning power into a
'circle whose centre is everywhere and nowhere/ which could be
to dissolve it in yet another way, we have to be able to discover
it in places where it is least visible, where it is most completely
misrecognized — and thus, in fact, recognized. For symbolic
power is that invisible power which can be exercised only with
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the complicity of those who do not want to know that they
are subject to it or even that they themselves exercise it." The
symbolic power of colonialism today lies in discourses of post- or
neocolonialism. This is a language that implies change and thus
assumes progress. This is a function of the evolutionary element
most scholars apply to their understanding of history, assuming
that a progression in time can be equated to a progression in
conditions. It is always easier to assume that contemporary
times are much more civilized than the barbaric past. While
this assumption may aid the creation of positive identities
for privileged groups, I do not find that it aids in the accurate
representation of contemporary global conditions. These global
conditions have left the colonizer sorry, but richer and stronger,
and the colonized broken and poorer. I question the accuracy
of this broken image, and the impact of the victim label on
colonized nations, since much of victimization (in the Western
context) seems to be associated with helplessness, backwardness,
blame, inefficiency, and lack of dependability, carrying with it an
infantilizing connotation that keeps the aggressor in control.
WHO ARE THE COLONIZED?
Writing during the era identified as colonialist, Memmi (1965,
91) claimed that mythology and dehumanization of colonized
populations played a functional role of control, and he
explained that "the myth is furthermore supported by a very
solid organization; a government and a judicial system fed
and renewed by the colonizer's historic, economic and cultural
needs." Thus, even if colonized peoples maintained an African
identity and resisted elements of degradation, "how could the
colonized escape the low wages, the agony of his culture, the law
which rules him from birth until death?" This question brings
forth an assessment of resistance, but within the grander scheme
of colonialism, what role does resistance play, and how successful
has the colonized world been in maintaining and regulating its
role in global politics? In a very warped world survival and
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success include submission to European and North American
structures that historically and today are racist and violent.
Struggles become defined through these domineering structures.
In this sense those who are colonized are forced to submit to
their domination in order to reach for an unattainable dream
of success, or they are forced to reject that system of minority
control, and become relegated to the outskirts of an already
struggling economy and infrastructure. The colonial experience
predicates racist exploitation. If you are a person in Africa, that
exploitation maintains a heavy international inequality. If you
are Black in America the same struggle exists, but instead of the
international maintenance of injustice you are subject to internal
colonization that presents a larger dream of success but provides
no sustainable access to it. Who are the colonized? They are the
people all over the world who are forced to live in poverty so that
very few Europeans and their descendants can maintain power
and wealth.
IMAGERY ASSOCIATED WITH COLONIALISM
Memmi (1965, 79) explains that, "just as the bourgeoisie proposes
an image of the proletariat, the existence of the colonizer requires
that an image of the colonized be suggested/' It is within these
images, largely supported by and promoted through Western
versions of science,18 that excuses and justifications for brutality
emerge; void of this imagery, "the conduct of a colonizer, and that
of a bourgeoisie, would seem shocking/' It is the same imagery
that I find consistent from the official cross-Atlantic slave-trading
era, through colonial times of occupation (during which Africa
was relegated to occupied territorial status), to the so-called era
of African independence. The continued implementation of such
imagery keeps the North/West deluded with self-identities of
civility and development. In this process the negative imagery
of the South/East must be enforced to maintain such delusions,
for without beliefs in the inferiority of Africans the superiority of
Europe and North America cannot construct itself. The imagery of
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colonialism is white supremacist. It is a normalized imagery that
transcends derogatory white supremacist languages and lives
through contemporary white supremacist institutions, policies,
and economies that function in normalized and privileged
cultures reproduced through Hollywood and constructions of
the American Dream. It is a white dream, and its existence relies
on the nightmare described by Ngugi.
Gilroy (2000,56) presents an assessment of colonialism within
the context of racism that emphasizes this connection between
the African nightmare and the American Dream. He explains that
colonialism implemented an ideology that consigned Africans to
prehistoric and prepolitical status. He asks, "in what sense does
modernity belong to a closed entity, a 'geo-body' named Europe?
What forms of conscious solidarity, and located subjectivity, does
it solicit or produce?" In addressing such identities, he concludes
that the process of colonialism provided an avenue through which
"racially differentiated groups no longer shared the same present.
The dominant groups could enlist their irresistible momentum
of history on their side and treat the apparently anachronistic
subordinates as if they belonged to the past and had no future"
(56-57). Today the overwhelming majority in the West subjects
Africa to a primitive image, one that encompasses pictures of
a used-up victim of circumstance, too broken to participate in
a future that was taken away through colonialism and slavery.
Through these Eurocentric attitudes and institutionalizations of
knowledge, the racist imagery that Gilroy addresses transcends
oceans and enters the consciousness of mainstream citizens in
Western societies.
Upon my return to North America from West Africa,
discussions with friends, family members, acquaintances,
colleagues, university students, and professors brought forth,
with few exceptions, an overwhelmingly consensual response:
Africa zs perceived as a wounded continent occupied by broken
people. This imagery contradicts my experiences in West Africa.
I left Nigeria with a sense of empowerment, understanding that
the West Africa that I experienced is a surviving realm, which,
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despite immense exploitation and imposed brutalities, stands tall,
not broken, but scarred. In facing the contradictions between the
negative consensus in the West and my empowering experiences
in Nigeria, Benin, Togo, Ghana, and The Gambia, I found myself
thinking back to the tribal marks on a Yoruba friend's face. The
scars were deep and numerous, and I remember first reacting to
them with surprise — scars are not often displayed in the plastic
world on this side of the ocean. As I got to know him and saw
more tribal marks on people's faces, I came to appreciate the
beauty they accentuated in the physical features of a person's
face, and I came to understand that scars (much like wrinkles),
while seen as unsightly in the West, are signs of survival, healing,
and wisdom in Africa. So when I say Africa is a scarred continent,
I am placing that comment within an understanding that scars
are signs of healing and that unhealed wounds beside them are
connected to past injustices: the social, economic, and communal
wounds that I did see and experience are not beyond the realm of
control; they, like old wounds, would one day become attractive
scars.
LINGUISTIC COLONIALISM
The negative Eurocentric imagery associated with Africa as
discussed above is ingrained and most prevalent in the type of
language used when discussing Africa academically, politically,
economically, and (though less in these politically correct times)
culturally. Through my discussions with people in the academic
and human rights contexts, I found myself compiling a list of
the double standards that are implemented and illustrated in
the type of language utilized and normalized when referring to
Africa and other continents that have mass colonial histories. The
list is an ongoing venture and is nowhere near comprehensive,
but it is representative of the discussions in which I have engaged.
It starts with an international focus and ventures into an African
national and criminal justice/law context.
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Table 2.1
THE SOUTH and EAST
1. l/nde/tleveloped or Develop/ng
Third World Nations
2. Tribal and Religious Clashes
and Riots
3. Tribes
4. Brutality in Justice: Human
Rights Violations - the problem
is in how people treat each
other
5. Traditional Justice Systems
6. Community Justice (informal/
Localized)




THE NORTH and WEST
1. Developed, Industrialized, First
world Nations
2. War
3. Ethnic groups and diversity
4. Brutality in Justice: Short-
comings in the penal system
- the people do not hurt each
other, its just that the system
cannot be perfect
5. The Criminal Justice System
6. Common and Civil Law
(common, natural, universal)
7. Civil Rights
8. Leaders who make mistakes,
are misunderstood or
misinformed
9. International Trade Agreements,
Free Trade and Capitalism
These differences in wording illustrate a double standard
both in the definition of issues and in the implementation of
solutions to these issues. In the hierarchical sphere of power,
Africa continues to come in last (third place); in the economic
realm Africa continues to represent a pot of gold that should be
grateful for the exploitation of its resources; and in the human
realm violence on African soil is associated with communal
clashes, while violence on Western soil is serious enough to
warrant international wars and global attention.
It has become clear to me that the value of life in this
global order is related to power, and that privileged citizens of
a powerful nation are entitled to anger and revenge when the
lives of their loved ones are taken, while citizens of the Third
World caste are not. Their anger is relegated to tribal clashing,19
while the anger of powerful governments is used to justify illegal
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wars and expanding colonial conquests. The double standards
are so engrained that they are present in the 'politically correct'
language of this era. While it is no longer okay to call Africans
primitive (in most contexts), it is now okay to refer to them as
underdeveloped. I do not see a difference between the two terms.
I do see a continued colonial mentality that justifies contemporary
colonialism.
On another level, the informal approach to African issues, as
illustrated in the language used, can be associated with resistance
to assimilation, illustrating a flexibility of African societies that
is complex in comparison to the simple rigidity of Western
standards. When those rigid standards are not met, an informal
relegation is accorded, and, while this informality appears
degrading in the industrialized and corporate context, within
a different context the inability to formally define structures in
Africa can be seen as an African triumph. According to Chabal
and Daloz (1999,4),
it is a consequence of the fundamentally instrumental concept
of power which marks out what we call the informalization of
politics on the [African] continent. There are, in consequence,
good grounds for thinking that the weak character of the
state in Africa may be more perennial than has hitherto been
envisaged. It may well be... that the state in contemporary
Africa will durably fail to conform to our own Western notions
of political modernity.
While this lack of conformity can be viewed as a failure in the
West, it came to represent empowerment and survival during my
experiences in West Africa. It also came to illustrate that, when the
West cannot understand or control something, dehumanization
and degradation are tools it uses to regain control; while First
World governments and institutions continue to use such tools
to control their own citizens and to justify their own brutalities
in relations with Africa, they cannot help but relegate themselves
and their people to a dehumanized status. As justifications arise,
brutalities expand, and, as brutalities expand, the First World
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becomes comfortable economically and politically, but socially
perpetuates cultures of greed and deluded supremacies.
WHAT IS LEGAL PLURALISM IN RELATION TO
COLONIALISM?
Legal pluralism is the academic field of study that formally
recognizes that different types of legal systems can and do
function in one society at the same time. This field of study arose
within academic institutions during recognized colonial times
when European governments invaded Africa and began to work
to realize and attempt to categorize what traditional practices
they could define as law. Different forms of legal pluralism have
been defined and utilized over time. Classical legal pluralists,
working during early colonial times, were largely a group of
legal scholars and anthropologists schooled in the Eurocentric
mindset that Western scholars had the academic tools through
which African societies could be studied and understood. Their
successors formed the new legal pluralist school of thought
that worked to address such Eurocentric notions, but in doing
so they did not address racism in academia but instead worked
to address shortcomings in previous works. Legal pluralism, as
a field of study, has spent much time observing, defining, and
categorizing African societies. It emerged as a study of law within
the classical legal pluralist framework and evolved into a study
of culture in the new legal pluralist framework. The following
is a presentation of how contemporary scholars discuss, define,
and conceptualize legal pluralism.
According to Tamanaha (2001, 115), legal pluralism as an
ideology was initially formulated by legal anthropologists who
were researching law and society in the wake of colonialism.
Their work brought forth what can be referred to as classical legal
pluralism. This form of legal pluralism encompasses a general
understanding that defines specific situations (e.g., colonialism) in
which "two or more legal systems coexist in the same social field"
(Merry 1988, 870). Hountondji (1983) assessed the emergence
of pluralism in Africa within the cultural realm, asserting that
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cultural pluralism existed in Africa before colonial governments
institutionalized themselves. He contended that pluralism as a
scholarly notion emerged as a dichotomizing and simplifying
force, artificially reducing pluralism to a confrontation between
two extremities.
The new legal pluralism as defined by Merry represents
Hountondji's pluralism. It represents an ideological shift that
assumes that " plural normative orders are found in virtually all
societies" (Merry 1988,873). Within this understanding state law
itself is recognized as plural in nature (890), thus allowing for
the unequal distribution of harsh consequences; in addition, an
understanding of power is implemented in this ideology, thus
allowing for an assessment of the "penetration and dominance
of state law and its subversion at the margins" (886).
New legal pluralism implements a developmental approach
to understanding knowledge, reassessing research that emerged
during the recognized colonial period, within the context of
the political era. The study of African law vis-a-vis Western
law continues to be central in this field. In these comparisons/
contrasts several new legal pluralist scholars have reached the
conclusion that African "'customary law' itself was a product
of the colonial period, shaped by efforts of 'native' modernizing
elites to create law attuned to the new market economy and
the efforts of European officials to preserve traditional culture
and the power of tribal political leaders" in works to maintain
control of occupied territories (Merry 1991, 893). In assessing
anthropological literature and contemporary scholarly research,
Merry concludes that native courts are not a function of precolonial
law but a historical construct emerging during the colonial period
to address issues of powerlessness among colonized populations
and struggles between the colonized and their colonizers for land
and resources: "The nature of law changed as it was reshaped
from a subtle and adaptable system, often unwritten, to one of
fixed, formal and written rules enforced by native courts" (897).
In these assessments Western scholars are able to recognize
that colonial governments imposed their own definitions of
law on colonized societies. What Western scholars are unable
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to recognize is that they continue to compare and contrast in a
hierarchical manner, relegating what they do not understand to
an informal status that implies lack of organization and structure.
Assessing changes implemented by traditional modes of social
control through the colonial process must be accompanied by a
contextualization of contemporary social structures of control
in Africa. Gilroy (2000, 41) stresses the need to recognize that
colonialism was a military enterprise and thus implanted militarizing
foundations for control. Abashi (1998) traces this militarization
as an implementation of British colonial rule and assesses the
constitutional building of a judiciary that has the discretion not
only to access traditional laws when necessary but also to refer
to martial law when needed. He illustrates the contemporary
implementation of such constitutional regulations by bringing
forth the kangaroo trial on November 10, 1995, in which Ken
Saro-Wiwa and eight Ogoni activists were hanged on murder
charges that did not allow for appeal after conviction.
These works illustrate the contemporary relationship between
civil society and colonial legal institutions in Africa. It becomes
clear that colonial and criminal justice models in African society
are central in the processes that maintain oppressive conditions
in Africa. The impositions of colonialism are brutal not only due
to the racist attitudes to which they gave birth; they are brutal
not only due to the uneven distribution of resources and wealth
they reared; they are brutal also because of their militarization
and criminalization of a continent that continues to struggle to
deal with such histories and continues to struggle to purge itself
of such abusive experiences.
WHAT WAS THE ROLE OF LAW IN THE
COLONIZATION OF SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA?
The role of law within the colonial process encompassed mass
justifications of racism and the legalization of exploitation. The
same laws that legalized slavery and colonialism have been used
to legalize globalization and criminalize resistance. Tamanaha
(2001, 112) explains that the law implanted by colonizers was
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largely encompassed by regulations for economic enterprise.
He also outlines the transition that occurred from laws initially
meant to govern the colonizers (and to keep them accountable to
their European governments) to laws transplanted to facilitate
the exploitation of colonized people's resources.
Merry points out that " European law was central to the
colonizing process but in a curiously ambiguous way. It served
to extract land from precolonial users and to create a wage
labor force out of peasant and subsistence producers. Yet at the
same time, it provided a way for these groups to mobilize the
ideology of colonizers to protect lands and to resist some of the
excessive demands of the settlers for land and labor" (1991,891).
The law used to oppress was also presented as the only legal means
through which rights could be obtained. In this ambiguity the law
becomes both oppressor and liberator, thus placing within its
realm the power to define liberty, take liberty, and shape liberty.
In the colonial setting this power extends beyond liberty, and
has come to encompass economic, political, cultural, and social
consequences that not only enforce colonialism today, but also
continue to keep the wounds from historical repression wide
open. In the continued implementation of law as defined by
colonial Europe, African societies continue to struggle to achieve
freedom and autonomy, as defined by such laws.
In an assessment of the literature on law and society in the
colonial context Merry concludes that " these works show how
law served the 'civilizing mission' of colonialism —transforming
the societies of the Third World into the form of the West"
(1991, 894). In studying these missions scholars have focused
on the points of intersection between traditional systems of
conflict resolution and colonial legal systems, the new forms of
law that emerged as a result of this interaction, and the points
of resistance to co-optation that took form through traditional
means of implementing legal and social control during colonial
periods: "Colonial officials saw the decline in traditional
authority as a threat to the stability of the colonial regime" (Merry
1991, 898). Law in this assessment becomes a reinforcement of
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colonialism. It institutionalizes cultural, economic, social, and
political degradation. The continued implantation of such laws
and criminal justice institutions on African soil will only aid
in the continuation of a colonialism that may not physically or
legally exist in Africa but structurally and institutionally thrives
to impose a status quo that keeps colonial governments in first
place and African societies in third place.
Merry also stated that " colonialism typically involved the
large-scale transfer of laws and legal institutions from one society
to another, each of which had its own distinct [precolonial]
sociocultural organization and legal culture" (1991, 890). These
transfers led to the implementation of what legal pluralists like to
refer to as dual legal20 systems and the emergence of an ideology
that accepts their coexistence. What Merry and other Western legal
scholars fail to recognize is that this coexistence is not the result
of a mutual agreement, or a mutually reciprocal arrangement,
but the result of a military enterprise that dominated one group
through the occupation of homeland territories. Merry asserts
that the implementation of dual systems (one for colonizers and
another for colonized) has resulted in the emergence of a conflict
in postcolonial societies, one that is centred on the struggle to
" fashion a unified legal system out of this duality" while reviving,
and implementing precolonial traditions and laws (1991, 890).
My time in West Africa illustrated to me the simplicity
and inaccuracy of such assessments. The duality of legal
systems is not the centre of the conflicts that have arisen—the
existence of colonial legality is the centre. While African civil
societies continue to be exposed to colonial social structures and
colonial criminal justice institutions, and the colonial corporate
exploitation of their resources, African government officials are
able to employ capitalist endeavours, making a significantly
small portion of the population richer while driving the majority
into poverty. This form of wealth distribution mirrors that which
exists in the civilized Western worlds, and, while it manifests
itself in more extreme forms in Africa, these extremities are not
the main problem: the main problem is the very existence of a
Eurocapitalist structure that nationally keeps the majority of
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Africans poor and globally keeps former colonialists and their
colonizing descendents rich.
HAS COLONIALISM BEEN ABOLISHED IN SUB-
SAHARAN AFRICA?
Tamanaha (2001,115) assessed the role of law in the contemporary
context and found that, while the revival of traditional law was
"one of the leading slogans of the worldwide decolonization
movement of the 1950s and 1960s," the decolonization process
kept much of the legal regimes "virtually intact through
'transnational' clauses that continued existing colonial law until
repealed," and such repeals, if they were pursued, involved a
lengthy bureaucratic process outlined in colonial languages and
falling in line with colonial goals. Tamanaha also placed the
role of Western law in decolonized settings within the context
of international politics. He found that, "under the prompting
and influence of international aid agencies, of transnational
banks and other corporations that required familiar legal
regimes as conditions of investment," and in the best interests
of capitalism as "partially inspired by Weber's argument that
formally rational law best suits the needs of capitalism," Western
legal systems continued to implement control not only over the
previously colonized peoples but primarily over their national
resources (2001, 115). Africa as a continent is rich in resources
but poor in wealth. Europe and North America, while not so
bountiful in resources, continue to maintain control over global
wealth. This legal construction of wealth through the capitalist
structuralization of global politics is key in maintaining a colonial
and exploitative status quo.
Through these assessments current global order is understood
as built upon European colonialism. An understanding of
contemporary situations void of the context of colonialism would
thus constitute an incomplete and inaccurate representation.
Hecht and Simone (1994,17) explain that "colonialism was meant
for the West to redefine itself in relationship to the world. And the
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work for which African bodies were captured during slavery has
much to do with the West's efforts to change itself, to construct
new kinds of economics and identities/' forging a journey through
which the West erodes opportunities for oppositional competition
in the contemporary capitalist world order. In addition to these
assertions Hecht and Simone outline the manner in which the
African continent, in its "underdeveloped" nature, represents
the potential, "not only to survive, but [also to] restructure and
reinvent itself within a context of global realities" (15). Within
this framework the dichotomization of the problems in Africa
becomes difficult.
Resistance becomes a necessary function of oppression, and
simultaneously oppression grows to become a tool through which
resistance can manifest itself. Despite the Eurocapitalist and
thus colonialist structures that maintain an uneven distribution
of wealth, and despite the inhumane behaviour of Western
'civilized' states, resistance is not impossible, and oppression
is not insurmountable. A starting point for resistance lies in the
dismantling of the illusions that the West has constructed in its
conceptions of Africa. The strength of such illusions lies greatly
in the dichotomization of issues. In fragmenting and ignoring
the interrelationships that tie historical and contemporary issues
together, the imposition of dehumanized and inferior images of
Africa can continue to be manifested.
An example of these fragmentations is the debate on the
problems associated with capitalism. Chabal and Daloz (1999)
outline the more traditionally dichotomized debate among
scholars and politicians who discuss colonialism. This debate
tries to decide how to address the assumed problematic nature
of African political institutions. On the one side, some argue
that political institutions have precolonial roots in the continent
and thus are destined to fail; on the other side, others argue that
political institutions in Africa are in the process of development,
and naturally should face problems and downfalls. Hecht and
Simone (1994, 31) bring this debate together, stating that "the
power of African colonialism21 was not so much to disrupt
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the internal dynamics of household, kinship, and social life
but to disrupt the wide-ranging interconnections that existed
among communities and people across often vast distances/'
adding that colonialism relegated the continent to an inflexible
condition, devastating but not eliminating its political structures
and internal economic cohesions.
Central to these analyses are not the functional or
dysfunctional political institutions that exist in Africa but more
the context within which Africa now exists. The reasons for the
existence of problematic institutions in Africa are not simply a
tenet and natural extension of historical oppression, nor are they
due to the struggle to rebuild from the destructions imposed by
an oppressive history. The problems are shaped (problematically
for the West) by the attempted destruction of an entire continent's
social, political, and economic structures. This attempted
destruction is perpetuated through a debate assuming that
destruction was successful and continues in discussion about why
such destruction was successful, and what can be done about it.
In resisting such unproductive and elitist debates, one can begin
to .restructure the conversation. What did Europeans achieve in
their colonial brutalization of Africa (thus shifting the focus from
what Africa is suffering to what the West is gaining)? How can
Africans survive such brutality (thus focusing on the struggle
as something that must be overcome)? What are Africans facing
today in relation to the continued brutalities and exploitations of
the former colonizing governments and corporations? How can
Africans continue to survive (thus emphasizing that Africans are
not victims but survivors)?
Instead of focusing on whether or not the rebuilding of Africa
should mirror precolonial social structures, scholars may want to
begin addressing contemporary Africa, and its interrelationship
to history, culture, tradition, and strength. The proposed
rebuilding process is problematic because it keeps Africa within
a development framework assuming that destructions of African
structures were successful. This is also problematic because
people who engage in these debates continue to assess Africa
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through a Western lens: "Many discourses on Africa lament
that the continent has lost its 'traditions' and become a dumping
ground for the world's social and cultural waste. But in practice,
Africans don't so much defend their traditions as allow tradition to
take its own course, into terrain that is often neither recognizable
nor acceptable" to the Western world (Hecht and Simone 1994,
23). In accepting their Eurocentric inability to conceptualize the
survival and strength that Africa has displayed in resistance
to colonial and slave-trading brutalities, Western scholars can
begin to learn from not trying to describe African politics and
social structures. The learning process may begin through an in-
depth assessment of current domineering nation-states and their
reliance on colonial racisms.
These colonizing nation-states have been unable to maintain
their boundaries and national identities in West Africa in ways
they were able to achieve in Europe and North America. The
dilution of statehood in Africa is visible at the national borders
that separate African nations but fail to separate African
ethnic affiliations.22 Between Nigeria and Benin, although
laws exist to regulate trade between the two nations, "the
border is the site of rampant smuggling, where unregistered
markets provide a livelihood for many.... The illicit exchange is
crucial to the economies of both countries. Officials are forced
to turn a blind eye or risk further undermining the regions'
precarious infrastructures" (Hecht and Simone 1994, 21). The
rigid borders defined by colonial governments continue to
be ignored by African peoples. The unacceptability of African
social structures in Eurocentric eyes places Africans in a position
of advantage. Because unacceptability is dealt with through a
lack of understanding in the West, Africans can continue to be
unacceptable in Western attitudes and non-conformist in practice.
All of these factors prepare Africans for a globalization that
appears to be dissolving notions of statehood, and transitioning
nationhood to corporate and economic control.
While the imposition of colonial borders on African nations
is formal and legal, these borders are meaningless in the face of
fluid African structures able to adapt to rigid and centralized
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impositions. The non-elastic colonial national borders snap
when confronted with the elasticity of African organizations
and social structures. Although the laws that regulate trade
between nations are being compromised, Hecht and Simone
(1994, 19) explain that, while African societies have become
"underdeveloped in the web of advanced capitalism/' what they
have essentially accomplished in this underdevelopment is the
ability to slip "further out of either comprehension or control.
Post-colonial regimes from Khartoum to Lagos have no idea
how many people live in their metropolis, let alone how, with
little or no employment or services, millions somehow survive/'
And it is in that survival that invisible governance emerges,
confusing, sometimes frustrating, but in general destabilizing
Western analysis of social structures, while empowering Africans
enough to endure and transcend the hardships associated with
displacement, oppression, and colonialism.
CONCLUDING COLONIALISM
Has colonialism ended in Africa? Has it transitioned? I have
demonstrated that it has not ended and has not transitioned
enough to warrant the use of new terms to describe current
conditions. I suggest that, on an international and continental
level, it thrives, that on a national level it is well defined in the
structures erected to regulate Nigerian society, but that on an
individual level I saw that people continue to resist colonialism
and continue to exist. So legally, yes, the same system that
legalized colonialism has now outlawed it, implementing legal
independence for African governance. But what is legal is clearly
not representative of what is applied. Economically, socially, and
politically, colonialism still has a strong hold on the continent.
And on the level of micropolitics, resistance continues: the
oppressive living conditions of civil society continue to carry
an emblem of survival against all odds. It is within this context
that Nigerian prisoners live, and it is within these historical
and contemporary conditions that their experiences can be
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appropriately and accurately understood. Outside this contexts,
the colonial demonizing and projecting of political and social ills
can continue. From within a contextualized understanding of
oppressed and imprisoned populations, their struggles function
as tools for understanding oppression as well as opportunities
to gain wisdom on resistance to a dominant penal coloniality in
these times of mass incarceration, private prisons, awaiting-trial
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15 A system that functions primarily to keep a minority of the
population wealthy and thus powerful at the expense of the
majority, who are rendered poor, not powerful, and thus vulnerable
to the processes of criminalization.
16 These languages continue to be used, facilitating territorial
determinism of contemporary economic relations in Nigeria to
England and the United States in general, in Cameroon to France,
and in Angola to Spain and Portugal; in addition, "past" colonial
Western nations tended to have the largest embassies in the African
countries they previously "inhabited."
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17 These structures are highly visible in the types of criminal justice
systems currently institutionalizing each African " nation/'
18 The Western fields of science provided Western "knowledge/'
which defined Africans as " inferior" biologically and culturally
during times when Europe needed to justify its oppressive
colonial regimes in Africa. The descendants of such scientists, now
identifying themselves as (Western) "positivists," continue to do so
in "research" that racially profiles African Americans as "criminal"
and African societies as "developing."
19 The term " tribe" carries with it Eurocentric connotations of primitive
cultures, while the term "ethnic groups" carries with it connotations
of diversity in contemporary, civilized societies.
20 Legality is a Western phenomenon used in conflict resolution,
becoming imposed upon traditional precolonial modes of conflict
resolution. The transition from conflict resolution to "legality"
often gets taken for granted, thus ignoring the structurally and
ideologically imposed co-optations that took place.
21 This would more accurately be referred to as European colonialism,
since it was the Europeans who colonized.
22 The Yoruba are present in southwestern Nigeria and neighbouring
West African nations, while the Hausa people in northern Nigeria
span northward into Niger and westward into Benin, Togo, and
Ghana.
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CHAPTER 3
AN EVOLUTION OF THE
PENAL SYSTEM: CRIMINAL
JUSTICE IN NIGERIA
Viviane Saleh-Hanna and Chukwuma Ume
This chapter looks at the historical circumstances that came
together to implement the Nigerian Prison Service and how
they have affected its performance. What challenges has the
institution been confronted with? The chapter also attempts to
offer scenarios for the future. The first section looks at the justice
system that existed before the advent of colonialism, the second
section compares colonial penal systems and postcolonial penal
systems, while the third section examines present penal systems
and indicates options for responses. In laying out this history, we
refer to geographical locations in Nigeria, and the following map
will serve as a guide to these references.
TRADITIONAL MODELS OF NIGERIAN JUSTICE
Generally, crime in precolonial Nigerian societies was limited to
serious violations of standard behaviours, customs, and traditions
of the various communal groups. What was traditionally
considered a crime or offence included behaviours generally
regarded as abominations: murder, theft, adultery, rape,
incest, and suicide. The definition of abominations was diverse
according to the different cultures that exist in Nigeria. Offenders
in these categories of crime were held responsible according to
community sanctions. These sanctions were sometimes extended
to their families and close relatives. Individualism was not, and
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Map 3.1: Federal Republic of Nigeria
still is not, a central tenet of Nigerian society. For example, those
who committed suicide were punished through the denial of
decent burials (Igbo 1999). Any family member who violated such
injunctions was in danger of being ostracized by the community
until reparations and prescribed rituals of purification were
undertaken by the family. In this way the extended family
kept a close watch over the activities of its members to ensure
good behaviour and compliance with societal norms, so as not
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to drag the name of the family into the mud for selfish or other
personal reasons. However, for a recalcitrant or uncontrollable
member of the family the last resort was to disown him or her,
thus exonerating the family from any charges of complicity or
cover-up. As one looks at the history of our culture, one learns
that social control in most traditional Nigerian societies and
customs was exercised by the community and the family, not by
the state.
Banishment or execution of offenders by the community
(today what we use prisons to accomplish) was always a last
option. It was saved particularly for repeat offenders who
participated in violent behaviours. In general, there were three
broad classifications of offences: those against individuals, those
against the community, and those against the gods or spirit world.
Each classification has its own set of punishments. But what
remains significant is that, apart from the extreme punishment
of banishment or execution, there was no consideration of
incarceration, particularly in southeastern Nigeria.
THE PENAL SYSTEM IN NIGERIA: COLONIAL AND
POSTCOLONIAL ERAS
Imprisonment as a form of punishing offenders is alien to Africa's
core values in the administration of justice. For the vast majority
of cultures in Nigeria, imprisonment was not considered a valid
form of dealing with conflict. To a small number of communities
in Nigeria before the colonial era, separation of the offender
from the community was employed. For instance, different
communities in the western and northern parts of Nigeria did
use various forms of imprisonment: the Ogboni House among
the Yorubas in the west, the Ewedos among the Edos of Benis in
the northeast, the Fulanis, in the north, and the Tivs in the middle
belt. In addition, the Lagos Blue Book indicates the existence of a
place of confinement at Faji where offenders were imprisoned
and employed mainly in street cleaning (Jarma 1998). These
places of confinement functioned on small scales and were used
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to handle issues of banishment from the community. Stigma
and demonization of prisoners were not a function of these
houses. Total separation through high-security cultures was not
central. The purpose of these forms of confinement was to secure
community safety, and there was never a total separation of
offenders from the community for extended periods.
It was only during the formal annexation and subsequent
colonization of Nigeria by the British that penal institutions were
manned by trained and commissioned officers2 in 1861 (Elias
1964). By 1872 the first formal prison was built by the British
colonial government to hold 300 prisoners. It was known as Her
Majesty's Prison and was built in what is currently known as
Broad Street in Lagos State. As the colonial invaders extended
their frontiers, the number of prisons increased in areas where
the British sphere of influence could be felt. Some of the prisons
built around that period include Ewedo prison, originally built
by a traditional ruler3 (Elias 1964), rebuilt and expanded by the
British in 1910, and then moved to Oko village to assume greater
responsibilities and capacities. In 1900 Sapele prison was built
under the Oil Rivers protectorate before amalgamation with
the Lagos colony in 1906. In 1890, Calabar prison was built to
detain convicts from the Calabar Rice Scheme. It was destroyed,
however, during the civil war in Nigeria and thereafter rebuilt
by the British.
The notions of "convict" and "criminal" were imposed by
the British as they implemented their criminal codes. Prior to this
time offenders were people who offended. As the British colonial
government extended its power over the Nigerian region, it also
extended the imposition of its criminal justice institutions and
its demonization of our offenders, who now came to be defined
as criminals. The separation of an offender from the community
took on a new aspect as that person became a criminal through
British law. In addition, the number of acts that could be defined
as offensive to a community grew as the British implemented
their colonial laws.
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For traditional forms of justice to be recognized by colonial
governments, they had to become institutionalized. With the
establishment of what the British came to call "native courts/' an
expansion of prison building was undertaken. Abeokuta prison
was institutionalized in 1900, while Owo prison was established
in 1911 at Ifon and transferred to Owo in 1925. Ijebu-Ode came
into existence in 1895; Agodi was established in the same year
under the Prison Ordinance of 1884, with only two cells, to
accommodate only a few male prisoners. Similarly, Kano central
prison was set up in 1903 and was later moved to its present site in
1910, while Kazaure was established in 1908 to accommodate fifty
prisoners. Like the prison built by an oba (king) in Bini Kingdom,
Zaria and Kaf anchan prisons were initially accommodated in the
emirs' ('princes''') palaces.
The vast majority of the current prisons in Nigeria were built in the
first two decades of colonial rule. Abinsi (now Makurdi) prison was
built in 1918, Gboko prison built as a Native Authority prison in
1932, and Oturkpo prison institutionalized in 1924 and briefly
administered from Enugu before the creation of a divisional
headquarters. Others include Gwoza in 1920 and Biu in 1910
(moved to its present site in 1923). Nguru was built in 1928, while
Maidugiri was first built in 1920 and rebuilt in 1954.
With amalgamation of the northern and southern
protectorates by Lord Lugard in 1914, the Prison Ordinance of
1916 and the Prison Regulations of 1917 were promulgated. The
ordinance gave extensive powers to the governor to establish and
regulate prison administration throughout Nigeria. It also gave
powers to the governor to appoint directors and other officers to
manage prisons,4 while the native authorities were operating at
the local level and under the local district officers. Consequently,
there was no uniformity in prison administration because of the
difference in the mode of governance in northern and southern
Nigeria. For instance, while prisons in the north were managed by
yaris ('chief warders"5), in the south there were three categories
of prisons: the provincial prison, the divisional prison, and the
convict prison for those serving sentences above two years. The
60 | Colonial Systems of Control
total institutionalization of a criminal justice administration had
not yet occurred.
It is imperative to note that, although there were many
ordinances and orders made by the colonial government to
regulate prison administration between 1920 and 1960, it was not
until 1966 (six years after independence) that the Nigerian federal
government made concerted efforts toward the unification
of prison administrations throughout the federation. These
reforms worked to mirror what the British had institutionalized
in Europe. With implementation of their institutions during
colonialism, it was said that the best way to "work with what
they had left behind" was to better institutionalize their laws.
These transitions into a federally regulated prison service were
encouraged, guided, and funded by Western (mainly European)
governments. Thus, what we have today as the Nigerian
Prison Service functioning under a centralized administration
was established on April 1, 1968, following the Gobir Report
(Jarma 1998) on unification of the existing central and native
prison administrations. The unification of administration, among
other implications, signalled the beginning of the gradual withdrawal
of British officers who hitherto had manned prisons in Nigeria. As
colonial institutions looked more like their own, they felt more
comfortable in their withdrawals. Subsequent reorganizations in
the prison service led to the promulgation of Prison Decree No.
9 of 1972. The decree chiefly placed the British prison system in
the hands of Nigerians.
It is important to point out that the circumstances surrounding
the period under review were also affected by sociocultural and
economic changes. Crime rates had risen. Ugly incidents attended
urbanization, and the creation of a British nation-state named
Nigeria in West Africa had dire consequences. The exploitation
of our economic fortunes and resources entered trade agreements
with the industrialized world. Poverty was on the rise; so was
crime. It was after the British pulled out of Nigeria that the
economic situation here began to dwindle; as they deoccupied
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our government positions, they continued to occupy economic
agreements and relied heavily on the institutions they had
put in place during colonialism to maintain a European status
quo. Consequently, during colonialism there was no recurring
record of prison overcrowding, with its attendant consequences.
Tools and facilities (particularly at designated vocational skills
acquisition centres within the prison) were enough to carry out
sentence planning of prisoners. In the posfcolonial era, when the
British no longer occupy Nigeria, our resources extend further
into the European economy, leaving Nigeria and Nigerians in
greater distress. As the British left Nigeria, they took with them
control over our livelihood. They expanded access to our oil
reserves and in so doing destroyed our agricultural lands. They
imposed a capitalist economy that keeps many poor and a few
rich. And they left behind their criminal justice institutions, which
could take care of those who did not fit well into the British
capitalist economy.
THE NIGERIAN PRISON SERVICE TODAY
Against the backdrop of a series of efforts aimed at restructuring
and positioning the prison service in Nigeria to meet up with
its ever-increasing demands, particularly enacting Prison Decree
No. 9 of 1972, another major shift took place in 1992. The Nigerian
Prison Service became recognized as an important and strategic
security agency. It was consequently removed from the civil
service structure and made to incline more toward a paramilitary
service.6 The prison service became retained under the Ministry
of Internal Affairs under the aegis of the Custom, Immigration,
and Prison Services Board.7 The board was mandated to manage
and formulate general policy for the three paramilitary services,
appoint and discipline all categories of staff for each service,
and make regulations and standing orders for paramilitary
services. The institutionalization of imprisonment through the
centralization of criminal justice in Nigeria aided in a shift from
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safety of the community in precolonial Nigeria to security for the
state in contemporary times.
Administrative Structure of the Nigerian Prison Service
Currently the Nigerian Prison Service has six directorates created
to ensure and enhance specialization and institutionalization
of the criminal justice bureaucracy in Nigeria. The directorates
comprise:
• operations;
• administration, personnel management, and training;
• finance and supplies;
• inmate training and productivity;
• medical and welfare services; and
• works and logistics.
Each directorate is headed by a deputy controller general. At
the apex of the structure is the controller general of prison,8 the
chief executive of the service, responsible for the formulation
and implementation of penal policies. He is answerable to the
president of the Federal Republic of Nigeria through the minister
of internal affairs.
There are eight administrative zonal commands into which
prisons in the thirty-six states, plus the Federal Capital Territory
of Abuja, are clustered for proper coordination and supervision.
Each zone is headed by an assistant controller general of prisons,
a rank next to that of deputy controller general of prison, who
heads the directorates at the headquarter office. Following the
assistant controllers general, each state command is headed by a
controller of prisons, who supervises the activities of the various
prison formations at the state level.
Functions of the Nigerian Prison Service
According to the Federal Ministry of Internal Affairs annual
report for 1997, the main functions of the Nigerian Prison Service
are:
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(1) to keep safe custody of people who are legally interned;
(2) to identify the causes of their antisocial behaviour, and
to treat and reform them to become law-abiding citizens
of a free society;
(3) to train them toward their rehabilitation on discharge;
and
(4) to generate revenue for the government through prison
farms and industries.
To implement any or all of these functions, the penal
system is currently endowed with 148 prisons, 83 satellite or
lock-up prisons, 10 prison farms, and 9 cottage industries for
inmates7 vocational training (Agomoh et al. 2001). However,
the achievement of these tasks by the prison service today has
not been easy, especially when viewed from its background
and other historical antecedents, vis-a-vis the present scope and
operations throughout the federation, coupled with the ever-
dwindling fortune of the nation's economy.
The rate of recidivism, and the rate of deaths (or permanent
disabilities) occasioned by malnutrition, long incarceration in
the "single" or overcrowded cells, contagious diseases, and the
generally poor welfare in most of the prisons in Nigeria today,
indicate that prisoners are living in dangerous environments and,
when they need it, are not receiving treatment or rehabilitation.
In fact, the problems militating against the effective realization of
these functions in the prison service today are many. Admittedly,
most of these problems —overcrowding/congestion, high
remand population, poor and dehumanizing ways of treating
prisoners (health and welfare), poor planning and logistics —
were ostensibly not in existence during and shortly after the
recognized colonial period, for reasons initially outlined.
With the benefit of hindsight, it is obvious that there was no
consideration or contingent plan for any or many of the problems
affecting the prison system today. The concern then was primarily
to contain a few dissident voices against colonial rule or the pocket
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sizes of Nigerians in the employ of the British institutionalized
commercial and capitalist interests. Nevertheless, some of these
problems could and should have been handled by the various
successive Nigerian administrations, while others are linked to
other agencies of the government. Unfortunately our options in
Nigeria included ostracization from the international community
through rejection of Western institutions and economic
structures, or ostracization of our people through the continued
implementation of European economic and social control
structures and institutions. Like the leaders of many nations in
this position, our leaders have chosen the latter, either out of fear
of the wrath of Western military aggressions,9 or out of greed for
Western capitalist and imperialist wealth, or a combination of
both greed and fear.
OUR TOMORROW: EMERGING ISSUES AND
SUGGESTIONS
Despite all these problems, hope has always been kept alive.
Over time there have been a series of interrelated efforts aimed at
correcting some of these identified anomalies. We identify areas
considered key for any meaningful reorientation and refocusing
of the Nigerian Prison Service.
• In 1998 the federal government's Taskforce/Committee
on Prison Decongestion and Reforms adopted a sector-
wide approach and determined criteria for the release
of prisoners, and by the end of the exercise some 8,000
prisoners were released nationwide. Regrettably,
though, this exercise has not been sustained, only ad
hoc. Those 8,000 prisoners were quickly replaced, and
other prisoners have yet to be immediately released at
such necessarily high rates.
• We believe that, rather than this approach, a more
insightful method of prison decongestion such
as alternatives to imprisonment or non-custodial
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approaches should be embraced. Again, there should
be a review of some of the obnoxious laws that enable
law enforcement officers to arrest and detain suspects
without having a reasonable conclusion of investigation
by the police. There should also be some functional
mechanism that allows our African values to re-enter
justice through encouraged contact between prisoners
and the community.
As a starting step, we hope to implement a legitimate
external non-governmental monitoring mechanism for
the Nigerian Prison Service, conducted by independent
observers who have the power to criticize and address
brutality in prisons. Without external observation
the prison system will be allowed to continue in its
brutality toward and demonization of prisoners.
External observation will allow us to concretely define
brutality while abstractly allowing for questioning of
the philosophies of imprisonment and its relevance
to Nigeria. These approaches will put in place more
sustainable solutions to the congestion of prisons in
Nigeria because they will allow for identification of
excessive use of power in imprisonment.
Similarly, while we make the call for decongestion
of the prison population, there is also every need for
the prison system in Nigeria to consider urgent steps
toward structural rehabilitation and provision of other
related facilities. While we still have prisons in Nigeria,
we need to address the immediate needs of the people
inside them. Structural rehabilitation would include
renovation of cells to allow for more healthy spaces (i.e.
air ventalization) to combat disease and may include the
reconstruction of wells to provide clean drinking water
for prisoners.
Also, in view of the dwindling economic fortunes of
the country, coupled with the fact that we never have
relied and likely never should rely on the state to fix our
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problems, it remains imperative that members of the
community should quickly come to the aid of prisoners
and become more involved in the issues relating to
prison management. It is time to shift back to community
safety and away from state security as central to justice
in Nigeria. If the "decay" injustice continues unarrested,
other social structures will continue to be affected to the
extent that no meaningful life will be allowed to take
place. The interconnectivity of our social structures is
recognized and accepted by Nigerians. If we begin to
address the problem of imprisonment, we can start the
journey toward healing the rest of this colonized, lived
existence.
CONCLUSION
The Nigerian Prison Service occupies a primary place in the
colonial criminal justice system. The problems associated with
the ineffective operations of the service have been enumerated
here and elsewhere (Agomoh 1996; Odinkalu and Ehonwal 1991;
PRAWA 1998). Some of the options for intervention highlighted
in this chapter would enhance empowerment of Nigerian
communities and hopefully lead to prison decongestion (and
eventually penal abolition) as a first step toward addressing
penal coloniality in Nigeria. On a more specific and immediate
level, we need to work to ensure an improved welfare system
for prisoners. We need to work back toward employing a system
that addresses conflict and harm in a manner that centralizes
integration of all peoples into our communities.
The structural decay that the criminal justice system has
imposed on our African societies must be arrested. It is our hope
that a turnaround can be achieved within a reasonable period
of time as we make further journeys into the new millennium.
Nigeria has endured slavery, Nigeria has endured colonialism,
and Nigeria continues to endure penal colonialism in all its
forms. We are concerned not only about prisoners' rights but also
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about a society that respects human dignity and inclusion; as long
as we have prisoners, we are not free; as long as we have prisons,




2 The officers were commissioned by Governor H. S. Freeman.
3 Oba Ewedo was the fourth oba who ruled the Bini Kingdom from
1255 to 1280. The prison named after him was rebuilt and made a
maximum-security prison to accommodate 608 beds.
4 For more details on the ordinance, see Order 60 of 1922. It is also
important to note that the first director of prison appointed after the
amalgamation was B. Dolan, who inclined toward the reformation
and rehabilitation of prisoners. Much credit was also given to him
for his efforts in initiating the classification of prisoners in Nigeria.
5 Here we see the mixing of a traditional African term (chief) with
an early colonial term (warder). The term "warder" rather than
"warden" is still used in Nigeria, reflecting the early British colonial
influence.
6 See Federal Government Circular B.63755/11/8311 of July 10,1993,
and compare Regulations 5 and 6 of the Draft Prison Regulations.
7 See Prison Decree No. 14 of 1986.
8 The controller general of prisons used to be the director of prison as
initiated by the colonial administration. This became unfashionable
in line with some of the restructuring that took place in the prison
service.
9 History and contemporary events show that those nations that do
not "coincide" with the demands of the West become demonized
and attacked. If our political, economic, and cultural structures do
not match those of the West, either we become "uncivilized" and
in need of "liberation," or we become "dangerous" and in need of
"attack."
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CHAPTER 4
THE MILITARIZATION OF NIGERIAN
SOCIETY
Biko Agozino and Unyierie Idem
INTRODUCTION BY DR. KAYODE FAYEMI
The dominant wisdom, a year and a half after Olusegun Obasanjo
assumed office as Nigeria's president in May 1999, is that the
country is now a democracy. It is true, of course, that elections
were held and that candidates vied for various positions on
the platforms of political parties, as a consequence of which
a democratically elected government, along with a National
Assembly and its counterparts in the states, are now in power.
As I have argued elsewhere, however, polling booths and voters
are not all that make a democracy. Indeed, democracy, at its core,
is a state of mind, a set of attitudinal dispositions woven into the
fabric of a society, the concrete expression of which are its social
institutions. Undemocratic social institutions cannot, therefore,
sire or sustain democratic governments, no matter how often the
ballot box ritual is enacted.
This is the kernel of the argument advanced by Biko
Agozino and Unyierie Idem in this important chapter, which
takes a hard look at the country's social fabric: the institution of
the family, the educational system, the economy, the military,
the judiciary, and traditional communities.1 It concludes that the
more than thirty years of rapacious military dictatorship, which
the Nigerian people have been forced to go through, have left an
indelible mark on the collective psyche. This psyche has been so
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militarized that it now embraces force and routine violence, and
instinctively shies away from debate and dialogue, the two all-
important props without which a truly democratic edifice cannot
stand.
Employing the refreshing method of participant observation,
and using the descriptive tools of anecdote, personal narrative,
and eyewitness account, the authors offer us a graphic and
troubling picture of a country at war with itself, where children
are brutalized by parents, students are terrorized by teachers
and government officials alike, and traders and other economic
actors are engaged in a vicious war of cat and mouse with rivals,
armed robbers, and security agents on the make. In churches and
mosques the talk is of spiritual warfare and jihad, cudgels, bows
and arrows rather than the tools of persuasion and conversion.
Military decrees have banished judges and the rule of law to the
margins of social life, and guns have usurped legal tomes as the
final authority.
It is an unflattering portrait of a society in a state of anomie,
a society where, to quote the Nigerian scholar Attahiru Jega
(1997), whose work is cited in this paper, the " prolonged nature
of military rule has constricted democratic space, entrenched
authoritarianism, and nurtured nihilism/'
Is it possible, then, for democratic politics and the
institutions that sustain it to take firm root and blossom in this
harsh landscape? This is the burden of this chapter. Agozino and
Idem's contention is that Nigerians need to undergo a process
of "demilitarization" akin to a detoxification exercise that will
make them unlearn and discard the military ethos they have
unwittingly acquired over the years since 1966, before the
journey toward a truly democratic country can properly begin.
The main strength of this chapter is how the authors take great
pains to succinctly demonstrate how Nigerian society became
infected with the "military" virus. They implicitly argue that
what is learned can be unlearned, that society is not atavistically
bound to violence, and that, given the right mix of programmes
and policies, what is damaged can be made whole again.
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And therein lies the importance of this chapter. It refuses
to take the country's new democratic dispensation for granted,
preferring to see it as a tender sapling that requires plenty of
water and sunshine to take root and flower. And this water and
sunshine are the country's social institutions that, as the authors
make clear, are so battered and bruised that they are more likely
to smother the sapling of democracy than nurture it if they are
not reformed within the appropriate policy framework. Agozino
and Idem have outlined the steps that, if taken conscientiously,
not only will safeguard Nigeria's nascent democracy but also
may be exported to neighbouring West African countries still
grappling with dictatorship and militarization of the communal
psyche.
This chapter makes a demand not only on Nigeria's political
and civil society leaders but also on the international community,
particularly policy-makers in Europe and the United States
currently involved in the important work of rolling back military
dictatorship, civil war, and poverty in Africa. If there is one thing
that this chapter makes clear, it is that bad economics breeds
poverty, and mass poverty in turn invites military dictatorship.
Dictatorship, as Africa's recent history has abundantly
demonstrated, is a key cause of civil war. And where there is
war, democratic politics flies out the window.
The battle to shore up democracy on the continent must
therefore adopt a holistic strategy, integrating the economic,
social, and of course political in a marathon designed to firm
up the institutional structures that ultimately must support
democratic governance if it is to have any chance of surviving
beyond the ballot box ceremonial.
CONTEXT AND METHODOLOGY
Between December 1998 and January 1999 we conducted an
ethnographic study in six states in Nigeria on behalf of the Centre
for Democracy and Development. While campaign groups in
the country at the time directed their attention to the return of
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the military to the barracks, we focused on militarization as a
process that goes beyond the military, permeating the whole of
civil society. And while donor agencies encourage a definition
of civil society that refers specifically to non-governmental
organizations (NGOs), we adopted a sociological definition
that embraces the institutions of the family, education, religion,
economy, community relations, and justice. Finally, while many
commentators assume that Nigeria is unique, we assume that
Nigerians have a lot to learn from and to teach their immediate
neighbours in West Africa about the means of democratizing a
militarized civil society.
This project aims to highlight the obstacles to democratization
due to the institutionalization of a militaristic ethos in Nigerian
culture and society. The project attempts to identify ways and
means of strengthening civil society through a structured process
of democratizing Nigerian culture and politics.
The project focused preliminarily on six states in the country:
Enugu State in the east, Cross River State in the southeast, Lagos
State in the west, Plateau State in the middle belt, and Kaduna and
Kano States in the north. Approximately one and a half weeks of
archival research, observations, and interviews were conducted
in each of the six states. The fieldworkers also established contact
with experienced researchers in these states who wanted to
collaborate on the more definitive project.
While most campaign and research organizations in the
country concentrated on the military handover to a civilian
administration, we observed the militarization of family and
kinship relations, with men assuming a militaristic attitude
toward women and children, resulting in widespread domestic
violence, abuse, and anti-democratic tendencies in civil society.
Children were beaten all the time by adults, men beat women,
some women were killed or maimed, while the culprits were
accountable to no one.
Yet the institution of the family remains one of the strongest
supporters of the struggle for democracy in the country. At a
time when it was easy for political activists to be betrayed, family
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members stood by their own in most cases. Also, in spite of the
authoritarianism within the institution of the family, it remains
one of the most open democratic spaces where genuine criticism
is expected and given without fear of censure. We would like
to extend this observation to the rest of West Africa to see if the
countries that are less militarized are also less authoritarian in
gender and kinship relations compared to the more militarized
ones.
The educational system in Nigeria reinforces the
authoritarianism of the family not only by widespread use
of security officials to run institutions of higher learning but
also because of the authoritarian orientation of the civilian
educational administrators and government officials, who ban
legitimate staff and student unions. In the reigning atmosphere
of insecurity, intimidation, and frustration, some students and
lecturers join or form secret cults through which they vent their
pent-up feelings by murdering, raping, maiming, and terrorizing
fellow students and sometimes staff.
Paradoxically, as in the case of the family, the educational
institutions remain one of the gateways to democracy in the
country, given their capacity to serve as places of open criticism
and debate in spite of attempts to muzzle critical scholarship.
This is evident in the fact that Nigerian students, lecturers, and
many university administrators remain in the vanguard of the
struggle for democracy even when a majority of their colleagues
remain silent supporters of the repressive system.
The religious institution is also militarized. Members of
religious organizations whom we interviewed emphasized that
they were engaged in spiritual warfare, and this is not always too
far behind actual wars against rival religious organizations. This
strong militaristic ideology inherent in all organized religions
needs to be studied in greater detail with a view to increasing
the democratization of religious practices and beliefs. After all,
underlying every religious faith in the country is the assumption
that people should love one another, indicating that this divisive
institution could yet be made to deepen democratic beliefs, more
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so as key members of the priesthood and some clerics have been
advocating the advantages of democracy in the country.
The legal institution in Nigeria is militarized through the role
of special military tribunals in the trials of civilians; the widespread
use of armed soldiers and police officers to shoot suspected
criminals on sight, resulting in the killing of innocent people; the
appalling conditions in overcrowded jails, where detainees are
held without charge; the use of capital punishment; and the lack
of democratic accountability by security agents. These issues will
be explored further to find ways of demilitarizing Nigerian law
and enhancing its democratization because the law remains one
of the chief instruments of challenging authoritarianism in the
country, albeit in a limited fashion.
The economy is one of the most militarized of Nigerian
institutions. Traders speak of the practice of using army
officers to collect debts or settle scores, the use of hired killers
to murder rivals, and the use of religious rituals and sorcery
in the spiritual warfare that is thought by some to accompany
trade. Nigerian workers receive brutal treatment at the hands
of employers and the government. Then there is interference
with trade union activities resulting in seizure of the unions
and their administration by government-appointed sole
administrators, the sponsorship of rival unions often armed and
used to attack genuine representatives of workers, the horse-
whipping of striking workers and their summary dismissal, and
the deprivation of the communities around industrial locations
and the use of "carrots" to divide such communities, resulting in
internecine conflict.
These conflicts sometimes spill over and affect industrial
installations, thus giving security agents the excuse to use live
ammunition against unarmed demonstrators. Are the economies
of the rest of the Economic Community of West African States
any less militarized than the Nigerian example?
Transportation companies routinely hire armed escorts to
protect the passengers from robbers, but the armed men that the
passengers usually encounter are at the countless military and
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police roadblocks, brazenly extracting illegal tolls from every
passing driver, thereby inflating transportation fares. While some
traders kill innocent people for " money medicine/' others take
the law into their own hands and execute suspected criminals,
referred to by Aba traders in the eastern part of the country as
"mice."
These issues require a closer look to find alternative
consensual ways of running the economy rather than perpetuate
the militarization of this vital institution of Nigerian civil society.
As in the case of the other institutions mentioned above, the
militarization of the economy sits side by side with free-market
beliefs and the deep-rooted democratic practice of haggling
in which the buyer is encouraged not to be intimidated by the
dictatorship of the trader but to make an offer based on a sense
of fairness and decency, unlike supermarkets in the West, where
the prices of items are not open to bargaining.
Some communities have adopted the barracks mentality of
"might is right," especially in the contest for elective political
office characterized by thuggery and violence. Some traditional
rulers run secret cults with which they intimidate people in
rural areas and extort money from them as fines without due
process. Young people who are thought to be delinquent are
rounded up, blindfolded, and tortured with threats that they
could be executed. At night armed vigilante groups patrol the
streets with what one informant called "enough,guns to wage
a war." Even in the cities the streets are barricaded, and armed
watchmen take over at night. Indeed, people live in a state of war.
Rather than resigning ourselves to this state of affairs, it is wise
to search for alternative ways of policing the community that
would be more democratic and less militaristic, given that many
Nigerian communities have age-old traditions of democratic
republicanism in the true sense of that phrase.
We propose that the questions raised about lessons from other
parts of West Africa be pursued by extending the ethnographic
research to the rest of the region. We also recommend that a
group of three researchers/activists be set up in each of the six
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Nigerian states visited and funded for three years to continue
the process of observation and analysis, and to coordinate the
implementation of the practical implications of the project in their
areas. They would employ two full-time research and education
officers (twelve altogether) from the fund. These hires will ensure
that the paradoxical observations highlighted by the preliminary
trip will be investigated more closely and documented in greater
detail for the purpose of developing an educational programme
that could help to disseminate the findings of the research and
thereby help to end the militaristic ideology in civil society.
The education programme would be implemented through
a series of radio programmes that would broadcast, in pidgin
English and Nigerian languages, issues of democracy and
"literacy." A monthly journal could be funded for all the groups
to contribute articles to and for discussions of the curricula of
the weekly grassroots democracy literacy classes. An annual
democracy literacy conference should also be funded for all the
groups and the foreign-based partners to review progress and
plans.
UNDERSTANDING MILITARIZED CIVIL SOCIETY:
ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
Military rule in Nigeria seems to be the norm rather than the
exception. The military has ruled the country for more than
thirty years in its forty years of independence. According to
Attahiru M. Jega (1997), "this prolonged nature of military rule
has constricted democratic space, entrenched authoritarianism,
and nurtured nihilism, while economic crisis and structural
adjustment have battered Nigerians, and has indeed led to the
increasing questioning, if not challenging, of the legitimacy of
the State." Such a crisis of democracy is compounded when the
government becomes even more militaristic and authoritarian in
an attempt to silence dissent.
This project focuses on the administration of justice, the
conduct of trade and industry, the conduct of private life, the
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practice of religion, organized political activity, and the politics
of traditional forms of authority. This empirical focus was
complemented by interviews with individuals and archival
research to determine to what extent the military style of
exercising power has permeated civil society in the country. We
interviewed experts and members of the elite, but went beyond
their opinions to interview ordinary urban and rural dwellers to
highlight the lessons that Nigerians need to learn about how to
deepen the democratization of civic life.
The ongoing communal conflicts in Nigeria that threaten
the process of transition to civil rule in the country make such a
project urgent to ensure that the military is kept out of Nigerian
politics. Previously, discussions focused only on the military in
politics (Bell 1968), but by focusing on militarization as an issue
that goes beyond the military the project stands a chance of
making an innovative contribution to the search for solutions to
the democratic crisis in the country. Ways of achieving such a
goal were explored through interviews with ordinary Nigerians
and experts alike, direct observation, and archival research. The
implications of the findings for West Africa and the rest of the
continent are highlighted in this chapter, and hopefully will be
followed up in further research.
In the course of the research for this chapter we sought
answers to questions of how to democratize a militarized civil
society from diverse sections of Nigerian society, with a focus
on how much civil society has been militarized. Answers to such
questions were previously sought in the way to limit military
involvement in politics or how to seek accommodation of the
military in politics.
No matter which society we care to examine, the assumption
that militarization is an essential aspect of social life goes
largely unexamined. The few who have examined this link
have restricted themselves to an examination of the role of the
military in politics. Some argue that the military as an institution
is needed for the defence of the territory of the state. Others point
out that the interests of the state are often interpreted from the
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point of view of the interests of the ruling classes. Some have
argued that, when their nation is at war, they are duty-bound to
support their country and fight in defence of the fatherland or
motherland. Others point out that the defence of the homeland
has been used as a slogan even when the competing interests
of the ruling groups, especially in commercial activities, lead to
war in which ordinary people are expected to back their country.
Still others add that, even in aggressive wars or defensive ones,
it is always the poor who are forced to fight one another in the
interests of the ruling classes.
Consequently, some call for all the poor people of every
country to refuse to fight one another just because they happen
to live within different borders. They call for the poor to boycott
all wars and mutiny once the ruling classes declare war on the
working people of a different country. They also call on workers
who are not in the army to support the soldiers by going on
strike in order to force the belligerent ruling classes to settle their
disputes democratically.
This approach has been dismissed as "heroic folly/' It is all
very well, it has been pointed out, for soldiers to desert as soon
as war is declared. It is also heroic to call for workers to go on
a general strike in opposition to imperialist war. However, this
idea is sheer folly because it plays into the hands of the ruling
classes, which could use martial law to suppress the working
people. It is also folly to wait until war has been declared before
opposing it.
This heroic folly has been contrasted with " opportunistic
cowardice" among those who call for unqualified patriotism in
defence of the homeland. Accordingly, those who adhere to this
form of social chauvinism are accused of forgetting that the days
of progressive national wars have been replaced by imperialist
wars and that the working people should always try to turn
these imperialist adventures into civil wars in their individual
countries (Lenin 1974).
So even those who oppose militarism have focused on the
army and on warfare. The present project aims to analyze the
extent to which militarism has gone beyond the army and warfare
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to penetrate and militarize civil society. We focus on different
social institutions in turn to see how democratic they are and, if
militarized, how to go about demilitarizing and democratizing
them. At the risk of oversimplification, militarism is defined here
as the use of force to settle any disagreement or to enforce order instead
of relying on intellectual and moral leadership to command respect or
obedience.
Eminent sociologist Stuart Hall (1996), in a paper originally
presented to a colloquium on Theoretical Perspectives in the
Analysis of Racism and Ethnicity, organized in 1985 by the
Division of Human Rights and Peace, UNESCO, Paris, follows
Italian intellectual and politician Antonio Gramsci in offering a
clear view of a militarized civil society that is similar to the one
adopted in this project. Gramsci (1971) argued that the intellectual
or moral leadership of a class, or what Lenin called working-class
hegemony, over other classes is exercised not only by the working
class, who need to win the support of the peasantry and other
exploited classes (by moral and intellectual leadership rather
than by force) in their struggle against the exploiters (especially
in underdeveloped economies such as that of Nigeria, where the
industrial and office workers are numerically weak), but also
by the ruling class, who are too few to rule by force alone and
are thereby forced to lead as well, though not entirely without
force.
Furthermore, according to Hall (1996, 426), such moral and
intellectual leadership differs from pure domination, coercion,
and economic-corporate monopoly over the legitimate forceful
means, not because they are completely absent in a hegemonic
situation but because " hegemony is not exercised in the economic
and administrative fields alone, but encompasses the critical
domains of cultural, moral, ethical and intellectual leadership/'
Hall goes on to add that "it is only under those conditions that
some long-term historic 'project'—for example, to modernize
society, to raise the whole level of performance of society or
transform the basis of national politics — can be effectively put on
the historical agenda."
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According to Hall, this clarification by Gramsci of the nature
of hegemony is based on an important distinction Gramsci made
in the Prison Notebooks (1971), the book he wrote when the fascist
dictatorship of Mussolini clamped him into jail for his working-
class politics. In the essay "State and Civil Society" Gramsci
argues that, contrary to the assumption of liberal social contract
theorists such as Thomas Hobbes and John Locke that civil
society is a state governed by rational civic law as opposed to
anarchic natural law in the state of nature, there are two types of
civil society in capitalist society, and both of them are extremely
militarized. The first type is characterized by modes of struggle
that Gramsci called the "war of manoeuvre," in which the struggle
between classes is concentrated in one decisive battle where
strategic victory is won "in a flash" by breaching the defences of
the opposing class. The second type of militarized civil society is
characterized by modes of struggle that take the form of a "war of
position." This type of struggle is more protracted, taking place on
many different battle fronts, so it is impossible to win the struggle
through any single breach without taking into account the whole
structure of society. These complex positionalities suggest that
the struggle to democratize Nigerian civil society, for example,
must abandon the antiquated tactic of the war of the trenches
or the war of manoeuvre because these "wars" have a tendency
to centralize and focus on a single issue: soldiers, regionalism,
classes, or corruption. The war of position demands a careful look
at the militarization of "the voluntary associations, relations and
institutions of civil society — schooling, the family, churches and
religious life, cultural organizations, so-called private relations,
gender, sexual and ethnic identities, etc. —[which] become, in
effect, 'for the art of politics... the "trenches" and the permanent
fortifications of the front in the war of position: they render
merely "partial" the element of movement which before used to
be "the whole" of war'" (Hall 1996, 428, expanding and quoting
Gramsci 1971, 243).
Our approach extends the limited perspective of Gramsci
by including the judiciary, one of the more coercive arms of the
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state, in the conception of civil society. We do so deliberately to
emphasize that juridification always goes beyond the law courts
and that, even with specific reference to the courts, it is necessary
to emphasize that civil society does not begin where the state
ends but actually remains a part of the state, where leadership
is or should be based more on consent (but never without force
at all) than on force (with or without consent). By adopting the
definition of a militarized civil society advanced by Gramsci and
extended by Hall, we warn that Nigeria is not the only country
with a militarized civil society. The problem of militarization
is global, and differs from country to country and from time to
time. Thus, our study of Nigeria offers important lessons on how
to democratize militarized civil societies throughout the world.
We apply this broad conception of civil society in our
project. A similar approach was adopted by Momoh (1998) in
a paper presented at the Workshop on Comparing Experiences
of Democratization in Nigeria and South Africa in Cape Town.
He is critical of those influenced by "ahistorical and Eurocentric
ideology" who deny the existence of civil society in Nigeria and
of those who claim that civil society emerged in Europe before the
state. To him, civil society has always been an arena of different
forms of struggle —social, cultural, economic, and political.
Mamdani (1995) also reviewed the misleading dichotomization
of state and civil society in Africanist studies, and concluded
that African problems should not be seen simply as evidence of
primordial influences. Our focus on militarization illustrates that
this is a global problem with African dimensions.
PRELIMINARY NOTES FROM THE FIELD
Before travelling to Nigeria at the end of November 1998 for the
field trip, we needed to go to the Nigerian High Commission
to renew one of our passports. There were only seven of us
at the High Commission by 9:30 that morning. As soon as the
receptionist signalled that it was time for us to queue, a fight
broke out between a man and a woman over who should be
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the first to be attended to. She slapped him, and he struck her
in return. The woman began to cry: "You call yourself a man,
and you are fighting a woman!" She struck out at him again and
again, with her handbag, with her palm. He tried to strike back,
and another man pushed him aside. They squared off and started
a boxing match.
Tempers calmed down after a while, and the man apologized
to the embassy staff. We suggested that he apologize to the
woman as well. He did so, but the woman said that an apology
was not enough. The receptionist said that it was too late in any
case because he had called the police. The police came and took
statements. It was not until one o'clock in the afternoon that the
man returned to join a much longer queue, but the woman was
nowhere to be found. Perhaps she had immigration problems and
she was detained for further questioning by the police. At about
three o'clock we saw the woman outside the High Commission
gesticulating and talking animatedly with another man.
The lesson is that, even with only seven Nigerians queuing
up to go into an office, there will be a rush to see who will be
the first. It would have cost the man and the woman less time to
allow the other to be attended to first. Much later, in a different
context, the Nigerians waiting all day for their applications to
be processed started offering explanations about why they were
frustrated. Some said the reason is that Nigerians do not love one
another. They said that, when you go to the embassies of people
who love their country, you are not made to wait all day. They
also said that, when foreigners come to the High Commission,
they are treated better than Nigerians themselves.
How true is this idea that we do not love ourselves? Is it
connected to the fact that we have been brought up under
undemocratic regimes where people got nothing unless they
were willing to fight for it? How do we encourage Nigerians
to avoid gra-gra ("machismo") and settle their disagreements
democratically when national problems are being settled
dictatorially?
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SIX MILITARIZED INSTITUTIONS
The Family
The family is the most ancient and most civil of civil society
institutions, but ironically it is the most militarized in Nigeria.
During the pilot study for this project we visited and observed
a young Nigerian family with four lovely children, the eldest of
whom was not yet five. We were surprised to find that canes
were kept in the house for the punishment of the children. One
was reserved for the father's special use. The mother regularly
threatened to use the cane. The maid used it freely, and the three
aunts caned the children too. Two visiting uncles used the canes
freely, and even family friends were allowed to use the cane
whenever they thought fit. We raised this issue with the family,
and they said that the children "do not hear" (are disobedient)
until they have been beaten.
The logic is that if they (the children) are not disciplined
corporally they will turn out to be delinquents. The father gave
the example of a neighbour who returned from England with
his family. According to him, the parents were so permissive
that their children had no manners at all. The son of that family
never carried out any chores until his father started "dealing"
with him the "Nigerian" way by beating the devil out of him.
The climax came when the teenage son shot his sister twice with
their father's shotgun and nearly paralyzed the girl. His father
beat him nearly to death, with the result that the boy learned his
lesson. Now he is of exemplary character.
One of us argued that treating children violently at home
is partly why they themselves become violent. We suggested
that the family should try to listen to the children more and talk
to them gently rather than threatening them with force. The
family agreed with our suggestion that many cases of corporal
punishment of children are unnecessary, and that beating
children makes them cry more than usual, thereby making the
parents restless. As a result, the children were no longer beaten
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while we were there. However, the threat of "I go beat you o!" (I
am going to beat you) was still liberally used.
We also suggested that the parents try telling their children
they loved them (something we never heard), because there was
no doubt they loved the children, instead of telling them all the
time they would be beaten. At one point we were being recruited
into the disciplinary regime by the parents, who threatened the
children that if they did not behave uncle or aunt would beat
them. To this we usually retorted that we would not beat them
because they were really lovely children, and this was true.
This issue was observed even among human rights
campaigners who were worried about the inhumane treatment of
prisoners in Nigeria yet were ready to forcefully discipline their
toddlers for throwing tantrums in public. We came to the defence
of a toddler by saying that she was simply being assertive, that
adults threw worse tantrums without being beaten in public, and
that even the law, with all its insensitivity, would not think of
"punishing" a child who had no sense of right and wrong.
Greater manifestations of this use of force or militarism within
the family came in the form of news reports that husbands had
gone beyond what one newspaper called the "traditional right"
of disciplining their wives through beating to the savage practice
of disfiguring them with acid. Some of the women were attacked
in this way simply because they were good breadwinners when
their husbands lost their own jobs. The jealous men figured that
their wives must have been seeing other men; otherwise, how
were they able to sustain the family?
We saw campaign posters around the country (issued by the
Legal Research and Resource Development Centre [LRRDC])
proclaiming, "YOUR WIFE IS NOT A PUNCH BAG. STOP WIFE
BEATING TODAY!" The poster depicts a bare-chested man
whose right hand has struck a woman with fright in her eyes
and plasters on her face, while the children look on sadly in the
background. The suggestion here is that wife-beating is a hobby
enjoyed by some sadists rather than a premeditated strategy of
command and control in the patriarchal family. The punching-
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bag metaphor oversimplifies the problem of militarized gender
relations within the family. However, the LRRDC is likely using
the metaphor mainly as a reference to an object to be dominated
and beaten without any fear of retaliation or challenge. Even
if some sadists see wife-beating as a hobby, it is because it is,
first and foremost, a means of controlling the woman, or so they
think.
A more direct manifestation of militarism in the family is the
intimidation of family members by agents of the state when one
member of the family (usually the man) is suspected of having
done something disapproved of by the state. Indirect pressure
can be applied by influential in-laws who might informally warn
their son-in-law to stop confronting the authorities. Also, the wife
can be arrested and detained until the husband gives himself up
for arrest.
The militarization of the family is most clearly represented
by the ceremony in military weddings during which a sword is
offered to the groom by his colleagues in the regiment. At one
such wedding that we attended the explanation given was that,
although the sword is an agent of destruction, the groom should
use it to protect his family. Similar symbolism (though not
identical) is found in some traditional marriage ceremonies in
which cannons are fired to celebrate the marriage of a daughter.
In one that we witnessed the groom's party was escorted by a
uniformed soldier to get past the numerous road blocks routinely
mounted by security officials to extort money from drivers.
Concerns with the family as a militarized institution of civil
society are summarized in a comic-strip poster produced by the
Women, Law, and Development Centre, Lagos. The comic strip
is captioned "VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN: SAY NO TO...
childhood marriage, wife beating [though the picture is that of a
fight in which the woman is clutching the man's crotch in apparent
self-defence], sexual harassment, female child labor, rape, female
circumcision, and negative cultural attitude" (illustrated with a
woman carrying a baby on her back and an overloaded basket on
her head while a man carries only a hoe and a gun). This poster
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is a clear illustration of how militarized family relations easily
spill out into the wider society. However, the poster focuses
on women as a unidimensional group, listing a wide range of
struggles and violent experiences under one category. While
this focus draws attention to women's struggles, the framework
cannot take into account the diversity of struggles that women in
diverse positionalities (e.g., age groups, socioeconomic classes,
marital statuses, etc.) experience. Their struggles and violent
experiences cannot be properly defined or addressed through
the unidimensional, fragmented nature of this framework.
The poster highlights various campaigns that were going on
in Nigeria, such as the Gender Specific Litigations and Protection
Strategies Workshop organized by the Gender Action Project
of the Shelter Rights Initiative (June 1998); the publication of
Beasts of Burden in April 1998 by the Women's Rights Project of
the Civil Liberties Organization; the Status of Women in Nigerian
Police, a special issue of Law Enforcement Review, April-June 1998,
a quarterly magazine of the Centre for Law Enforcement; and the
Democratic Alternatives Workshop on Women's Participation in
Politics, November 21,1998, to mention but a few.
The militarization of family gender relations is summed up
by Namiji in her article "Harmful Traditional Practices Affecting
the Health of Women from Childhood." In answer to the question
"who is a man?" Namiji (1998) writes that "he is the boss of the
woman... He is the commander-in-chief of the family and rules and
regulations are established and maintained by him as a woman
has no say in running the affairs of the house." These issues were
prominent in interviews with activists and researchers, and they
will be taken up in greater detail to promote the democratization
of family and gender relations.
The Educational System
We were still in high school when the distinguished historian
Professor Ade Ajayi was dismissed from his post as vice
chancellor of the University of Lagos, Nigeria, in 1978. That
was also when Dr. Edwin Madunagu was dismissed from his
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post as a mathematics lecturer at the University of Calabar
and the late Dr. Ola Oni, an economist, from the University of
Ibadan. They and others were removed because they expressed
sympathy for students who were protesting against the killing of
their colleagues by soldiers during the demonstrations against
the commercialization of education that year. The students
were demanding a candle-lit procession to bury their murdered
comrades, but General Olusegun Obasanjo's administration saw
this as evidence of insurrection because the students also called for
the resignation of the education minister, an army colonel. Army
officers with horse whips were sent to all the high schools in the
country to act as disciplinary officers, and they ended up acting
as gate men who arrested students for coming late to school and
punished them corporally. Some students resisted this military
discipline by deliberately sneaking out of the boarding houses at
night to attend parties in nearby villages, just to prove that even
army sergeants could not restrict their freedom of movement.
All the campaign groups, activists, and researchers whom
we encountered during the field trip expressed profound faith
in the ability of education to serve as the principal tool for the
democratization of a militarized civil society. To provoke a critical
evaluation of this faith, we pointed out that the militarists are often
very educated individuals and that the educational institutions
are militarized. We were told in response that a democratic
educational programme has to be a special programme, but all
agreed that educational institutions in Nigeria are in dire need of
democratization and demilitarization. As Toyo (1998) put it,
only the ideological education, organization and political action
of the masses can get the country near democracy. Only the
self-governance of the toiling people and their self-education
through this can make democracy evolve. The foolish notion
that democracy can result from someone's magic wand,
wizardry or manipulation must be cast into the rubbish heap.
The current antithesis is between military rule and responsible
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and truly national civilian rule, not between military rule and
democracy. With all the goodwill in the world, it is a gross
error —to say the least —for military officers to stay long in
office and excuse their doing so by the chimers that this will
ensure a "transition to democracy/'
The militarization of education takes two principal forms:
(1) a lack of accountability and an authoritarian attitude among
administrators who issue orders with " immediate effect/7
undermine student and staff unionism, and seem to be scared of
dialogue, and (2) the widespread use of secret cults to intimidate
and attack activists on campuses, kill or maim rivals, rape female
students, and intimidate staff.
During our fieldwork Professor Eskor Toyo told us that
people mistakenly talk about the collapse of the educational
system. According to him, the system has not just collapsed; it is
dead, and academics were busy writing its obituary. A detailed
analysis of Professor Toyo's thesis is provided by Professor
Idowu Awopetu (1998) in "The State and Democratisation of
Education: Obstacles and Prospects of Independent Student
Unionism under Military Dictatorship/' Awopetu argues that
education is a human right and not a privilege. He outlines the
historical struggles of Nigerian workers to expand educational
opportunities as part of the struggle for political independence.
These efforts resulted in a huge expansion of education, but when
the military took power it began to commercialize education in
the country.
This process came to a head in 1978 when the government
of General Olusegun Obasanjo announced a threefold increase
in the cost of feeding and housing students, resulting in the " Ali
Must Go" protest (named after the military minister of education
at the time) in Nigerian universities. The government responded
with force, resulting in the killing of some students and the
closure of the universities. The tribunal of enquiry set up by the
government recommended sacking many renowned academics
for expressing sympathy for the students. Government-employed
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journalists were also sacked, and many students were expelled.
From this time onward the military saw student unionism as
a threat and routinely banned the National Union of Nigerian
Students and the Academic Staff Union of Universities. Given
the overall atmosphere of intimidation and authoritarianism,
according to Awopetu, it was not surprising that secret cults had
mushroomed in the universities and were fast spreading into the
secondary schools.
The Sunday Tribune (Nigeria) of August 16, 1998, ran a
story on the "rising menace of campus secret cults/' The paper
reported that some of these cults in Nigeria's tertiary institutions
were "Pyrate Confraternity, Buccanneers, Maplates, Blood
Suckers, Black Cat, Eye Confraternity, Vikings Fraternity, Mafia,
Red Devils, Black Beret, Green Beret, Trojan Horse, Neo-Black
Movement, Musketeers, Black Axe, Temple of Eden Fraternity,
Mafiosi, Osiri, Burkina Fasso, Revolution, Mgbamagbu Brothers,
Scorpion, Dragon, Panama Pyrate Confraternity, Airwords, Ku
Klux Klan (KKK), Amazons, Barracudes, Wairus, Black Heart,
Maphites, Mgbamgba, Ozo, the Pink Ladies, Frigates, Himalayes,
Canary, Marpiates, Pirate, the Blood Spot, Ibaka, Ostrich, the Eagle,
the Flamingo, the Woodpecker, even the Dove and the Seadogs!"
According to the newspaper, "there have been frequent clashes
between members of these cults and violent fights over matters as
trivial as space for holding nocturnal meetings or rallies. Daggers
have been drawn over such mundane issues as 'ownership of
girls.' Moreover, they employ the auspices of their clubs to settle
private scores with non-members by subjecting them to acts of
terrorism, intimidation and brigandage. Besides, self destruction
results from violent inter-personal clashes resulting in their own
deaths and those of innocent persons."
According to Professor Muyiwa Awe (the Post Express,
March 30, 1998), when he and Professor Wole Soyinka formed
the first secret cult in 1953 as students of University College,
Ibadan, they had no sinister motive. All they wanted was a covert
way to oppose the colonial administrators of the university
on policies that went against the interests of student welfare.
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Their cult, Pyrates Confraternity, remained the only one active
in the universities until 1968, when the rival Eye Confraternity
emerged with the aim of resisting oppressive government
policies countrywide. Professor Awe blamed the militarization
of campus cults on political violence and thuggery that led to
the bloody coup of 1966, the pogrom against easterners in the
north and west of the country, and then the civil war that nearly
dismembered the country.
The violent clashes between these cults in the institutions of
higher learning result in increased militarization of the campuses.
Armed police officers are dispatched to the campuses to maintain
order, and some people call for the setting up of special military
tribunals to try cultists. Daily newspaper headlines tell the story
graphically: "Nsukka Varsity Shut over Cult Crisis" (the Guardian,
May 11,1998), "Cults: Police Boss Accuses EDSU Administrator
[a military-style sole administrator appointed by the Abacha
dictatorship as an alternative to a vice chancellor) of Complicity"
(the Guardian, May 29, 1998), "Police Return to LASU, UI as
Cultists Clash" (the Guardian, August 27, 1998), "Oyo, Ogun
Expel 256 Students over Cultism" (Vanguard, February 18,1998).
The above stories are only a sample from a big file on secret cults
in the library of one of the daily newspapers.
In a contribution to a Committee for the Defence of Human
Rights publication Nigerian Students and the Challenge of Leadership,
Dr. Kola Babarinde (1998) argues that, although secret cults are
found in different Nigerian traditional societies, student cults
can be explained thus:
1. Students' mass protest is a worldwide phenomenon that
differs from secret cults.
2. Government interference with students' activism
through repression of organized student bodies has
encouraged inexperienced and ill-disciplined students
who were frustrated or ambitious to join underground
movements.
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3. There is a link between the militarization of the society
and an upsurge in cult activities on campuses.
4. The history of cultism and underground movements is
linked with periods of political repression.
5. A lasting solution can only come through the
democratization of the entire society.
6. Nigerian youths have a role to play in the democratization
process.
During the African Studies Association meeting in
Philadelphia, where this section of our chapter was presented
as part of a panel honouring Nigerian history professor Ade
Ajayi, he commented briefly on the details of events that took
place at the 1998 convocation ceremony at the University of
Ibadan, where he was then a research professor emeritus.
According to Professor Ajayi, one of the staunch supporters of
the Sani Abacha dictatorship in Ibadan attended the convocation
ceremony with a motorcade of three bullet-proof limousines.
The students allegedly got suspicious and decided to search the
limousines to see why anyone would be visiting a university in
bullet-proof vehicles. It turned out that the local politician had a
cache of weapons. Outraged, the students burned all three cars.
Later the then head of state, General Abdulsalami Abubakar,
sent word to find out if it was safe for him to visit the university
for the occasion, and the students sent word back to say that it
was safe since they had destroyed the weapons brought onto
campus by a corrupt politician. It was shortly after this incident
that some alleged cult members killed a number of students
at the university, raising suspicions that the killing had been
sponsored by external forces in retaliation against the students
for "disgracing" local politicians.
The repression in Nigerian universities attracted the attention
of activist musicians such as Fela Anikulapo Kuti. This was also
the case with the late Jamaican singer Peter Tosh, who reasoned
that, if education was for domestication rather than liberation,
one should not blame youths for acting like gangsters. According
to lyorchi Ayu2 (1986), the conditions under which Tosh was
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teaching were similar to those of Kuti in Nigeria. He analyzed
the aesthetic and the political in Kuti's musical education of the
people, and concluded that it remains a powerful instrument
for advancing the resistance of Nigerians against neocolonial
fascism. Kuti was repeatedly brutalized, like many ordinary
Nigerians, but he maintained his reputation as a social critic and
popular educator until his death in 1997.
Community Relations
Interviews with scholars, journalists, and individuals in addition
to archival research revealed the widespread use of force and
violence to settle communal disputes in various parts of Nigeria.
Members of the ruling class fall back on their respective ethnic
groups to mobilize support. Even when they come from the same
ethnic group, they still manage to manipulate different gangs
of mainly unemployed youths into harassing and fighting one
another. At other times false propaganda peddled by competing
groups of rulers incites people into spontaneous violence against
their fellow oppressed.
This was the case when British officials blamed severe
economic hardship following the Second World War on the
uncompromising attitude of the nationalists. Since the radical
labour movement led by Michael Imoudu was openly aligned
with the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC),
the leading nationalist movement, the British accused Nnamdi
Azikiwe, the party leader, of inciting workers to embark on the
1945 general strike during which Imoudu was jailed without
trial. The Hausa community in Jos came to believe that Igbo
traders, against whom they competed for trade, were responsible
for the shortages and high costs of commodities. In December
1945 ethnic rioting broke out in the Jos market between Hausa
and Igbo traders.
This scene was repeated after Anthony Enahoro moved the
historic motion for independence in 1956. Alhaji Ahmadu Bello,
leader of the Northern Peoples Congress and the Sarduana of
Sokoto, countered with a motion for independence "as soon
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as practicable/' The northerners were called unprintable
names, and their leaders adopted an eight-point programme of
"northernization" that sounded like secession. Southern leaders
concluded that their northern counterparts were imperialist
stooges who did not represent the views of ordinary northerners.
Thus, the Action Group sent a team led by S. L. Akintola to
campaign openly in the north for independence in 1956. However,
when rioting broke out at a Kano rally, the Hausa attacked mainly
Igbo supporters of NCNC, perhaps because they were the more
numerous and more conspicuous southerners in the north.
The Tiv had also rioted in 1947 against the imposition of a
Yoruba as the chief of Makurdi. However, the major crisis in the
middle belt was that of 1959 following the federal elections. In
alliance with the Action Group, Joseph Tarka's United Middle
Belt Congress (UMBC) appealed to the Tiv to leave the Hausa-
Fulani-dominated Northern Peoples Congress (NPC). The UMBC
won by a landslide, and the NPC resorted to scapegoating.
UMBC supporters were sacked from their jobs en masse, and they
embarked on civil disobedience. They refused to pay taxes and
started attacking Native Authority policemen who were used to
intimidate them. The situation became worse between August
and November 1960 when 30,000 houses of NPC supporters were
burned, 20 arsonists were killed by landlords and the police, and
5,000 "Tarka"-chanting Tivs were arrested.
History repeated itself in the western region following
the elections of 1964. The NPC government had frustrated the
efforts of United Progressive Grand Alliance (UPGA) candidates
to file their nominations in the north, paving the way for sixty-
seven Nigerian National Alliance (NNA) candidates to be
returned unopposed. This tactic forced Dr. Michael Okpara,
leader of the UPGA, to call for a total boycott of the elections.
The boycott was total in the east but partial in the west, north,
midwest, and Lagos. In spite of the boycott, victory for the NNA
was announced, but the UPGA refused to accept the results.
Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe could have used his powers as president
to appoint a caretaker administration until a fresh election was
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held, but he struck a compromise instead and got the NNA to
concede some appointments to UPGA politicians.
The federal elections were followed by the October 1965
regional elections. The western region rejected Akintola and
his unpopular Nigerian National Democratic Party at the polls,
but Akintola went behind the scene to announce, over the
government-controlled mass media, that he had won and that
the winners had lost. The west went wild. Operation "Wetie"
(or soak him with petrol and set him ablaze) became a rallying
call. That was when the federal prime minister, Alhaji Abubakar
Tafawa Balewa, chose to declare a state of emergency, but not
before wondering aloud why people were saying that there was
trouble in the west when Lagos, a part of the west, was calm
(Nnoli 1978).
This was the last straw that brought five patriotic majors to
attempt to shoot some " democratic" sense into the body politic
(Ademoyega 1981). However, either by design or by error, their
victims fell into an ethnic pattern, and the Hausa-Fulani were
once again incited against the Igbo. This anger resulted in a
countercoup and one of the bloodiest pogroms in human history.
The civil war that followed this unscrupulous power struggle by
the ruling class is now history, yet no lesson was learned by the
politicians of the second republic, who tempted the military back
into power (Falola and Ihonvbere 1985). However, even under
the military, several parts of the country were convulsed in
intercommunal conflict.
In Osun State in the west, during the preliminary fieldwork
at the end of 1998, the people of Ife were fighting their
Modakeke neighbours over the siting of a new local government
headquarters. In Delta State in the south the Ijaw were fighting
their Itsekiri neighbours for a similar reason, and in Ondo State
in the west the Ijaws were fighting their Ilaje neighbours. In
Taraba State in the northeast the Kuteb were fighting the Jukun
and Chamba.
Toward the end of 1999 members of the Oodua .People's
Congress were fighting northerners and Ijaw youths in Lagos.
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Yoruba people in the north and the south were being attacked in
retaliation. In Lagos factions of the same organization fought one
another and engaged the police in armed confrontations, to the
extent that the state governor was waylaid and nearly killed, and
the Nigerian president, Olusegun Obasanjo, threatened to impose
emergency rule. In Odi, Bayelsa State, some police officers were
kidnapped and killed, and the military descended on the town,
raping, looting, and killing the people, and eventually flattening
the town.
According to a human rights lawyer interviewed in Kaduna,
these ethnic conflicts reflect undemocratic conditions that do
not allow for the peaceful resolution of disputes. The Human
Rights Situation Report for July-October 1998, published by the
Human Rights Monitor, stated that, although some of these
conflicts revive ancient animosities between the warring ethnic
groups, we must not forget that those communities were living
peacefully, by and large, until the current crisis of democracy led
to mass frustration and a loss of faith in legal institutions. These
conflicts are worsened by discriminatory government allocation
of facilities. Even after setting up public commissions to advise
on the locations of those facilities, the government ignored the
advice and submissions received, and went ahead to balkanize
the communities in the name of local government creation.
The above observations are supported by activist and social
theorist Dr. Edwin Madunagu (1998), who states that
Nigeria is a country of hungry, desperate, betrayed and cynical
people. It is a country where public authority is completely
alienated from the people, where there is no iota of faith
between the governed and those that govern them. It is a
capitalist country but one with an extremely corrupt, bankrupt
and philistinic ruling class and which combines all known
maladies, inequalities, insensitivities and irrationalities of
capitalism namely, oppression, poverty, disease, exploitation,
ethnic domination and arrogance, religious manipulation,
unemployment, armed robbery, drug trafficking, social anomie
96 | Colonial Systems of Control
and moral despair. It is a country of dialectical extremes:
extreme of poverty and extreme of wealth; a country where
some individuals are stingingly rich, but the society as a whole
is very poor; where there are mansions, but no roads to get to
them; where water is as scarce as petrol.
The Ogoni struggle and the Ijaw youth protests differ from
the many ethnic wars slightly because, when they were not
fighting their neighbours over ownership of oil-rich land, they
were marching against the international oil companies and the
military government that preside over the exploitation of natural
resources from a land that they consider their own, without
any compensation or reward for the people whose sources of
livelihood have been damaged by oil spillage and pollution.
Interviews with journalists who visited the Ijaw area indicate the
bravery of the young people but also the devastating military
repression that the government unleashed on them. Yet all are
agreed that democratization would be a major step in settling
the conflict.
Religion
The right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion is
enshrined in the Nigerian Constitution. Section 35 of the 1979
Constitution, section 38 of the 1999 Constitution, and Article 8 of
the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (Ratification
and Enforcement)3 all contain elaborate provisions for the
freedom of religion. Section 35(1) of the 1979 Constitution states
that "every person shall be entitled to freedom of thought,
conscience and religion, including freedom to change his religion
or belief and freedom (either alone or in community with others,
and in public or private) to manifest and propagate his religion
or belief in worship, teaching, practice and observance/'
This provision was copied uncritically by the 1999
Constitution, but there are problems even with this basic
provision. Freedom of religion seems to be narrowly defined as
the freedom to choose a religion. Implicitly, the freedom to choose
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not to have any religion does not seem to be protected by the
Constitution. The greater problem is with young people under
the age of eighteen whose freedom of religion is to be exercised
on their behalf by parents, who must choose the religion that they
should be taught at school. Their choices ignore the militarized
nature of family relations that could manifest here in the form of
torture, physical and mental, of those children who do not share
their parents7 religious beliefs. Once again the family and the
educational institutions are being used to regulate the freedom
of religion without examining the anti-democratic character of
these institutions.
Although Nigeria is a secular state, there have been efforts
to identify the country as a religious state, but these efforts
have been successfully resisted to some extent. Biko Agozino
and others conducted research for Mass Mobilization for Social
and Economic Recovery (MAMSER), a government agency, on
the politicization of religion and its consequences in countries
such as India, Pakistan, Spain, Ireland, Sudan, and Lebanon as
a warning to those who were bent on politicizing religion in the
country (Toyo 1989). The continuing politicization of religion
in the country has resulted in many " religious clashes/' such as
the "Maitatsaine riots, the Zangon Kataf, Kafanchan and Tafawa
Balewa riots'7 in northern Nigeria (Sako and Plang 1997).
Contributors to Ethnic and Religious Rights in Nigeria, edited
by Festus Okoye and published in Kaduna by the Human Rights
Monitor (1998), contend that the increasing incidents of religious
conflict in the country are linked to manipulation of religion by
colonial officials followed by politicization of the volatile issue
by neocolonial elites. In the first chapter of the book Sam Egwu
argues that religious identity should be recognized as a problem
instead of being seen simply as a taken-for-granted fundamental
human right. Another contributor, Y. Z. Yau, analyzes the parties
involved in most religious conflicts: the state and polarized
religious groups. Yau argues that, far from being neutral, the
state should be seen as a partisan actor in these conflicts. He
warns that the state should not treat migrant beggars (Almajerai)
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who flock to religious zealots for alms as repressively as it treats
religious militants.
Most of these religious conflicts take place in the north, but the
phenomenon of secret cults that are no less religious in character
takes place mostly in southern universities. Also, in the north
and the south, superstitious beliefs in spiritual warfare abound.
People decorate their houses with charms or blood-stained
paintings of Jesus Christ to ward off evil spirits. Books that teach
people how to fight and win spiritual "battles" sell very well. The
consequence is not only lack of trust in other people but also loss
of faith in the ability of Nigerians to solve their own problems.
Families are torn apart by accusations and counteraccusations of
sorcery and witchcraft or demonology, resulting in high rates of
mental illness and even murder.
Also in the south, some traditional rulers use secret cults to
intimidate citizens in their localities and extract fines from them
for offences such as playing music all night long or harvesting
new yams from their own farms before the ruler ordains that the
harvest is ready. Some of these cases end up in court, with the
citizens claiming that they no longer indulge in nature worship
and that the traditional ruler was abusing their human rights by
forcing them to abide by such rituals. In many such cases the
churches provide lawyers for the defence of their members in
court.
It is for such reasons that the Political Bureau set up by
General Ibrahim Babangida to moderate the national debate
on the political future of Nigeria reported that most Nigerians
rejected notions of diarchy (civilian-military joint rule) as well
as triarchy (civilian-military-traditional rule). According to the
report of the Political Bureau, "as regards traditional rulers, we
cannot see in which way their inclusion can provide a unifying
force... They compete against the nation for allegiance, represent
a force against the principle of popular democracy and are
dysfunctional reminders of national differences" (1987, 78-79).
Just like the educational institution, the religious institution
helps to sustain the militarization of the family by preaching
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doctrines that recognize the man as the undisputed head of every
household. The duty of the woman is always that of obeying
and serving the commander-in-chief of the house, and his only
responsibility is to love and care for her.
The dangers of militarizing religion in the country were
highlighted by the ongoing adoption of sharia as the dominant law
in many of the northern states of Nigeria. Christians all over the
country and pro-democracy activists have been calling for a halt
to the adoption of what they regard as Islamic fundamentalism
in parts of the country. Muslim politicians who are making
a case for sharia have tried to reassure them that it would be
applied only to Muslims. Agozino and Anyanike (1999) have
contributed to the debate by arguing that it is wrong for some
of the governors to declare that their states have become Islamic
states, since Nigeria is governed by a secular Constitution that is
supreme. Although sharia has always been allowed to operate
as a customary law, it was restricted to civil matters, while the
Nigerian penal code was applied in cases of criminal offences.
The declaration of sharia by some states in the country
has been followed by vigilante groups who try to enforce strict
adherence to segregation of men and women in public, even
though such segregation was required only in the homes of
Muslims in the past. It is feared that the vigilantes might begin to
demand the segregation of public transport according to gender,
to the disadvantage of women, who would have their freedom of
movement curtailed. Moreover, a strict enforcement of the dress
code might lead to the sexual harassment of women, Muslim and
non-Muslim alike, who prefer not to wear the veil. Already one of
the local governments in a state that adopted sharia has ordered
unmarried women and widows to get married as proof that they
are not prostitutes or face ejection from the local government
area. The sharia issue is part of the overwhelming militarization
of civil society in Nigeria.
Kayode Fayemi, in a paper presented to the DFID West
Africa Governance Team in April 2000, has explored this sharia
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controversy from a more holistic perspective that encompasses
all of the social, economic, and political underpinnings of the
phenomenon. For him the sharia debate has to be located first
within the problematic identity politics prevalent in the country.
In this regard the central question has revolved around the
nature of the Nigerian state and the definition of citizenship.
These fundamental issues, debate on which has hitherto been
suppressed or scuttled by successive military administrations, are
now openly expressed by the newly found democratic freedom
in the country. Fayemi goes further to conceive of the sharia
phenomenon in terms of the power struggle that has engulfed the
country since the return to democratic rule. This power struggle
has pitched the "political north/' which dominated national
politics for much of the postindependence period, against the
rest of the country. "Disappointed" northern elements that were
the forces behind the presidency of Obasanjo now use sharia as a
weapon to deal with him.
Yet another explanation for the sudden rise of the issue has
been linked to the perceived leadership vacuum in the north and
the possibility that the propagators of sharia are using it to fill this
void. One of Fayemi's (2000) many explanations that corroborated
our own position on this issue is that sharia represents "a
response of Islamic fundamentalism to a growing Christian
fundamentalism under a 'born-again' Christian President." A
disturbing thing about this Christian fundamentalism, from the
standpoint of Muslims, is its fundamental opposition to Islam,
unlike the stance of established denominations such as the
Catholic, Anglican, and some Pentecostal churches, which have
been more accommodating in this regard. That these Christian
fundamentalists have dubbed the present government as God's
government—in clear violation of constitutional provisions
designating Nigeria as a secular state — does not help matters in
any meaningful and peaceful way.
Finally, the sharia question, according to Fayemi, must be
understood in socioeconomic terms as a demonstration of the
lack of faith in the "democracy dividend" by those involved in
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the sharia carnage, most of whom have been the greatest victims
of the political and economic mismanagement of the country.
All of these explanations are credible and carry enormous
weight. Our contention, however, is that the militarization of the
"national psyche/' again to borrow from Fayemi (2000), makes
it impossible for Nigerians to initiate democratic processes to
address and resolve these fundamental issues.
The Judiciary
Ideally, the judiciary is one of the bastions against arbitrary
power. In Nigeria, however, the institution has become
completely militarized. Apart from the usual doubts about the
independence of the judiciary, especially under a military regime
in which the executive and the legislative arms of government
are one and the same, successive military regimes in the country
have tried to colonize this vital organ as well by using special
military tribunals to try cases that would ordinarily be handled
by normal courts. This issue was addressed by lawyers and
activists in a book published by the Kaduna-based NGO Human
Rights Monitor (Okoye 1997).
In the first chapter, "The Military and the Administration of
Justice in Nigeria/7 Chris Abashi (1997) traced the history of the
search for justice in Nigeria from colonial days to the present.
He noted how the administration of justice became increasingly
militarized under British rule with the introduction of both
armed force and militarized law enforcement agents, in contrast
to precolonial societies. He analyzed section 6 of the 1979
Constitution, which vested the judicial powers of the federation
in the courts: the Supreme Court of Nigeria, the Court of Appeal,
the federal High Court, the High Court of the states, the High
Court of the federal capital territory, a Sharia Court of Appeal of
a state, and a Customary Court of Appeal of a state.
The Constitution did not mention magistrates, customary
and sharia courts, or special military tribunals specifically,
but subsections VIII-IX cover "such other courts as may be
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authorized by law to exercise jurisdiction on matters with which
the National Assembly may make laws" and "such other courts
as may be authorized by law to exercise jurisdiction at first
instance with respect to which a House of Assembly may make
laws." These were the subsections abused by successive military
regimes by authorizing the trials of civilians in military tribunals.
The most notable instance was the kangaroo trial of Ken Saro-
Wiwa and eight other Ogoni activists who were hanged for
murder following a conviction that did not allow any appeal.
Abashi (1997) also reviewed the Bill of Rights provisions in the
Constitution designed to safeguard due process in the judiciary.
Nigerian military regimes, he discovered, flouted every one of
these provisions, including the simplest one, that cases should
be heard in public. According to Abashi, judges now decide
cases in their chambers without regard to due process. A panel
headed by a justice emeritus of the Supreme Court, Kayode Esho,
produced a report in 1997 detailing numerous problems ranging
from corruption to excessive militarization of the judiciary. Up to
the time of writing this chapter, the civilian government had not
released an official report of the panel.
The trend was set by the Constitution (Suspension and
Modification) Decree, 1966, which stated that
any decision, whether made before or after the commencement
of this decree, by any court of law in the exercise or purported
exercise of any powers under the constitution or any enactment
or law of the Federation or any state which has purported to
declare or shall hereafter purport to declare the invalidity of
any Decree or of any Edict (in so far as the provisions of the
Edict are not inconsistent with the provision of a Decree) or
the incompetence of any of the government in the Federation
to make same is or shall be null and void and of no effect
whatsoever as from the date of the making thereof.
It is noticeable here that "Decree" and "Edict" are capitalized,
while "court of law" is not.
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Abashi (1997) noted the irony that, in spite of their
authoritarianism, the standardization of the courts in Nigeria
was accomplished by military regimes. Moreover, the excesses
of the military are quite understandable, given that soldiers are
trained to use force to resolve matters speedily and efficiently.
This sounds like the ideal bureaucracy of Max Weber, but, as his
critics have shown with the example of the Nazi Holocaust, an
institution or process that is fast and efficient does not necessarily
guarantee justice. The sad situation in Nigeria is that even the
police are authorized to shoot suspected criminals on sight. Also,
due to speedy arrests without sufficient evidence, the prisons are
overcrowded, with the majority of inmates awaiting trials for
years on end.
Arguing that more democratization is the only guarantee for
the rule of law, Abashi (1997) quoted the late dictator General
Sani Abacha to emphasize the decay in the Nigerian judiciary.
According to Abacha,
a just and fair society must enjoy a trusted judiciary. A judiciary
that is not insulated from political control or financial pressures
is soon weakened and put in disarray. Under such conditions
brigandage replaces societal orderliness and the right to life and
property. The judiciary is a vital custodian of our individual
liberties. While no constitutional system or the instruments
that govern it can be perfect or made watertight against human
abuse, we demand that our judges be courageous, impartial
and honest. In recent times our judiciary has been especially
subjected to the strains and pressures arising from ethnic,
political and social considerations. The events immediately
preceding the annulled presidential election illustrate the
aberration, which ha[s] intruded into our judicial process.
We had the puzzling and unpleasant experience of our High
Courts delivering contradictory judgments on the same issue
within the same period, depending on where the litigation was
instituted and by whom. (Abashi 1997, 24)
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A careful reading of Abacha's speech reveals an attitude of
loathing toward the judiciary. Nigerian soldiers refer to civilians
as "bloody civilians/' meaning that they are not disciplined and
thus not efficient. It is part of the military's self-appointed task in
politics to discipline Nigerians, including judges, to make sure
that they deliver judgments with immediate effects as in wartime.
Abacha was surprised that the courts gave contradictory verdicts,
but that is part of the democratic process that the courts must
uphold. That is why there are appeal courts and the supreme
court, but dictators will not trust independent-minded judges,
which is why they make decrees ruling out the possibility that any
court will challenge them even on the ground of incompetence.
Yet the problem is not caused only by the military. Corrupt
judges and lawyers, after all, draft the draconian decrees that
help to militarize the Nigerian judiciary.
Just as Nigeria inherited its legal rules from imperialist
Britain, so too the law courts in neocolonial Nigeria continue
the colonial policy of administering repression and maintaining
inequality by force. This oppressive legal practice was opposed by
Nigerians right from colonial days by refusing to go to court and
preferring to settle disputes in traditional settings or by venting
their anger on the infrastructure of the courts. This was the case
when Aba market women burned down Native Authority courts
in 1929. The defiance of Nigerians later manifested itself in the
refusal of the Zikists, a group of fiery young nationalists, to plead
before a colonial judge. They were convinced that the colonial
court had no jurisdiction to try the case because the matter was
between Britain and Nigeria. More recently, Ken Saro-Wiwa
advanced a similar argument when he was tried by what he
called a kangaroo court.
As the United Nations Fact-Finding Mission to Nigeria
stated in 1996, the Civil Disturbances [special tribunal] Act of
1987, under which the Ogoni nine were judicially murdered, was
not valid because it violated the right to a fair trial. Although
the Nigerian Constitution had a provision for such a tribunal to
be set up, it required a commission of enquiry that was never
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set up in their case. The defendants faced enormous prejudice,
given the fact that they were tried in two separate groups for
the same charge. The request by the defence to play a tape in
which the military governor of Rivers State pronounced the men
guilty even before commencement of the trial was refused by
the tribunal, showing how biased it was. Similarly, the tribunal
refused the introduction of contradictory video evidence given
by a prosecution witness. That the defendants were denied the
right of appeal made the trial deficient in the dispensation of
justice.
The haste with which the Provisional Ruling Council (PRC)
confirmed the death sentences indicated that the outcome was
determined in advance. Moreover, the PRC confirmed the
sentences even without receiving the transcripts of the trial. The
failure of the tribunal-appointed lawyers to present a case for
the defendants before the PRC (after their own chosen lawyers
had withdrawn due to military interference) indicated that the
appointed lawyers were not representing the interests of the
defendants. The fact that a military officer was a member of the
tribunal meant that its independence was compromised. Even
when the defendants instituted a suit in the High Court asking
for a suspension of the tribunal, the tribunal ignored it and
continued (Campaign for Democracy 1998).
It is not surprising that the Nigerian military prefers a
repressive role for law. This, however, is not an exclusively
military practice, given that the colonial and neocolonial civilian
administrations share this preference. One of the first things
that the Tafawa Balewa government did in office was pass the
Banking Act of March 1961, aimed at liquidating the National
Bank of Nigeria, on which the opposition government depended
to finance its activities. Fortunately for the opposition, Justice
Daddy Onyeama was bold enough to rule that the law was null
and void. But that marked the end of judicial independence in
the country.
The judicial crisis deepened when Samuel Ladoke Akintola
was constitutionally removed from office as premier of the western
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region, following a petition by the majority of the members of
the Western House of Assembly to the governor, Oba Adesoji
Aderemi. Rather than respect the Constitution, Akintola sat tight
and announced that he had unilaterally removed the governor.
The newly appointed premier, Chief Adegbenro, then took the
case to the House of Assembly, seeking a vote of confidence
in himself. Before any vote could be taken, the supporters of
Akintola started a fight that ended in the breaking of the mace.
Prime Minister Tafawa Balewa promptly ordered the police to
disperse the members with tear gas. He went on to summon
parliament, which declared a state of emergency in the western
region, with Sir Moses Majekodunmi, a federal minister, as the
administrator.
With the help of the NPC-NCNC alliance, Akintola was
reinstated as premier, while the regional NCNC leader, Chief
Fadahunsi, became the new governor. The federal government
did so even though the matter was still sub judice. Akintola had
gone to court, during the emergency, to challenge his removal.
As expected, the federal courts nullified his removal, but the
case went to the Privy Council in London, which ruled that the
removal was constitutional and that Chief Adegbenro was the
legitimate premier of Western Nigeria (Agozino 1989).
The ruling of the Privy Council was ignored by Balewa and
Akintola, and instead the plan to annihilate the opposition was
rigorously pursued. Thus, in September 1963, Justice Sowemimo
told the nation that his hands were tied and that he had no
choice but to convict Chief Awolowo and his co-leaders of the
opposition to long terms of imprisonment for alleged treason. If
the strong and mighty could be bruised in the internal struggles
of the ruling class, then one can only imagine the fate of the
powerless masses. An example is the case of Tiamiyu Banjoko,
who was arrested on suspicion of breaking a windowpane. He
was still awaiting trial for the seventh year when the chief judge
of the former western region released him (This Week, March 28,
1988).
The courts seem to understand their role as that of main-
taining order by keeping the people in check without worrying
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much about the actions of the rulers and their agents. This is
especially the case under military regimes when all manners
of unchallengeable decrees are heaped on the people. The only
serious effort to control elite crimes came with General Murtala
Muhammad's Corrupt Practices Decree of 1975, which created
the Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau and special tribunals
to try those suspected of corrupt practices.
However, before the tribunals were established, the 1979
Constitution replaced the decree with the toothless Code of
Conduct Bureau and Code of Conduct Tribunal. The same
military government that was hesitant to prosecute millionaire
thieves did not waste time in storming the popular musician Fela
Anikulapo-Kuti's home with soldiers, who caused the death of his
mother, a foremost leader of Nigeria's struggle for independence
(Martins 1998). The same repressive measures awaited students
who protested that the government of General Obasanjo was
trying to commercialize education.
The second republic inherited and maintained this tradition
of judicial repression. With the excuse of looking for the gunmen
who had snatched some money from a multinational company
in Apapa, the police gathered sixty-eight innocent poor people,
detained them overnight, and then squeezed them into a security
vehicle meant for a maximum of twenty-eight. They were driven
to court and left in the scorching sun all day, and fifty of them
suffocated to death. This was on March 3, 1980. Public outcry
forced the government to bring the police officers to trial, but, as
expected, none of them was convicted of any wrongdoing. Six
weeks later, on April 26, more than 120 peasants were murdered
in Bakolori. Their crime was that they had dared to ask for
adequate compensation before multinational companies could
take over their farmlands. Not even one police officer was brought
to trial for this crime, even though the president of the country
came from the same state as the farmers. The same police force
was to stand watch while what one of the officers described as
a "cooperative mob" burned Bala Mohammed, special political
adviser to the governor of Kano State, to death on July 10,1981
(Usman 1982).
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These are mere snapshots from the judicial records of the
second republic, a regime that was inaugurated by judicial fraud.
To settle the quarrel among the leading bourgeois contenders for
power, the Supreme Court " discovered" a new mathematical
law claiming that two-thirds of nineteen states equal twelve. This
method of winning elections became fully developed during
the 1983 elections, when some petitions alleging fraud were
dismissed on the technical ground that they were not properly
filed, while other petitions with similar technical defects were
allowed. The same internal struggle among the elites was the
reason Jim Nwobodo used the colonial law of sedition—the crime
of the Zikists —to jail Arthur Nwankwo, the author, who was
lucky to be freed by the federal High Court on the ground that
the law on sedition was contrary to the freedom of expression
guaranteed in the Constitution.
Generals Muhammadu Buhari and Tunde Idiagbon
overthrew the second republic, and then got tough with
millionaire thieves and innocent people alike. They launched
the War against Indiscipline (WAI) on the assumption that
ordinary Nigerians lacked discipline, and that they needed to be
regimented and taught basic sanitary practice by force. The two
dictators sacked many judges, allegedly on health grounds. Chief
Justice Sowemimo confessed to This Week of March 28,1988, that
the judiciary was "sick" and that what the government was doing
was "an exercise to rekindle the credibility of the judiciary."
The regime made drug-trafficking a capital offence and
immediately executed three young Nigerians as a deterrent. The
militaristic tribunal that tried them did not allow any appeal.
Under the two dictators a judge went to the hospital bed of
Fela Kuti to beg forgiveness for sentencing him to prison on the
orders of the military when there was no evidence against him.
In almost all the states of the federation today there are armed
patrols of soldiers and police officers authorized to shoot to kill
on sight all those suspected of criminal behaviour.
Soldiers and officers still go on rampages against the civilian
population, justifying this abominable behaviour with the excuse
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that they were trained to be "mad dogs/7 Idiagbon and Buhari had
jailed many second republic politicians for corrupt enrichment,
until General Ibrahim Babangida overthrew them in August
1985 and gradually released all the politicians, before locking up
journalists and executing those whom military tribunals found
guilty of trying to overthrow his government. General Abacha
drove this militarization of the judiciary to the extreme extent of
using tribunals to settle old scores and eliminate rivals in his bid
to succeed in office.
The Economy
The militarization of the Nigerian economy dates back to the
scramble for territories by European multinational companies.
The Royal Niger Company was the first colonial power that
owned the country, ran its own army and police, and fought
to repress resistance to the penetration of the interior by British
traders at the end of the slave trade. When the British colonial
administration took over the coercive role from the company
to help maximize its profits and competitiveness against other
European rivals, the colonial police and colonial army became
the instruments for the repressive economic exploitation of
Nigerians.
Evidence comes from the Women's War against Colonialism
in Eastern Nigeria in 1929. The women were not simply protesting
against attempts to tax them without democratic representation,
but also directly attacking the properties of the multinational
companies in the region, destroying local authority courts, and
attacking the stooges of colonialism otherwise known as warrant
chiefs. The women were massacred by the colonial police
because they dared to challenge the double squeeze of Nigerians
by the colonial economy, which guaranteed steady increases in
the prices of manufactured goods and steady decreases for raw
materials such as palm oil, from which the women earned the
bulk of their incomes. A similar fate awaited the coal miners
at Iva Valley in Enugu, who were mowed down for daring to
demand a fair wage in support of the struggle for independence
from Britain.
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The Campaign for Democracy (1998) concluded its A Special
Report on Nigeria by stating that "the state of the economy
profoundly veers off the path of sanity. Like a rogue economy
it is like a bandit state where consumption overlaps production,
reward is to the indolent, order is macabre and reproduction is
only of looting of future credit/7 In fairness, observers will say that
this is a most unmilitary state of affairs, given that the military is
usually associated with discipline, order, and efficiency. Sadly,
when an economy is run like a battlefield, the result is that there
will be widespread demolition of basic infrastructure, general
disregard for the rules, an atmosphere conducive to looting and
pillaging, and an attitude of winner takes all.
The above view was strongly demonstrated in a paper
presented at the International Conference on New Directions in
Federalism in Abuja, Nigeria, March 15-18, 1999, by J. Kayode
Fayemi of the Centre for Democracy and Development (CDD).
In his paper, "Entrenched Military Interests and the Future of
Democracy in Nigeria/' Fayemi argued that, contrary to the
received wisdom that Nigeria was democratizing irreversibly,
there were indications that military officers were scrambling over
booty and that the influence of militarism in Nigerian politics
went beyond the handing over of power to a retired army general
whose party won the presidential election of February 1999.
Given the overwhelming role of the military in the transition
process, Fayemi pointed out that there was a need to go beyond
the simplistic debate over whether the military is the armed
wing of the oligarchy or the oligarchy itself. Instead, the military
"mindset" itself should be explored to see how militarism
has become hegemonic in spite of the individual intentions of
specific military officers. Fayemi suggested that the emergence
of the "bureaucratic-economic militariat" could be traced back to
the discovery of crude oil in the country, and the way in which
the military tightly controlled the oil industry for the purpose
of political patronage and primitive accumulation of capital,
sanctioned by decrees that claimed to be making the economy
more nationalistic at the same time that it was increasingly being
cornered by the military top brass and their cronies.
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In fairness, some will argue that senior military officers
and leading politicians all over the world are always targeted
for recruitment by big companies, precisely because they can
use their strategic skills and government contacts to help such
companies become more competitive. The difference in the case
of Nigeria is that one retired army officer is able to own and
control a conglomerate of thirty-five companies with interests in
banking, shipping, textiles, and, of course, oil.
Further evidence of the militarization of the economy comes
from the London-based newsletter Africa Confidential in its edition
of April 2, 1999, which reported that, prior to their retirement,
Nigerian army officers used their dictatorial powers to line
their pockets and those of their families and friends. The report
indicates that the president elect at the time, General Olusegun
Obasanjo, was not happy because General Abudulsalami
Abubakar awarded eleven oil exploration blocks and eight
oil-lifting contracts soon after the presidential election. Out of
the eleven exploration blocks only one went to an indigenous
company with a track record in the industry, Amni International,
whose chairman, Sard Bello, is the father-in-law of General
Abubakar's eldest daughter. Emmanuel Edozien, the economic
adviser to General Obasanjo's winning party, is a director of the
company.
Other companies were awarded similar licences due to their
military connections, including Anchorage Petroleum (Chief of
Defence Staff Air Marshal Al-Amin Daggash), Dajo Oil (Chief of
Army Staff General Ishaya Bamaiyi and leading oil trader Mike
Adenuga), Ozeko Energy Resources (Chief of General Staff Vice
Admiral Mike Akhigbe), Totex Oil (Brigadier Anthony Ukpo
and Texaco), Malabo Oil (former Minister of Oil Dan Etete, who
uses his Ghanaian pseudonym, Kweku Amafegha, and senior
diplomat Alhaji Aminu). Many of these companies lack expertise
in oil exploration. However, according to the Guardian of May
11,1999, the Nigerian military dissociated Al-Amin Daggash and
Ishaya Bamaiyi from the controversial awards.
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No matter how brazen the primitive accumulation of capital
by military officers appears in Nigeria, we must not forget that
the problem goes far beyond the military as such to include
militarization of the wider civil society, even when military
officers are not directly involved. There are widespread reports
that the multinational oil companies have their own armed
security guards, and that they import weapons for the police
and the army to use in intimidating the people in their areas
who are demanding compensation for the degradation of the
environment. This is in addition to the lopsided spending on
"security" in the national budget, as Table 4.1 shows.
Discussions with traders in Nigeria during our fieldwork
revealed a militarized mindset that threatens the democratic
tradition of haggling in the open market. According to the traders,
police officers routinely arrest them and threaten to shoot them
unless they part with their goods or money. Those who resist are
intimidated by tales of people whom the police have shot and
later claimed to have been armed robbers. Young traders often
succumb to this intimidation and lose their money or goods.
The traders themselves imbibe the ideology of force by arming
their own vigilantes to keep watch over their shops at night and
execute as "mice" those who trespass with the intent to steal.
On a different level, organized labour is subjected to dictatorial
regulation even when it is simply challenging corruption that is
killing the economy. This was the case during our fieldwork when
it was reported that workers at the Enugu State-owned Daily Star
had gone on strike to demand more financial accountability from
the army-appointed director of the company. The managing
director reacted by sacking the striking workers, including
senior journalists on the editorial board. The workers rightly
pointed out that only the board of directors had the power to hire
or fire them. The managing director reported the incident to the
military administrator of Enugu State, and he drove to the scene
"with immediate effect." On seeing him the workers naively
started cheering, thinking that he had come to support their call
for accountability at the newspaper, which had been reduced to
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Table 4.1: Federal Recurrent Budget in Million Naira
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Source: Federal Republic of Nigeria, Budget of Transition Press Briefing
(cited in Ibeanu 1998).
an occasional weekly due to financial mismanagement. To their
surprise, the administrator asked the workers to step to his right
if they wished to go back to work or to remain on his left if they
did not wish to return to work. Of course, everyone wanted to
return to work, but the military administrator was not satisfied.
He asked for a list of the ringleaders of the strike and called out
their names one after the other. The strike leaders were publicly
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humiliated and horsewhipped before being told that they had
been fired. The workers went to the state High Court, and it ruled
that their sacking was null and void and of no effect. The military
government refused to accept defeat and went on to appeal the
ruling, until a visit by judges of the Court of Appeal to the state
house managed to convince the administrator to withdraw the
case and reinstate the workers with compensation.
This form of repression becomes more severe when workers
become vocal about the need to democratize the whole society
instead of concentrating on the usual demands for fairer wages.
This was the case when the National Union of Gas and Petroleum
Employees went on strike along with the National Union of Bank
Workers in protest against the undemocratic annulment of the
June 12th presidential election that Chief Moshood Abiola had
won. The union leaders were clamped into jail without trial for
more than five years, and because the Nigerian Labour Congress,
the umbrella workers' organization, supported the pro-
democracy strikes the military government sacked the executive
of the congress and appointed a sole administrator to run it
for five years, 1994-1998. Unfortunately, as always, some trade
unionists collaborated with the military by supporting decrees
that disqualified experienced professional trade unionists from
standing in union elections. Such anti-democratic unionists have
also been reported to use intimidation and outright violence to
silence their opponents in the unions, while others even try to
bribe union members with food and other gifts for votes.
CONCLUSION
Follow-up of this information could be conducted in the form
of further research combined with democracy literacy classes,
national seminars on the democratization of everyday life,
and an international conference on the relationships between
militarization and civil society.
Seen as a whole, the project is a democracy audit of the
country, starting with pilot fieldwork and a report highlighting
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issues to be included in the curriculum for a series of democracy
literacy classes in selected locations. Proceedings of the national
workshop and the international conference, along with the
original report of the fieldwork, will be published as a guide to
groups and individuals who may wish to build on the findings
by carrying out similar audits of democratic processes in an
educational framework broadly defined.
We recommend that a group of three researchers/activists
be set up in each of the six states visited and funded for three
years to coordinate the project in their areas. They would
employ two full-time research and education officers (twelve
in all) from the fund. This would ensure that the paradoxical
observations highlighted by the preliminary research will be
investigated more closely and documented in greater detail
for the purpose of developing an educational programme. The
proposed programme could help to disseminate the findings of
the research and thereby help to stem the spread of militaristic
ideology in civil society.
As stated above, the education programme could be
implemented through a series of radio programmes that addresses
the public issues of democracy. This could be accomplished
through the implementation of thirteen episodes of thirty
minutes each on Radio Nigeria Kaduna because of its wide reach,
with possible syndication by other radio stations in the country.
This should be expanded at some point to include television
programming to reach wider audiences. A monthly literacy
journal could be created to allow all the groups to contribute
articles addressing the curricula of grassroots democracy literacy
classes. This would also include monthly enlightenment lectures
through which face-to-face discussions could occur.
An annual democracy literacy conference should also be
funded for all the groups and the foreign-based partners to
review progress. The preliminary researchers should be retained
to serve as consultants on the project, and to act as the foreign-
based partners of local researchers and educationists.
This project and related activities will, we hope, bridge the
gaps between academic and organic intellectuals in the local
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communities in the way that Walter Rodney (1969) suggested,
by holding " family discussions" in the universities and schools,
over the radio and television, on the pages of newspapers, but
also on street corners, in back alleys, in places of work, and in
market squares.
NOTES
1 The critique of gender politics within the Black Panther Party by
Michelle Wallace, author of The Black Macho, informed our decision
to share this project equally, even though it was originally contracted
to one of us. We thank the Centre for Democracy and Development
for funding this project at short notice. Thanks also to the Criminal
Justice Group in Liverpool, John Moores University, for providing
one of us with replacement teaching during a sabbatical, affording
ample time not only to finish editorial work on a book on migration
patterns but also to travel to gather material for this chapter. We
also thank colleagues, family members, and friends whose generous
support and assistance supplemented our limited resources during
the field trip.
2 The fact that Ayu later went on to serve a military regime as the
education minister who challenged the University Staff Union was
not lost on us.
3 Act Cap 10 Laws of the Federation 1990.
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The following chapters were written by men forcibly confined in
Kirikiri medium and maximum security prison in Lagos. All the
authors were given the option to use pseudonyms or their real
names in this book. They all chose to publish under the names
given to them by their families. Many thought that their stories
and their names needed to be heard. Through this book their
lives are no longer anonymous numbers trapped inside prison
yards. These chapters (with the exception of "Patriotism: Illusion
or Reality?" by Osadolor Eribo) were handwritten in Kirikiri in
2003.1 transcribed them and then translated them from Nigerian
pidgin English. The chapter by Clever Akporherhe was verbally
stated in the PRAWA office (upon his release) while I transcribed
it, verbatim on his behalf. Major efforts were made to maintain
the original messages and aesthetics of these writings. These are
men who exhibited immense amounts of courage and integrity
while I worked with them in Kirikiri. Despite the hardships they
face each day, they continue to work toward educating those
who are not in prison about the inhumane realities of their lives.
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CHAPTER 5
ANOTHER FACE OF SLAVERY
Osadolor Eribo
After the abolition of slavery and the slave trade towards the end
of the eighteenth century, people around the world, particularly
the black race, were gladdened in body and in mind because it
marked the beginning of the end of a savage and barbaric era.
But little did the people of Africa and Nigeria in particular know
that in less than a century would come a period of decadence,
a society that is reminiscent of the era of slavery. The "elites"
in Nigerian society returned to the continent and came to see
themselves as our messiahs, sent here to guide and take us safely
to the promised land —an epic of civilization; instead, they led
the larger society astray with their selfish and uncompromising
attitudes. The attitudes of the political bigots in this country have
created a riotous environment, an unparalleled state of insecurity.
There are fewer moral values now than ever before. Nigerians
now see vices as virtues. We live in a society that has legalized
tribalism1 by calling it "the quota system." We live in a society
that sees "crimes" only as actions committed by armed robbers,
while actions committed by bureaucrats and the powerful
people in this society —such as forgery, 419 (fraud), looting of
the government's treasury and land resources, misappropriation
of funds, and dissemination of false information to the general
public —are not regarded as crimes.
This is a society that openly and readily denies its citizens
"justice." There is always one sort of governmental interference
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or the other in the court of law, which is supposed to symbolize
truth but is now a vehicle of violence. Nigerian society is openly
ruled by a particular class of people, and it has been that way
since the beginning of the postcolonial era, the so-called era of
African independence. Nigeria has become a nation that refuses
to give youths a chance. It has become a society with leaders who
are over seventy years of age, who were once military dictators
but now are "democratically" elected "presidents7' wearing
the best fabrics, showing off the newest designs, owning and
flaunting brand-new Rolex watches, estates, and fleets of cars
both in Nigeria and abroad. These are men who live gluttonous
lives in fabulous houses. They have become models of fashion
and design, often appearing on the front pages of this country's
national newspapers and magazines. All this they have achieved
with taxpayers' money and with this country's rich resources.
Strangely enough, they do not seem to make the link between
their lifestyles and poverty in Nigeria. They do not make it their
responsibility to alleviate the suffering of the masses, most of
whom live in abject poverty. The attitude of "monkey dey work;
baboon dey chop" is rampant.2 Sociopolitical and economic
insecurity, social injustice, unprecedented rates of violent crime,
and mass human rights violations are another epoch of slavery
in this African society.
The rulers of our present society have been able to achieve
such a remarkable feat in their pursuance of oppression by
capitalizing on the weakness of the people. Poverty and illiteracy
are the tools they use to keep the masses oppressed and their
own bellies full. The Nigerian Prison Service's role in this
oppression is instrumental. A Nigerian prison yard is where I am
currently held captive. Ninety-five percent of the prisoners who
are currently behind bars are from poor homes and are illiterate.
They are people who have been pushed to the edge of a cliff by
life's frustrating factors created by the elites of this nation. Most
of the victims of this society got involved in crime as a result of
their frustrations and the lack of opportunities to survive through
"legitimate" means. Many felt dejected and hopeless without
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shelter and food, pushing them into the "other side of life" and
engulfing them in it: the side of life people call "criminal." Worse
still, upon arrival in prison these people are shown cruelty,
depravity, inequality, and sheer wickedness. All basic rights are
denied: food, clean drinking water, and medical attention come
to mind immediately. Food that the government sets aside for
prisoners is almost always "diverted elsewhere." Prisoners here
are being subjected to physical and mental torture, which starts
in the police stations and continues inside the prisons. Some
prisoners arrive here half-crippled from the torture they endured
inside police stations or as a result of a hard life on the streets,
the unavailability of affordable polio vaccinations, the lack of
nutrition, or "accidents" along the way. On being brought to
prison they are subjected to psychological torture as a result of
their disability.
One question I keep pondering over is this: are these people
the most dangerous offenders in our society? If they are not,
why are they treated in this inhumane manner? Every time I
ponder over these questions, I find myself reaching the same
conclusion: they treat us like this because they can, because we
are among the poorest, most uneducated, and underprivileged
people in Nigeria. My pondering also helps me to reach a
second conclusion: the prison in the Nigerian context is not
an instrument of reformation but an instrument of perpetual
slavery and persecution employed by the privileged against the
underprivileged. It is a dumping ground for police "suspects,"
it is a place to keep those people whom society has rendered
worthless, and it is a place to incapacitate the poorest masses.
This incapacitation is achieved not only through imprisonment
but also through gunshots and chains under the pretense of
interrogation: too many prisoners have been physically crippled
through such brutalities.
Nigerian prisons are also an instrument for silencing patriots
who refuse to compromise themselves for the social ills in this
society. It is a place where innocent citizens are held captive to
cover up the misdeeds of the government. It is no surprise to
most people in this country that their "government" and police
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"force" have not been able to crack down on any assassination
cases here. So many protesters have been assassinated, and not
one case has been brought to justice. The murder of Dele Giwa,
editor of News Watch magazine; the assassination of the defunct
National Democratic Coalition (NADECO) chairman Pa Alfred
Rewane; the recent killing of Minister of Justice Chief Bola Ige;
these are but a few of the cases.
The Nigerian prison is like an ugly monster created by those
in powerful positions to destabilize (physically and mentally)
the youth and underprivileged of this nation. The penal system's
work is ensuring that this nation is left with a future too similar
to its violent past. The Nigerian prison is a mirror of Nigerian
society, where cruelty, depravity, hunger, inequality, social
injustice, and basic wickedness are the order of the day. I have
seen no clearer picture of mass inhumanity than that of the
Nigerian prison environment, and I have been a soldier at war in
several nations in my life.
Prisoners given sentences ranging from ten years to life
in prison for Indian hemp (marijuana)-related cases are still
languishing behind bars, even though the laws that put them
behind bars have been amended by the Nigerian "democratic"
government as one of the implemented changes from military to
civilian rule. Are such sentences not at variance with our present
Constitution and law? Why are these people still in prison? It
is a shame that innocent men charged with the murder of Pa
Alfred Rewane are in jail even after countless revelations and
confessional statements by government agents confirm that the
government itself is responsible for his death.
It is even more disheartening to know that veteran soldiers,
who served as Nigerian contingents under the ECOWAS3
monitoring group ECOMOG,4 with various physical disabilities
as a result of gunshot and bomb blast wounds sustained while
on peacekeeping missions in Liberia and Sierra Leone, are still
languishing in jail simply because they spoke out against the poor
medical care they received and the non-payment of their estacode
("allowances"). Some are still waiting for medical treatment and
are in need of surgery, which they will likely never receive.
Another Face of Slavery | 125
The cases I list here are but a few among so many appalling
ones I come across every day inside this prison. The typical
Nigerian prison is a place where mortal beings are metamorphosed
into lesser beings. Prisoners are stripped of the natural power
of choice endowed upon humanity; they are shown hatred and
violence. They are haunted by stigmatization both within and
outside the prison. They begin to feel dejected and hopeless. After
spending most of the productive years of one's life in prison,
one is sent back into society without any incentive or hope for
the future, and many have been maimed from torture. When
they leave prison they become " savagely wicked and cruel" in
the eyes of Nigerian society. It is shocking that so many people
know of the inhumanities and the cruelties that take place here,
yet are puzzled at the inability of ex-prisoners to become "better
citizens'7 of this corrupt and lethal society.
In light of all this, I find it necessary to reinforce this
capability: irrespective of the traumatic experiences both inside
this Nigerian prison and outside within the harsh Nigerian
society, there are those of us who continue to take back the
power of choice. We choose to resist corruption and oppression;
surprisingly and unrepentantly, we choose to remain patriotic
to the nation that has robbed us of our lives. There are some of
us who still look forward to the day when positive changes will
occur within our society.
"And the moon's fine to look at when the sun isn't there."
So says the tale of Shakespeare "Treason". At this crucial point
in time, I wish to commend the efforts of the humanitarian-
minded people and the various human rights organizations
nationwide, the non-governmental organizations, the religious
bodies, and of course the international communities for their
awareness programmes and immense contributions, morally and
financially, toward the attainment of a just society and, more so,
for the level of love you have been able to give to those who feel
dejected inside these prisons. Your networks have been our only
source of love, hope, inspiration, and "moon" to look at when the
sun is conspicuously absent.
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When I look at the good and wonderful handiwork of
nature around me, the ever-green landscape of our geographical
setting, the fertile soil, and the brilliant men and women who
live in this African nation, alongside the corrupt and selfish
ones, I tend to have a vision of truth: one where inequality and
perversion of truth will be replaced by equal rights and true
justice; where the looting of Nigerian resources and government
treasuries will be replaced by pride and nation-building; where
old and egocentric political bigots will be replaced by young,
dynamic, and invigorating leaders; where economic depression
will be replaced by industrial revolution; and, above all, where
hatred and political violence will be replaced by peace, serenity,
and equal rights. The key to achieving these dreams lies in
revolutionizing the entire social structure, in refocusing on
education, in reorienting this nation's people through the use
of intelligible and relevant African methods with a logic that
can penetrate deeply into the fabric of Nigerians and break the
shackles of this continued colonial slavery.
NOTES
1 Tribalism is discrimination according to tribal ethnicity.
2 "Monkey dey work; baboon dey chop": That is, one person works,
while another eats the fruits of that labour.
3 The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)
was formed in 1975 by several West African nations to
strengthen the West African region's economic structures.
4 ECOMOG (Economic Community of West African States Monitoring
Group) or ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) is an armed
monitoring unit set up by ECOWAS (Economic Community of
West African States) in 1990 to implement peacekeeping missions
in West African countries experiencing civil wars and other violent
internal conflicts.
CHAPTER 6
MY NIGERIAN PRISON EXPERIENCE
Clever Akporherhe
I, Clever Akporherhe, stayed in Kirikin medium security prison
for a period of one year and six months. On the day of my
admission I became seriously sick. I complained to the officer
or warden, but I was told that I would be taken to the clinic on
Monday. I arrived on Friday. In reality I was never taken to the
clinic.
On arrival I was taken to the "welcome cell" meant for new
inmates. There the prison "INTERPOL" tortured us with whips
and asked us to bend our heads while sitting on the floor. We
were about 250 men, all new prisoners courtesy of " Operation
Fire for Fire" [a police squad working the streets of Lagos}. We
were locked up in a cell meant for twenty-six people. We sat
like that for most of the day. At about 9 p.m. the general of the
prison, with headphones and a walkie-talkie, spoke to us and
issued a warning that those of us with hidden money, whether
in our anuses, pockets, or anywhere else, should hand the money
over to them immediately. Fear gripped me for the first time,
and I quickly dropped my N2,100 (equivalent to Canadian$ 21),
along with my Rapido wristwatch worth N2,500 (equivalent
to CA$ 25). Upon release they gave me N300 (equivalent to
Canadian$ 3), and I never saw the watch again. At the time
several other persons dropped various sums of money. Later we
were all searched again and asked to excrete — to "make sure"
that no one was hiding money inside his anus.
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The sleeping arrangements were terrible, as we were lined
up like sardines on the ground. We did not receive any food that
day; they said that, since we were alejos ('newcomers" to prison),
we were not entitled to eat yet. Inside the welcome cell there was
one big bucket of water for the 250 prisoners, who were squatting
like sardines. They were calling us up two at a time and giving
us one cup of water each, which we had to drink immediately
and then return to our spots. If you asked for a second cup of
water, they gave you a whip instead. We were not allowed to go
near the bucket of water or even ease ourselves at the lavatory.
Inside the cell, if one of us needed to use the toilet, a big plate was
given to him to piss in before the convicted prisoners who are
made to supervise the welcome cell poured it into the sink. This,
they said, was meant to avoid making the sink smell bad, but in
reality it was meant to dehumanize their "new" prisoners.
We were woken up very early the next day, around 5 a.m.,
and asked to pray. Before the end of prayer the "morning baked
beans/7 as they call them, were brought to us, not more than
twenty beans with dry garri (a staple carbohydrate in the Nigerian
diet) scattered on top. We were not allowed to wash our hands
before and after eating; no utensils were provided. Two hours
later we were brought out and given cutlasses (machetes) to clear
the area where a lot of human waste was buried and grass had
overgrown. After the morning's backbreaking labour we were
taken back to the welcome cell without bathing.
The warders and officials are not very friendly unless they
think they can get something from you. They are usually friendly
if they know that "your people" (family or friends) will be coming
to visit you — they hope to get a piece of whatever your people
bring for you.
There was a time while I was in prison that all the mango and
fruit trees in the yard got chopped down due to the unavailability
of firewood for cooking. The contractor supplying the wood had
brought nothing. So used tires and fresh wood were used to
cook, and it took a long time to prepare the food for the 2,400
prisoners in Kirikiri medium security prison at the time. This is
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a prison built to accommodate 788 people. While the shortage
of firewood was going on in the prison, they served dry garri
twice a day —once in the afternoon and once in the evening —for
about three months; our food supply was getting smaller and
smaller because they did not have a means of cooking for us.
Even before this situation, a lot of the prisoners, especially the
ATMs (awaiting-trial males), were underfed and looked very
undernourished.
Before the shortage of firewood, the main food was dry garri
soaked in water from wells contaminated with larvae: worms
and insects can clearly be seen with the naked eye in the water.
As for the health clinic, there is nothing to write home about. It's
a mere dispensary unit: no doctors examine prisoners, and all
complaints- are met with tablets when they are available — this
for prisoners who are fortunate enough to visit the clinic. Any
prisoner who wants to go to the clinic must make it to prayers on
time; any latecomers are denied medical help. Those prisoners
who are fortunate enough to have visits from their families or
friends and are fortunate enough to get medicine from them
have it seized by the prison officers at the gate. They confiscate
it, stating that the doctor did not prescribe it in the hospital,
even though doctors rarely examine prisoners in the clinic. After
confiscating the drugs they never help you to go to the clinic for
medical assistance. Only one person is taken from each cell for
treatment each day; it does not matter how many people in that
cell need medical attention.
Daily reports of death from various cells frightened me,
and one day I complained to the authorities about our living
conditions. I was immediately taken to the solitary cells called
angola. These are cells where prisoners are punished for one
offence or the other. The cells are built for one person, but they
cram about six or seven people in. My survival was due to the
Christian churches that came for fellowship and brought in
food.
Most of the food meant for prisoners was carted away by the
officers. Aside from that, the same warders who are supposed to
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"correct" us supplied bunches of Indian hemp for prisoners who
in turn sold the drugs to other prisoners on a retail basis. After
being divided into "pinches/7 as they called it, a wrap of Indian
hemp worth N10 (10 Canadian cents) in the free world could be
sold for N60 (60 Canadian cents) inside.
Current conditions do not provide clean drinking water,
a good toilet system, or proper medical aid, and there is
overcrowding and too much torture of prisoners by warders.
Even on Sundays prisoners are asked to manually clear grass for
labour. The conditions are dehumanizing and fatal. In view of the
above facts, I appeal to the general public and to this audience to




On April 24, 1994, I heard a knock on my office door. Before I
could even say "come in/' two men entered. One of them was
my boss; I tried to read the expression on his face, but it was
blank, and I knew right away that I did not like the air around
either his looks or the looks of the man standing next to him.
That man was following closely behind my boss, not allowing
any distance. Initially that did not have any meaning to me. My
boss's voice echoed, "Mr. Chris, I don't know what it's all about.
I just can't understand the message. This is a police officer, and
he would like to see you at the station. You better go with him for
a better explanation. I don't get mixed up with such stuff, don't
expect me around." Then he continued, "Constable, this is Mr.
Chris; he stands a better chance of giving whatever explanation
you need." With two strides he was out of the office.
The constable said politely, "Sir, your attention is needed at
the station for a little briefing on a certain matter that requires
your attention. You only need to come with your car, just to make
things easier for the both of us. I promise to give you a helping
hand where necessary. I am waiting."
I had no prior experience with police stations. Neither could
I remember or think of anything in my life that would give them
reason to want or need to speak with me. I raised my head to
speak to the constable, but no words emerged. Like most people
in Nigeria, I was terrified of the police. That fear is especially
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escalated among those who do not have massive life savings.
I allowed the policeman to drive my car in order to regain my
composure. He parked the car in a parking lot I had never seen
before. I looked at the inscription on the wall of the building; it
was bold enough to convince a fool: Barbeach Police Station. The
words I had wanted to say were no longer available or necessary.
I had entered their turf. I swallowed my words and without even
a gesture followed him inside.
Four men were called out from the police cell. We were
arranged in a single row before the station officer. I recognized
one of the men as the man who had sold me my car, Segim
Oladokim. He was my neighbour about two years ago. I lived
in a building that had four flats [apartments]. The man who
sold me the car occupied the two flats upstairs, while the two
flats downstairs were occupied by my work colleague Ademola,
Mr. Williams, and me. Oladokim had five cars in our parking
lot, among which he placed one for sale. We agreed on the
price, and documents were handed over to me after settlement.
Two days later Oladokim himself brought certified papers on
"change of ownership" and handed them to me. All the while
I had nothing on my mind, no doubts about the legitimacy of
this sale —it did not occur to me to raise any suspicion. He was
a good man, managing a big business, but at the time I didn't
know his secret.
It dawned on me as these men confessed that the car that
Oladokim had sold to me was not only stolen but also sold to
me under the pretense of doctored documents. The car was
connected to a criminal case investigation in Alagbon, Lagos
State, of robbery and murder. After being tortured for some time,
the men had confessed to this robbery.
I spent two weeks in the police cell, unaware that these
were days of grace given to me to find whatever [monetary]
"settlement" I could for a job well done by the police. It was
unfortunate, but I didn't understand the smallest signals and
secrets of this procedure and the affairs in which I found myself.
My level of understanding at the time had no reference to how
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the criminal justice system is run in this country. I got to know
about it at court, through a tip offered to me by one of the police
officers (that, if I had found " settlement" for the police officers,
I would not be on my way to jail), but at that point it was too
late. Naively, I expected to be released, believing that my role in
their murder and robbery case had been cleared before the police
through the " confessions" made by the robbers, leaving me with
little or no statement to make: their "confessions" had, as far as
I knew, answered all their questions. If wishes were horses, I
would have collected an "award" for innocence. I never knew
then that my journey was just about to begin.
On May 8, 1994, I was taken to court. That morning the
police officer in charge of my case called on me and said, "My
hands are tied, the case is the sensitive type.11 have to charge and
take you to court to defend your case. You better make necessary
preparations for your bail. We shall be at the court in the shortest
time." I brightened, believing the case was over. I was ready to
"pay" the police constable some money to show my appreciation;
he had refused to accept any money from my wife. I did not
know then that the offer made by my wife was too small and that
he considered it an insult; thus, he had already decided to "deal
with me." He never knew I was poor. He had concluded from
the size of my office and from his personal scale of assessments
given my appearance that I was not. How I wish I was as big as
that empty office and as powerful as the misconceptions that led
to my misfortune.
The story changed in court. I heard the judge say "that you,
Mr. Chris Affor, on the 17th of May, 'robbed' one Mr. Anerson
Ebere of Mob Odade Street, Agege Lagos, a 505 Peugeot Saloon
car valued at 'N500,000.' You are hereby to be remanded at Kirikiri
medium prison without bail under section... of the Constitution
of the Federal Republic of Nigeria awaiting DPP [Directorate of
Public Prosecution] advice." This essentially meant that I would
be sent to prison on a "holding charge" to await trial, and that I
would wait until the DPP brought me to court for trial. I turned to
look for the policeman who once promised to give me a helping
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hand if necessary. He was nowhere to be found. I have no words
to describe the type of rings [shackles] they hooked upon my
hands and legs. The weight alone is enough to frustrate a beast.
In my head I could not understand what was going on. What
shall I say to my people? Will they hear that their son is now a
robber? The stigma associated with that in Nigeria is too much to
carry. Whom shall I call for explanations? Who will listen to my
voice? Is it possible to believe me instead of the police and the
judge? Who is the liar — the police, or the judge, or the man found
with the stolen car? Possibly, they will know the truth later. Who
will convince them? The police? Who will solicit on my behalf?
Will they believe him? I must be a dreamer if I believe I can easily
be vindicated. The evidence appears so obvious in this court of
law, but no one is ready to decode the real facts. How I wish the
ground could have opened and swallowed me up just to satisfy
the intensity of my desire for a hiding place; even the world is
too small to contain me. I was absolutely devastated. My job? My
wife and kids? All gone? Is there a God in heaven? Why should
he fail to intervene in this case? Possibly he is not aware. But he
knows all things. Why must my case escape his eyes? Possibly it
is my fault. But what is the fault? Too many questions — and not
a single answer.
From that moment on, nothing else seems to have stayed in
my memory for long. I noticed it was drizzling outside; after that
my memory is absolutely blank. The only thing I can recollect
was when I was guided by two strong hands through a mighty
gate made with some rugged type of iron, part of which was
used to construct the railway. I heard myself answering certain
questions absentmindedly, and I later found out they were the
correct answers. The police here seem to have forgotten how to
smile, staring as if they have nowhere to go, and they also seem
to have forgotten what it means to be decent in appearance. The
world immediately began to feel very different, a place where
too many things occur that are absolutely unnecessary.
My wife immediately arranged for a lawyer. She received
assistance from the policeman in charge of my case, the same
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man who had arrested me and promised to help me, also the
same man who had promised to release me from prison within
a month. According to that police officer and the lawyer he
had helped us to find, my robbery charge was pending, and a
"holding conviction" by the judge made it possible for them to
keep me in prison as long as need be. That "conviction," I am
told, was later determined unconstitutional by the Court of
Appeal. The lawyer was paid, and hopes for release were high.
To cut a very long story short, we found out that the lawyer
was a duper, conspiring with the police to extract money from
people in prison, abandoning cases early, and claiming he had
been "trying his best," eventually forcing people either to pay
him more money or to begin looking for another lawyer out of
frustration. He abandoned my case after it went through the
Court of Appeal, so my release proceedings were left without
representation. I ran out of money, so my only option was to
begin looking for another lawyer after my wife gathered up more
funds.
The second lawyer we hired could not produce results because
he did not possess a passing idea on the series of protocols and
procedures made in a holding charge by the Nigerian judiciary,
despite the fact that it had been deemed unconstitutional by
the Court of Appeal. He was what we call "a baby lawyer": we
knew him to be a lawyer, but quickly learned that lawyers have
credentials regarding the type of cases they can handle. He was
not a criminal lawyer and did not disclose this information at
the time of consultation. I know now that he is a divorce lawyer
and never knew how to produce results in criminal justice
proceedings. At this point I had spent three years in prison, still
believing stories from lawyers, and their words of assurance and
reassurance, all to no avail. I eventually understood that I needed
to find a different path.
My wife and I decided to consult a Nigerian human rights
activist as a result of our lack of funds. His response to our lack
of money was "Goodbye." To cut that long story short as well,
the DPP had not "looked" at my case for eight years. The judge
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refused to make any efforts in my case, claiming that it was illegal
for him to interfere with the activities of the DPP even though it
had failed to perform its "duty" for eight years. It is illegal to
interfere in the activities of the DPP, even as a judge, after eight
years as a matter of protocol? But the same protocol failed to
recognize as illegal my detention without trial. Who is to blame,
the man in detention or the chains of judicial impropriety? Who
is to bear the brunt of this inactivity that receives the blessings of
government protocol?
A detailed look into the actions of the Nigerian criminal
justice system brings to light incredibly ironic occurrences. Right
now I have been in prison for ten years without trial. "Visiting
judges'7 come into the prison to listen to the complaints of
prisoners, especially those awaiting trial for ten years or more.
This exercise is performed four times a year and includes official
visits by chief judges for the state. They come into the prison,
promise to look into the "affairs of the awaiting-trial inmates/7
once in a while they release a few people, and then they leave.
Too many of us have been awaiting trial for more than ten years;
too many of us continue to wait for a trial or for a judge to have
mercy during a visit and let us go.
We have come to learn that the presence of these judges is
only one among a series of government protocols. It has nothing
to do with release. Can you imagine judges inside these prison
yards, parading themselves around in the presence of absolute
injustice? And not seeing the irony of their actions because they
are so wrapped up in the name of government protocol? They
claim to "sympathize77 with prisoners weeping for want of justice
and suffering from illegal detentions signed by those same judges.
How can they reconcile my situation and sympathize with me
when my detention warrant has been declared unconstitutional?
Is the judiciary divided? Do they not communicate with each
other? Where is the supremacy of the Court of Appeal over lower
courts? Why does the penal hierarchy enforce only itself inside
the prison while failing to keep its police officers from brutal
behaviours and its courts from imposing unjust sanctions?
My Story | 137
I believe that the lower courts, the high courts, the Court of
Appeal, and the Supreme Court are all under the same judiciary.
What brought about the differences in their applications of the
law? If judges are helpless in the presence of absolute injustice,
then what chance do I, a prisoner, have of ever getting out of this
prison?
I strongly believe that, if judges wanted to access authority
to redeem the filthy judicial situation and its misuse of the
prison system, they would know precisely how to obtain such
power. They say that their hands are tied, and they say that in
the presence of prisoners awaiting trial? Whose hands are tied?
Besides, if the hands of judges are tied, judges who are still sitting
in the seats of judgment, who are still being endowed with the
power to interpret and apply the law, then is the law itself tied?
Who shall restore justice?
It is important that the actions of these judicial powers be
brought to light before one can determine measures to restore
authority and reinstate absolute independence worthy of a
constituted judiciary of a nation. And this " investigation" needs
to occur before international penal reformers come here to
"help" us build a more efficient system of justice. Does a more
efficient system give judges more power? How can we trust
them, in light of how they have misused their power already, not
to implement a more brutal system? It is irrelevant to talk about
the existing incremental impropriety, because when things have
fallen apart this badly the centre can do nothing to hold things
together. Little wonders come forth when one sees the Court of
Appeal declaring certain rules unconstitutional while the higher
court and the lower court, the police, and the prisons continue
to implement a holding charge. My "learned friends," where is
your knowledge?
I do not know when I have ever been as extensively
discouraged or depressed as I have been with my experiences
of the failure of justice in this country. It is frustrating to meet
up with the predator's objective and the perpetrator's mandate.
Prison has no particular agenda for implementing anything
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good. It is meant for dumping and wasting natural potentials
and human resources, purposefully built to deprive the poor of
the right of real success and in fear of possible future rivals for
power in society. Prison retains that social mantle of authority
and kingship that allows for a very limited and predetermined
number of heads to wear the crown.
This system does not have an agenda for reformation
or rehabilitation. It is a system of practical exploitation and
subjugation through constant pressure. The threat under law has
a hidden purpose, and that is to subdue the poor by reducing
them to a state of irresponsibility and slavery. As prisoners
fight for their rights and their needs, those who wear the crown
continue to ignore us.
The public has become too willing to accept as true anything
the people in authority claim to be true. What they do not know
in detail is that prison life is dreadful and would frighten a lion.
Nothing is normal here. Nothing makes sense here. What a
confused world. The meals are tasteless. The food is constantly
undercooked and permanently cold, and portions seem to have
a way of reducing themselves constantly. We don't eat food, we
swallow food like pills with our eyes closed. We have no choice;
it is our only source of survival. We eat what we hate and enjoy
what we dislike, all in the name of survival. If I were a criminal,
all this might be a reminder of the magnitude of my actions.
My situation, along with those of thousands of awaiting-trial
prisoners, is unique. We have come to see how this system is
deliberately cruel and openly oppressive. How can I live without
past reflection? How can I not think that this raw distribution
of injustice can be deadly if the raw desire for vengeance is not
properly checked? How can I, or anyone for that matter, begin
to look for rehabilitation within the realm of a revenge-based
system?
Criminal justice in Nigeria is not concerned with guilt
or innocence. In this system the police are experts at "getting
confessions" out of individuals and continue to do so to improve
their own careers as efficient officers. Receiving injustice from
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the seat of justice, from discredited social and justice systems,
is not only corrupt but has also left too many citizens in this
African motherland in colonial prisons. We are here through
the measures of the Constitution that is meant to protect us. It is
the same Constitution that legalized colonization and the slave
trade. How does a constitution-based system relate to Africa? It
never has had, and most likely never will have, our best interests
in mind.
I long to see the day when the law shall avenge the poor and
bring justice upon the ruling class, which for too long has subdued
and subjugated the less privileged to a state of social, economic,
and psychological breakdown. Their political ambitions are not
rivalled by those of the lower class, and never will be as long as
they continue throwing us into prison with the help of their laws
and their institutions of "justice/'
If you go around the prison, a little personal survey will tell
you that the man you see is either a poor man or the son of a
poor man. The wealthy are not here. All the so-called accused
rich people we see in the media who have been arrested for fraud
and brutality have rarely been seen inside Nigeria's prisons.
The law has a way out for them. It is a selective distribution of
justice, always in favour of certain classes of people: "corporate
criminals" with "corporate immunity" by "corporate law" for
the "corporate class."
An illustration of what I am trying to express about Nigeria
today is found in the Kirikiri maximum security prison in Lagos
State, the number one prison in Nigeria, they say. As of today,
despite a series of celebrated criminal cases in the media, and
despite the newspaper headlines reporting fraud, duping, drug-
dealing, and political and economic corruption, this prison holds
six "political" detainees from the Abacha [military dictator] era
for human rights violations. Where are the others? They say that
in theory "nobody is above the law." They also say that there
is "equality before the law." But practical justice continues to
exonerate the rich. And if the lower courts fail to keep the rich
out of prison, the higher courts can exert their power and release
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them. If the higher courts delay a rich man's freedom, then the
Court of Appeal will restore that freedom almost immediately,
without preambles or delays. Before you can finish saying " Where
is the man?" he will be back in his luxurious family home feasting
on fresh fish pepper soup. Their cases are often discharged
and they are acquitted for "want of substantial evidence" and
"lack of proof." Justice in this country is for "just us"—just the
poor in prison and never the rich accessing the power of higher
courts. This system values money over human life and dignity,
exonerating corporate criminals and condemning powerless
individuals to years of jail time.
The solution to this problem of discredited justice is still far
from being defined. Do we now sit back and rely on the corporate
and politically powerful class to reform their own system? They
know that the imbalance of power is exploitative. The privileged
person who is not vulnerable to justice might think that prisons
give the government power to curtail crime and make their society
safer. I agree: it makes their society safer by safeguarding a small
rich population, keeping just that population less vulnerable to
competition for power. To remain safe, they must continue to
subjugate the poor in a perpetual state of slavery.
The irony for me is that all these conditions come with
"civilization." The same system that was brought to us by
"civilized" British colonialists represents one of the more brutal
aspects of life in Nigeria. I still wonder how long I will be held
behind these walls. I still wonder about my future. I wonder
what this system is really doing and where it is all going.
And sometimes I find myself wondering what this system is
maintaining and why.
NOTES
1 "Sensitive" in Nigeria because armed robbery is the worst crime a
person can commit or be accused of committing. Armed robbers
are viewed as one of the most immediate and lethal problems in the
country.
CHAPTER 8
A TRIBUTE TO SOLIDARITY: MY OASIS
Chris Affor
I regret that I don't have the words to express the depth of my
gratitude; I would have started to write a heart-felt appreciation
long overdue that put " golden tears" on my face even at a
dreadful point of emotional and psychological breakdown, when
I was eaten up by pessimism and despair, attracting insanity
and suicide. There came a turning point, the PRAWA Circle,1
which introduced prisoners to calculated, sifted, and refined
reconciliation, social reformative measures aimed at diluting
tension, anger, depression, and raw desire for vengeance. We
prisoners together have learned to survive as one. Words do not
come close to describing how happy I, as well as many others,
feel, and we recognize and respect the presence of solidarity,
as if it was divinely destined to comfort dejected souls like cold
water on a thirsty tongue and like good news about home from
a distant land.
Prisoners are rejected people, abandoned by society and
ignored by the world as a whole. Social discomfort with the
unknown leaves those " tagged" as prisoners to become the
representation of deadly character descriptions, meant for
beasts. As a prisoner in Nigeria I feel enslaved by events and life
circumstances so unfavourable that humiliation and dejection
are evident enough to form sweat on squeezed faces like those of
the Caihdihh Ancestral Shrines.
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It is not possible to interpret this experience through words
or facts, for when one is not free true expression of the self and
of experiences is tantamount to crossing an ocean in your own
room. Those who have travelled along this particular road can
better tell the story, for my life has left a mark on my palm, a
constant reminder of the bitter past of cultural imbalance, yet I
still maintain hopes for days of plenty. I must not fail to confess
that solidarity here has altered my life for the better, giving me
a restoration of identity, dignity, and self-esteem. But I have
been emotionally, physically, and psychologically discredited
by the judiciary, and my imprisonment has been the result of
judicial impropriety through selective distribution2 under the
rich colours of the law.
In light of oppression, solidarity among prisoners and those
from the outside world who work with us gives us the strength
to deal with the negative public sentiment in regard to prisoners.
I continue to believe that something good can come out of all
this. The sad reality is that in here there is an overabundance
of fertile minds, of vision-oriented and talented people, hidden
behind bars. We are unduly isolated because of "unknowns/7
with derogatory and even deadly security measures meant to
put our credibility as human beings in question.
Whom can you believe? The convicted and disreputable
fellow with more than substantial evidence to attract a position
behind bars, or a respected public servant with a standing
reputation in the court of law? It is not simple. We refuse to let you
believe that it is simple. This is a puzzle that requires considerable
scrutiny to solve. There is one standing assurance: our longevity
must speak for our survival in moments of severe deprivation
and degradation. It is incredible that solidarity can accomplish
something real inside the walls, bringing support to prisoners
to survive psychologically, physically, socially, and emotionally,
constantly giving prisoners new energy to keep fighting back
in the war for power and control. In recognizing our present
state as pawns in the hands of our criminal justice predators, we
gain power. Always less than satisfied with the "barter criminal
justice system" (the perpetrators' choice), we remain aware.
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True solidarity inside prison includes sustained efforts to
put out the contemporary penal inferno, which serves the ruling
class, the political predators, those few individuals who have
privatized the seat of power, representing their interests while
misrepresenting the poor and the decency of all people regardless
of social position.
In the end heartfelt smiles from prisoners inside these
dungeons go a long way toward repairing deadly emotional
and psychological damage inflicted by punitive people and
their systems. In here, lingering at the corner of life's destitution,
living at the heart of life's wilderness, we are dedicated to putting
smiles and optimistic looks on the faces of the poor and helpless
victims of this unjust system.
Sincere solidarity among prisoners makes me feel like a
human being in the midst of my life's wilderness. Solidarity
among prisoners and members of our human rights community
is proof that walls cannot distance us from society for long, and
every time community members sit with us, every time they do
not distance themselves from us, every time they fail to show
signs of distaste or disgust in our presence, every time they are
comfortable in our company, so lively that they seem to have
forgotten we are prisoners, we are reminded that we continue to
be human beings.
Solidarity does not allow us to feel like lesser people. In
a prison yard, inside the grasp of the law, meant to humiliate
the less privileged, we look upon solidarity with community
activists as the closest thing we have to brothers and sisters.
Solidarity gives us a certain degree of confirmation, reminders of
our humanity, touching our spirits. It is special and now deeply
engrained in my heart.
My oasis comes through my recognition of the humanity
around me. No matter how hard the prison works to dehumanize
us, when I look at the people in prison with me I experience
humanity. As we sit inside this prison yard, hungry but in
discussion with each other and sharing knowledge, we find
ourselves instilling a great and versatile presence of mind, defining
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success, and getting a sense of accomplishment by helping each
other. Presenting each other with the fact that knowledge is
power, and realizing that power cannot be circumvented by
circumstantial disasters and tribulations, we learn that the light
of knowledge knows no failure. Life is a stormy career from
creation until death, but the gift of unconditional planting is the
mother of unconditional harvest. Solidarity inside this prison is
the unconditional planting of life.
Whatever we have done as people becomes our identities and
is instituted as a perpetual reference for recognition—positively
or negatively. It is human to respect people from whom we can
gain something positive. The giver in us is to be honoured for
the wonderful aspect of giving. Recognition of this giver brings
a happiness that cannot be wholly reciprocated at the other end
of the spectrum.
How I wish I was gifted with better language to decode and
express my experiences, and the power I have seen in solidarity.
For now, I continue to refuse to be broken emotionally and
psychologically. I am covered by this oasis and have found
immunity.
The authorities have tried to subdue the poor in this country
to a breaking point where there will be no future available to us.
They are wasting the natural resources of my nation, and I along
with the others who are less privileged cannot see the light in our
lives beneath the walls of this unjust criminal justice system. It
does not have a legal agenda; its practical purpose is exploitation
and subjugation through constant pressure and threat under
the colour of their laws. With this agenda against the poor, the
criminal justice system is purposefully aimed at reducing people
to a confused social, emotional, and psychological state.
The law that is supposed to uphold, maximize, and update
the interpretation of justice does not cast a light that shines on the
poor in this nation; the law is an instrument of deliberate injustice
and practical corruption. The judge's gavel has been sold for a
cut of the "national cake/' The truth is now for sale, with a price
tag that only the wealthy can afford. You need to be a millionaire
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to contend for your rights in a country where no one cares. The
"fundamental human rights" of people who do not have money
have been buried and forgotten. We see rules and regulations
and constitutional rights on posters displayed on walls in police
stations, prisons, and government houses, and on streetlight
poles, paid for by foreign funders in another "awareness-raising"
campaign. Some of these fundamental human rights are pasted
on the walls in several police stations I sat in. Those posters say
that bail is free, that you should not give or collect bribes, and
that the police are your friends. All that took place in those police
stations underneath such signs contradicted these messages.
It is painful that, despite all these posters and campaigns, the
Nigerian police, judiciary, and prison system can keep a suspect
in prison for ten years without trial and no means of earning
bail. In the name of a "holding charge," even after the Court of
Appeal has declared such a charge and subsequent detention
unconstitutional, we continue to sit behind prison walls.
If some of us succeed in raising our heads above these waters
of injustice, and find a way to leave this prison yard, after all
the years our families and friends (those of us who have them)
spent raising fortunes to get us out, there is no compensation
for wrongful imprisonment, for years lost in prison without trial.
In the hands of police, lawyers, and judges lie our uncertain
fortunes.
I take some satisfaction from knowing that my truth has
been told. My power lies in speaking out: while the constitutional
justice system is credited permanently to the rich in our society,
the poor remain voiceless because they have "nothing to offer." I
know I have something to offer. My experiences speak volumes
about the nature of the law and how it functions to oppress the
underprivileged.
I am a Nigerian, but at times I find myself daydreaming about
reasons to doubt my citizenship. If I am a Nigerian, or a citizen of
any nation, then where is my access to fundamental human rights
as accorded to me through my citizenship? I feel as if I belong to
no country in particular. I think that prisoners all over the world
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must feel like this. If we do belong to a nation, then we should have
access to an embassy for help, a source outside the system that
could properly represent our best interests. If I were a true citizen
of this nation, then I wouldn't have been "used" to implement
colonial injustice. My citizenship has nothing to offer me. I have
been used in this "African" experiment with "constitutional and
colonial justice," subjected to rules that have been abused by a
series of "according to taste" constitutions, meant to subjugate
the poor while fulfilling some kind of established "unconditional
pledge for national loyalty."
NOTES
1 The PRAWA Circle is a programme that Viviane Saleh-Hanna
implemented in several Nigerian prisons to enhance solidarity
among prisoners and aid in building survival tactics for those serving
time in Nigeria. In addition to community-building, the programme
allowed prisoners to identify their own needs and to work toward
helping each other meet them. In Kirikiri medium security prison
prisoners suggested the implementation of a literacy component to
the programme; as a result prisoners who had literary skills began
to teach others who did not. In the maximum security prison literacy
was not a concern; community-building was considered to be the
main priority; thus, its circle programme consisted of discussions
and debriefing sessions.






I am Mr. Igho Odibo, forty-two years of age, and am currently
held in Kirikiri maximum security prison in Lagos, Nigeria. I
was a student in Germany, studying computer assembly, before
I contracted HIV/AIDS and was deported back to Nigeria in
1998. I was handed over to the Nigerian federal government
for medical treatment, but they did not provide any. I have
started to battle with the federal government along with battling
my illness. I am currently in prison, where there is no medical
treatment available to me at all. It's only some non-governmental
organizations and human rights agencies that once in a while
give me assistance and care for me. I have become a Christian in
prison and have handed all hope over to Christ. I am currently in
prison for an alleged robbery offence but have yet to face trial. In
Nigeria, if you don't have money, you cannot come out of prison,
sometimes for life. I have nobody coming to see me and nobody
to take care of me, it's only Christ Jesus.
Mr. Igho Odibo
Kirikiri Maximum Security Prison
Lagos State, Nigeria
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CHAPTER 10
THE SYSTEM I HAVE COME TO KNOW
Sylvester Monday Anagaba
June 18, 2003
I was arrested on April 17,1992.1 was taken to the Lagos State
Police Command in Ikeja, where I was hung like a monkey from
the ceiling, with my hands holding up the rest of my body. This
was done to me twice for long periods of time in one night, all
in the name of "investigation." The second time they strung me
up to the ceiling I passed out, only to wake up the next morning
with my hands and legs paralyzed from the hanging, and my
whole body covered with bruises and blood. I was ordered at
gun point to sign a statement. I do not know who wrote it or
what it entailed. I refused but was hit with a police baton. My
IPO [investigating police officer], Sergeant Otein, was the man
beating me; he even threatened to kill me if I refused to sign the
statement. I did sign it later. That same day the leader of the team
of men [police] handling my case came into our cell (there were
many of us in one cell that night). They chose thirty people and
sent them out to be killed by the OCSARS [officer in charge of
special anti-robbery squad] in the Lagos State Police Branch.
Since they believed I was innocent, they told me that they did
not want to kill me but at the same time could not release me
"free of charge," as bail is not free in their police station. They
asked me to contact my family and to ask them to bring N40,000
[approximately CA$ 400] for bail. I did contact my family, and
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they did manage to collect the money, and my family did pay the
"king" of the other policemen in that station.
On April 21,1994, very early in the morning, I was taken to
court by my IPO, Sergeant Otein. When I tried to enquire why I
was not being released, he told me that I had given the money
to his superior. I should have given him the money, because his
boss had eaten the lion's share of that money; for that reason
I will suffer more than Job [the biblical figure]. At court they
charged me with stealing a necklace from a woman. I have been
remanded, by the magistrate, to Kirikiri maximum security
prison on a "holding charge."
I was taken to Area F Police Station at Ikeja on court
order because I raised up my hand at the court to demand my
adjournment. At Area F Police Station I was put inside cells with
hardened armed robbers. It was like hell, because I have never in
my life had cause to be behind a police counter. I was pushed into
a cell that afternoon. The police had informed the suspects inside
that cell that I had refused to give them money. I was mocked
by the other prisoners and told what the future had in store for
me. I was eventually able to make an impression upon the hearts
of that hungry mob, and we had a conversation. They had been
deprived of their freedom, most for years ranging from one year
to four years. They had been in police custody, warehoused
inside police cells the whole time. I spent five months and two
weeks in that police cell. I paid N10,000 to be taken to court on
September 20,1994. That was my ticket out of the police cell and
into the maximum security prison in Kirikiri. I have been here on
a "holding charge" awaiting trial ever since.
At the "reception" of this penal institution, which the guards
on duty call "country no vex" (i.e., "Welcome to the country
where you cannot get angry"), everybody registered under his
family name. After the exercise of recording our identities was
complete we were taken to the "solitary blocks." We were put
into cells, eight of us in an eight-by-ten-foot cell. It stunk like
hell; the odour was so overwhelming that five of us vomited
immediately upon entering it. It was like entering a hole that was
The System I Have Come to Know | 151
a natural extension of hell. In the cell there were no mattresses,
there was no toilet and no means of getting water, the floors were
littered with cigarette butts, ash, and spider webs covered with
dust and sweat from the prisoners who had used the cell before
we arrived. The place was hot; there was no ventilation except
the door with crossed iron bars. Worst of all, there was no light,
and we had no food. The guard claimed that our number was not
included in the rations for that day. They took all the money any
of us had and made it clear to us that ownership of money is not
allowed in prison.
The next day we were put in blocks [small halls filled with
people]. The sight of my roommates was sickening. I remember
one man in particular who was not dead but decaying. Scabs
covered many people, from head to toe, and some even had scabs
on their palms. My block was another eight-by-ten-foot cell, but
this time we were fifteen in number. Now I knew why the first
cell was called the "solitary cell/'
That night my journey of exile in this country began. I
couldn't sleep, as we were packed in like sardines. At one point
we were told that we would be taking turns sleeping, since there
wasn't enough room for us all to lie down on the floor. When
five people were asleep five would mount sentry, while the
remaining five would sit down. At about two in the morning I
was still standing when one of my new friends, Felix Okoedion,
fell over. All efforts to revive him were fruitless. We shouted for
the guards to come, and they asked us to "handle the situation"
until daybreak. Felix finally gave up at 3 a.m. We rang the iron
door with our feeding pans but to no avail. The next morning we
were beaten with batons, gang-chained with shackles, and taken
to solitary confinement, where we spent three months without
questions or medical care, and we were given half of the measly
rations of the miserable food they give to the rest of the prisoners.
These are just some of the experiences I have had with the penal
system in Nigeria; they are the ones that come to mind when I
reflect upon my time here. It has been difficult.
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CHAPTER 11
MAN'S INHUMANITY TO MAN
Sylvester Monday Anagaba
Game hunting is a jungle sport, but in this inside world known as
maximum security prison men are still being hunted like game. It
is a cruel, dehumanizing mechanism they call rehabilitation; it is
a system that is nothing more than a refined method of slavery —
all the ethics of enslavement are very much alive, mostly in the
blood of the colonial slave drivers known as wardens or prison
guards.
I have been in this prison for nine years now, but something
that I cannot forget until they put me inside a grave took place
on May 20, 1995. On that fateful day there was a slaughter like
I have never experienced before or read about. Forty-three men
were murdered: that is, they were executed while on death row,
and their executions were meant to appease the then military
governor of Lagos State, Colonel Oyinlola. He ordered the killing
of men who, by legal rights, still had their appeals or the rest
of their trials to go through. They were killed in cold blood by
the blood-thirsty men who rule the affairs or dictate the events
inside this prison and the society in which this prison functions.
On that day the yard was peculiarly cool and deserted. Even
the officer in charge of morning feeding and the checker who
confirmed prisoner numbers each day never performed their
routine activities. It was not a usual morning. At about 9 a.m.
there were sounds of chains, as if a gang of slaves were being
led from one section of the yard to the other to be taken out for
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execution.1 They started firing at 10 a.m., but by 1 p.m. there was
a break, as a quarrel had erupted between the state governor
and some radical lawyers who were protesting the deaths of
their clients, people whose cases were pending in the Court of
Appeal. Surprisingly, at 1:30 they continued their slaughter,
and by 4 p.m. they had killed forty-three men. The prison yard
became a mortuary that day, and it was an experience I can never
forget. The next day we saw thick blood on clothes and watched
human meat being chopped [cleaned] off the bullets that had just
executed many men.
Years later, on May 5, 2003, my lawyer filed a suit at the
Federal High Court on fundamental human rights challenges,
asking the court if they intended for me to perpetually remain in
prison. All efforts to secure freedom had been thwarted by that
court for so many years. In most cases the Nigerian court uses
long adjournments and bureaucratic jargon to frustrate lawyers
who actually try to help prisoners.
But I must keep persevering, I cannot languish in this place.
Lately, I once again filed a third motion at the Ikeja High Court,
asking for information on the standing status of my case, only to
learn once again that the Directorate of Public Prosecution (DPP),
the police, and the court have yet to locate a case file for me.
They do not even have a charge sheet, and, worst of all, my name
did not appear in the computer in the Ministry of Justice. The
judge ruled that, since she does not know what they are charging
me with, she cannot give me bail. When I read that judgment I
became physically ill.
The warders [prison guards] here don't want us to leave. It is
clear in their actions and their attitudes. They cannot help us, and
when we try to help ourselves they try their best to frustrate us.
There are minimal prisoner welfare facilities. Most help comes
from Nigerian non-governmental human rights organizations.
Some provide us with written materials, but few provide medical
care, which is most needed since so many prisoners are sick,
and the few who manage to go to the prison hospital seldom
get checkups and too often are told that there is no medication
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available. If medication is available, they ask us to buy it from
them. Those who cannot afford it die. The federal government
does supply some medication for prisoners, but too often prison
guards take it home for personal use or for resale —it's their
"Christmas bonus/' This year (2002) so far, eight people have
died in the prison hospital due to the unavailability of drugs or
neglect by the nurses, who come to "work" to sell clothes, shoes,
and wristwatches to prisoners and staff, not to take care of sick
prisoners.
In a phrase, in here it is about survival of the fittest, and the
fittest are defined through monetary wealth. The richest of the
poor people in prison are the ones who have a chance. If you
do not have money, you cannot survive, as the food in here is
minimal and horrible. The government does supply prison staff
with some soap, mattresses, slippers, insecticides, and so on for
the maintenance of prisoners, but all these things seem to belong
to the prison guards. They continually tell prisoners to just use
what we have and to buy what we need or want. Extortion is a
way of life here. Prison guards tell us that the government has
not paid them salaries for months, and, if we the prisoners have
some money somewhere in our possession, they will find it.
When they don't get paid we get searched, and family members
get harassed for money if they come to visit. In order to see us
they always have to pay the guards for access anyway. This is
one of the reasons there was a riot on April 13, 2003, at Kirikiri
medium security prison. Prisoners are sick and tired of such
harassments. The situation is tough for us, and what keeps some
of us alive is the hope that it will end some day: one way or the
other, it will have to end some day.
Sadly, Motivating Monday, as the prisoners and community organizers
and activists used to call him, passed away in 2004 inside the maximum
security prison hospital. Prisoners have confirmed that he was told
before he died that he had earlier been diagnosed with AIDS. Prison
officials failed to inform him of that diagnosis until shortly before his
death. They did not provide him with any medication; in fact, medication
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made available to prisoners has been consistently sold by the prison
guards who work in the Kirikiri maximum security prison hospital.
May Motivating Monday's soul rest in peace. His smiles will always be
remembered. His positive attitude, despite all the hardship, oppression,
and injustice, prevails in the minds of those of us who met him, got to
know him, and were inspired by his strength.
NOTES
1 Outside the walls of Kirikiri maximum security prison there is a
wall of metal barrels between the wall and a long line of poles that
have been dug into the ground. This is the shooting range set aside
for executions. While the barrels prevent most of the bullets from
hitting the prison wall, the sounds of death echo throughout the
prison yard while the executions are taking place.
CHAPTER 12
PATRIOTISM: ILLUSION OR REALITY?
Osadolor Eribo
Under a government that imprisons any man unjustly, the true
place for a just man is also a prison.
— Henry David Thoreau
The epoch of political instability, chaos, ethnic rivalry, and the
continued existence of colonial boundaries defining nations in
West Africa gave birth to a period of armed insurgence and war
in the West African countries of Liberia and Sierra Leone. This
unrest culminated in military peacekeeping operations by many
West African countries, and these efforts were spearheaded by
Nigeria.
As a patriotic person with the burning desire to ensure that
the world can provide dignified life for all, irrespective of class or
nationality, I saw it as an honour when I was short-listed by my
country's army for military peacekeeping operations in the war-
ravaged countries of Liberia and Sierra Leone. These peacekeeping
operations can best be described as peace enforcement operations,
which proved to be worse and more complex than any outright
war. During the process of peacekeeping/enforcement, on
behalf of defenceless citizens, we were met with stiff resistance
from full-fledged combat engagements. As soldiers we saw it
as a point of duty to defend innocent and defenceless citizens
and their properties. In short, these countries were under severe
rebellious torrents.
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The atrocities and crimes against humanity that we witnessed
were appalling. We saw the burning of people's homes, the
looting of properties, the raping of women, child soldiering, and
the maiming and cutting off of hands and limbs of defenceless
citizens. These actions were perpetrated by the various rebellious
factions, who met outright condemnation by the international
community and the United Nations. Hence, the ECOMOG
Operation, to act as a counter against all odds, worked to restore
normalcy, peace, and stability, and to create room for democratic
governance as sanctioned by the international community. But
little did we, the peacekeeping soldiers, know that we were acting
on our own, and at our own risk, not on behalf of the Nigerian
government. Time and the events that transpired eventually
proved this to us.
We encountered stiff resistance from rebellious factions
carrying the same deadly weapons that we carried. The result
was massive death tolls and injuries incurred by both parties. I
happened to fall into the category of "wounded in action," with
a comminuted fracture of the right femur. I still don't know how
I managed to be among those who remained alive; I limped
away with much pain and grief as a result of this world's apathy
toward human life.
Those of us who were injured were taken to Cairo, where
the Nigerian army refused, first, to pay us medical severance
and, second, to provide us with sufficient medical treatment.
On our return to Nigeria, rather than addressing the plight of
the wounded ECOMOG soldiers, the state and the army began
discrediting our complaints, stating that the soldiers had not
channelled their complaints through the army properly. How
could we have channelled our complaints through the same
institution about which we were complaining? Consequently
the soldiers were charged with mutiny, conduct contrary to
good order and service, lack of discipline, and disobedience to
particular orders. We were found guilty as charged, illustrating
the state's and the army's total disregard for fundamental human
rights.
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The wounded soldiers who were patients at the military
hospital, Yaba-Lagos, were all forcefully ejected to face court
martials even though they were all in very bad physical states:
shattered bones with physical disabilities, nervous breakdowns,
battered souls with feelings of having been betrayed by the
army. On the day of judgment of the court martial a letter was
passed on to the president of the General Court Martial (GCM),
who insisted on having copies made available to the other army
generals presiding with him. I think the letter itself was the
judgment of the case, and only God knows where it originated
from—perhaps it came from a very high authority, higher than
that of the army. When the president of the GCM was passing
his oral judgment on the case he said, "the way and manner I
find you guilty is nothing I can explain/' And with that, all
twenty-three wounded ECOMOG soldiers were sentenced to life
imprisonment by a "kangaroo court/7
Paradoxically, I, a patriotic citizen of his country, a
disciplined soldier who has had no reason to be tried by
the military for any act of indiscipline or insubordination,
automatically found myself in the "inside world/' the lowest ebb
of life where mortals are reduced to nothing: the prison. Reasons
for my imprisonment: simply for complaining to the appropriate
quarters of the state about fraud I encountered in army practices
and medical negligence, a complaint that both the state and the
army authorities validated.
This was daylight robbery of justice by the state and the
army. It was sheer wickedness and barbarism! Soldiers who had
paid their dues and served humanity to the best of their abilities,
to bring about peace and political stability in neighbouring West
African states, were being treated as infidels and worthless
beings. Rather than giving God the glory for sparing the lives
of the soldiers from the torrents of bullets and shells, they chose
to dishonour, chastise, and persecute them, and even try to kill
them psychologically by incarcerating them incommunicado.
I believe these proceedings were manipulations by the state to
cover up the corruption of some influential and powerful people;
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hence, the wounded ECOMOG soldiers were used as scapegoats.
If not for their injuries as a result of service in Liberia and Sierra
Leone, these soldiers would not be where they are today.
Despite the high level of moral decadence that seems to
have consumed the world today, it gladdens my heart to know
that there are still traces of truth. The inhuman treatment and
persecution meted out to the wounded ECOMOG soldiers met
stiff opposition from a few notable individuals and human rights
activists, who saw the entire process as not just an act of injustice
but also a slap on the face of humanity, scuttling the democracy
we have all been working so tirelessly for. Notably, Chief Gani
Fawehinmi, a human rights activist, challenged the verdict of the
GCM in the Court of Appeal in Lagos. With Fawhemi pressing
for litigation in the Court of Appeal, and because of pressures
and criticisms from human rights organizations, the army and the
state had to commute the life imprisonment sentences imposed
on the soldiers. This took place in the seventh month after the
original verdict was passed. These were the new sentences:
fifteen of the soldiers were "awarded" one year in prison, five
others were "awarded" three years in prison, and three others
were "awarded" five years in prison. These revisions of the
original sentences caused the army to relocate the soldiers from
the military police cells at Arakan barracks (where they had been
held hostage for seven months incommunicado) to the Kirikiri
maximum security prison.
As one who had been convicted by the state and sent to
prison, supposedly a correctional facility where citizens are to
be remoulded into better citizens, I found out, to my greatest
surprise, that the prison has failed totally to serve as an instrument
of rehabilitation/reformation. I went on a fact-finding mission;
it began to dawn on me that I had been kept alive by divine
providence just to witness this social blight that is called prison.
Contrary to my patriotic beliefs before incarceration, I discovered
that the state needs more help than does the average prisoner.
The state that created the prison institution has got to be, for lack
of better words, absolutely sick in the mind. Prison is vindictive
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and violent, an institution that seeks vengeance and punishment.
The colonial government that "invented" it and brought it to
African soil surely was anything but "civilized."
Everything about prison is counterproductive and a million
steps backward from this present age of Homo sapiens. The state
claims that my ways are not good enough, that my behaviour is
antisocial, so it threw me into prison to be reformed and shown
better ways to live my life? At first I decided to be receptive to the
good things the state had to offer me. But little did I know that I
was at the threshold of doom and death. All that the state/prison
system has to offer its prisoners is marijuana, trickery, treachery,
deceit, bribery, and corruption, along with a host of other social
vices. In seeing this I realized that the state in conjunction with
the prison authorities works to massacre the spiritual and
psychological makeup of the masses. The plan of the prison
system is simple: lock up the prisoners, throw away the keys,
allow them to smoke their heads off (but make sure to catch them
once in a while to punish and torture them), and render them
demented and dispirited without any sense of belonging. The
system also renders prisoners docile for the remaining parts of
their lives.
My experience as a prisoner was like that of a slave, and
it was insulting to my human existence. Rather than being
receptive to their "rehabilitation," I decided to shut the doors of
my mind against the invading toxins of the state/prison system.
I had to be on guard and put all my survival instincts to use to
stay afloat, much like I had to do when I was at war. The vile
strategies adopted by the state/prison system in the breakdown
of the average prisoner served as a challenge to me to value the
life I had prior to incarceration, and I dredged up every ounce of
strength I had within me to stay alive.
I speak of the prison system based on the Nigerian context in
which I am living. I have not been a witness to the prison systems
around the world, but I know that prison is prison no matter how
you paint the picture. In the Nigerian context, sixty percent of the
prison population are Awaiting Trial Inmates (ATMs), while the
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Convicted Inmates (CMs) constitute a fraction of this population.
It was revealing for me to learn that the prison system targets
the helpless, the hopeless, and the underprivileged in society.
Children, particularly boys in this country, are vulnerable to
this penal attack. Those whose parents cannot afford to shelter
them are being raided in the streets by the police and thrown
into prison on trumped-up charges of armed robbery. There is
another category of prisoners that I have come to know as ATM
lifers, those who have been held hostage awaiting trial for as
long as ten to fifteen years.
Prisoners have been stripped of all rights to livelihood,
including the right to eat. Food is being siphoned and taken home
by members of the prison staff, and at the end of the day prisoners
are left with very little to eat. When they go to the hospital to
report sickness they are told that there is no medicine available,
yet the prison authorities sell medicine to those prisoners who
can pay for it. Basically, prisoners exist because of visitors who
bring food, medicine, clothing, toiletries, and so on. Meanwhile,
prison guards constantly extort money from visitors, and they
do so as they stand under the sign at the entrance gate that in
boldprint states that "all prison visits are free/7 Prisoners "pay"
to survive inside Nigeria's prisons, and they don't just pay in the
loss of their freedom or in the unconstitutional denial of court
appearances; they literally pay money to stay alive.
Another disgusting thing about the prison system that struck
me is the differential treatment imposed according to class, how
the rich and the poor within the confines of the same prison
walls live such different lives. Class segregation is the order of
the day: the rich flout prison rules and get away with it freely,
while the poor are severely dealt with. The rich are entitled to
numerous privileges, ranging from self-feeding (getting food
from the outside) to having sex with their female visitors in the
administrative building. In a nutshell, the rich control not only
society but also prison.
Religion also plays a role in how the prison is run. It seems that
religion is the only means of rehabilitation and reform available
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to prisoners; more so, it is the only option left for prisoners to
get themselves busy, and, most importantly, to get relief through
the religious visitors and the supplies they provide: All other
rehabilitation "programmes" in prison, such as workshops or
trade learning centres, are either grounded or ill-equipped. In
such conditions prisoners go to church or to mosque from dawn
till dusk. The doctrines presented there do not have meaningful
effects for a large number of prisoners; they simply go to pass the
time and to get access to resources.
My vision for rehabilitation efforts for the average prisoner
goes beyond mere teachings of religious doctrines — it is all about
giving people an alternative roadmap for life. The key lies in
empowerment, not in religious rituals. Rather than implementing
workshops and programmes, thereby creating avenues for
the acquisition of vocational skills as a way of empowering
prisoners, the state is busy building churches and mosques in
prison yards. Hence, many prisoners today nurse the ambition
of becoming pastors after imprisonment, and I believe that is due
to their lack of access to other vocations. When religion becomes
the only avenue for livelihood the level of tyranny becomes
more problematic. They have hijacked our freedom, and now
they have co-opted our spirituality. Of course, I cannot say
there is too much "wrong" with society having a lot of clergy,
but the unfortunate thing within the context of religion inside
Nigerian prisons is that, by the time prisoners are released (if at
all), and find their way to those churches that came to see them
and provide assistance in prison, they are often treated with a
cold shoulder. With nowhere else to go, and having left prison
with nothing but faith, prisoners end up feeling disappointed
when the church does not provide support in the community.
So many have lost hope on so many levels, and so many, feeling
dejected and duped, fall back into crime. While in prison they
were not empowered; they were "spiritualized." It is one thing
to quote Bible passages to someone asking him or her to refrain
from crime; it is another thing for the person to fully believe and
accept the passages as solutions to life's problems.
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Ironically, even when some of us are busy trying to find
better solutions to this social menace of crime and punishment,
the criminal justice system is simply not doing likewise. It is
busy frustrating the thinkers and the serious-minded prisoners
with a show of full-blown apathy. Its administrators think
that they already have the answer. They think that, because
they have an institution, the problems are being addressed. I
must commend the non-governmental organizations working
on prisoners' rights, particularly Prisoners Rehabilitation and
Welfare Action (PRAWA), for their attempts to train prison
officers about rehabilitation and prisoner empowerment. These
efforts have actually gone a long way toward sanitizing the
prison environment in terms of physical abuse of prisoners by
prison staff—although they had started flogging prisoners again
just before I left in 2003.
Much is still expected of the human rights groups, especially
prison-focused NGOs such as PRAWA, in terms of sanitization
and education of the average prisoner in the Nigerian prison
system. While I was in prison my heart bled every time I walked
by posters designed by PRAWA for prisoners with messages
such as "it your rights have been abused, please report or write
to so and so office"; eighty percent of the prisoners around me
could not read that message, let alone write to report abuse.
The posters are not conspicuously placed, and they are of no
importance because the average prisoner has yet to be educated
about his rights. So even if his rights are being violated on a
daily basis, he may not know it. Worse still, the prison system
has socialized its prisoners into believing that writing letters
voicing complaint or seeking redress is a crime; in fact, it is the
gravest sin a prisoner can commit, so much so that when caught
fellow prisoners are ready to lynch the culprit. As a result, while
the posters are a great gesture, and while the concept of prison
officers behaving humanely while working in an inhumane
system is well-intentioned, prisoners either don't know how or
don't want to be involved in grievance procedures.
I can still recall an incident that transpired in 2002 when a
team of Amnesty International (AI) employees visited Kirikiri
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maximum security prison for a fact-finding mission. Normally,
when visitors of such calibre visit the prison the authorities,
because they have so much to hide, ensure that all prisoners are
in lock-up, except for those few inmates working directly with the
system. In this instance, while the AI team was walking with the
prison warden I saw one of the AI employees having a chat with
one of the privileged prisoners who was not in lock-up that day.
After the visit I walked up to the prisoner (a lifer) to inquire about
the nature of his discussion with the white man. He said, "Oh,
he was just trying to know from me about the general condition
of the place and whether or not our feeding is good enough/7 I
quickly asked, "And what did you tell him?" He smiled broadly,
his eyes filled with light, and he answered, "Oh, of course I told
him the food is good, and everything is OK." I was silent for a
moment and could not utter a word; I almost choked, for then I
knew that his broad smile was that of betrayal, and I too forced
a smile and said, "Oh! It's OK. You're right." I had no option but
to play it cool with him, for if I had opposed him he would have
made the matter known to the prison authorities, and I need not
divulge what that could have entailed for me.
The prison system is so complex that, for the masses to
devise a catalyst with which to break it down, all hands must be
on deck. There needs to be a concerted effort among prisoners,
ex-prisoners, and civil society in bringing about an alternative
to the present criminal justice system. Unfortunately there tends
to be a wide margin between the people concerned. One reason
the Nigerian prison system is waxing stronger and stronger as
an oppressive mechanism is simply that there are no prisoners7
rights groups or programmes in prison. There also tends to be a
wide gap between ex-prisoners and current prisoners.
While I was busy resisting my period of penal colonization
with non-confrontational and non-violent means, litigation was
going on in the Court of Appeal on behalf of the twenty-three
wounded and convicted ECOMOG soldiers. On March 18, 2003,
the grounds for appeal paid off, as the soldiers were discharged
and acquitted of all the charges against them by the GCM. The
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decision of the Court of Appeal was unanimous, yet it took eleven
days for the prison to enforce the decision of the Court of Appeal
by releasing I and two others whose sentences were commuted
from life imprisonment to five years imprisonment. Whereas,
those (20 others) whose sentences were commuted to one year
and five years respectively had already served their terms.
Currently I and my military colleagues remain in a state of
distress since nothing seems to be in the works, either by the
state or by the army, in terms of our progress. Particularly, our
medical predicament is huge, since some of us still need medical
attention for injuries sustained during peacekeeping operations.
The stigmatization and intimidation we are now faced with, both
within and outside the military environment, are massive. Our
freedom and our lives are perpetually threatened.
Consequently I now have a contrary view of warfare: no
matter how refined the rules may appear, it is an archaic and
uncivilized philosophy. I have come to understand that not
all ancient philosophies are outdated and that not all modern
philosophies are civilized. In these "modern" times we use guns
to repel fighting and a repressive penal system to repel crime.
It is an act of sheer folly to use violence to repel violence, for
violence is violence irrespective of how it is painted, so no person
or group of persons, even if they are members of a state, is eligible
to be the custodian of violence.
Although the ECOMOG peacekeeping operations incorpo-
rated elements of mediation and dialogue, in a bid to reconcile
the various warring factions and to bring about normalcy, these
efforts were not fully appreciated or sufficiently used. Maximum
use of these alternatives to violence would have averted the
humanitarian catastrophes that ensued, resulting in too many
dead bodies and the irreparable effects of war on those who
survive it. "Modern" society is still very capable of conducting
witch hunts and evil rituals. The same phenomenon is illustrated
in other wars fought in other parts of the world. It is not an
element "special" to Africa.
When one makes a critical appraisal of war and the penal
system one sees how interwoven they are in terms of the violent
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solutions they offer to their respective " dilemmas/' and the
devastating effects they have on all whom they touch. Hence,
both problems may need to rely on similar solutions if true
change is to occur. Such solutions need to be non-violent in both
nature and structure.
While I was an inmate at Kirikiri maximum security prison
I got to work with Viviane Saleh-Hanna, working under the
aegis of Voluntary Service Overseas and placed for two years
in West Africa with Prisoners Rehabilitation and Welfare Action
(PRAWA). Through her I got to know about transformative justice
and penal abolition. Her work in the prison during her time with
us in Nigeria was most beneficial through the programmes she
initiated in the maximum and medium security prisons. Her
dedication and service to humanity have greatly affected my
life and inspired me to believe more in myself, a feeling that is
shared by so many members of the programmes she brought in
through PRAWA. We all love you and miss you greatly! And we
hope that more people will become involved with prison work
and the penal abolition movement. It has empowered many of us
to think for ourselves and to revolutionize our minds, and it has
shown us that there are segments of the global population who
are working to truly change oppressive mandates.
Given the circumstances that surrounded my incarceration
and the experiences I had while imprisoned, I now understand
the urgency in opposing this present form of criminal "justice/'
The state seeks vengeance on and punishment of the poor, the
illiterate, and the underprivileged — people whom the state has
failed by subjecting them to these conditions in the first place.
Unfortunately the larger society fails to appreciate the fact that
many prisoners behind bars are social rebels, people who fight
against the oppressive system that does not want to see them
exist. Since the Nigerian government and the United Nations
can negotiate with rebellious militias, why can't they extend
this practice to the average criminals and offenders in the street?
Must these rebels against poverty become rebels who challenge
the political power structures, not just the economic ones, before
they are asked relevant questions and spoken to like real human
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beings? Or is their discerned poverty an excuse to render them
helpless and unsophisticated — and thus not worth the effort?
More functional and healthy modes of justice are not
about creating an escape route for criminals or about fostering
an opportunity for the government to compromise with evil;
rather, the concepts of transformative justice and penal abolition
provide an avenue through which everybody in society gains
equal access to opportunities and rights. I do not believe that
hundreds of years ago West Africans had a worse method of
solving conflicts in society; frankly, I believe that the methods of
conflict resolution of precolonial Africa were far better than the
" modern" penal system, and this is why I also believe that ancient
philosophies are not less civilized or wrong in our era. It is true
that stagnation is the greatest enemy of nature, but for humanity
to take a step further and assume the status of Civilization we
must put under appraisal the past and the present. We need a
change away from the present penal system.
Today's society seems ever so keen to make the Western
penal system the only permanent form of justice. This system
is so big and so powerful, so controlling, that for any major
changes to come about we must all work together in unison, like
one family with diverse members who have different strengths
to offer. We must be very careful of the kind of change we wish
for and how we go about achieving it, lest we become like the
overzealous politician or revolutionary who wants change at all
cost, either by rigging the ballot or pointing the gun. The present
penal system, compared with traditional African modes of
justice, rather than taking humanity a step forward, has proven
to be a step backward and a betrayal of civilization. Therefore,
whatever the alternative to the penal system may be, it must be
devised in line with various traditional sociocultural settings of
peoples of the world.
Whether or not we have been abused by war or the present
penal system, or overall by government policies, we must not be
indifferent to issues affecting humanity in general. Change needs
to occur now for the benefit of future generations. Let us replace
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indifference with concern and apathy with empathy, so that we
can leave behind an inspired legacy for generations to come.
I strongly believe that care, love, empathy, and morality are
all encompassed in the phenomenon of patriotism, and that it
cannot stand silent in a state where irregularities have gained
wide acceptance as a normal way of life. As true Nigerian
patriots we cannot fold our hands and stand akimbo to watch
while the rich and self-centred people of the world deprive us
of our power, and violate our rights to choice and survival.
As a virtuous and patriotic citizen of the world, I believe that
true patriotism should be viewed, not only as a duty we owe
to the countries we are citizens of, but also as a duty we owe to
ourselves and to generations of unborn people, and the global
village into which we are developing.






Penal colonialism is a concept that brings forth the perpetuation
of colonialism in "former" European colonies through the
contemporary existence and use of colonial legal and penal
institutions. Colonialism implemented a form of social control
that divided, dehumanized, degraded, and conquered those
people whom colonialists aimed to exploit; it is important to
recognize that colonialists not only degraded and brutalized
those populations targeted for colonialism, but also, in that
process, created the illusion of superiority and civilization for their
people and their people's creations. Among those creations was
the penal system.
It is not surprising that nations responsible for the atrocities
that occur(ed) during colonialism are also responsible for the
creation, implementation, and widespread use of the penal system.
It is a system that relies on the degradation and dehumanization
of those whom it targets, and by their very nature the penal
system's institutions and codes target those populations that are
most vulnerable in society. Aside from the overrepresentation of
poor people and people of colour in all penal institutions, those
people who are most vulnerable among vulnerable populations
struggle and are prone to suffer grave consequences. This section
presents the experiences of those who live in poverty, those who
are developmentally challenged, and women within the penal
system. Penal colonialism, while atrocious and harmful to African
societies on many levels, imposes a high degree of oppression
upon those who are least able to defend themselves.





The reflections presented in this chapter emerge from a daily
journal I kept during my time as a community organizer and
activist inside Nigerian prisons. The experiences I had were
inundated with visual brutality, mental stimulation, and
political conversation. In attempting to keep myself grounded,
and in trying to grasp the larger picture, I found myself creating
mental snapshots of the details that eventually combined to form
a mosaic that made sense to me, according to the things I saw,
heard, and thought while I sat inside prison yards and conversed
with Nigerian prisoners. These words are an attempt to present
that mosaic.
From October 2000 to November 2002 I lived in Onipanu,
Lagos, Nigeria, and worked as a community organizer and
activist with Prisoners Rehabilitation and Welfare Action
(PRAWA) through Voluntary Service Overseas (VSO).1 Leaving
Nigeria was one of the most difficult things I have had to do.
My culture shock was greater upon returning to the West than it
was upon arriving in Nigeria. For two years I lived and worked
in a country that was extreme at all levels; it was an incredible
learning experience, a discovery mission that changed my life. I
discovered more about my own and other people's boundaries
than anything else. When a person who has grown up in the
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privileged world of the West lives in Nigeria, where people are
suffering and struggling to get the most basic things in life, one
cannot help but learn from that struggle.
I saw people struggle to get nutritious food and clean
drinking water. I saw people go to work every day on roads
full of potholes and on buses packed with people. I saw people
work in offices and banks without access to telephones, other
communication equipment, or constant electricity. I saw people
of all ages struggle all day in the scorching sun to sell what they
could so they could take food home to their families. I saw elderly
people get killed crossing the expressway because there are no
crosswalks. I saw children gathered around a single kerosene
lantern at night because there was no other light to do homework
by, and I saw too many children who did no homework because
their parents could not afford to send them to school. I saw the
same children on the streets working day and night to sell what
they could so their families could survive. I saw babies die of
malaria because their parents could not afford inexpensive
medication. I saw young people who were physically disabled
because they did not receive polio vaccinations. They were living
on the streets, and they were using handmade skateboards to
mobilize themselves just enough to beg for money. I saw people
persevere and struggle just to get by. Yet I saw a lot of smiles
and joy throughout that process of survival, along with the
frustrations and the despair. I saw the basic human soul make the
best of unnecessarily harsh living conditions in one of the most
fertile, oil-producing nations on the African continent. In Lagos,
my home for two years, the basic infrastructure is simply not
functioning—and it is home to more than fifteen million people.
The things that people did to help me, the tolerance levels I
saw them exhibit for each other's struggles and for my struggles,
were massive. The identification of struggle as a collective
phenomenon was immense. There were times when people piled
in on each other's laps on buses because there was a fuel shortage
in Lagos, the most populated state in an oil-producing nation.
During these fuel shortages the number of buses on the road for
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public transportation was never enough to accommodate the
number of people needing to get to work or go home or just go,
so people piled in on top of each other. I remember my first few
months in Nigeria when I watched in awe and kept a silent but
defensive air on the bus: "Try and get on my lap, and I will 'deal
with you-o'"! But as the months went by and I understood more
about the struggle to get by and the need for collective efforts in
accessing basic resources, I saw myself changing. That change
became conscious when a woman I sat beside on the bus one day
explained to me how selfish I was for putting my comfort level
above the need for someone's mother, father, son, or daughter
to get home before dark. I quickly realized that the Western
outlook on life is self-centred and self-prioritized. I realized that
not allowing a complete stranger to sit on my lap on the bus
meant that one less person made it home before the Lagos streets
became dangerous at night,2 and I quickly learned that this little
inconvenience for me was nothing in comparison to that of the
person who got stranded on the street. The journey of learning
had begun.
The little things that I saw changing in my thought patterns
grew beyond everyday life and brought me into a whole new
mindset. That mindset looked at the larger political scheme
and opened my eyes to the self-interests and self-promotion of
Euro-supremacist systems of governance and resource control
in relations with the global South. It got to a point where I was
dreading a return to a world that is so sufficient and so convenient
and so gluttonous with the consumption of everything that on
the surface it is able to revolve around a delusional, extremely
introspective, individualistic mentality. And I got to a point
where I became very conscious of the imperialist fact that those
comforts for the minority in the world are built on the backs and
discomforts of the millions who comprise the majority. I came
to realize and experience the fact that most of the people on this
planet live in violent poverty so that the minority can (not should)
live in excess.
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My work inside the prisons enabled me to meet people who
have been "rejected and neglected/' as prisoners used to tell me,
and I came to see on a new level that the ideals and ways of the
West are now ingrained in the control institutions and economic
structures in Africa. The criminal justice system that functions in
the self-promoting West is the same system that is being forced
upon black people in Africa. It is foreign, and it is dehumanizing,
and it is malfunctioning: people wait in prison for years before
they go to court, medical care is almost non-existent, malnutrition
and disease are killing people every day. The Western world, the
same world that colonized Africa and other continents, is putting
money into penal, social, and political reforms, and into what is
called human rights work: these reforms maintain colonial systems
on African soil, and the work of human rights as implemented
through European and American governments and corporations
ensures that the West remains well within its comfortable role
of the patriarch in Africa. I came to the harsh realization that
colonization still exists within the strong structures of global
economic control and resource exploitation. Slavery continues in
the degradation of African cultures, in the exploitation of African
resources, and inside the cells of European prisons in Africa.
Meanwhile, genocide among ethnic groups is being promoted
by the national boundaries and the capitalist global economies
that the Western world has implemented.
Living and working in Nigeria, and coming to these
realizations, forced me to admit that the so-called civilized
segments of the world of today are more dangerous in their
illusions of political correctness and assumed universal moral
schemes than the uncivilized, slave-producing, colonial world of
not so many years ago. If this is civilization, I continue to fail to
see civility. If this is justice, I continue to see the criminality of
justice in criminal justice institutions. The state we are in now,
as a global community, is oppressed and broken, much like the
state that our global society was in hundreds of years ago, but at
least in the past people knew what they were up against, people
knew what and whom to fight against: they were the colonial
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governments and their arrogant white employees, they were the
slave catchers and the slave traders, they were the white men who
researched Africa and named it primitive, tribal, underdeveloped,
and barbaric, and they were the white-robed missionaries who
demonized African spirituality. In today's world the oppressors
are your friends and allies: Western/imdmg agencies, international
diplomatic allies, European colleagues who control organizational
agendas, and fellow human rights activists who work to reinforce
European economic and political structures and institutions.
In the meantime, as this beast they call civilization works to
abstract oppression and blur the boundaries of freedom, the
majority of people in Africa (and on all continents recovering
from European occupation through colonialism) continue to
struggle; unfortunately, most can no longer see on a concrete
level what exactly it is they are struggling against. The white-
robed missionaries now have black skin underneath those white
robes. The government that maintains the European exploitation
of Africa now gives public speeches wearing expensive agbada
and asoke (African clothes), carrying African last names. Gone are
the European top hats and straight trousers, but not gone are the
European systems of control that continue to allow the West to
rob Africa blind.
Financial and political corruption is rampant in the non-
governmental, non-profit, human rights world. I came to learn
that this corruption is intimately linked with the continued
imposition of Western structures, institutions, attitudes, and
financial regulations upon Nigeria. The quest for human rights
in Nigeria is still defined and controlled by Western governments
and European institutions and structures at the root of the
upheavals that Africa continues to face. Also at the root of this
human rights discourse and work is the assumption that Africans
can get life and dignity from Europeans —a fallacy that has
strong foundations in savage European slavery and colonialism.
The commodification of all that is human is exemplified in this
human rights discourse, which assumes that humanity can be
" given" and " taken/'
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While the West continues to flourish and grow, Africa
continues to struggle, and leaving Nigeria knowing that was
difficult. I felt torn between worlds. I knew I was coming back to
a capitalist, corporate, imperialist North American reality, and I
knew that this reality is built on the backs of entire nations and
millions of people of colour. I did not know if I could handle
coming back to the West, but I also knew that in Nigeria I was
oyeebo, baturia, and enyatcha ("a foreigner"). In North America,
as an immigrant, I often feel like a stranger. People may not call
me "foreigner" to my face, but there are many ways for them to
reinforce my separate category as a woman of colour. I belong
to a large generation of people who have been displaced from
the South and placed in the West—involuntarily forced to live in
the belly of the beast, no longer belonging in Africa (because my
family was forced out), yet never being "included" in the West.
So what is home for me, and what is home for most people
in this miserable, corporate, forced migration existence? I found
myself questioning many things that people in positions of white
privilege, economic superiority, and Western citizenship often
take for granted. Am I pretending to come back home? How do
I walk away from the people I have struggled beside for two
years? In the grander scheme of oppression, how does one not
just survive but also fight back and maintain self-dignity through
that fight? How can people of privilege come to understand the
implications of their privilege for the underprivileged? And as I
got ready to leave Nigeria, I could not reconcile myself with the
fact that, despite the struggles and the hardships, Nigeria had
become home to me, more so than any Western society in which
I had lived. The same people who called me oyeebo in Nigeria
embraced me as one of their own. Being different in Nigeria is
not degrading, as being different in the West is. I had never felt
more at home than I did in Lagos. Why was I leaving? Did I join
the Nigerian world temporarily so I could test myself, all the
while knowing deep inside that this immediate struggle would
not be a permanent reality for me? And what is more important,
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the physical comforts of the West or the emotional comforts of
inclusion that I experienced for the first time in Africa? Why is
it that in this fragmented and broken world so many of us are
forced to have one or the other? Why are so many black people
living such broken and incomplete lives?
In the West people have the option to ignore the harsh
realities of oppression. In Nigeria I did not meet a single Nigerian3
who had that privilege. Even if someone lived in a privileged
compound with generators to supply electricity during NEPA4
outages, and even if someone had an air-conditioned car with
a driver, and even if someone maintained a high income, that
person still had to confront the realities of those who did not
have any of those things. Nigerian society has not yet developed
the ability to hide its problems and to completely segregate those
who have from those who have not.
As I witnessed and experienced these social realities, questions
continued to engulf my thoughts. Why is the distribution of
resources, opportunities, and comforts so unbalanced? Is this
form of capitalist imperialism going to go on for much longer?
Forget about whether it is " fair" — is it sustainable for so few to
have so much while so many have so little? Can the minority
who own so much sustain that wealth? And at what cost will
they fight to maintain the global monopoly of resources? I know
it cannot last forever, and I know this only because change is the
only constant element of this global existence. I found comfort
in that understanding, but I also felt anxiety: will change bring
about equality and freedom, or will it continue to promote and
abstract and reinforce the same inequalities? What has my being
in Nigeria really done in the grander scheme of the world and
oppression? I know it has done more for me as a human being
than anyone else. I have learned so much, and I console myself
with this thought: now I know more, and, yes, this knowledge is
violent and painful, but I still prefer to know rather than never to
have had the opportunity to learn.
Here I present some of the experiences I had while in Nigeria.
These experiences shaped my understanding of the world, and
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for the first time I began to feel as if I had access to something
real. It was not sugar-coated. It was not commercial. It was not an
adventure that could be commodified. It was real life for millions
and billions of people. And I am grateful to have accessed it, even
if for just a moment. And I am responsible for spreading it as far
and as wide as I can: I leave Nigeria with a readiness to share this
knowledge with whoever is willing to learn it.
Nigeria has shown me that life is about survival. For some
it is physical survival; for others it is emotional, cultural, and
spiritual survival. For me it became a combination of all those
things. There were times when I feared for my physical safety,
but those times were few and insignificant. The most significant
experiences for me were the times when my belief systems and
perceptions of life were put in question, when my thoughts
no longer made sense, when my priorities were drastically
challenged and renumbered. Nigeria was a place of growth and
truth for me, and that has been survival. In that survival I found
moments of freedom. In a place where the leaders are lying and
the average person is dying, I had to search for truth and ways to
keep growing, and I learned that, even in the midst of upheaval
and struggle, the human spirit prevails. I left Nigeria with a sense
of hopelessness for the world as we know it, but with a renewed
sense of hope in the human capacity to collectively resist and
survive through community.
PENAL INTERACTIONS WITH THE COMMUNITY
A criminal justice system that was not made by or for West African
societies continues to be imposed upon Nigeria —its inefficiency
reflects the inefficiency that rules the country's general state. This
state reflects the injustice that Western social structures impose
upon all societies "structured" by them. The end result? People
get caught in a grinding machine that destroys all that it touches.
I have come to see the penal system as a tool by which colonial
structures are implemented among those whom the national
and international corporations cannot "employ." The more time
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I spent working with Nigerian prisoners, and the more I was
confronted with open police brutality on the streets of Lagos,
the more convinced I became that the penal system in Nigeria is
the most visible symbol of the continued colonial presence in the
Nigerian mental state and the Nigerian governmental structure.
My Nigerian journey became a time when I had to ask a lot of
questions and engage in a lot of discussions to make sense of my
surroundings, and, at times, to survive in those surroundings.
Those questions, discussions, witnessed events, and experienced
moments were pivotal in creating an awareness that continues to
challenge how I perceive the penal system and society in general.
In Nigeria I did not learn just about Nigeria, I learned about the
foundations of all criminal justice institutions, and I learned about
the functions and behaviours of all criminal justice agents.
GOVERNMENT CORRUPTION: THE ISSUE OF
PAYING SALARIES
It would be unfair to present my interactions with the Nigerian
penal system without presenting the situations with which
Nigerian governmental agents are faced. When discussing
corruption and brutality with prisoners, prison guards, police
officers, and community members, many in Nigeria understand
that the government does not pay its employees salaries for
many months at a time. It is believed that the money is kept to
accumulate interest in private bank accounts. Many claim that
this lack of constant and reliable income is the main cause of
theft and corruption among prison guards and police officers
in Nigeria. Corruption extends beyond the penal system, and
affects schoolteachers, local government staff, court-appointed
magistrates, doctors, nurses, and so on. Demanding bribes for
services becomes the main method of earning money for many
government employees. In Nigeria the infectious nature of
state brutality is visible and constantly observed. I preferred
this openness to the delusional propaganda that promotes state
institutions as existing to "serve and protect" the people.
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The political, economic, and penal structures in Nigeria
have turned many groups in society against each other,5 and
thus play a large role in the functions of social control: confusion
and animosity are powerful modes of divide-and-conquer
frameworks. Benefits for the state are both financial and political.
While money is accumulating in private bank accounts, the
people struggle against each other to survive; the community
breaks down; unity and solidarity are weakened; and organized
resistance to the situation becomes more and more difficult. While
salaries are used as a method of social control in Nigeria, and
while the lack of consistent salaries seems to result in increased
corruption, the lesson I learned was that this specific situation
in Nigeria only illustrates the modes through which the state
divides, oppresses, and conquers.
Police brutality and prison guard sadism occur in all
criminal justice institutions, and they are not a function of a few
bad seeds. Such violence is a function of the criminal forms of
justice that penal structures impose. This violence is not limited
to Nigeria. It just happens that in Nigeria the dysfunctioning
of bureaucracy disqualifies justifications for criminal justice,
making the problematic and violent nature of criminal justice
more visible.
THE MEDIA
In Nigeria the national newspapers often gave accounts of police
brutality and government corruption. The prisons, being less
visible, did not make the headlines as often, although when
they did the accounts were critical and exposed the brutality
that takes place. My experiences with the media in Nigeria
came primarily through reading newspapers, several television
interviews I participated in, and interactions with newspaper
journalists. Every morning I read the national newspapers, and
every morning I had the same reaction: too many rich people buy
up too many pages to advertise their birthdays, anniversaries,
retirements, graduations, or promotions. The space left for
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news was generally critical of the government, and critical
of the economic situation in Nigeria, but rarely looked to the
international forces that support, encourage, and benefit from
Nigerian corruption.
The portrayal of people engaged in street crime demonized
and vilified them. The escalation of "jungle justice" (violent
means employed by community members to kill people caught
stealing) was rarely portrayed in a critical manner. It was often
accepted as a necessary means of protecting one's community.
On a more political level, articles that supported and glorified
high-level politicians were read with a grain of salt.
My discussions with many Nigerians illustrated such
attitudes. In a society where corruption is openly practised
people were free to assume that bribes and gifts inspired such
articles. This level of transparency in relation to corruption in
Nigeria allowed the masses to function in a more critical and
socially aware mindset. At the same time, journalists whom I met
were, like most of the people, struggling to survive. They wrote
about such struggles, and when they got incentives (i.e., bribes)
for writing otherwise the public understood why. In relation to
the penal structure the media in Nigeria presented a skeptical
and weary picture. It is my opinion that such portrayals were
made possible through the above-mentioned inability of the
criminal justice system in Nigeria to mask its oppressive realities
and functions.
GENERAL ATTITUDES TO CRIME IN NIGERIA
In Nigeria the worst crime a person can commit is armed robbery. If
a person is identified and labelled as an armed robber, the chances
that he or she will survive street justice, police raids, or prison
time are slim. Those who do survive are rarely given a chance to
re-enter society. My discussions with many Nigerians (including
taxi drivers, university professors, market women, youth on the
streets, people sitting next to me on the bus, neighbours, doormen,
heads of human rights organizations, students, and others) on
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their views of the penal system, and specifically the institution
of imprisonment, showed me that on the surface they support
it, but any discussions beyond superficial slogans revealed an
understanding that incorporated the economic context. Some
of the facts shared as common knowledge among the public
included the following. Armed robbers generally rent guns from
the police force and use them to rob the community. The average
person in prison for armed robbery is violent because he or she
was pushed to rob to survive. The minority who are given the
opportunity to attend and graduate from university will most
likely have a very hard time finding a job, let alone one that will
pay enough to sustain them or their families. That is why some
of the armed robbers in Lagos are university students trying to
pay school fees or university graduates who are unable to find
work.
The myth behind justice through a criminal justice system
has been largely revealed in Nigeria, but too many are too busy
trying to survive to work against it. While demonization of
armed robbers, and open verbal and physical attacks on them,
were common, I did not meet a single person who discussed
such attitudes without placing them within the proper social and
political context of Nigeria at the end of that discussion. It was
those discussions that formed my views and understandings of
crime in Nigeria. Many whom I spoke to understood this: if they
are robbed, there is a chance they won't eat that month. They
cannot trust the police to protect them, and therefore they turn to
vigilante justice for protection; if they do not adequately address
the possibility of an armed robbery, or deal with the experience
of being robbed, they can end up in severe financial trouble,
along with the families they have to support and the neighbours
who also got robbed. Because armed robbers generally worked
through neighbourhoods in Lagos, when one home suffered it
usually suffered with the homes around it. It was understandable
why armed robbers were so feared and so hated: they represented
the most visible and most immediate threat of the short-term loss
of money or life. They were less predictable than the government,
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which has established a traditional method of extorting money
from the country. The lack of stability in Nigerian socioeconomic
structures does not present people with many options for
safety. These circumstances, in my opinion, naturally lead to an
extremely angry outlook toward armed robbers.
This hatred, and the increasingly violent reactions from
community members and vigilante groups toward armed
robbers, have led to an increasingly violent method of robbing.
Awaiting-trial and convicted armed robbers whom I spoke to in
Kirikiri medium and maximum security prisons explained that,
to ensure survival of street justice (what is often called jungle
justice), which ultimately leads to a horrific death by burning,
armed robbers began adopting a more violent approach to
robbing. While the initial purpose was to steal money, more and
more armed robberies now end in violence. The armed robbery
suspects and convicts I discussed this with explained that leaving
survivors who may recognize them only increased their risk of
getting caught and likely killed. This cycle of violence is vicious
and one of the many contributing factors in a reported increase
in the number of deaths related to street crime in Lagos State
(among other states).
When the people have little or no faith in the police or the
government they work for, violence often becomes a reaction
that appears to be necessary for survival, not because there
are no peaceful means of resolving these conflicts, but because
Nigerians continue to live within the penal and corrupt structures
that colonialism imposed. When penal structures reinforce state
behaviours that encourage revenge as a mode of addressing
conflict, such structures also encourage revenge as an acceptable
method through which those people whom the state has failed
should address conflict. In Westernized nations the state has been
able to monopolize the right to avenge, punish, and brutalize. In
Nigeria the state's inability to do so has aided in exposing the
consequences that criminal justice and imperialist economic
practices bring to a society. While citizens of Westernized nations
continue to blame each other for social problems, Nigerians
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appeared to be more aware of the larger issues and were more
able to identify the roots of their problems as residing in state
(in) actions.
RELIGION AND COLONIAL CONTROLS
The vast majority of Nigerians identify themselves with either
the Christian or the Muslim religion. I came to understand that
a large number of Nigerians still have ties to the traditional
religions of their ancestors, but such ties are shunned and
viewed as demonic. It was ironic to note that so many religious
people relied on colonial religions as protection against black
magic, also referred to asjuju. The irony lies in the contemporary
colonial mindset, which seems to have a strong spiritual hold on
the country. Colonial religions continue to be perceived as pure,
while West African spirituality is viewed as black and evil. Aside
from reinforcing missionary and colonial degradation of African
spirituality, the institution of religion also plays a key role in
distorting the international understanding of Nigerian society.
Conflicts in Nigeria are often presented in the international
media in a highly simplified form: they are often referred to as
religious conflicts or clashes. The historical and political contexts
of conflict are rarely illustrated. I came to learn that religious
conflicts are primarily conflicts between ethnic groups and are
almost always linked to a political or economic cause. In addition
to the simplification of historical and contemporary ethnic
relations, the international media have little understanding of
the upheavals that European colonial boundaries impose upon
African nations: the lines drawn by colonialists now define
African nation-states, not according to precolonial African
kingdoms and empires, and not according to ethnic affiliations
to specific land spaces, but according to coastal land spaces,
primarily created for European trading purposes. "The Berlin
Conference [1884] was Africa's undoing in more ways than one.
The colonial powers superimposed their domains on the African
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continent. By the time independence returned to Africa in 1950,
the realm had acquired a legacy of political fragmentation that
could neither be eliminated nor made to operate satisfactorily"
(Rosenberg 2004). In colonizing Africa, European nation-states
created African nation-states according to European agreements
that allowed European access initially to trading ports along the
coast and eventually to interior land spaces on the continent:
"What ultimately resulted was a hodgepodge of geometric
boundaries that divided Africa into fifty irregular countries.
This new map of the continent was superimposed over the one
thousand indigenous cultures and regions of Africa. The new
countries lacked rhyme or reason and divided coherent groups
of people and merged together disparate groups who really did
not get along" (Rosenberg 2004). Many of the religious conflicts
occurring in Nigeria today are intimately linked with these
colonial measures of exploitation. Conveniently, such recent acts
of oppression are not publicized in the international media. All
the global community learns about are the religious clashes that
take place.
The only religious element of such clashes is associated
with the imposition of missionary inquisitions on the continent.
In addition, the highly publicized religious conflicts are often
used to divert attention away from the roots of these problems,
not only by diverting attention away from the war crimes that
Europeans participated in during colonialism, but also by
directing attention toward these colonially introduced religions
and the tensions that arise as a result of their divisions. In the end
the Western corporate exploitation of African resources is not in
the limelight, and neither are the criminal actions of European
nation-states. The focal point, conveniently for the West, becomes
the actions of people in Nigeria who continue to struggle with
the consequences of colonialism, missionary impositions, and
globalization.
The use of religion inside prison played a key role in social
control. The prison, a colonial institution, imposed mandatory
identification with colonial versions of religion. Several ex-
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prisoners informed me of the signing-in process that required
them to check off on their entry form their association with either
Christianity or Islam. Those who did not officially associate
themselves with either religion were assigned one; those who
did not participate in religious ceremonies prescribed by the
prison did not gain access to the donations of food and medicine
provided through churches and mosques.
Two ex-prisoners whom I worked with as colleagues in the
PRAWA office spoke to me in detail about their experiences
with religion inside Nigerian prisons. Both had dreadlocks upon
entry, and both practised traditional religions. Once imprisoned,
they were forcibly shaved bald and made to choose from one of
the two available religions: Christianity or Islam. Upon choosing
Christianity, they were identified as Christians in prison records
and for the remainder of their imprisonment attended church
services and listened to sermons. They celebrated Christian
holidays and special occasions, and occasionally received food or
medicine through church donations. Both returned to practising
their traditional religions upon release. In a few instances, ex-
prisoners who established strong religious affiliations (both
Christian and Muslim) while in prison received community
support from churches or mosques upon release. These
conditions and circumstances, often reinforced through colonial
penal structures, highlight the intrinsic need to associate with
colonial religions in order to survive.
Inside Kirikiri medium security prison, the first prison in
which I implemented the Prisoners Support Circle Programme,
I was told by both prisoners and guards that it was the
first programme that did not have religious and/or legal
connotations. It was the only programme that did not start
and end in prayer, and it was the first programme that did not
require religious affiliation for participants. Many prison guards
and staff in Nigeria emphasized religion as an essential part of
the rehabilitative procedure. There were many prisoners who
benefited spiritually from these religious programmes and were
happy to participate in them, but there were many prisoners who
felt coerced and exploited.
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The prevalent attitude of prison guards and prisoners' rights
activists toward prisoners who practise any form of traditional
Nigerian spirituality is compliant with the missionary attitude
that colonizing nations exported to Africa: these prisoners are
demonized and ostracized. These attitudes also mirror the
outspoken opinion of the general public as I came to hear it. Often,
when conversing with prison guards and church organizations
inside prisons, I was told that " souls need to be saved/' and I
often found myself silently and sarcastically thinking "and
what better place to do such saving than in a colonial prison
institution where people have few options or choices and where
they are struggling to survive?" I still have images of hundreds
of malnourished awaiting-trial prisoners crouched in tight
neat rows on the dirt of the prison yard, chanting and praying
as missionaries in white robes led them in song, standing over
them, clapping and preaching in English, often in a loud manner
that consisted of shouting religious "truths." Sitting beside the
missionaries on the floor were large bags of rice and garri.
I still have memories of some circle programmes I ran that
were disrupted by loud missionary and other church group
preachers, and louder songs in reply by hungry prisoners. Sitting
in a colonial prison yard, built to maintain a colonial criminal
justice system, listening to colonial religious chants, while black
men and women in colonial prison uniforms guarded over all
proceedings, and witnessing Africans maintain all these colonial
structures felt tragic, to say the least.
INSTITUTIONALIZED POVERTY
Criminalization of the poor is not a secret or disputed topic of
debate in Nigeria. It is an accepted fact. Within the Nigerian
prison and police cells one rarely found people whose families
had money. Those who had money were efficiently bailed out;
those who did not remained inside. In the streets of Lagos poverty
and homelessness were rampant. Unlike in North America and
most Western nations, where the poor are segregated within
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certain neighbourhoods, and generally kept out of view of
the middle and upper classes, in Nigeria one found poverty
everywhere one looked. The state in which I witnessed the most
extreme levels of poverty was, ironically enough, Bayelsa. This
state, in the southeastern region of Nigeria, is one of the richest
states in terms of resources. When one defines wealth through
natural resources, Bayelsa State is crucial in the provision and
production of oil. I visited a remote village called Eniwari. It was
located far into the Delta River region and could only be accessed
by boat. To the governor of the state it was made accessible by
helicopter. To the people it was made accessible through different
types of boats —smaller ones with engines for those who could
afford them and larger, much slower, boats for those who had
very little money.
Along the river, on the way to Eniwari, I was struck by
the level of poverty in the villages. I was further struck by the
unavailability of fuel for boats. I was angered by the natural gas
flares of the oil refineries that burned twenty-four hours a day,
seven days a week, depriving the surrounding villages of clean air
to breath, clean water in the Delta River (the only access to water
in the region), and the comforts of a dark nightfall. Frustrating
was the fact that the majority of these villages had no electricity
or access to phone lines. I began to wonder why the natural gas
flares were not being transformed into a source of power for
these villages and quickly came to this conclusion: hook-up costs
for electrical connections cannot be that high, but the human
potential to organize can be. If people are left to struggle to find
food and clean drinking water in the oil-polluted fields and
rivers, they will have less energy to organize and struggle against
oppressive economic and international corporate oil structures. *
Despite such obstacles, there is a strong movement
developing in the area among the people in protest of their living
conditions. Oil pipes are visible everywhere. These pipes have
been built through villages, homes, schools, whatever is in their
way: oil pipes are built over the ground for economic reasons,
as opposed to underground for safety purposes, and instead of
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diverting their course any building or vegetation on the closest
and most convenient path is destroyed. These visible oil pipes
are often vandalized, and international oil company workers face
kidnappings for the purpose of ransom collection. It has become
so common that major oil companies, such as Shell, Chevron,
and Mobil, have set aside specific amounts of money to deal
with ransom demands. It has been found that paying ransoms
is cheaper than following safety regulations in extracting oil.
Unfortunately for the people, the amount of money set aside
by these companies is far less than the amount of money they
stand to lose if organized resistance attacked and shut down
the oil-producing process in Nigeria. Their attempts, while
inconveniencing these corporations, do not threaten corporate
existence or divert corporate actions away from the destructive
consequences faced by the people who have lived in that region
for generations.
A stronger, more visible police and military presence exists
in this area of Nigeria, more than I found in other states. This was
yet another clear connection between the suffering of the people
and the use of the penal structure's personnel to protect and
maintain colonial structures that benefit from a status quo that
sustains Western corporations and their monopoly over African
resources. Under such conditions one cannot help but see the
immense economic gains that the powerful minority accumulate
on the backs of the vast powerless majority. One also cannot help
but see the clear role that the penal system's mechanisms play in
assisting the powerful by oppressing the powerless within the
context of economy, finances, and armed control.
THE POLICE
My knowledge about the Nigerian police force comes mainly
through direct contact with the police through my work with (ex-)
prisoners, through my contact with the police while commuting
around Lagos, or through stories prisoners and ex-prisoners told
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me about their experiences with the police. This section outlines
some of my direct interactions, the stories passed on to me, and
some of my thoughts and conclusions about what I witnessed,
heard, and experienced.
My Experiences with the Ajegunle Police
To present the situation with the police in Nigeria and their
interactions with the average (and poor) Nigerian, I will share
an experience I had, starting on July 19, 2001. An ex-prisoner,
Florence, whom I had been working with since my arrival in
2000, was living in the poorest neighbourhood in Lagos. It is
called Ajegunle and is referred to by Lagosians as "jungle city/7 It
is an overcrowded, concrete, urban jungle with very few running
water facilities, very sparse electricity, and dilapidated buildings
as homes. Florence worked hard to find rent money, and this
neighbourhood was the only one she could afford to live in. One
night she got into an argument with her neighbour and was
making a lot of noise. Another neighbour got involved, and in
his attempts to reduce the noise level he beat her severely. That
night (July 18, 2001) she was taken to the police station and put
in a police cell for the night.
The next morning Florence's husband asked for my assistance
in bailing her out. In Nigeria bail is not legally supposed to include
the transfer of money. All police stations have posted notices
stating that bail is free. Bail is granted when a responsible person
signs on behalf of the person being held. When that person signs
bail forms he or she is admitting responsibility for the released
prisoner. Should that person not appear in court at the appointed
time, the police have the right to arrest and imprison the person
who signed the bail forms.
Upon arrival at the police station in Ajegunle I was met with
screams and shouts from inside the interrogation room. There
was only one room, and that was where I was taken to meet
with the investigating officer for Florence's case. Upon entering
the room I found a young teenager topless and handcuffed on
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the floor, being beaten with wooden rods by a policeman. The
policeman was hovering over the trembling teenager screaming,
"Are you ready to speak yet?" As we walked in, the policeman
motioned for his suspect to take a seat on the bench beside me.
He was facing his investigating police officer, and I was facing
Florence's. I could feel his shoulders trembling beside me. As
they discussed his case, Florence was brought into the room.
There was an open wound on her head, and blood was dripping
down her face. This, she explained to me, was from the beating
her neighbour had given her the night before.
As she sat down beside me, the teenager's family entered
the room and began discussing his case with the police officer.
Ironically, that officer was sitting directly beneath the "BAIL IS
FREE" sign. He had an open copy of the Nigerian Criminal Code
in front of him, and was eating moimoi6 and porridge for lunch as
they discussed details of the case. The police officer claimed that
he had arrested the teenager for the theft of a fridge from under
a bridge in Lagos. The teenager insisted that the policeman had
picked him up off the street randomly. The policeman ignored
him, and continued explaining to the teenager's family that
he had arrested "this boy" and was charging him with theft of
the fridge. This crime carried a sentence of up to seven years,
he stated, but he added that he believed the boy had stolen the
fridge at night, which could lead to a life sentence. I do not know
if this is the case in Nigerian law, but the policeman seemed to be
confident that it was. He proceeded to tell the teenager's family
that, if they had N5,000 (approximately CA$ 50), he was willing
to forget the entire matter. The family discussed the situation
among themselves and concluded that they had no means of
gathering such a large sum of money. They had no choice but to
leave. The teenager sitting beside me broke down crying, and the
policeman continued to eat his lunch.
As all this was happening, I was trying to convince the
investigating policeman for Florence's case that he should release
her from custody because he did not have a charge against her.
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His responses to my questions and comments were not related
to the case at all: he wanted to know if I was married and what
I was doing in Nigeria. To my surprise the policeman who had
been dealing with the teenager and his family in such a brutal and
corrupt manner stood up in my defence, and asked his colleague
to be reasonable and to show me some respect. It was concluded
that, if a resolution could be reached among the neighbours, the
police would let Florence go. The neighbours all gathered, and
we reached a resolution, but the police refused to sign any papers
or release anybody until I left the station.
They delayed the procedure for days, and after I had travelled
out of Lagos for (ironically) an Access to Justice workshop in
the middle belt region of Nigeria, they released Florence. A few
steps out of the police station two women screaming "Thief!"
grabbed Florence. The police arrested her again, and put her in
a cell with the property she had allegedly stolen (clothes) and
the tools she had allegedly used to break into the home of the
supposed victims. They took her picture with the evidence and
told her she was going to pay for bringing a foreigner into the
police station to help her out. "Are you trying to get us stripped
of our badges?" they asked her.
Upon my return to Lagos I was informed that Florence
had been taken to Kirikiri prison for women to serve time as an
awaiting-trial prisoner on theft charges. After hiring a lawyer,
and bribing several officials and officers, she was released on
July 27, 2001, before a holding charge could be imposed upon
her. This was the only time during my stay in Nigeria that I
succumbed to the pressure to bribe somebody, and I did it
because I felt personally responsible for her false imprisonment.
The experience showed me how quickly and efficiently
imprisonment can be used and reversed in Nigeria. As for the
teenager they were torturing when I arrived at the police station,
I never found out what happened to him. Like so many others,
he was likely either shot by the police or imprisoned indefinitely
as an awaiting-trial prisoner.
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Illegal Raids
An ex-prisoner named Uche, whom I was working with at
the PRAWA office (he is a sculptor and artist, and trained ex-
prisoners and youth at risk through our trades and skills work
programme), disappeared for a week. No one knew where he
was, and, knowing the situation with the police and illegal raids
in Lagos, I was worried. He eventually showed up on March 2,
2001, and told me what had happened.
He was in the market the prior week and was picked up by
the police. He did not have enough money to give them, so they
arrested him. They threw him into the back of a van, and one
of the policemen took his trousers. He was left exposed from
the waist down in the van. Another policeman commented on
how savage he was, walking the streets naked, and would not
accept any explanation about the missing pants, even though
his colleague was standing beside him holding them. Uche and
about fifty others were taken to a local police cell, where they
stayed for a few days. They were not given any food and had to
beg for water, which they were given sparingly. One of the other
detainees managed to get the message out to his family that he
was in that particular police cell —he had convinced the police
officers that if his family found him they would be able to pay for
his release. When the family arrived Uche was able to convince
them to help him too. They helped as many as they could and
took messages out to the families of the rest of the people being
held there. Those whose families were contacted and had the
money to pay for release were taken home; the rest were taken to
prison on awaiting-trial charges.
In the two years I spent in Nigeria there were three separate
incidents of jaywalking that resulted in the imprisonment of
people I knew either through work or through my community. I
went to the local government's holding cells in Onipanu, a place
where all jaywalkers were kept until they paid their fine of N500
(CA$ 5). At N500 a head, these government workers were making
quite a bit of money; they told me they picked up hundreds of
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people a day. I managed to talk to the local government staff who
had arrested these people, and because I was a foreigner they
humoured me and released them without taking money from
me.
I took my time with the discussions and learned that the
people I was talking to were not police officers. They were local
government staff who used this as a means of making money to
subsidize themselves while they were waiting for their salaries to
be paid. They had built cells in their offices (complete with bars).
They were in charge of the main highway (Ikorodu road) near
my home and office. Ikorodu road has overhead foot bridges
that can be used for crossing the road, but they are few and far
between. It was a long walk to the overhead bridges, and most
people just crossed the main road by running to avoid the fast-
moving vehicles. A problem with using the foot bridges was that
they were not well maintained and thus not safe; they were made
of thin metal and often had large holes (sometimes covered with
large rocks to help people avoid stepping into them) that one
had to walk around to avoid tripping. Thousands of people used
them to cross the main road every day.
While I was living in Onipanu, one of the overhead bridges
broke and sent many people to their deaths, either from the
impact of the fall or from the traffic below. The number of people
who died was never officially reported. I remember discussing
this incident with the local government staff who were arresting
people who did not use the bridges, and the response I got was
simple: it is our job to make the main road safer, and we must
arrest people who insist on running across the road instead
of using the overhead bridges. The dangers that the poorly
maintained overhead bridges posed were not their concern—that
was another government department's responsibility.7
To provide some perspective on the safety of these foot
bridges, I present an experience I had using one to cross the
Ikorodu road one afternoon in the middle of August 2001. The
foot bridge nearest to my home was beside a gas station. While I
Nigerian Penal Interactions | 197
was crossing the bridge, the police had come to use the gas station
to fill up their vehicles. They were transporting money (which
included special armoured cars and many armed escorts), and
to scare away any potential armed robbers they started to fire
(while in the gas station) rounds of ammunition into the air. All
of us on the bridge had to run for safety. I remember the people
around me, the racing cars below me, the sound of gunshots,
and the sight of smoke. It was surreal to me but so normal and
expected to those around me. It is what the police do, and all
those who get in their way must learn to move fast or suffer.
Bribes: Happy Weekend!
Often in Lagos, and many other parts of Nigeria, the police set up
traffic check points where they flag cars down and " check to see
if all is well/' What generally happens is that they ask for money,
take what they can get, and move on to the next car. On the
weekends this request is verbalized through a widely known and
understood phrase: leaning into each car's window, holding his
gun, the police officer, with a smile, exclaims "Happy weekend!"
I came to understand this as meaning "Make it a good weekend
for me by giving me money." These police check points, set up
both on the weekends and during the week, usually led to many
traffic jams and sometimes ended in violent confrontations.
Aside from police check points on the road, the police also
take over almost all major bus stops in Lagos and request bribes
from all taxis, buses, or okadas (motorbikes used for public
transportation) passing through. There were many violent
incidents in Lagos related to this police presence at public bus
stops and motor parks. There were countless accounts of public
transportation bus drivers or okada drivers being shot and killed
by the police for failing to give them bribes at the bus stations.
There were several times when all public transportation workers
went on strike to protest the police bribes they had to pay at each
bus stop. These strikes have not succeeded in stopping the police
from vilently robbing bus drivers in Lagos.
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From a Military State to a Police State: A Cab Driver's
Incident
My experiences with the police check points involved a lot of
discussion and many questions. Generally, when they found that
I did not respond with money quickly enough they asked me to
move on. I always felt that my foreign status kept me safe from
violent confrontations. Contemporary global power dynamics
put people with European or North American identifications
in positions of privilege, and in Nigeria I came to experience
such privilege. While in the West, as a person of colour, I am
constantly struggling to achieve recognition, respect, and benefit
of the doubt, in Nigeria the global elements of oppression played
out in my favour.
On the night of March 22,2002,1 did experience one incident
that was not so peaceful. I was alone in a taxi around 9 p.m.
after a concert in Ikeja, on the Lagos mainland. My taxi driver
had tried to avoid a police check point (to avoid giving them
money) by doing a U-turn, but was spotted by the police. Four
of them surrounded the car, and one started to whip the taxi
driver's hands on the steering wheel. These actions succeeded in
immobilizing the car. Policemen with batons, whips, and guns8
surrounded the car. While one policeman was whipping the taxi
driver's hands (resulting in cuts and open wounds), another
stuck the barrel of his gun inside the car against the driver's head.
The policeman was shouting angrily, threatening to kill the taxi
driver. We immediately pulled over to the side of the road, and
the taxi driver was taken to the side and surrounded by several
policemen.
I stepped out of the car and initiated a discussion with the
police officers standing nearby. I wanted to talk about what had
just happened and what we were going to do to resolve it. I tried
to convince them to let us go. My argument was that it was late
and that the streets were getting more dangerous, as armed
robbers may be nearby (in my silent opinion, the streets were
getting more dangerous because of the heavily armed and volatile
Nigerian Penal Interactions | 199
policemen). During our discussion one policeman turned to me
and said, "This is not a democratic state, the military regime is
gone: the police are now in charge. If you want democracy, go
back to your country, let us deal with this man/71 was constantly
aware that Nigeria had been transformed into a police state after
the military regimes were removed. I was surprised to hear
this thought verbalized by a policeman in uniform. Besides, he
reminded me, everyone in Nigeria still remembers Olusegun
Obasanjo (the current democratic president) when he ran the
country as a military tyrant. It became clear to me that a change
in appearance (i.e., uniform) rarely means a change in structure.
The president of Nigeria now wears plain clothes instead of a
military uniform; the streets are now terrorized by armed men
in black police uniforms instead of armed men in green military
ones.
In North America the masses tend to believe otherwise. In
North America people put a lot of faith in appearance and political
correctness. Presidents and leaders of nation-states may have
corporate backgrounds, but they are not viewed as businessmen,
since they make decisions on behalf of the state. In Nigeria the
situation does not allow any segment of the population to live
in such superficial comforts. In Nigeria, I discovered, the vast
majority of the people do not live within an illusion of democracy
and rights. It is understood that the state functions to control its
citizens, to subdue them so that the rich can get richer, while the
poor continue to struggle. A policeman, armed and dressed in
uniform, explained these things to me. Despite my anger at the
situation, and my fear for the taxi driver, I respected his honesty,
and was struck by his political awareness and understanding of
society. He did not need a university degree to understand issues
of power and institutional affiliation to historical oppression.
That night I had several short political discussions with
police officers who were not directly involved in the argument
with the taxi driver. This kept me occupied until the taxi driver
was able to give the rest of the policemen enough money to let us
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go. In the car the taxi driver thanked me for staying with him—
had I left and taken another taxi, he did not know what would
have happened to him or if he would still be alive. It is a sad and
scary state of affairs — the police control the streets with guns and
intimidation. Aside from the threat of death or grievous bodily
injury, there is always the threat of prison and awaiting-trial
prisoner status.
Torture: Stories from a Nigerian Prison Yard
A lot of my knowledge of police brutality in Nigeria came through
experiences I heard from prisoners who were tortured in police
cells prior to being taken to prison. I met prisoners who had both
arms broken as a result of being hung by their arms from the
ceiling for weeks. The pressure from their bodies resulted in bone
fractures in their arms. Once taken to prison, these prisoners
rarely received medical attention; all the prisoners I met in
this condition were awaiting-trial prisoners. Most of them had
been held in the notorious SAS (special armed robbery squad)
detention centre, known to be one of the most brutal and violent
detention centres in the country. I met many prisoners who
had been shot and tortured by the police prior to being taken to
prison. My work with those who had experienced police brutality
before being imprisoned helped me to understand how health
is managed in prison, while raising my awareness in relation to
police brutality. The two issues are intertwined: police brutality
usually results in injuries for which the prisons, after receiving
prisoners from police cells, do not provide medical attention.
One awaiting-trial prisoner named Enmeka was nineteen
years old when I met him inside Kirikiri medium security prison.
He had been arrested early in December 2000 (at age eighteen),
and shot in the back of the leg while being made to lie down
on the floor in a police cell beside seven others who had been
arrested with him. The police had shot four of them; two had
died instantly. Enmeka had received no medical attention for
his wounds; occasionally he was given painkillers. I met him
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on September 5, 2001, eight months after he had been shot. The
bullet had hit the bone in his upper thigh, causing it to splinter; he
had been in prison the entire time, and the bone fragments in his
right thigh were causing an infection and resulting in immense
amounts of pain. When I met him he was .lying on the dirt in the
prison yard verbally wishing death upon himself. After talking
to him I tried to bring in doctors to see him and to buy antibiotics
for his infection. I quickly learned that the prison medical staff
was unwilling to help him because he was suspected of being
an armed robber and thus considered unworthy of their limited
resources. He was in Kirikiri medium security prison located on
the same grounds as Kirikiri maximum security prison in Lagos.
The maximum security prison had a hospital, while the medium
security prison had painkillers donated by a church.
The medical staffs of the two prisons refused to cooperate
with each other. The maximum security prison staff refused
to take Enmeka into their cleaner hospital without access to
painkillers (which they did not have), and the medium security
prison staff, who did not have access to the cleaner environment
of a prison hospital (they had only a small clinic), did have access
to painkillers, but were not willing to give any to the maximum
security prison hospital. They were low on supplies already. As
a result Enmeka was held in solitary confinement in the medium
security prison, occasionally receiving painkillers when his
complaints of pain got too vocal. He was in solitary confinement
not for humane but for practical reasons. Putting him in the
overcongested awaiting-trial cells was impossible because he
was unable to squat or stand for long periods of time due to
his injuries. He was sharing a cell built for two with five other
prisoners, and in his opinion this was a luxury; at least he was
not in a cell built for twenty with seventy-six other prisoners.
On September 7, 2001, I spent the entire day discussing
and negotiating Enmeka's situation with both the medium and
the maximum security prison guards. We finally reached a
compromise: the medium security prison guards agreed to give
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Enmeka painkiller pills (not injections) to take with him, and the
maximum security guards agreed to admit him to their hospital.
This compromise was reached after the wardens of each prison
persuaded their staffs to comply. When it came time to transport
Enmeka from the medium security prison to the maximum
security prison I was informed that there were no vehicles
available. I was told that "There are rotting corpses in the prison
vehicle, which we have not taken to the mortuary yet, and so he
will have to wait until tomorrow to be transferred/7 Not wanting
to risk a change in anyone's mind, I suggested we move him in
the PRAWA office vehicle. The prison guards were disgusted,
and told me that he had scabies and would most likely infect
the car. I asked for blankets to place on the seat for him, and
they informed me that all blankets available for prisoners' use
were infected with scabies as well. I decided to continue with the
transfer nonetheless. Two convicted prisoners were assigned the
task of carrying him to the car (which we drove into the prison
yard), since he was unable to walk and the guards did not want
direct contact with him. An armed prison guard accompanied us
in the car, and we drove down the street on the prison grounds to
the maximum security prison, where convicted prisoners carried
him into the hospital.
When we arrived at the clinic they did not have a bed ready
for him, and Enmeka was dumped onto the concrete floor while
they prepared one. Over the next few months I worked hard to
raise money for him to buy medication and antibiotics for the
infection, but his injury was not in my expected and planned
budget. After raising money and finding authentic medication9
I took it in to Enmeka.
On November 14,2001,1 learned that half of the medication
had been confiscated by the prison medical staff (who are all
uniformed and thus prison medical guards), and sold for their
own profit. Since Enmeka received only half of the medication
he needed, his infection took much longer to heal. Eventually
I was able to raise enough money to subsidize an x-ray for him
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and learned then that the bullet was not in his leg (it had gone
right through), that the bone fragments were the cause of his
infection, and that the antibiotics were helping his body to expel
them one by one: they were being released in the pus that was
forming around his wounds. Enmeka would gather the bone
fragments and save them in a tissue each day. He kept count
of how many pieces were exiting his wound each day, and
would show them to me and share with excitement the proof
of not only his injury (prison staff had often told him that there
were no bone fragments in his leg) but also healing. He stayed
in the maximum security hospital for many months, and before
his wounds completely healed he was sent back to the medium
security prison, much to my protest: his wounds had not healed
properly and in the medium security prison environment would
only become infected again. My protests were futile.
By the time I left Nigeria Enmeka was able to walk while
applying partial pressure on his leg. He was still wearing
bandages and hoping that he could keep the wound clean outside
the hospital setting. I was able to get a lawyer to take on his case
(since he had no legal representation when I met him, like so
many awaiting-trial prisoners). I hope that one day he can at least
be taken to court and, if not released, then sentenced so that he
has a definite number of years to serve and thus a chance of being
released from prison one day. However, as far as I know, and
from what people released from Kirikiri maximum and medium
security prisons have told me, the lawyer whom I knew and had
worked with in PRAWA did very little for Enmeka after I left the
country.
Recently I was informed by some prisoners who managed to
be released from Kirikiri maximum security prison that Enmeka
was transferred back to the maximum security prison because
he had been involved in riots protesting living conditions in the
medium security prison. His leg has completely healed, and he is
happy to have resisted the amputation that the hospital staff had
constantly threatened him with during his first year in prison. As
for his case, he continues to await trial.
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THE COURTS
The court system in Nigeria is backlogged and inefficient. It
remains foreign to most of the people in the country. The logic
of English common law has failed to implant itself upon the
consciousness of this African nation. While I view that failure
as a triumph against colonialism, I also saw the impact that such
disconnection between the people and the social structures they
are forced to live within can have. It is an oppressive reality
that not only enforces dysfunction but also works to degrade a
population already alienated through poverty.
Language
On June 27,2002, during an Alternatives to Violence Programme
(AVP) training workshop in Lagos, I met a court magistrate
who was a participant in the workshop with me. We struck
up a conversation about the cultural dynamics of the Nigerian
criminal justice system. She told me about the tensions that lead
to violence in Nigeria and the language barriers that exist between
ethnic groups. She explained that often, in her Lagos-mainland-
based courtroom, defendants do not speak formal English, and
generally do not understand the basic tenets of European legal
codes and procedures.
She mentioned a specific case that she had encountered. The
man (defendant) standing before her spoke very little English
and had no understanding of how the court or the criminal
justice system works. He had spent years in prison awaiting
trial. On his court date his family managed to get enough money
together to get him a lawyer. He was acquitted of all charges.
When the magistrate made her decision and announced it in
court the defendant standing before her did not understand. She
had to translate the court's legal jargon (acquittal) into pidgin
English, commonly used in Lagos ("You are free, make you dey
go''), so that he knew it was time for him to leave the courtroom.
At first this story surprised me. In the west, we are bombarded
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with criminal justice knowledge in the media. As I spent more
time in Nigeria I realized that the irrelevance and inefficiency
of the court system in Nigeria were topics of discussion mainly
among lawyers and judges. While inaccessibility to language is
a visible disconnection between people and the criminal justice
system, it is symbolic of a much larger disconnection: the logic of
criminalization, community separation, and stigma is incongruent
with most cultures in Nigeria. Conflict is not commonly dealt
with through such degrading and barbaric rituals. Conflict is
generally addressed through communication, representation,
and solutions/problem-solving models.
Inefficiency: Technology, Funding, and a Backlogged
Bureaucracy
All records in the Nigerian penal system, at all levels, are kept
manually. Computers and recording devices are inaccessible, not
only due to expense but also due to the lack of constant electricity.
All records are handwritten and filed. If an awaiting-trial
prisoner's file goes missing, the chances that prisoner has of ever
going to court or leaving prison are almost non-existent. I met
many prisoners and ex-prisoners whose life circumstances have
been greatly affected by such inefficiencies. I came to see that,
while the Western industrialized world has been able to adjust
its penal bureaucracies to a level that gives an air of functionality,
in Nigeria that functionality is constantly challenged, and in that
challenge lies the true dysfunctions of the penal system. I often
wonder what it is about the penal system that keeps it so strong.
I find that a lot of the bureaucratic jargon flogged at us in the
West allows the institutionalization of brutality to hide behind
segments of processes and procedures.
In Nigeria these processes and procedures in no way justify
criminal justice; instead, their inefficiency exposes the weakness
of penality as social control. So where does the justification for
the penal system come within the West African context? I came
to understand that the West continues to flog cultural supremacy
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and assume criminal justice civility that suggests superiority
in its dysfunctional bureaucratic systems of control. It is in the
expectation that a more efficient system may implement more
justice that Africa maintains penal systems irrelevant to its
societies. Colonial powers continue to exert control over the
continent through assumed superiority in implanting systems of
social and crime control. The penal system in Western societies
assumes a monopoly in conflict resolution and harm-defining
roles. In Africa, colonialism brought in such monopolies, and
imposed its penal institutions and mindsets upon nation-states
and citizens. Despite the failure of penal systems to produce
safety and crime reduction in Western societies, the colonial
mindset of superiority continues to justify attempts to make
the penal system work in Africa. As justifications fail, and as
the penal system continues to implement a criminal form of
justice the average African continues to bear the brunt of such
practices.
A Man Shares His Story: Prison and Court Brutalities
On April 30,2001, late in the afternoon, an elderly man named
Felix who had been released from Kirikiri maximum security
prison that morning came to the PRAWA office. He told me
that he had just come from the courthouse, where he had been
informed, after nine years of awaiting trial in prison, that his
case had been thrown out of court three years ago. "No one told
you?" the judge had asked him. He had been free to go for three
years, but no one had noticed or told him. Upon hearing what he
called the bittersweet truth, he had been released. The prisons
and the courts had not given him enough money to pay for
transportation off the prison grounds. He had walked all day and
eventually found his way to the PRAWA office. He was seeking
assistance. Felix explained that too many people released from
prison after many years behind bars are not given any money for
transportation home, and often have to steal to get themselves
home to their families or friends.
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The majority of ex-prisoners often have no home to go
to: the stigma attached to imprisonment is so strong that it
does not differentiate between awaiting-trial and convicted
prisoners. Nigerians are aware of the problems that push
people to break the law or expose people to police brutality and
wrongful imprisonment, but at the same time they see prison as
a mysterious and scary place, so, despite the reasons that led a
person there, upon release that person also becomes mysterious
and scary. Many ex-prisoners end up living on the streets and
eventually go back to prison. Felix had lost all contact with his
family and had nowhere to go. My office did have a home for ex-
prisoners to use as a transition point after prison, but the rooms
were never enough for the number of people who needed them.
We did have a room for him at the time, and he stayed there for
the entire time I was in Nigeria. I am not sure what will happen to
him if that home can no longer be sustained by PRAWA.10 Felix's
experiences and the time we spent discussing them during my
stay in Nigeria illustrated firsthand how imprisonment breaks up
a community, not only stigmatizing prisoners but also separating
them from families and friends for extended periods of time. This
process weakens community strength and reinforces a divide-
and-conquer mechanism of social control. Now when I read or
speak about security and criminal justice, I put them within that
context. The state secures its status quo and strengthens itself at
the expense of the community, which becomes fragmented and
weakened.
THE PENAL SYSTEM QUESTIONS AND EXPOSES
ITSELF
The penal conditions presented, while brutal for those who suffer
from them, illustrate that the penal system does not just make
mistakes occasionally but is built on a foundation that is vengeful
and dangerous. While the human casualties in Nigeria continue
to mount, I found that these problems prompted discussions that
allowed Nigerians working in criminal justice to question this
system and its relevance to their society.
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Awaiting-Trial Prisoners: Bureaucratic Finger-Pointing
As stated above, most prisoners in Nigeria are awaiting trial. I
had the opportunity to discuss this specific issue during several
DFID-funded11 Access to Justice workshops held in July 2001 in
Makurdi, Benue State. These workshops were attended by the
police force, the prison service, the Nigerian Bar Association,
judges, magistrates, and community members. Upon attempting
to find the root cause of the disproportionately high prisoner
population that had not been taken to court for years, it became
clear that a criminal justice system with a weak infrastructure
does not provide shelter from the bureaucratic administrative
legitimizations of inhumanity that take place in Western-based
criminal justice institutions functioning within more rigid
and defined infrastructures. Blame for the large awaiting-trial
prisoner population in Nigeria was passed from one sector to
the next. The bureaucratic reality set in as it became clear that
the root cause of this problem is not linked to a specific segment
of the criminal justice system in Nigeria, but results from the
collective efforts of all branches involved. Unfortunately, within
the context of bureaucracy, responsibility for shortcomings gets
distributed into an ambiguous, insoluble, unfortunate situation.
The magistrates and lawyers who work in the courts openly
blamed the police for arresting too many people indiscriminately
and unjustly, while at the same time pointing fingers at the
government's refusal to provide them with proper resources
(technological recording devices, non-payment of salaries, and
so on) to deal with such high numbers. The prison guards also
blamed the police for such misconduct, while pointing fingers at
the courts for their inability to speed up the entire process. The
police pointed fingers at the lawyers and the court officials, who,
they claimed, are not working efficiently enough and thus causing
a backlog in the penal structure, which results in a large awaiting-
trial prisoner population. A large number of the prison staff who
participated in these Access to Justice workshops openly stated
that they believed the prisons are dumping grounds for the penal
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system's inefficiency and injustice. The police force claimed that
society has become so violent that they have no choice but to
arrest as many people as they do. The prison guards, lawyers, and
magistrates disagreed with them. The magistrates and lawyers
stated that they are the scapegoats for inefficient structures and
inappropriate police actions. The community continues to suffer
at great expense, and the penal structure continues to expose
itself through the constant failures and degradations it imposes
upon all those whose lives it touches. Community leaders who
participated in these workshops pointed fingers at all branches
of the inefficient and criminal justice system.
"Jungle Justice": A Violent Solution within a Violent State
of Penality
One disturbing and rigorous reaction to such tensions and
failures in the criminal justice system has caused many to turn
away from the penal structure. These issues were also discussed
in the Makurdi workshops in July 2001. Unfortunately the justice
most visibly utilized throughout the country maintains the penal
structure's violent and revenge-oriented mentality. This is what
many Nigerians have come to refer to as" jungle justice." The
mistrust that so many feel toward the penal system's official
structures has caused people to turn to pockets of organized
political groups who serve as neighbourhood watchers.
These groups have resorted to violent means of dealing
with armed robbers in certain neighbourhoods. Because most
Nigerians do not have access to guns, the concept of necklacing
has been introduced. When an (alleged) armed robber is caught,
a tire is thrown around his or her neck and brought down to his
or her arms. The vigilante group proceeds to douse the person
with kerosene and set the person on fire. The bodies are usually
left on the streets as warnings to others that they have entered
a community that does not tolerate armed robbers. It was
unanimously stated by community participants in the Access to
Justice workshops that this has been the only way communities
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can protect themselves. If they choose to take the people they
caught robbing them to the police, they fear that the police will
be bribed, and the released armed robber will come back to find
them and most likely kill them. On the other hand, those charged
with and convicted of armed robbery in prison have stated to
me that this jungle justice has resulted in their need to use more
violence while robbing. They fear that leaving people alive can
result in their getting caught and their inevitable necklacing. The
cycle of violence grows larger and more dangerous under these
conditions. In addition to such factors, the politics involved with
these organized neighbourhood watchmen are violent. Many are
organized based on ethnic groups and various political party
affiliations.
As discussions progressed in these workshops in Makurdi, I
learned that both the community members present and the police
agreed that jungle justice is necessary and just. Discussions went as
far as to suggest that the police should seek the assistance of such
groups in dealing with the violent situations now overwhelming
the nation. In responding to this violence, the police officers
present at the workshop pointed fingers at the government for
its refusal to provide them with proper resources to do their job,
stating that an alliance with such political and violent groups may
be their only chance to deal with the violence they face every day.
They complained that they lacked access to functioning guns,
proper vehicles, and working telephone and communication
services. Even uniforms have to be bought by police officers who
want to wear them while on duty. As these discussions progressed
between different agents of criminal justice, the use of violence
to address problems was natural and expected, not because the
people who work for the system are violent but because violence
to address conflicts has been normalized in Nigeria through the
implementation of criminal justice. The culture of criminal justice
and the institutionalization of penality have resulted in a reliance
on violence and dehumanization to address conflicts and social
ills.
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THE PRISONS
My most direct contact with criminal justice while in Nigeria
was with the prison system. Prison guards were more accessible
to me, and were less confrontational and violent than the police
I confronted on the streets. In conferences and workshops
the Nigerian Prison Service representatives were the most
progressive in their attitudes toward prisoners, possibly due to
increased contact with prisoners over longer periods of time.
While I found that prison guards who hold high positions in
the Nigerian Prison Service were progressive in their politics, I
also found that those prison guards who worked directly with
prisoners often mistreated and brutalized them.
Health in Prison: A Religious Experience
Inside Kirikiri medium security prison the convicted prisoners'
cell blocks hold up to twenty prisoners, while the awaiting-trial
prisoners' cell blocks (they are approximately the same size)
hold seventy-seven. These blocks consist of one cement room
with small windows on either side of the walls. In other parts
of Nigeria such windows do not exist, and ventilation is much
worse than it is in the dilapidated conditions in Kirikiri medium
security prison. The awaiting-trial prisoners do not have beds or
mats to sleep on, and the conditions are so congested that they
must take turns sleeping on the floor. On all occasions I had to
visit the health clinic in Kirikiri medium security prison I saw an
overwhelming majority of the awaiting-trial prisoners seeking
medical attention. I was told by an awaiting-trial prisoner that
each day only one prisoner per cell block is allowed to seek
medical attention. Prisoners allow whomever they think is in the
most need to emerge for help. Those who make it to the clinic
are made to sit on the ground outside the clinic as they wait for
access to health care. Those prisoners who do not come in time
for prayers are not allowed to visit the clinic that day.
On several occasions I witnessed prison officers herding
a group of ill prisoners with sticks and beating those who did
not move fast enough, and most of the time I saw them beating
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prisoners on the head. I heard those prisoners seeking medical
attention being made to shout and scream their amens and
hallelujahs prior to seeing the nurses. It is those prisoners who
look like walking skeletons, half-naked and sitting on the ground,
who are made to sing, clap, and chant as they wait to be seen by
the nurse.
Inside the clinic, where I spent an entire day (September 7,
2001), I noticed that the medical staff do very little assessment of
sick prisoners. Several convicted prisoners (serving as medical
assistants) were made to check if the ailments existed (if there
were complaints of visible illness), and one medical staff nurse,
upon the order from the matron (head nurse), gave a shot of
painkillers to a prisoner, who was made to drop his pants in front
of everybody. Any prisoner who showed any fear of the needle
or hesitated in dropping his pants was ridiculed and threatened
by the prison's medical guards.
Food and Water in Prison
Because an official budget does not exist for awaiting-
trial prisoners, there are no budgetary provisions for their
imprisonment. Convicted prisoners wear blue uniforms, while
awaiting-trial prisoners are made to wear the clothes in which
they were arrested. Most of them no longer fit those clothes due
to the overwhelming weight loss and malnutrition they suffer
during their imprisonment. Upon discussing the issue of food
with some of the convicted prisoners, they explained to me in a
letter how the system works. They explained that the Nigerian
Prison Service hires a contractor who supplies the food to the
prison. Before supplying the food the contractor takes his or
her cut and then passes the food on to prison headquarters in
Abuja, the federal capital. In Abuja prison officials take their cut
and then pass the food down to each of the state controllers of
prison, who in turn take their cut and then pass the food down
to the controllers of each prison, who of course take their cut and
then pass the food down to the yard, where the chief of the yard
takes his cut and then passes the food down to the kitchen, where
the guards in charge there help themselves to their cut and then
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pass the food down to the convicted prisoners who cook it, and
who admitted to serving themselves and their friends bigger
portions. What is left of the food then gets distributed to the rest
of the prisoners in the yard, first to the convicted and then to
the awaiting-trial prisoners. Some prisoners also explained in a
letter that, during a prison visit by Obasanjo's12 special assistant
on prisons to assess living conditions in Nigeria's prisons, prison
officers brought in twelve extra bags of garri for him to see as
available food for prisoners, and after he left they took back
thirteen bags.
These accounts and stories helped me to better understand
how prisoners in Nigeria have come to experience such
malnourishment. On an ironic note, prisoners have pointed out
that the car used to move dead bodies13 from the prison yard to
the mortuary is the same car that prison officers use to move the
food from the prison yard to their homes.
In addition to malnutrition, other factors contribute to the
poor health of prisoners. In the majority of the prisons there is no
access to clean water to drink: wells are dug into the ground and
are not properly maintained. Upon looking inside the wells, one
can often see the insects and the worms that live inside and around
them. In the overwhelming majority of the prisons those wells
are the only source of water for drinking and for bathing. They
are also a breeding ground for mosquitoes, among other insects,
and this has created an increase in the number of prisoners who
suffer from malaria. While diagnosis and treatment of malaria
are cheap and readily available in Nigeria, it has been stated
that untreated malaria is one of the main causes of death in the
country. In prison testing and medication for malaria are not
readily available, and, since there are very few official records
outlining cause of death for the many who die inside prison, the
number of people affected is not available.
Tuberculosis in Prison
Another problem prisoners face is the lack of medicine for
diseases such as tuberculosis (TB). In Kirikiri medium security
prison in 2002 there were eighty-three prisoners suffering from
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TB. These prisoners were segregated into the TB cell because it
is a contagious and lethal disease. They were given medicine
when it was available (mainly through donations from churches
or other charitable organizations), and when they ran out of
medicine the treatments stopped until the next batch of medicine
was bought or donated. This inconsistent treatment has created
a group of prisoners who have developed a form of TB that is
immune to medication. If released alive from prison, they will
spread this form of TB among the community. Considering that
TB is a highly contagious disease spread by sharing the same air
space, the possibilities for disaster are massive.
The ironic detail here is that in Lagos State, where Kirikiri
medium security prison is located, TB medication is free. This
was one of the promises that Governor Tinubu made to the
people when he was elected in 1998. The problem in receiving
the medication is that proof has to be given that the patient is
suffering from TB, and the tests are very expensive. The high
cost of these tests (along with the minimal prison health care
budget) results in prisoners being moved to the TB cell without
proper testing and diagnosis. Any loud coughing may result
in transfer to the TB cell. After entering this cell most prisoners
are never released back into the general population because (1)
they almost never get the full dose of treatment and thus rarely
recover to full health and because (2) the few who do get the
full dose, through friends or family members who provide the
medication, cannot be sent back to the general cells, since other
prisoners fear contracting TB and do not trust the authorities to
have treated infected prisoners properly. Prisoners who enter the
TB cells rarely leave them alive; those who are discharged during
their confinement in TB cells leave the prison very sick and rarely
survive, due to lack of money or the immunity they have built up
to TB medication while in prison.
Beatings in Prison
While most of my knowledge of torture came from the stories
I heard from prisoners, and from their visible scars, there were
several occasions when I witnessed beatings of prisoners by
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prison guards. Beatings often took place in front of the chief
officer's office in the prison yard, where all prisoners could see
and hear exactly what was happening. Discussions with and
questions to the prison guards about these beatings led me to
learn that they were over infractions of prison rules, and were
almost always linked to drug-trafficking in prison. One of the
most horrific beatings I saw a prisoner get was given by the chief
guard in charge of the yard himself. He was teaching his officers
how to beat a prisoner properly.
On a hot Wednesday afternoon, May 16, 2001,1 witnessed a
highly disturbing and degrading moment. It happened during
a programme I ran beneath a tree in the yard with convicted
prisoners. Two awaiting-trial prisoners were allegedly caught
dealing drugs inside the prison, and the guards felt they had to
make examples of them. Within sight of the majority of prisoners
in the yard, they were made to kneel handcuffed, shackled, and
topless in the burning sun for hours. They were stripped down to
their underwear. The kneeling was followed by brutal beatings
with wooden sticks and whipping with leather whips. The
handcuffed and shackled men were then forced to stand up and
hop from the guard's office to the white-painted doorway leading
to solitary confinement, a section in the yard that prisoners refer to
as Angola. As the prisoners were made to hop to Angola, guards
were mimicking them, hovering around them, imitating their
actions and their postures, walking as they were walking with
the shackles and hopping around behind them as they hopped
their way to solitary confinement. The scene was degrading,
horrific, and violent on physical, mental, and emotional levels.
This was one of several times I witnessed prisoners being beaten
by guards in Kirikiri medium security prison.
I did not witness a lot of violence between prisoners. The
only incident of violence among prisoners that I did see occurred
on September 10, 2001. The chief of the yard called me into
his office to show me what two mentally challenged prisoners
had done to each other. One had given the other an open head
wound; the wounded one was shackled, and the assailant looked
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very confused. The chief was leading them with a stick to the
clinic. He explained to me that they had six mentally ill prisoners
and that he was seeking funds to have them transferred to the
Yaba psychiatric hospital. Despite the beatings I saw him inflict
upon prisoners, I also witnessed him providing his own home
for ex-prisoners who did not have a home upon release, and I
witnessed several occasions when he personally bought clothes
for those who did not have sufficient clothing upon release.
The contradictions in the prison system in Nigeria once again
illustrated that, despite the brutal structures of this violent
system, there were a few times when humanity and a sense of
African community managed to prevail.
The beatings that I witnessed inside prison generally occurred
while I was running the Prisoners Support Circle Programme in
the prison yard, and I often discussed with the prisoners who
witnessed the beatings with me what could be done in that
situation. I was told that going to the guards and interrupting
them would result in harsher beatings for the prisoner after I left.
I had to resort to talking to the prison guards about it after they
finished, when I was on my way out of the prison. Discussion had
to be carefully worded. I did not want to put the prisoners at risk
of further torture and punishment. The overwhelming response
from the prison guards who did engage me in discussion fell
back on the penal system's crime and punishment rhetoric.
Once again the Nigerian penal system succeeded in illustrating
the violent and degrading potentials that the people who work
within it can reach, while emphasizing the justifications that
allow and encourage the institution of violence.
Overcrowding: Baroness Helena Kennedy's Visit to
Kirikiri
On April 26,2001, Baroness Helena Kennedy was in Nigeria for a
visit organized by the British Council. During this visit she spent
some time in the Kirikiri prisons in Lagos. Inside the medium
security prison we walked through the convicted and awaiting-
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trial sections of the yard. The awaiting-trial section had been
cleaned up for her visit, yet what we saw was horrific. Inside each
cell block holding over seventy prisoners each were half-naked,
skeleton-like men staring at us through the bars. Some tried to
get her attention, pleading for help. The entire scene made me
angry, both at the inhumanity of the conditions and at the power
differentials exhibited. Most prisoners in this section of the yard
rarely see people from the outside, and thus any chance to be seen
or heard represents the chance to briefly exist. In addition, many
prisoners thought that, if white people saw what was happening
to them in this white institution, brutality would cease.
The smell in this section of the yard was overwhelming.
Unclean water holes were left exposed, and people had been
locked up for days, maybe weeks. There are no words I can find
to describe the sensation. The baroness and the British Council's
executive director for West Africa (at the time) were mortified
by their prison visit. Upon returning home, I was informed by
my Nigerian colleagues, the foreign visitors were physically ill
and vomited after seeing the prisons that day — and they saw the
prison yard in its best, cleaned-up condition. I wondered that
night if the foreigners who entered Nigeria's prisons thought
about colonialism and why such institutions exist in Africa as they
sat back in their comfortable first-class seats back to Britain.
Women and Children in Prison
There is only one prison in Nigeria that exclusively imprisons
women. It is located on the Kirikiri prison grounds between the
medium and maximum security prisons. The Kirikiri female
prison incarcerates on average 150 to 200 females. I met some
prisoners who were fifteen years old and others who looked
even younger. On average there were between eleven and fifteen
convicted women, while the rest were awaiting trial. The Kirikiri
female prison has only female guards working in it, and it is
not as overcrowded as the neighbouring male prisons. It is also
the prison that I had the hardest time gaining access to, and the
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prison where I saw some of the most brutal forms of punishment
being imposed.
Maintaining the stereotypes of how women are expected to
behave, most of the punishments and oppressive tactics involved
emotional manipulation and degradation, while physical torture
was kept to a minimum. I witnessed women being made to kneel
on the ground in the scorching sun for hours in the prison yard.
They were being punished for being involved romantically with
each other. I met women who were in prison with their babies —
they were either pregnant upon arrest or had their children with
them at the time of arrest and did not have anywhere to leave
them before the police took them to prison. Some of the babies
I met in this prison had never seen a man. The women told me
about an Amnesty International visit that included several male
visitors. One of the toddlers was so confused and scared by the
sight of a man that she cried for hours.
The female prison was the only prison in Nigeria that did not
allow me to donate food directly to prisoners; I had to leave all
donations with the prison guards, which they distributed after I
left; prisoners reported not receiving full portions of what was
left for them. The level of disrespect and resistance I received
from the female prison warden was so immense that I had a hard
time working with the women prisoners, and thus cannot say
that I fully comprehend what takes place in that prison. I was
able to visit the death row section several times. On March 1,
2001, I saw two prisoners who were severely developmentally
challenged awaiting execution. One sat naked in her cell in a
trance, and the other knelt when she saw me and told me about
her hallucinations and fears.
Women arrested and imprisoned outside Lagos State are
held in male prisons in compartments built within the male
prison yard for them. Upon visiting Makurdi prison on July 25,
2001,1 asked the prison guards what happens when women get
sick and are in need of medical attention. The clinic is located in
the male section of the prison yard. The response I got was short
and simple: "Women are hygienically cleaner than men and do
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not need to go to the clinic to heal; they can stay in their cells and
heal there/7
Women also become pregnant in these prisons, and it was
unofficially reported that these pregnancies are the result of
rapes by prison guards or male prisoners for whom the prison
guards were doing favours. This prison held twenty women,
eighteen of whom were awaiting trial. Of the two who were
convicted one talked about the " insurance system" that resulted
in her conviction.
After leaving Makurdi prison, and before heading back to
Lagos to further investigate the " insurance" policy, we stopped
at a new model prison, built just outside the boundaries of
Makurdi in Benue State. It was an eerie sight for me; this building
resembled North American prisons, right down to the type of
bricks used for outdoor hallways and the colour of the paint
inside the reception area. Apparently a blueprint of modern
Western prisons had been sold to Nigeria, I assume, along with
the building supplies. I was not able to confirm if this was done
through private prison industry or government means. I was able
to confirm that the prison was not in use, though construction
was complete, due to a conflict between the building contractors
and the Nigerian government. Our tour guide, a Nigerian guard,
stated that the government did not pay the contractor in full, so
in retaliation the contractor kept the keys. In this one instance I
could say that government corruption served the people.
Whenever I had access to the Kirikiri female prison, I
inquired about the reasons for women's imprisonment and
eventually came to learn more about the "insurance" policy as it
gets implemented by the Nigerian police force. I consulted with
several lawyers for more details and learned that, if a male crime
suspect cannot be located by the police during an investigation,
the police arrest the first woman they find who has connections
to him (mother, wife, girlfriend, daughter, niece, or other) and
proceed to take her into custody for "insurance" purposes. If
the man does not present himself to the police within a certain
period of time, the woman gets sent to prison to await trial for
his crime.
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Many of the women I spoke to in Nigerian prisons were
being held under such circumstances; some had been sentenced
on conspiracy charges as a result of these "insurance" policies.
Other women I spoke to who had been imprisoned for crimes not
related to the "insurance" policy were serving time for crimes
(mainly drug-trafficking offences) that they had committed for
their husbands. Many spoke about the financial situations they
were in and the reasons behind their decisions to help their
husbands support their families.
CONCLUSION: FEAR, POVERTY, AND CONTROL
The awaiting-trial situation in Nigeria puts people in fear of the
police. For those who are not well-connected or who do not have
money, it is an everyday reality that they can be picked up by
the police and can disappear into a prison for years or forever.
Many prisoners gave me notes to pass on to their families; many
prisoners had been missing for years, and their families presumed
they had died. The amount of power the police command through
these imposed fears is immense. It puts the penal system in a
position of power that is not only unquestionable to the average
citizen but also almost undeniable to the homeless population in
Nigeria. Because they have no homes to sleep in at night, they
are easier targets for the police. This level of power, so openly
displayed against the poorest people in the country, is publicly
acknowledged by most citizens. In Nigeria, the connections
between poverty and crime are clear, and so are the connections
between poverty and vulnerability to penal brutality.
NOTES
1 PRAWA is a Nigerian non-governmental human rights organization
with headquarters in Lagos, and branch offices in Enugu, Nigeria,
and Accra, Ghana. I was placed to work with PRAWA through the
Canadian Voluntary Service Overseas [VSO] office. VSO is a non-
governmental organization that places individuals from Canada,
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India, Uganda, France, the Philippines, the Netherlands, Britain,
and the United States in the global south to promote "development"
while strengthening cross-national global experiences and
connectivity. VSO volunteers are paid salaries in currencies and
sums that are average to the general public residing in the host
nation. As a VSO, I was encouraged to affiliate with the Lagosian
community as my primary source of support, understanding, and
security.
2 They were dangerous because of armed robbers but also because of
the infamous police check points.
3 I specify Nigerian because I did meet Europeans and Americans
who are in Nigeria as expatriots and businessmen/women. They
flew into the country and were whisked away in air-conditioned
SUVs with tinted windows to their American or European living
compounds and only emerged to go back to the airport to visit their
"home nations/' Those people did not have to face the realities of
oppression in Nigeria. The Chevron compound in Lekki, Lagos, for
example, has its own school, movie theatre, grocery store, swimming
pools, tennis courts, offices, and homes. People are paid in foreign
currency and only interact with those Nigerians who have been
hired to serve them.
4 NEPA stands for Nigerian Electric Power Authority, better known
among Nigerians as "never expect power always."
5 Civilians against police officers, police officers against prison
guards, prison guards against court magistrates, those who can pay
the demanded bribes against those who cannot.
6 Moimoi is a dish of ground beans, steamed and often eaten with
porridge or rice.
7 The dispersion of responsibility through colonial bureaucracies is
in plain view in Nigeria. The inefficiency of colonial nation-state
bureaucracies is also highly visible.
8 Women on the police force are not allowed to carry guns.
9 There are many fake pills in the markets in Nigeria that are sold as
medicine to the people.
10 As far as I know, official funding for that home was not available.
It was sustained through various donations and efforts by the
PRAWA staff reaching out to the community for help. The home
has closed since my departure.
11 Department For International Development, the development and
foreign aid branch of the British government.
12 Olusegun Obasanjo was the president of Nigeria while I was there.
13 Many of the malnourished and half-starved prisoners die inside
Nigerian prisons.
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CHAPTER 14
WOMEN'S RIGHTS BEHIND WALLS
Mechthild Nagel
INTRODUCTION
In the 1990s a global political consensus emerged that "women's
rights" are also "human rights." In particular, the Beijing
Women's Conference set forth an ambitious agenda, and activist-
scholars in the global South began circulating ideas and papers
on "putting women in the centre of analysis." I believe this focus
is necessary, especially when it comes to critiquing the current
prison system worldwide. Globalization has altered family
relations and consumer behaviours, further marginalizing
women in caste and class societies. There has been little research
done on the impact of globalization on incarcerated women
in Africa, with perhaps the notable exception of sex work and
trafficking of girls and women from West Africa. This chapter
offers a comparative approach to issues faced by criminalized
and imprisoned women in several African countries. It also
highlights the voices of resistance, especially women political
prisoners of South Africa.
AFRICAN WOMEN AND THE GLOBAL HUMAN
RIGHTS AGENDA
When feminists in the global North talk about women's rights in
Africa, inevitably the first thing that comes to mind is the topic
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of female circumcision or, in feminist-charged speak, female
genital mutilation.1 This discussion may be followed by other
discussions of sexualized violence, such as trafficking, AIDS,
and, occasionally, customary practices such as polygamy and
land tenure. On the bright side, the UN Millennium Goals have
broader and more explicit gender perspectives affecting women
in Africa, including economic and educational rights. Yet,
overall, despite the important shift of the human rights agenda
to do more than lip service to women's rights, African women
get short shrift.
Feminist writer and educator Abena Busia tries to shift
the discourse about women in Africa through a new academic
endeavour, Women Writing Africa, sponsored by Rutgers
University. She shares the following insight in an interview with
WHR.net:
In Women Writing Africa we collect women's cultural
production—oral and written, formal and informal, sacred and
profane. We try to collect whatever we can lay our hands on, as
far back as we can get. We are looking at things that we know
were written or spoken in female-centered spaces, about things
that only women could say or in circumstances that women
can control. What we are trying to do is get a sense of the way
women have agency and control over their lives and negotiate
their lives differently.
We just got so tired of our non-existence as women of power
and agency in Western discourse where we are predominantly
viewed as perpetual victims —a barefoot pregnant woman
holding a baby in our hands, or a barefoot pregnant woman
with a baby on our back and hoe in our hand. We are labeled
endlessly. That sense of missing many things —such as no
agency, no affective space, no human negotiation—all those
things, which in fact, everybody knows are profoundly central
to our existence and shape our lives. (WHR.net 2003; emphasis
added)
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Given the colonizing lens that Busia describes so well, the
outsider expert continues to label and exoticize the hapless
African woman, and knows which remedies work best for
African women and children (Mohanty 1990; Nagel 2001). This
patronizing " speaking for" attitude has come under criticism, in
particular with respect to vociferous attacks on female genital
mutilation by non-African feminists (Butegwa 2002; Welch
1995).
In the decade of emerging women's rights, which culminated
in the Beijing Women's Conference, it turned out that the
African regional committee provided much food for thought for
the conference. The final platform for action drew much of its
content from the preparatory African meetings. No longer would
African women be silent bystanders who have to be represented
by "well-meaning" northerners; rather, under the leadership of
Gertrude Mongella, dubbed in Africa as "Mama Beijing," they
have joined the centre of discussions and shaped the platform
for women decisively.
Now, having argued that one should take care not to "speak
for" but to "speak with" African women, this chapter suffers from
a particular epistemological and political dilemma. How does one
address human rights violations concerning non-elite women
without falling into the patronizing trap? How do women, who
are walled in either in their families' compounds or in the state's
carceral structures, participate when they do not get the chance
to speak? Florence Butegwa (2002) argues sensibly that outsiders
may speak on behalf of the oppressed only if it is impossible for
the inside group to agitate: "I can see a role for capacity-building,
including skills in problem analysis, organizing and advocacy.
The content of their advocacy efforts, including definition of
issues and possible solutions, should remain entirely for those
working from within" (126). In describing women's imprisoned
or "walled-in" experiences this chapter attempts to stay clear of
normative claims that find little basis in lived experiences. Yet it
is difficult, admittedly, to write about women prisoners and not
thematize their enormous victimization.
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In human rights campaigns almost invariably pure and
deserving victims become the poster children. Similarly, in
the prison literature about women one tends to find fervent
appeals to the women's virtual innocence and rationalizations
of a woman's particular offence. I do not claim to do anything
different from that paradigm, but I also note that men's criminal
acts could easily be justified by drawing on the environmental
hypothesis: most violent offenders tend to have been victimized
in their childhood by family members or others. Vivien Stern
(1998) points out that there is a major difference for women's and
men's imprisonment. Unlike men, few women resort to violence,
and most commit property offences due to poverty. The world
over, women's rate of imprisonment is about five percent (or
less) of the total rate of imprisonment of a country (the exception
is the United States, due to its "war on drugs" policy, which has
targeted women).
I argue that there are two types of women prisoners:
"imprisoned intellectuals," borrowing a term from Joy James
(2003), and social prisoners. On the one hand, there are women
who politically organize and oppose family and/or state power,
of the stature of a Winnie Mandela (South Africa) or Wangari
Maathai (Kenya), who may find political clout thanks to their
international connections and even win prestigious prizes
for their daring opposition to patriarchal, kleptocratic, and
dictatorial regimes. On the other hand, there are invisible women
who are criminalized and become social outcasts, women who
have born children out of wedlock (Amina Lawal, Nigeria, one
of the most prominent of castigated, fallen women) and who
may turn their luck around thanks to energetic African lawyers
(Hauwa Ibrahim, Nigeria) and local NGOs (e.g.. Women Living
under Muslim Laws). But most women who end up as social
or common prisoners do not have high-end representation and
face a number of challenges rarely addressed by human rights
agencies.
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AFRICAN HUMAN RIGHTS DISCOURSE:
COLONIAL PARADIGM OR LIBERATORY
PRACTICE?
In recent years several conferences and books have been devoted
to the question of human rights in Africa. Does it make sense to
focus on a "rights discourse/' or is it more prudent to use "other
languages of resistance" (An-Na'im 2002)? The human rights
declarations that evolved from the global North focus almost
exclusively on the negative rights of the individual against state
power: from the British and American Bills of Rights to the
Universal Declarations of Human Rights, these documents focus
on individualized freedom to pursue self-interested ideals apart
from community needs. Such ideology is alien (and therefore not
universalizable) to most of the globe, where community interests
trump individual interests, especially the possessive individual
pursuit of happiness. Thus, John Mbiti (1970, 141) rearticulates
the egocentric Cartesian cogito into a sociocentric variant: "I am
because we are, and because we are therefore I am." Clearly,
a Eurocentric "rights discourse" devoid of sensitivity toward
cultural practices will not be applicable in an African context of
sociality and responsibility toward one's community, customs,
and elders. However, due to the colonial legacy, the rights
discourse has firmly been instituted in the legal instruments of
African countries.
The African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (1986)
weaves together different traditions, and the outcome has
been assailed as a contradictory mix of rights and duties of the
individual and groups (Mutua 2002). However, as Makau Mutua
emphasizes, Western human rights experts have underestimated
the reality of individual rights of Africans before colonial conquest.
Mutua's cursory view of precolonial practices of adjudication
highlights the high respect for human life and the dignity of
the person, the guarantee of equal protection of individuals
(e.g., the Akamba of East Africa), the ability to dismiss a chief
who rules oppressively (in the Akan society of West Africa),
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the presumption of innocence, and dedication to the juridical
process (e.g., the Amhara of East Africa). Mutua is careful not
to romanticize the historical record of precolonial Africa and
points to cases where human rights of individuals, especially the
rights of women, were not safeguarded. So in what ways can
individual and group rights coexist in harmony, as the African
charter imagines? The new South African Constitution (1994)
also commits itself to this ideal of coexistence. However, the past
decade witnessed serious tensions, particularly in customary
family law (Chanock 2002). In 2005 the South African Supreme
Court ended some aspects of the debate by ruling that customs
that discriminate on the basis of gender have to be abolished. The
debate is still going on in the northern states of Nigeria, which
ushered in sharia law in 2000.
When it comes to the adjudication of rights, whether as
group/culturally based rights or as individual rights, one has to
look at individual cases for which the ideological position might
be most advantageous and representative of women's needs.
This is especially important for women who have transgressed
against a person or against social standards. Here I would like to
contrast practices in two different parts of West Africa: Mali2 and
northern Nigeria.
A woman in Mali killed her husband because he had married
a second wife. The first wife poisoned the husband on the day of
the naming ceremony of the second wife's child. The family's ;e/z
(bard who engages in informal conflict resolution) intervened,
and it was agreed to banish the offender from the village; she
went into exile at her paternal home. Nobody proposed turning
her in to the police, despite the severity of the crime (Kone 2003).
The police, too, when called to arrest an offender, will ask whether
people have tried to resolve the conflict in the customary way.
This may be a bewildering gesture if one is accustomed to the
Western worldview that an offence is done against the state, first
and foremost, which then intervenes on behalf of the victim, and
it may seem that victims' rights are disregarded in communally
based adjudication. However, one ought to see the other side too.
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When British colonialists started to prosecute persons for crimes
against the Crown, such as property theft or murder (of another
African), victims were bewildered when they did not receive the
customary restitution from the offender's clan. "Doing time" in
a penitentiary serves no purpose from the point of view of the
aggrieved. Mali is a predominantly Muslim country that does
not condone sharia law, but allows indigenous practices of
mediation by thejeli caste and joking relatives to restore peace in
the community and to solve conflicts between persons and clans.
"Cultural justice" may not have to clash with secular "criminal
justice" (Comaroff and Comaroff 2004), but the next case shows
that it certainly can.
The Zamfara State government of Nigeria adopted the
Islamic legal system, sharia law, in January 2000, in disregard
of the secular nature of the Nigerian Constitution and of other
religious minorities living in this state. Sharia law was declared
by the governor as "not just a penal code but a way of life"
(Abdullah 2002). All women were soon banned from sports
activities, and single women received an ultimatum: get married
within three months or lose your job! The controversy about the
law heated up when the first penal sanctions were delivered:
limb amputation for theft and public flogging of prostitutes and
a male procurer. International attention came along with the
conviction and flogging of seventeen-year-old Bariya Ibrahim
for the offence of fornication. Proof of the offence was based on
the fact of her pregnancy and her unmarried status. Such proof,
however, is quite spurious, given that sharia law stipulates third-
party eyewitnesses of the transgression of fornication, which
did not occur (Abdullah 2002). Amina Lawal's case of adultery
followed two years later, but her conviction and death sentence
were overturned by the Sharia Court of Appeal.
These two cases show that it is impossible to differentiate
between (pure) customs and traditional practices, on the one
hand, and politically expedient customs, on the other. Customs
are always open to contestation and interpretation; they can be
read in a progressive way or in a reactionary way. This is meant
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as a caveat to liberal feminist human rights experts who jump to
the defence of a woman cast as a victim of customary practices.
I simply wish to point out that a human rights adjudication
that relies on imprisonment as its main instrument may also be
harmful to women.
A BRIEF HISTORY OF PRISONS IN AFRICA
Prisons in Africa are an un-African institution. In precolonial
African societies one of the harshest sentences faced by an
offender was expulsion; exile equated to social death. When the
European colonialists arrived, in the " scramble for Africa/' they
converted slave forts along the Atlantic coast into jails or cachots
(Bernault 2003). Chinua Achebe's (1954) anti-colonial novel
Things Fall Apart describes well the trauma incurred by political
leaders of the community who faced incarceration by the colonial
power. For the African psyche it was simply unimaginable to
utilize prisons as a form of punishment. West Africa's measures
for crime control tended to be restorative and retributive justice;
collective punishment, rather than individual punishment,
was also common. Where an individual defrauded a member
of another clan the offender's entire clan may have had to pay
restitution, as is still commonly practised in Mali (Kone 2003).
During colonial times sexual assault and gang rape were
particularly prevalent because women were not given separate
quarters from men in prison. In Senegal African women were
expected to cook for the entire prison population and sleep
in the kitchen or on the porch of the fort or prison compound
(Konate 2003). Colonial prisons enforced racial segregation, and
European prisoners were housed in the vicinity of the warden's
office or compound (Goerg 2003).
In postcolonial Africa several notorious prisons were shut
down, and some serve as memorials for a haunted past, such
as Robben Island, where South Africa's anti-apartheid activists
were imprisoned. Due to the international pressures of the
United Nations and human rights organizations, a few countries
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have opened separate prisons for women and adolescent men.
However, most African prisons house men, women, and children,
and may merely provide separate sleeping quarters for men and
women.
Since the 1990s a few African governments have also invited
an intergovernmental, regional agency to insp'ect their prisons. The
African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights appointed
a Special Rapporteur on Prisons and Conditions of Detention in
Africa. "This [appointment] provides a unique opportunity to
take a more holistic approach to the problems in prisons which an
individual appointed to consider torture or inhuman treatment,
for example, may not" (Murray 2002). The rapporteur has noted
in published reports that many African prisons face the following
challenging conditions: severe overcrowding, unsanitary living
quarters, inadequate diet, mixed gender facilities, and a high
percentage of prisoners on remand.3 The rapporteur visited
Malian prisons several times and acknowledged improvements
made after his recommendations. This, however, is a rare case
of encouraging news. Most African countries prefer to take the
walls behind which their citizens disappear to stand for "walls
of silence" rather than offering their prisons to inspection and
critique by an outside rapporteur. Given enormous budgetary
constraints, governments are also under pressure by the public
to invest in schools and health care before ameliorating the
conditions of the least desirable subjects: prisoners.
GENERAL ISSUES OF WOMEN'S HUMAN RIGHTS
BEHIND CUSTOMARY WALLS OR PRISON WALLS
Demographics of Criminalized Women
Even in Africa, prisons have turned into "homes" for young,
socially displaced, undereducated, and poor women, many of
whom are also mothers. Social displacement is an effect in part
of globalization and structural adjustment. More single women
leave their rural homes and venture into the cities for gainful
employment. Unlike their male counterparts, female convicts'
232 | Colonial Systems of Control
crimes tend to be non-violent, such as theft. Certain occupations,
such as sex work or domestic work and, to a lesser extent,
drug-dealing, expose women to a higher risk of sexual abuse
and criminalization. Domestic workers tend to be young, rural,
unmarried women who may risk being assaulted or raped by
their patrons, and in countries where abortion is illegal they may
commit infanticide out of despair. In some women's prisons,
such as in Bamako, Mali, the majority of prisoners and remanded
women are accused — or convicted — of infanticide. Mali does not
sanction legal medical procedures for the abortion of an unwanted
child. The social sanctions of having a child out of wedlock are
severe. Unfair and sexist trial procedures put women at further
risk. A divorced woman whose baby was stillborn was charged
with murder because her doctor's evidence was not introduced
in court (Amnesty International 2004).
In several African countries the familial practice of polygamy
seems to be an additional stress factor, but it affects more women
who have never received formal education and those who
dropped out of primary education. Polygamy seems to be losing
widespread support due to westernization, urbanization, and
Christianity. A recent Ugandan study (Tibatemwa-Ekirikubinza
1999) actually notes the higher prevalence of female criminality
(targeting the husband, junior co-wife, or the co-wife's child) in
rural regions where polygamy is prevalent. Prisoners, in particular
those who were senior wives, note the disparities in asset-sharing
by their husbands; many times these convicts rationalize their
violent offences by accusing the husband of total economic and
emotional abandonment of the senior wife and her children,
and devoting all the jointly earned resources to the new co-wife
(Tibatemwa-Ekirikubinza 1999). The majority of women who are
convicted of violent crimes have been in abusive relationships
(see Walker 1984 on battered woman syndrome), and it is only
since the UN conference in Beijing (1996) that domestic violence
has been taken seriously as a public health concern.4 Yet women
who kill their abusive partners in self-defence or in premeditation
receive punitive sentences, including capital punishment, rather
than leniency and compassion.
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Custodial Conditions
The United Nations rule that only women should guard women
is widely followed in Africa (unlike in the global North). Male
guards or visitors may enter women's quarters only in the
presence of other female guards, or, as in Nigeria, men can only
enter in exceptional circumstances, such as medical personnel
providing health care (Stern 1998). Male prisoners can be a
threat to women's well-being, which makes it necessary to insist
not only on separate sleeping quarters but also on separate
institutions, which was implemented in the capital of Mali
in the late 1990s. The women's prison at Bolle (near Bamako)
now serves as a model prison, not only in Mali but also on the
continent. Few countries run separate women's prisons because
of economics. Women's sections tend to be merely cordoned off
by a high wall or housed in makeshift buildings. They are treated
as an afterthought (Stern 1998).
In many countries unsentenced detainees held for more
than five years comprise over seventy percent of the prison
population. What is often deemed " death by natural causes" by
prison officials is actually caused by lack of sanitation and clean
drinking water, dietary deficiency, lack of adequate health care,
and overcrowding. Mortality rates increase dramatically during
the rainy season (Agomoh 2000). Often prisoners' families have
to supply food, soap, hygienic products, and blankets for the
prisoners. African governments are loath to spend the national
budget on prisoners' amenities in part because of the public's
outcry of undue favouritism toward criminals. In Kenya warders
also live in prisons with their families in squalid conditions, which
may well turn them into brutes who torture or kill prisoners
(Muiruri2005).
A recent Zimbabwean study (Musengezi and Staunton
2003) problematizes the lack of gender-specific consideration.
Men's prisons are the standard according to which women are
housed in sections of men's prisons or —more infrequently — in
separate facilities. Therefore, women do not receive items that
are not allocated to male convicts (e.g., basic sanitary items).
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South African women common law prisoners were particularly
denigrated by being denied panties and cotton from the prison
system in the 1970s (Kuzwayo 1985). The lack of basic health and
dietary needs is particularly grave for pregnant women. In most
prisons in Africa pregnant convicts get minimal or no pre- or
perinatal care; child mortality, as a result, is higher in prisons
than in civil society.
Most female prisoners are mothers, and young children
often stay with them in part because the father has abandoned
the mother upon her incarceration or because the mother's
family is ashamed of her convict status and refuses to take the
child. In some prisons no extra clothing is provided for the child,
and children suffer from the same poor diet as their mothers, so
that the children are literally punished along with their mothers
(Taylor 2004; Tibatemwa-Ekirikubinza 1999). "Women with
babies in prison seem to carry a double punishment of coping
themselves and fending for their children" (Musengezi and
Staunton 2003). Measures of rehabilitation are minimal, and
prison chores are overwhelmingly domestic—reinforcing the
gendered division of labour. Many women are illiterate and have
minimal formal education. Linguistic difficulties may adversely
impact ethnic minorities and immigrants, who do not understand
the lingua franca of the courts and the prison staff (de Klerk and
Barkhuizen 2001).
In South Africa, where there is now an active prisoners'
rights association (South African Prisoners' Organization for
Human Rights) that even won the right to vote for convicts in the
1990s, rules seem to be selectively enforced with respect to illicit
sexual practices. Since 1996, in male prisons, condom dispensers
are ubiquitous, and condom use is encouraged to curb the spread
of AIDS. On the other hand, in women's prisons, perceived
lesbian convicts are reported to prison staff, and lesbians may
also fear reprisals by other convicts (Dirsuweit 1999). This is not
to say that relationships in men's prisons are of a consensual
nature, and adolescents housed in adult prisons are vulnerable
to assaults and sexual exploitation.
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Political Prisoners
From the onset of the colonial conquest the carceral compound
was used for political control of Africans. However, after
decolonization many governments continued with the practice
of incarcerating political opponents (Bernault 2003); even
leaders who were political prisoners under colonial rule
enthusiastically locked up their political opponents (Asumah
2001). Much of women's political imprisonment is predicated
on their participation in liberation struggles during the colonial
and apartheid era. Women instigated revolts against poll taxes
(Nigeria) and fought alongside men for national liberation
(e.g., Mau Mau members in Kenya, pass law resisters in South
Africa). Many women faced sexual assault, rape, and other forms
of torture and murder in detention camps and prisons cells
(Harlow 1992; Kuzwayo 1985; Tesfagiorgis 1992; wa Wamwere
2002). Women political leaders also faced house arrest and
banishment, which turned the banned person into a self-policing
docile body (Ramphele 1995). Winnie Mandela, banned during
apartheid, was so acutely aware of her exceptional status under
the apartheid regime that she was always prepared to return
to prison, having a suitcase ready at all times (Mandela 1985).
Similarly, Gambo Sawaba readied her loin clothes because she
was incarcerated more than a dozen times for her defiant stance
(Shawalu 1990).
Political detainees and prisoners differentiate themselves
from common or social detainees and convicts. They report
serving their sentences with pride and determination. They
instigate hunger strikes and launch grievances, never coming
to terms with the label of prisoner; some refuse to work, and
all refuse to be "rehabilitated." Some women are erroneously
detained for participating in illegal political movements, yet
upon release they actually join the liberation movement that
they were falsely accused of belonging to (Tesfagiorgis 1992).
In South Africa under apartheid political prisoners attempted
to make common cause with common prisoners, who were
condemned to hard labour (Meer 2001). Sometimes the warden
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placed common prisoners with political prisoners to press them
into service to inform on the latter (Makhoere 1988). However,
political prisoners were often able to educate common prisoners
about their lot and the oppressive situation. Northern Nigerian
political prisoner and Muslim Gambo Sawaba counselled other
Muslim women to say that they were practising Christians to
evade harsh sanctions of the sharia court (Shawalu 1990).
But at times political prisoners distance themselves from the
" unfortunate drunks" and outcasts (First 1989). This hierarchy
is reinforced by the warden's "fear of infectious belief": political
detainees and political prisoners tend to be totally segregated so
that they cannot incite the mass of social prisoners to rise up and
organize for better prison conditions or, worse, to "conscientize"
(to use South African vernacular) them about party politics.
Almost all political prisoners who have written memoirs have
participated in or organized a hunger strike to protest prison
conditions. Caesarina Kona Makhoere (1988) reports that her
cohort instigated the first strike in South Africa's women's
prisons in 1976 —a time of mass arrests and deaths in detention
of schoolchildren in the aftermath of the Soweto uprising. After
1976 the isolation of detainees increased. Being segregated for
only a short time attacks the soul of the political prisoner; once
the sense of time breaks down, sensory deprivation creates
psychopathic and somatic responses; one ages faster and may
have long-term health problems as a result of isolation (First
1989; Makhoere 1988; Mashinini 1989; Mandela 1985).
Sometimes political prisoners are allowed no other literature
than the Bible or the Qur'an; they use the scriptures to shed light
of their situations (Makhoere 1988; Meer 2001), in particular when
they face psychological torture, such as interrogation (First 1989).
Makhoere (1988) discovered the subversive messages of the Bible
when she adorned a letter of complaint to prison authorities with
pithy quotations from it. The letter was torn up by the apartheid
prison officials. One political prisoner reports that male activists
considered women's imprisonment to be lighter than what men
experienced (Middleton 1998). While it was the case, as First
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(1989) and others admit, that white women had much better
conditions (especially regarding hygiene and food) than black
women, it cannot be said in general that women suffered less
than men from imprisonment and especially from isolation.
Release
There are long-term negative physical and psychological effects
associated with incarceration. Many former political prisoners
complain of heart problems, tumours, and other diseases
affecting their long-term health. Emma Mashinini's account
(1989) of her six-month solitary detention reveals an intense
level of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). Her isolation was
only interrupted by extended interrogations by her tormentors.
For social prisoners the return to civil society also involves
an inordinate ordeal of shame, another form of social death.
In the Bolle prison in Mali women who are going through an
apprenticeship programme (e.g., learning soapmaking or
typewriting) are told that they can return after their release to
complete the programme. Few do so because society would
judge them to be imprisoned again (Nagel 2007).
On the other hand, in Kenya some prisoners refuse to leave
after their official release dates because prison has become a home
after the vice president in charge of prisons instituted a series of
reforms since 2003 (Obonyo 2005). Release may not necessarily
be associated with freedom, for ex-convicts face "hostility,
rejection and disdain from their families and society" (Ayieko
2005). Elizabeth Mwita, released in June 2005 after sixteen
months of jail time, was served with divorce papers from her
husband, who did not want to consort with somebody convicted
of a criminal charge. He never visited her once in prison, which
is a fairly typical experience for married women prisoners. In
Bolle women's prison, Mali, women are allowed family visits,
but rarely do family members come, whereas the men's prison
in downtown Bamako bustles every day with wives visiting
and bringing food to their incarcerated husbands. In addition,
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children of convicts and ex-convicts find themselves stigmatized
and have difficulty finding work in Kenya (as elsewhere) (Ayieko
2005).
Clearly, the stigma of incarceration has huge repercussions
for extended family networks. While the shame of imprisonment
is felt by men and women alike across the continent, women and
their children bear the brunt of a jail sentence — many studies the
world over have shown the psychological, social, and economic
costs associated with the incarceration of women who carry the
main responsibility not only for parenting but also for subsistence
living for their (extended) families (Taylor 2004).
For imprisoned intellectuals return to the community is
experienced differently. Many such prisoners note with pride that
they endured persecution, banishment, and prison life, and at
times even "confess" to their interrogators that "everything I had
done I would willingly do again" (First 1989, 90). Fatima Meer
(2001), a former president of the Black Women's Federation of
South Africa, reports that she did not want to miss the experience
of five months of detention, even though she was already a
banned person by the time she was detained. But she enjoyed
great spiritual and material support from her family during her
prison stint, and thus she did not endure the social ostracism
with which common prisoners have to deal.
Women who are politicized because of group membership
and subsequently tortured, and who have to adhere to an honour
code, find it difficult to talk about their experiences, especially
with their spouses. They often suffer from severe PTSD (Wenk-
Ansohn 2002). According to psychologist Mechthild Wenk-
Ansohn, men who have gone into prison due to participation in
liberation movements tend to have less severe PTSD problems,
even though they may have been severely tortured too. Their
conviction about the cause tends to help them adjust to new
circumstances, such as being refugees in a foreign country and
culture, and their healing and social readjustment are more
easily assured. Ex-prisoners who write about their detention
experiences may find writing about them therapeutic (Pross
2002). Rarely do we find accounts by social prisoners. South
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African Pumla Mkhize (1992), who was forewarned by her
mother about prisons being "a snake with ice water," clearly is
exceptional in discussing frankly not only the reasons for her
incarceration but also how she gained favours inside (and early
release) by snitching on other convicts. Snitching is considered to
be one of the worst forms of transgression within the prison and
violates the prisoners' own moral code.
CONCLUSION
This chapter has discussed in broad strokes human rights issues
of African women, in particular those who are " walled in" by
"culture" or by "criminal law" statutes. Let me return to the un-
African custom of incarceration by the state.
Without question, women who enter the criminal justice
system have experienced serious victimization prior to arrest and
incarceration. While the reasons for their incarceration may be
country-specific, victimization coupled with poverty comprises
a major factor in pushing a woman into a difficult situation. It is
then quite easy to argue for more lenient sentences for women
victims-turned-perpetrators. One can argue that women should
not face incarceration because it aggravates their already poor
social status and gives them fewer choices when they return
to civil society. Furthermore, the sentence often disconnects a
mother from her children, who in turn are likely to become felons
and prisoners too. However, it is quite another matter to argue for
leniency toward other perpetrators, say men. Nevertheless, this
is what some feminist prison activists are prepared to do. From
the classic Instead of Prisons (Knopp et al. 1976) to the manifesto
Prisons and Social Control (Kinesis 1987) activists have argued for
the abolition of the criminal justice system, in particular curtailing
the sentencing of people to prisons and making them into "slaves
of the state" (Muntaquim 2003; Nagel 2003).
Human rights are safeguarded only when people are indeed
treated with humanity, and 200 years of the experiment of caging
people have shown us that prisons not only are "crime schools"
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but also prepare people for savagery and despair, not penitence
and rehabilitation. Minimum standards for prisoners ought to be
guaranteed, but this should not be the end of one's advocacy. It is
merely the starting point of acknowledging that nobody forfeits
rights, not even a prisoner on death row, and much more has to
be done to encourage prison reform and eventual abolition.
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NOTES
1 The following is based in part on Nagel (2005).
2 Some of my discussion on prisons and restorative justice in Mali is
based on Nagel (2007).
3 Prisons in Mozambique - Report of the Special Rapporteur on
Prisons and Conditions of Detention in Africa, Series IV, 3; Prisons
in Mali. Report of the Special Rapporteur on Prisons and Conditions
of Detention to the 22nd Session of the African Commission on
Human and Peoples7 Rights, Series IV, 2.
4 Kenya, which has experienced a series of prison reforms since the
NARC government took power in 2000, opened its first women-
run police station in Nairobi in 2004. Kilimani Police Station deals
exclusively with crimes and violence committed against women
and children. In August 2004 a government report noted that more
than half of the women in Kenya have experienced violence since
the age of fifteen. Most of the violence is attributed to husbands,
some sixty percent of beatings. Some of it leads to violent deaths of
the women (Muiruri 2004).
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CHAPTER 15




As I was writing this chapter, news reached me that a Nigerian
female journalist, Isioma Daniel, had been sentenced to death by
a deputy governor of a self-proclaimed Islamic state in Nigeria
for writing an article that Muslims consider blasphemous. The
article, published by This Day newspaper, suggested that the
Prophet Mohammed would have liked to marry some of the
beauty queens who were in Nigeria to contest for the Miss World
crown. In the protest that ensued over 200 innocent Nigerians
were slaughtered, and the organizers were forced to shift the
venue for the finals of the competition to London. The staging
of the contest in Nigeria had earlier been controversial because
such contests encourage what most Muslims see as indecent
appearance by women (although beauty pageants have been
organized annually in Nigeria for a long time without similar
incidents). On the other hand, many beauty queens boycotted the
contest to protest the sentence of death by stoning for adultery
of Amina Lawal, and some Nigerians now suspect that the
campaign by the foreign press against the staging of Miss World
in Nigeria was part of what made Muslims more sensitive to the
contest. The president of the country, retired general Olusegun
Obasanjo, regretted that efforts to attract foreign investors to the
country would suffer due to the riots, but he promised that the
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journalist who wrote the offending article would not be arrested.
The journalist had reportedly fled to the United States, but many
Nigerians were demanding that the politician who tried to incite
people to kill her should himself be arrested.
The Daniel case problematizes the common-sense equation
between crime and punishment, and demonstrates that what is
considered "criminal" is situational and culturally specific. In
this chapter I suggest that this rupture does not exist in Nigeria
as an outcome of a punitive version of Islamic fundamentalism
alone. The arbitrary and unjust punishment of Nigerian women
does not occur only under sharia law. Rather, the entire colonial
system of criminal justice is based on the criminalization of
innocent black women. The chapter starts by reviewing the theory
of "victimization as mere punishment," which I developed in
my study of black women and the British criminal justice system
(Agozino 1997). This theory is illustrated with recent empirical
evidence from Nigeria. Finally, the implications of the problems
confronting Nigerian women for the struggle to decolonize
Africa are outlined in the conclusion.
Jean Baudrillard (1983,25) famously asserted that Disneyland
is there to conceal the fact that it is the whole of America that
is the real Disneyland, just as the prison is there to conceal the
fact that it is the social in its entirety that is the prison. The
implication of Baudrillard's statement is that you do not have to
go to Disneyland to have fun in America. The whole country is
one elaborate amusement park. Similarly, Americans do not need
to enter the prison gate to become subjected to state surveillance
and social control; rather, the entire population is controlled as
inmates of the global lockdown. Nigeria is no America. The land
mass is only a fraction of that of America, possibly the size of
Texas alone. The population is dense in comparison: almost half
the population of the United States. Of course, what Baudrillard
was saying here was already said by Malcolm X, who told people
who laughed when he referred to the time he was in prison that
they were still in prison themselves, the prison without walls.
Fela Kuti made similar remarks in his song "Beast of No Nation,"
in which he complained that people wanted him to sing about
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life inside prison as if life outside prison is much different in
Nigeria.
More to the point, American prisons and jails hold more than
two million citizens, compared to the fewer than 50,000 prisoners
held in Nigeria. The surprising thing is that Americans believe
they can teach Nigerians better ways of running the criminal
justice system when it seems that what Nigerians can learn from
the United States is how to avoid the high costs of what Reiman
(1979) calls the theory of the pyrrhic defeat: the fact that, after
spending about four times the national budget of Nigeria on
the criminal justice system alone, Americans continue to name
"crime" as one of their top concerns. Indeed, while Nigeria has
just budgeted approximately $7 billion to run the entire country
for 2003, the new US Department of Homeland Security alone
has been allocated more than $30 billion.
Of course, the low number of prisoners in Nigeria compared
with the number in America can be used as evidence that
Nigerian law enforcement agents are inefficient. They have
failed to arrest the criminals who roam the streets and intimidate
ordinary citizens, while American mayors such as Rudy Giuliani
of New York can claim that zero tolerance means that the "bad
guys" are all locked up. However, even the greatest enthusiasts
of law-and-order policies cannot claim that much success, since
their law enforcement budgets rely on the continuing existence
of criminals on the loose.1 When people complain that Nigerian
criminals are allowed to roam the streets, they more often mean
the criminals in the corridors of power who cannot be touched,
while many of the prisoners happen to be innocent poor people
who lack the resources with which to bribe or influence their way
out of the prison preindustrial complex.
HISTORIOGRAPHY OF AFRICAN WOMEN AND
CRIMINAL INJUSTICE
In my earlier work on black women in the British criminal justice
system (1997) I made a surprising discovery — that many of the
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black women who were placed under lockdown were completely
innocent of the offences for which they had been convicted. I
searched in vain for criminological perspectives that could help
me to explain the unexpected finding, but I was frustrated because
criminology focuses almost exclusively on the punishment of
individual offenders. Jurisprudence uses the term "punishment
of the innocent" to describe the imprisonment of those who have
been falsely convicted (Lacey 1988). However, this concept tends
to view the incarceration of "the innocent" as an unfortunate
error in an otherwise just and efficient criminal justice system.
As such, it fails to challenge the criminological concern with the
individual and minimizes the disruptive potential of miscarriages
of justice. In addition, the term "punishment" hides the fact that
what is done to the innocent prisoner is a form of victimization,
for which redress is required. Stuart Hall's (1980) analysis of the
articulation of social relations in societies structured in dominance
provides a more useful theoretical framework to understand the
victimization of the innocent. Hall argues that the experience of
black women must be viewed through the lens of the race, class,
and gender oppression to which they are subjected. These three
major social relations cannot be analyzed separately; rather,
they are articulated, disarticulated, and rearticulated. Thus,
the central point of "victimization as mere punishment" is that
the criminal justice system institutionally violates the rights of
certain groups of people because of the ways in which power
relations are structured within society.
Historically, we can look at the African holocaust, otherwise
known as European slavery, for an early example of victimization
as mere punishment. The works of Angela Davis (1981), C. L. R.
James (1980), and Walter Rodney (1972) alert us to the fact that
our African ancestors did not have to commit any crime in order
to be hunted down, chained (if not killed), and transported to a
hostile world to be brutally exploited. Race-class-gender relations
were articulated in the victimization of Africans during slavery,
and African women suffered gender-specific inhumanities that
are too well known to be recounted here. Contemporary African
Nigerian Women in Prison 249
women and men continue to be locked down even when we have
done nothing wrong. For example, the wives, mothers, sisters,
or girlfriends of army officers are often arrested and detained
with their children when their male relations are suspected
of plotting unsuccessful coups and when they either flee or
commit suicide. Sometimes these women are harassed, maimed,
killed, or detained for years without being suspected of having
committed any crime themselves. Such cases attract immense
publicity because of the prominence of the individuals involved,
but research indicates that what such hostages suffer is part of
the daily experience of poor men and women in Africa.
Winnie Mandela (1984) had a "barometer" theory for this:
she said that she was a social barometer because anything that
the apartheid regime tried on her was later generalized to the
oppressed in South Africa. Some scholars have tried to explain
the oppressive treatment of black people by analyzing the prison
system as the new slave plantation or the new ghetto (Wacquant
2001). What they have overlooked is the fact that African
Americans did not have to break any law to end up in the slave
plantation or in the ghetto. Rather, as Box (1983) and Reiman
(1979) argue, the poor end up in prison not because they are
more criminal but because they lack the resources with which to
free themselves even when they are falsely accused. Meanwhile,
the rich routinely get away with murder.
The concept of victimization as mere punishment requires
us to rethink the purpose of the prison. The history of prison
construction in Nigeria is intricately entwined with the history of
attempts to repress the popular aspirations of Nigerian masses.
The African Concord of August 6, 1990, reports that many "of
Nigeria's prisons are more than one hundred years old. Records
show that four prisons were built between 1800 and 1850, 11
prisons were built between 1851 and 1900,83 were built between
1900 and 1950, and 33 prisons between 1951 to date" (Ehonwa
1996). As this article demonstrates, there was no prison in the
place called Nigeria before 1800. European trading companies
were the first to construct prisons in Nigeria for holding
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kidnapped Africans prior to the Middle Passage or for detaining
Africans who resisted the banditry of Europeans in Africa.
Prisons were thus first built as part of the machinery of
the brutal slave economy and are closely related to the African
holocaust. In other words, the prison emerged in Nigeria not
as an agency of the criminal justice system but as a tool for
organized crimes against humanity. The Africans who were
kidnapped and detained before being sold into slavery had
committed no offences. The biological fiction of racial inferiority,
not criminality, was used to justify their loss of liberty. The period
1850-1900 covers the first few decades of the official colonization
of Nigeria after the 1860 Berlin conference for the partition of
Africa. In this short period the number of prisons in Nigeria
nearly trebled, reflecting increasing resistance to European
penetration of the interior regions. The geometrical progression
in the development of the prison preindustrial complex in Nigeria
continued; the period 1900-1950 represents nationalist struggles
when the gunboat criminology of imperialism failed to silence
the call for independence and when many patriots were thrown
into jail. Following independence in 1960, the rate of growth
of the prison establishments slowed somewhat, reflecting the
relative legitimacy of neocolonial regimes, but the rate remained
high enough to reflect their continuing reliance on the colonial
methodology for stifling popular protests in Nigeria.
I am not suggesting that all prisoners are freedom fighters.
Some of the prisoners may have committed violent or unsocial
acts. However, I am convinced that this correlation between
the history of repression in Nigeria and the history of the
expansion of penal institutions needs to be studied more closely.
As Michel Foucault (1977) informs us, there were hardly any
prisons in Europe until the late eighteenth century. Prior to that,
punishment in Europe took the form of public display of torture.
Foucault's genealogy of the prison implies that the prison is not
an enduring feature of human society but a repressive technology
of modernity. In the Nigerian context the birth of the prison
cannot be separated from the histories of slavery, colonialism,
and neocolonialism.
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Political independence from the British has not ushered
in a golden era of postcolonial justice. M. K. O. Abiola, who
established African Concord, was one of the few rich and powerful
people to suffer victimization as mere punishment in Nigeria.
After claiming victory in the June 1992 presidential elections,
which were annulled by the military, he was jailed and ultimately
murdered in prison. While he was in detention one of his wives,
Kudirat Abiola, was executed by an assassination squad set up
by the bloody dictator General Sani Abacha, who also hanged
Kenule Saro-Wiwa and eight other Ogoni environmental activists
after framing them for the murder of four chiefs in Ogoniland.
Abacha also sentenced to death several past military rulers of
Nigeria, including the present president, General Obasanjo,
following a trumped-up charge of complicity in a coup plot
against him. Luckily for many of them, but too late for General
Shehu Yaradua, who was killed in detention, General Abacha
died suddenly, and they were released by his successor, General
Abubakar. This close shave with death made Obasanjo pledge
to support the campaign for the abolition of the death penalty
worldwide.2
The first time that rich and powerful people found themselves
behind bars in Nigeria was when Chief Obafemi Awolowo and
leaders of the opposition were framed and convicted of plotting
to overthrow the government by force in the first republic.
Following his imprisonment a group of army officers attempted
a coup with the aim of handing over power to Chief Awolowo,
but they failed and were also detained in prison. A countercoup
followed and facilitated a genocidal pogrom in the north against
easterners. This led to attempted secession by the east, and the
release of Chief Awolowo and the military officers from prison,
before the onset of the Nigeria-Biafra war of 1967-1970. The
second time large numbers of the elite saw themselves in prison,
was after the abortive military coup against the government
of General Murtala Muhammad, which saw dozens of top
army officers and several civilians executed for their roles in
the coup attempt under General Obasanjo as the succeeding
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head of state. Again, following the overthrow of the second
republic government of Shehu Shagari in 1983 the military
rulers prosecuted and convicted many of the second republic
politicians of high levels of corruption and embezzlement. They
were given prison sentences ranging from twenty-five years to
life. However, in 1985 the military government was overthrown,
and all the rogue politicians jailed by Generals Idiagbon and
Buhari were released by General Babangida. Babangida did not
hesitate later to execute dozens of top military officers suspected
of involvement in several abortive coups against his own military
regime.
RECENT EMPIRICAL REPORTS ON NIGERIAN
WOMEN IN PRISON
In the fall of 1998 I collaborated on a study of the militarization
of Nigerian civil society (Agozino and Idem 2001). During
the fieldwork we learned that social institutions such as the
family, educational facilities, religious establishments, trade
and commerce, the justice system, and community relations
were permeated by the militaristic ethos of a society that had
experienced long terms of military rule. Husbands assumed the
roles of commanders-in-chief of their families, beating wives and
children; educational institutions witnessed authoritarian styles
of administration, while students formed secret cults with which
to commit murder or gang-rape female students; religious and
ethnic violence was the order of the day; and due process was
almost non-existent. Militarism promoted violent means for
settling quarrels in civil society: for example, traders would hire
armed soldiers to murder their rivals. The militarism of Nigerian
society is also reflected in policing and the prisons, which are
feared as institutions imbued with violence, including sexual
violence, corruption, and the rule of force.
Police Violence and Detention
The economic desperation of most families due to the Structural
Adjustment Programmes decreed by the World Bank and the
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International Monetary Fund means that families are forced
to choose which children should be educated and which
should be left in ignorance. This choice leads to the continued
undereducation of girls, who are then more vulnerable to
injustice and exploitation as young women. Moreover, the
crushing poverty imposed on Nigerians as part of this "global
lockdown" has led to popular protests by the masses, resulting in
the widespread arrest of women either for participation in such
protests or for being family members of suspected men. In 2001
Nigerian women stripped naked to intimidate oil workers and
seize control of the facilities of Chevron Texaco, to press home
their demand that the company that polluted the environment
from which they could no longer earn their living as peasants
should pay reparations to the community and provide jobs for
their sons (not surprisingly, given patriarchy, the women did not
also demand jobs for the daughters, wives, and mothers of the
community). The women decided to lead the protest after the
young men who had previously engaged in direct action were
arrested and jailed. Although the women were not arrested, the
disdainful response of the politicians was to ignore them and
punish them with the bitter cold air of the open sea, where some
of them reportedly caught pneumonia. Thus, the women did
not have to go to prison to experience the cruelty of the global
lockdown.
In 1984 Maroko slum was demolished on the order of the
governor of Lagos State, and 300,000 ghetto dwellers instantly
became homeless. Some were forced to sleep under bridges, but
a few found refuge in some uncompleted housing estates that the
government was developing. Again, the state military governor
ordered armed police to eject the refugees, and in the process as
many as seventeen women and girls were raped by the officers.
On the topic of arrest and detention, Akumadu (1995)
reports that women are treated in a crude and unconstitutional
manner. Many women are not told they are under arrest until
they are lured to the police station under the pretext of helping
police with investigations, and some are not told of the charge
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against them until they appear in court. To make matters worse,
the police are given wide discretion by the law to make arrests
without warrants under various circumstances. A prostitute,
Adizat Mohammed, detained at the Kano police post, reported
that the police raid prostitutes only when they are broke, and that
those who pay the N300 "fine" or bribe demanded by the police
are released immediately. Another woman who was a trader
reported that she displayed her wares in front of her house once
during a compulsory national environmental sanitation exercise
when police officers arrested her and confiscated her wares. She
was released on bail after two days in detention, but her wares
were never returned to her. Another woman, Kemi (surname
withheld), had a quarrel with her neighbour and was arrested
with her baby. Both were held in detention for a week without
any provision for child care. She suspected that the police officers
must have been "settled" or bribed by her neighbour to torture
her and her baby. The result of the overzealous use of detention
by the police is that their tiny cells are always overcrowded, and
the only toilet facility in such crowded cells is usually a bucket.
In the cells older inmates extort "state money" or taxes
from new inmates, and refusal to pay can result in physical
abuse. This practice is more common among male detainees,
but they also extend their demands to female detainees, and
any resistance is met with threats to throw the woman into a cell
occupied by men. Such psychological torture is usually enough
to make women acquiesce to extortion. In addition, food is
rarely served to the detainees, and when served it is often not
fit for human consumption. Thus, the detainees are expected to
bribe police officers to be allowed to buy their own food from
vendors at the police station. Women reported being tortured
during interrogation by having a candlestick or the neck of a
bottle inserted into their private parts by male police officers in
an attempt to get them to confess to crimes they did not commit.
The suspects are usually not allowed access to an attorney, and
the illiterate ones are not even read their rights; police officers
write up statements for them to sign with a thumbprint, and they
do not even realize they are signing confessions.
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One woman, Esther Ayorinde, went to a police station
to complain that, by moving her husband from that station to
another one far away, it was difficult for her to visit him. Her
husband had been arrested following a quarrel with his elder
brother over the sale of their father's land by the brother. The
police officers arrested the wife for complaining and detained
her in the same cell where suspected male armed robbers were
held. She was gang-raped. Women rarely report cases of rape
in custody out of a feeling of shame. Theresa Akumadu (1995),
in Patterns of Abuse of Women's Rights in Employment and Police
Custody in Nigeria, reports that women seeking redress for sexual
harassment at work are often subjected to further violence by the
police. She gives the example of a typist, Uzoma Okorie, who
was maliciously accused of theft by her boss after rebuffing his
advances. During her interrogation police officers gave her what
they called the "VIP treatment" by stripping her naked, cuffing
her hands behind a pillar, and inserting the neck of a bottle into
her vagina while flogging her bare buttocks until she bled so
much that she fainted, only to recover in the police hospital days
later.
PRISONS
Recent research on Nigerian prisons focuses on overcrowding
and concerns about a growing population. Agomoh, Adeyemi,
and Ogbebor (2001, 6) reported that there are currently "148
prisons and about 83 satellite prisons or lock-ups (where few
prisoners are held in court buildings), 10 prison farms and
9 cottage industries for the training of inmates." In 1999 the
prison population was 40,899, and out of this number 21,579 or
52.8 percent were prisoners awaiting trial. While these figures
appear much fewer than the two million Americans behind bars,
we should note that Nigerian prisons have a combined capacity
of 25,000, and are therefore significantly overcrowded. If the
number of people awaiting trial were given bail, then more than
half of the prisoners would be released, and the prisons would be
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nearer their full capacity. If the innocent people who are wrongly
convicted were also released from prison, then the Nigerian
prison population would be much lower still. And if non-violent
offenders were corrected in the community, then Nigeria would
not be in need of many prisons at all. Moreover, some of the
prisoners are too young to be in prison. For example, in 1991, out
of a total of 52,129 prisoners, 1,204 were below the age of sixteen.
These youths were housed with adult prisoners, and they were
thereby exposed to sexual and physical abuse by the older male
prisoners and guards. Agomoh, Adeyemi, and Ogbebor (2001,
18) give the sex distribution of the population of Nigerian prisons
by state as follows in Table 15.1 (note that Bayelsa did not record
any prisoners, probably because it was a newly created state that
was yet to construct its own prison facility).
Table 15.1






























































































































































From thé above statistics we can see that Nigérian prisons reflect
thé global phenomenon whereby incarcerated populations are
mainly mâle. The major différence between thèse findings and
my study of black women and thé British criminal justice System
(Agozino 1997) is that in Nigeria social relations of race are almost
irrelevant, given thé relative homogeneity of thé population.
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In the place of race the politics of ethnicity is articulated with
gender and class to explain the preponderance of women from
certain parts of the country in women's prisons. The fact that
the prisons in the predominantly Muslim north and those in the
predominantly Christian south of the country are not remarkably
different in the gender composition of prisoners is an indication
that religion and ethnicity are not significant variables for the
explanation of the prison population. Whether the prisoners are
male or female, young or old, they are more likely to be poor,
uneducated, and unemployed. However, more recent reports of
the use of sharia law to oppress Nigerian women in the northern
parts of the country indicate that women do not have to be in
prison to qualify as inmates of the global lockdown.
Similar oppressive gender social control is also found in
the south, where inhumane treatment is reserved for poor
widows, while the practice of female genital mutilation remains
widespread. The high populations of women in the prisons of
Rivers State, Lagos State, and Kaduna State may be a reflection
of the fact that these are trouble spots of recent ethnic/religious
conflict that law enforcement agents try to repress through mass
arrests and detentions without trial. Women do not have to riot
to become suspects and be detained, since the police use the
practice of holding women as hostages when they cannot find a
son, husband, brother, or boyfriend who is wanted as a suspect.
In 1993 the Civil Liberties Organization (CLO) published a
report written by Osaze Lanre Ehonwa. The report documented
the cruel conditions of Nigerian men in prison, but hardly
commented on the plight of women and children. The focus on
men is common in " mainstream'' criminology, where women
remain invisible. To its credit, the CLO saw the shortcomings of
its first edition and decided to issue a revised edition, in which
women and children were mentioned, and a second volume
(1996) was dedicated exclusively to women and children who
are hidden in the shadows of prison walls. The report quotes
Nigerian State High Court Judge Alhassan Idoko, who describes
Nigerian prisons as ghettos and shanty towns where inmates are
forced to live on top of one another due to congestion.3 The use
Nigerian Women in Prison | 259
of mass release or amnesty by politicians trying to save money or
seeking cheap popularity makes it difficult to assess congestion or
to predict future trends. For example, the total prison population
was 25,622 in 1979 and 31,000 in 1990, but the average monthly
prison population grew from 32,000 in 1979 to 60,000 in 1990. The
fact that the average monthly prison population was nearly twice
the annual prison population in 1990 is indicative of the practice
of mass arrests and mass releases by the military government,
which was facing a crisis of hegemony from a people who refused
to be intimidated. Overall prison congestion in male and female
prisons is illustrated by Ehonwa (1993) in Table 15.2. The rate of
congestion appears in parentheses.
Table 15.2













Other prisons are even more congested than the few examples
from Lagos State shown above. For instance, Ado-Ekiti prison is
overpopulated at a rate of 557.58 percent; Ogwashi-Uku prison at
456.86 percent; Auchi at 398.75 percent; Benin at 349.55 percent;
Lafiagi at 318.18 percent; Sapele at 285.31 percent; Biu at 285.00
percent; Potiskum at 274.67 percent; Ilorin at 238.84 percent;
Kirikiri medium security at 236.36 percent; Kwale at 222.73
percent; Enugu at 221.16 percent; Nguru at 213.98 percent; Warri
at 202.69 percent; Okene at 183.33 percent; and Owo at 179.33
percent (Ehonwa 1993). Most of these highly congested prisons
are in the southern part of the country.
It is evident that the female prison in Kirikiri is much
less congested than the male prisons. The temptation here is
for mainstream criminologists to deny that the women are
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undergoing repressive and inhumane conditions in prison. As
Pat Carlen (1983) argues with reference to female prisons in the
United Kingdom, the fact that they are relatively less overcrowded
than the male ones often leads to the claim that female prisons
function less for punishment, and they are inaccurately likened
to colleges and motels. Such claims are grossly incorrect, because
there is evidence that women are more likely to end up in prison
as hostages of the law when men close to them are suspected
of doing something wrong. The patriarchal assumption that
conditions in female prisons are good derives from the use of
male imprisonment as the false standard with which to measure
how women should be treated. The consequence is that, even
when innocent women are being unlawfully held as hostages in
prison, there is little outrage because the difference between the
capacity of the only women's prison in the country and the actual
prison population is seen to be "so marginal that it is practically
of no consequence" (Ehonwa 1996,19).
The report goes on to indicate that women make up 3.4
percent of the prison population in Nigeria, but adds that, when
women were kept in rooms within male prisons, their rooms were
"reasonably spacious" even when thirty-one women were forced
to share two rooms. However, the report warns that, if there are
no plans to tackle congestion, the female prison and the female
wings in male prisons might soon become as overcrowded as
the male ones. The report tends to consider women only as an
afterthought, but Table 15.3 and Figure 15.1 indicate the reasons
for overcrowding in Nigerian prisons.
Table 15.3
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Figure 15.1
Bar Chart of Categories of Nigerian Prisoners: 1988-1995
The figures suggest that, if the prisoners awaiting trial were
given bail, the prison population would be nearer its normal
capacity. Moreover, if children who are illegally detained in prison
and non-violent offenders were corrected in the community
rather than being held in prison, Nigerian prisons would be
almost entirely empty. The category of "Others" in prison is not
explained in the report, but they could include those who were
detained without being charged with any offence, so they can be
said to be neither convicts nor remand prisoners. From all the
discussions above, we can predict that the proportion of women
awaiting trial or those convicted of non-violent offences or those
simply held as hostages or as "Others" will be extremely high.
In 1993 the CLO published a report on "prisoners in the
shadows." These children and women are hidden behind the
walls of the prison and are hidden from public curiosity about
prison conditions, partly because prison authorities restrict
access to women in prison even by researchers. This report
shows that, although women prisoners are fewer in number, the
rate of increase in the female population far outstrips that of the
male population in prison. This is partly due to a media panic in
Nigeria suggesting that women's liberation is leading to women
committing as much crime as men.
That was part of the reason why the military government
introduced the double jeopardy decree in the early 1990s to
seek the retrial of Nigerians who had served prison sentences
262 | Colonial Systems of Control
for drug offences abroad and to sentence them to fresh terms
of imprisonment in Nigeria (Agozino 1997). Apparently, the
inhumane conditions of the prison industrial complexes in
Europe and North America were regarded by brutal dictators
in Nigeria as child's play and not proper punishment. However,
Oloruntimehin and Ogedengbe (1992) reported that patriarchal
oppression of women is responsible for increasing substance
abuse among women in Nigeria. The same patriarchal and
imperialist oppression is also noticeable in the huge number of
women being trafficked to Europe to work as prostitutes to earn
money with which to support their families at home.
CONCLUSION: TOWARD COUNTERCOLONIAL
CRIMINOLOGY
This chapter has demonstrated that Nigerian women do not
have to commit any crime in order to fall under the repressive
gaze of the global lockdown. While Nigeria has a relatively low
rate of incarceration, its prisons are significantly overcrowded.
In part this is due to the large numbers of imprisoned men and
women who have not been convicted of any offence, as well as
children and significant numbers of women held as hostages for
men wanted as suspects. The crisis of Nigerian prisons reflects
the larger crisis of under development in Nigeria. I therefore
conclude with a discussion of policies that African leaders are
touting as solutions to the problems of underdevelopment,
including mass poverty and preventable death, mass illiteracy,
and political repression. According to the African heads of state
who met in Abuja, Nigeria, in 2001 to adopt the New Economic
Plan for African Development (NEPAD), these problems are due
to a lack of foreign investment in Africa. They argue that NEPAD
will be the African equivalent of the Marshall Plan that helped to
stabilize Europe after World War II.
I suspect that those who drafted NEPAD were making a
practical joke on the suffering African masses. For a start, the
acronym is notoriously close to NEPA or Nigerian Electric
Power Authority, which is popularly known in Nigeria as " never
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expect power always" (or even at all).4 NEPAD could equally
be translated as "never expect progress, African democrats/'
This would be a fitting translation of NEPAD, given that the
African leaders promote it as an original African initiative that
will involve the masses in the development of the continent,
yet the masses were not consulted when NEPAD was drafted.
In addition, leaders promise that NEPAD will be to Africa what
Marshall was to Europe, but they forgot that Marshall was a
government grant given to Europe by the United States, whereas
NEPAD involves begging for private foreign investment. Also,
NEPAD is promoted as being gender-sensitive when it is based
on the same economic policies of structural adjustment that the
World Bank and IMF have been imposing on African countries
to the detriment of women (Mikell 1997). Contrary to these
predictions, NEPAD will lock African people more tightly into
the cells of the imperialist global lockdown.
A more viable policy for Africa is that championed by
Kwame Nkrumah (1968). A People's Republic of Africa would
immediately eliminate the conditions of neocolonialism and
halt the multiplication of military budgets in Africa. This alone
would free up enormous resources for education, health care, and
social security planning. A People's Republic of Africa United
Democratically (PRAUD) would achieve more than the beggars'
lobby that is called NEPAD or the empty promises of African
Union. Such a powerful republic would effectively lead the
struggle to obtain reparations for the African holocaust instead
of the current situation, whereby President Obasanjo begs for
foreign investment while dismissing the call for reparations as
unrealistic.
While the crafters of NEPAD view the integration of Africa
into the global economy as a panacea for social and economic
underdevelopment, critics of neoliberal globalization have
developed a different analysis. Fidel Castro in his address to the
United Nations conference on the financing of development in
Mexico, 2002, proposed that global economic integration was in
fact a key reason for underdevelopment. According to him,
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the existing world economic order constitutes a system of
plundering and exploitation like no other in history.... [In
2001] more than 826 million people were actually starving;
there were 854 million illiterate adults; 325 million children
do not attend school, 2 billion people have no access to low
cost medications and 2.4 billion people lack the basic sanitation
conditions. Not less than 11 million children under age 5 perish
every year from preventable causes, while half a million go
blind for lack of vitamin A; the life span of the population in
the developed world is 30 years higher than that of the people
living in Sub-Saharan Africa.... In the face of the present deep
crisis, a still worse future is offered where the economic, social
and ecological tragedy of an increasingly ungovernable world
would never be resolved, and where the number of the poor
and the starving would grow higher, as if a larger part of
humanity were doomed.
While most criminologists busy themselves theorizing the
punishment of offenders (as if everyone who is " punished"
is necessarily an offender), Castro has proved himself a better
criminologist by highlighting crimes of genocidal proportions
that result from the global economic lockdown. The silence of
criminologists on such massive criminal policies around the
world is actually underdeveloping criminology as a discipline.
Criminal injustice systems worldwide have contributed to
the inhumane treatment of people of colour, especially people of
African descent. The battle of ideas has been a critical component
of the criminal justice apparatus. This is why criminology is a
common discipline in universities located in Europe and North
America, while the discipline is hardly existent in Africa (apart
from South Africa), Asia, and South America, for criminology
was developed to serve imperialism as a tool for the repression
of others.5
An old African proverb says that, if you hold someone on
the ground, you too will not be able to rise until you let that
person go. The prison officer is also a prisoner of some sort. This
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saying provides insight into the nature of the global lockdown—
we are all inmates of the global prison whether we are behind
bars or in front of bars or branded with bar codes. Our collective
responsibility for imperialism (as the workers, investors, and
consumers who oil its machines and the teachers who train its
troops) means that we need to ask ourselves what we can do to
reverse the process of decolonization perpetrated by free-trade
agreements and IMF-led socioeconomic policies. Criminologists
need to study the history of the solidarity between their discipline
and imperialism, to learn from global struggles for decolonization,
and to develop a new methodology. Only in this way can we
use what Amilcar Cabral (1979) called the weapon of theory to
strengthen anti-imperialist struggles around the world.
NOTES
1 Increasingly, those "criminals" include police officers such as the
killers of Amadou Diallo and the brutal attackers of Abner Louima
and the corporate cowboys who fraudulently wreck the economy.
2 Close to the end of his first term in office as an executive president
in Nigeria, he had yet to sign a bill for the abolition of capital
punishment in Nigeria; such a bill was introduced only during the
campaign for Obasanjo's re-election in 2003.
3 In Nigeria the term "congestion" is used rather than the term
"overcrowding."
4 Despite national production of billions of dollars of oil every year,
the Nigerian electricity infrastructure is so poor that a personal
generator is a prerequisite for many businesses and middle-class
homeowners.
5 For a more detailed discussion of this point, see Agozino (2003).
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CHAPTER 16
PROTECTING THE HUMAN RIGHTS
OF PEOPLE WITH MENTAL HEALTH
DISABILITIES IN AFRICAN PRISONS
Uju Agomoh
INTRODUCTION
Persons with mental illnesses often face unique difficulties
in ensuring respect for their basic human rights, both in the
community and in mental institutions. There is growing
international recognition of this fact and a consensus across the
criminal justice spectrum that something has gone painfully
wrong: "the nation's [US] jails and prisons have become
mental health facilities — a role for which they are singularly ill-
equipped" (Fellner and Abramsky 2004). It has been argued that
the mentally ill are victims of two failed public policies: the failure
of public officials to ensure an effective mental health system,
and an overly ambitious criminal justice system that tends to
send people to prison even for low-level, non-violent crimes.
This chapter addresses some of the human rights issues
related to having mentally ill persons in prisons. This topic covers
three broad areas in which people are categorized:
(1) mentally disabled persons who have been convicted of a
criminal offence;
(2) mentally disabled persons on remand who have been
charged with a criminal offence; and
(3) mentally disabled persons on remand who have not
been charged with any criminal offence.
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Here I am concerned primarily with the third category, though
I also make brief references to the other two categories when
necessary. People grouped in the third category are commonly
referred to as " civil lunatics/7 while the others are referred to as
"criminal lunatics/71
The practice of imprisoning mentally disabled persons raises
critical questions. The rationale for imprisonment comes into
question. Such practices also challenge both the human rights
posture and the quality of health care delivery of the state in
question. Our main focus here is the former, but the issue itself
calls into question the "right of everyone to the enjoyment of the
highest attainable standard of physical and mental health/'2 Aside
from questioning the macrolevel concept of imprisonment, the
practice of imprisoning mentally ill people also raises microlevel
administrative issues, such as access to fair trials,3 and protection
against torture, inhumane or degrading treatment,4 and arbitrary
detention.5
When considering the question of criminal lunatics we are
mainly concerned with the issue of a fair trial and the fairness/
effectiveness of the review procedure(s) where applicable. With
civil lunatics the key issue is arbitrary detention. The issue of
torture or inhumane and degrading treatment becomes relevant
when we consider the conditions of treatment in detention.
MENTALLY DISABLED PERSONS AND THE
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
In most African countries mentally disabled people are detained
in or commuted to prisons.6 This section highlights the cases of
Nigeria and The Gambia, and compares them with the system
in the United Kingdom. The fact that the legal systems of these
African countries7 are modelled on the English common-law
system presents the opportunity for a structural comparison of
conditions in each context. European human rights case law on
this issue may also provide some guidance for our look at this
issue within the African human rights system. In Nigeria civil
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lunatics are often detained at the insistence of family members,
with the support of the police. It has been alleged that these
families are unable to pay for the treatment of these persons in
psychiatric hospitals or, for other reasons, do not wish to send
their family members to a psychiatric hospital. There are several
issues here about the treatment of mentally disabled persons
within the criminal justice system.
Procedures for Detention
The first issue relates to the procedure for detaining mentally
disabled people in prisons. The process seems to be plagued by
arbitrariness and a lack of due process. For instance, one of the
prisoners detained as a civil lunatic in Enugu prison in Nigeria
informed me that her husband had requested her detention in
the prison because he wanted to marry another woman. The
prison officers confirmed that the husband did marry another
woman and that his first wife clearly suffered from postpartum
disorder, which occurs usually after childbirth. She had suffered
three previous episodes, which had been treated in a psychiatric
hospital, and during the most recent episode her husband had
decided to have her detained in prison instead. She was in prison
with her newly born child when I met her. Prison staff noted that
her husband had never visited her in prison. Another prisoner,
a young man, reported that he was detained in prison only
because his uncle wanted to sell the land of his deceased father
and clearly wanted him out of the way. While these reports have
not been fully investigated, they raise serious issues regarding
the unlawfulness and arbitrariness of the arrest and detention
process.
Article 9 of the ICCPR provides that no one shall be subjected
to arbitrary arrest or detention. Section 32(1) of the Constitution
of Nigeria reads thus: "Every person shall be entitled to his
personal liberty and no person shall be deprived of such
liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with the
procedure permitted by law.... In the case of a person suffering
from infection or contagious disease, persons of unsound mind,
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persons addicted to drugs or alcohol or vagrants, for the purpose
of their care or treatment or the protection of the community/7
In justifying its position on the imprisonment of mentally ill
persons the government argues that this exception should apply
to " people of unsound mind who are categorized as threats to
the peace and coexistence of society/' It also argues that there
are safeguards against abuse of the process, because, as was
held in Obolo v. Commission of Police, it is the duty of the person
arresting or exercising public authority to restrict the liberty of
the citizen to show that his actions are in accordance with the
laws of the land.8 This has proven to be an inadequate safeguard.
There seems to be wide discretion in police practice and there
is no external oversight mechanism to supervise these powers.
Also, what is the implication of the phrase "in accordance with
the procedure permitted by law"? Does the fact that there is a
provision in legislation or regulations against such practices
make the detention of mentally ill persons in prisons "lawful"?
How difficult is it to establish that arrest and detention were
arbitrary? As established in the European case of Winterwerp v.
Netherlands (1979), the deprivation of liberty must not only be
described as "lawful" if it is prescribed by the municipal law but
also must be lawful in a conventional sense. Detention may be
"arbitrary" even if properly motivated if it is not proportionate
to the attainment of the purpose of Article 5.1, which is similar
in substance to Article 9 of the ICCPR stated above. The African
Commission seems to echo this. Article 6 of the African Charter,
which prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention, states that "every
individual shall have the right to liberty and security of his person.
No one may be deprived of his freedom except for reasons and
conditions previously laid down by law. In particular, no one
may be arbitrarily arrested or detained." The position of the
African Commission is that mere mention of the phrase "except
for reasons and conditions previously laid down" in Article 6
does not imply that any domestic law may justify the deprivation
of such persons' freedom, and neither can a state party to the
African Charter shelve this responsibility by recourse to this
limitation.
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Domestic laws must conform to internationally established
norms and standards.9 On the issue of whether the detention of
persons believed to be mentally ill or disabled falls within the
ambit of Article 6 of the African Charter, the commission stated
that there are no violations of human rights in cases where mentally
ill persons are detained in prisons. This, it argued, is because
Article 6 was not intended to cater to situations where persons
in need of medical assistance become institutionalized. This
position is highly contestable. First, if the persons are detained in
prison, how can such an institution aid in progressing their best
interests or the best interests of society? Second, this position is
too simple in its assumption that the process of institutionalizing
persons in need of help is sufficiently met through criminal
justice institutions. The persons responsible for such acts and the
place/procedure of such institutionalization should be subject to
the test of "arbitrariness," much as they are subject to such tests
in cases where the prisoner is not mentally disabled.
Conditions of Detention
The second issue relates to the conditions of detention/
imprisonment of mentally disabled persons. Most of them sleep
on bare floors in the prison or on torn mattresses and blankets,
a situation also common to other prisoners, especially those on
remand, because of overcrowding and lack of adequate resources.
There is also no clear segregation10 between the civil lunatics
and the criminal lunatics, or between juveniles and adults, or
between convicted and remanded. Those with babies have no
special units. The guiding principles that decide where a prisoner
is warehoused seem to be manageability and availability of cells.
These principles clearly violate the international human rights
provisions relating to the treatment of prisoners and persons
in detention. Article 8 of the ICCPR states that "the different
categories of prisoners shall be kept in separate institutions or
parts of institutions taking account of their sex, age, criminal
record, the legal reason for their detention and the necessities of
their treatment."
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The conditions of detention above raise concerns about
violations of the rights to protection of every person from torture
and cruel, inhumane, and degrading treatment. Article 7 of the
Nigerian Constitution provides that "every individual is entitled
to respect for the dignity of his person and accordingly... no
person shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading
treatment/' In addition, Nigeria recently ratified the Convention
against Torture.11 The African Charter prohibits torture and cruel,
inhumane, or degrading punishment and treatment. Article 5
states that "every individual shall have the right to the respect
of the dignity inherent in human being and to the recognition
of his legal status. All forms of exploitation and degradation of
man, particularly slavery, slave trade, torture, cruel, inhuman or
degrading punishment and treatment, shall be prohibited/7
In Media Rights Agenda v. Nigeria12 the African Commission
held that the phrase "cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment
and treatment" is to be interpreted to extend to the widest possible
protection against abuses, whether physical or mental. Also, the
commission held that exposing victims to "personal suffering
and indignity" can take many forms.13 In Purohit and Moore v. The
Gambia, a recent case on the Lunacy Detention Act (LDA) of The
Gambia, the commission drew inspiration from Principle 1(2)
of the United Nations Principles for the Protection of Persons
with Mental Illness and the Improvement of Mental Care, which
requires that "all persons with mental illness, or who are being
treated as such, shall be treated with humanity and respect for
the inherent dignity of the human person."
The Review Process
The third issue relates to the lack of independent review
procedures for assessing cases in which mentally ill persons
are being detained in prisons. This lack of external review leads
to a violation of the fair trial procedures and the principles of
natural justice. There is no Mental Health Review Tribunal or
a similar body with powers to release patients detained in the
African countries under study. There is also no effective statutory
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instrument(s) for ensuring due process and fair trial procedures
in the handling of these cases. Therefore, there are no national
safeguards for protecting these persons against unjust and
arbitrary detention.
In the United Kingdom there are some safeguards. An
application can be made to detain a person in hospital for up to
six months upon the written recommendation of two registered
medical practitioners.14 Restricted patients are entitled to apply
for a review of their cases once every twelve months, and the
home secretary has the discretion to refer a case of a restricted
patient for hearing at any time he or she thinks fit.15 He or she is
also obliged to do this if the patient has not requested a review
for three consecutive years.16 Mandatory up-to-date medical
reports from the patient's responsible medical officer, and other
reports from sources such as social workers, psychologists,
and independent psychiatrists, as well as the home secretary's
statement, are required for every case under review.17 Patients
are also entitled to receive a copy of every document relevant to
their applications.18 In assessing eligibility for discharge for non-
restricted and civil patients consideration is given to presence/
lack of continuing mental disorder of a degree requiring
detention in hospital for medical treatment or detention for their
own health/safety or the protection of others.19 In these cases the
tribunal also has the general discretion to discharge the patients
in any case, unlike with restricted patients, for whom there is the
lack of such general discretion to discharge.
While the above can arguably be described as " safeguards/'
some of the provisions and practices have been criticized. In a
general sense the independent tribunals in the United Kingdom
continue to place mentally disabled persons in disempowered
positions. While in Nigeria mentally disabled prisoners are at the
total mercy of the prison service, mentally disabled persons in
the United Kingdom are subject to the total discretion of mental
health institutions.
In X v. United Kingdom2® the tribunals' inability to authorize
the discharge of restricted patients (as was the case under the
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1959 Mental Health Act) was challenged. It was found that
such practices were in violation of the European Convention on
Human Rights (ECHR). In attempting to address such restrictions
and unethical practices the United Kingdom implemented the
1983 Act. Another case worth noting is R. v. (1) Mental Health
Review Tribunal, North and East London Region, (2) Secretary of State
ex parte H,21 where the Court of Appeal made a declaration of
incompatibility with the ECHR in respect of sections 72 and 73 of
the 1983 Act. The decision of the court stated that the compulsory
detention of a patient cannot be implemented unless it can reliably
be shown that the patient was suffering from mental disorder(s)
unwarranted and contrary to Articles 5(1) and 5(4) of the ECHR.
These articles relate to provisions on arbitrary detention. In 1998
an expert committee was commissioned to assess how the mental
health legislation can reflect a balance between the protection of
the rights of individual patients and the need to ensure public
safety (Department of Health 1999a, 1999b, 2000; also see the
Dangerous Severe Personality Disorder [DSPD] Order). Some of
the new proposals include the extension of the tribunals7 function
to confirm compulsory treatment orders, and the renewal and
review of such orders (Holloway and Grounds 2003).
Regarding the quality and procedural content of the review
by a court, the Strasbourg jurisprudence has established that a
court-like body sitting in quasi-judicial capacity will satisfy the
requirement of Article 5.4 of the ECHR (Padfield, Liebling, and
Arnold 1990,105). The key requirements are as follows.
1. An oral hearing must be provided.
2. The detainee has the right to call witnesses, examine
them, and cross-examine them.
3. The detainee must have adequate time and facilities to
prepare his or her case.
4. The review of remedy should be exercised at reasonable
intervals, and the decision must be taken speedily by the
reviewer.
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The hearings do not necessarily have to be conducted in
public. The entitlement of persons with mental illness to be
treated as such and to be heard and represented by counsel in
determinations affecting their lives, livelihood, liberty, property,
or status, is particularly recognized in Principles 16, 17, and 18
of the UN Principles for the Protection of Persons with Mental
Illness and Improvement of Mental Care.
Following provisions in the UK system of institutionalization
of persons with mental illnesses, the African Commission
implemented Purohit, Article 7(1) of the African Charter. This
article necessitates that, in circumstances where persons are
to be detained, they should be presented at the least with the
opportunity to challenge the matter of their detention before
the competent jurisdictions that should have ruled on their
detention. On this basis the commission held that The Gambia
Lunacy Detention Act violates Article 7(1) (a) and (c). This is
because the Act does not contain any provisions for the review
or appeal of an order of detention, for any remedy for detention
made in error, for any wrong diagnosis or treatment, or for the
legal right to challenge the two separate medical certificates that
constitute the legal basis of detention. While such revisions and
policies attempt to deal with the unethical detention of mentally
ill persons inside prisons, the problems in Nigeria and the
United Kingdom illustrate that this human rights violation is not
being addressed in either the bureaucratic systems of the United
Kingdom or the criminal justice procedures of Nigeria.
Treatment of Mentally 111 Persons in Prison
The fourth issue is the quality of treatment received by mentally
ill patients in prison. In Nigeria, often these patients receive
no psychiatric treatment. Sometimes they are locked up in
solitary cells and in chains if violent. Even when medications are
prescribed, few or no funds are made available to purchase the
medications.22 There are often no psychiatrists working inside
the prisons.23 In Enugu prison two psychiatric nurses from the
Federal Neuropsychiatric Hospital Enugu are usually posted to
the female prison unit (to attend to the female prisoners) and the
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male asylum section respectively. At the federal neuropsychiatric
hospital in Calabar staff sometimes arranged community
outreach programmes to the prisons. These arrangements were
made at the discretion of the hospitals. While these efforts are
highly innovative and commendable, such ad hoc arrangements
are far from satisfactory.24 The government needs to take
more positive steps in providing a comprehensive system that
guarantees due process, as well as access to high standards of
both physical and mental health, in line with its international
human rights obligations. The United Nations has affirmed that
all incarcerated persons with mental illness " should receive the
best available mental health care/'25 It has been rightly argued
that " society has no right to detain patients for the purposes of
treatment if the resources for that treatment are inadequate"
(Holloway and Grounds 2003,146).26
It is important to note that in the case of Estelle v. Gamble27
the US Supreme Court ruled that medical care or the lack thereof
is unconstitutional (under the Eighth Amendment) when it
involves the "unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain," and
extends to the " deliberate indifference to serious medical needs
of prisoners, including the treatment of mental illness/' However,
substandard quality of care, negligence, or malpractice does not
suffice to establish a violation under the Eighth Amendment.
As held in Farmer v. Brennan,28 officials can be found to be
deliberately indifferent based not on what they should have
known but on what they actually know. This preference for
subjective criteria rather than an objective test (constructive
knowledge) is certainly very limiting. It does not provide
adequate safeguards for addressing violations of the rights of
the mentally ill. Interestingly, Article 16(1) of the African Charter
also provides for the right to enjoy the "best attainable state of
physical and mental health," and Article 16(2) calls for state
parties to take necessary measures to protect the health of their
people and ensure that they receive medical attention when they
are sick. Article 18(4) of the African Charter stipulates that the
aged and disabled have the right to special measures of protection
in keeping with their physical or moral needs.
Protecting the Human Rights of People | 277
The questions therefore are, first, why should the state keep
mentally disabled persons in prison and, second, why does the
state continually fail to provide adequate treatment for these
persons? Such actions violate UNSMR Rule 62, which states that
medical services of the institution shall seek to detect and treat
any physical or mental illnesses or defects that may hamper a
prisoner's rehabilitation as well as provide all necessary medical,
surgical, and psychiatric services to achieve this end. It cannot be
argued that the restrictive wording of this rule offers justification
for the problems faced by mentally ill persons in prisons. The
provision of such services cannot be hinged on only the ability
to lead to "rehabilitation" of the prisoners. This could not have
been the intention of the drafters of such legislation, especially
when we consider other provisions of the UNSMR.
Sections 22(1), 82(1), and 82(2) of the UNSMR are worthnoting.
Section 22(1) states that there should be in every prison at least
one qualified medical officer who is knowledgeable in psychiatry
and that the institution's medical services should be organized
in close relationship to the general health administration of the
community or nation. Section 82 reads:
(1) Persons who are found to be insane shall not be detained
in prisons and arrangements shall be made to remove
them to mental institutions as soon as possible.
(2) Prisoners who suffer from other mental diseases
or abnormalities shall be observed and treated in
specialized institutions under medical management.
Will the argument of lack of resources suffice? The African
Commission has this to say:
It is aware that millions of people in Africa are not enjoying
the right to health maximally because African countries
are generally faced with the problem of poverty which
renders them incapable to provide the necessary amenities,
infrastructure and resources that facilitate the full enjoyment
of their rights. Therefore, having due regard to this depressing
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but real state of affairs, the African Commission would like to
read into Article 16 the obligation on the part of the State party
to the African Charter to take concrete and targeted steps,
while taking full advantage of its available resources, to ensure
that the right to health is fully realized in all its aspects without
discrimination of any kind.29
In a recent publication by Human Rights Watch (Fellner and
Abramsky 2004,1) on the treatment of mentally ill persons it was
reported that at least one in six prisoners in the United States
is mentally ill—well over 300,000 men and women. The report
also stated that there are three times as many mentally ill persons
in US prisons as in the country's mental hospitals. American
prisoners include people suffering from schizophrenia, bipolar
disorder, and major depression, among other illnesses.
This situation in the United States suggests that the problem
of imprisoning mentally ill people is influenced more by policy-
related matters and societal attitudes than by economic or
resource considerations. In addition, it becomes clear that the
unethical practice of imprisoning mentally ill persons is not
limited to Africa, but is an international issue linked to the use
of imprisonment as a means of dealing with social problems and
the lack of adequate resources made available to the general
populations of many countries. While the assessment of policies
and amendments to policies, and the presentation of institutional
structural arrangements that imprison mentally ill persons, have
been highlighted in this chapter, the use of institutionalization of
mentally ill persons (whether in prison or psychiatric hospital)
must cease to be the only response available for dealing with the
problems mentally ill persons face.
REMEDIES FOR REDRESS OF VIOLATIONS
Domestic Remedies: National Courts
The ability to exhaust all local remedies is a primary
consideration in accessing admissibility of cases before regional
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and international human rights mechanisms. Article 56(5) of
the African Charter states that communications received by the
commission shall be considered if they "are sent after exhausting
local remedies, if any, unless it is obvious that this procedure is
unduly prolonged/' Article 2 of the First Optional Protocol to the
ICCPR30 restates a similar position. What if the domestic remedies
are inadequate, ineffective, inaccessible, unfair, biased, or unduly
prolonged? On this issue the African Commission rejected The
Gambia government's argument that complainants could seek
remedies by bringing actions in tort for false imprisonment or
negligence.31 The commission also questioned the fact that no
legal assistance32 is available to vulnerable groups in prison to
enable them to access the legal procedures of the country. It
therefore submits that the remedies should be both realistic and
effective for the category of people33 under consideration.
Article 1 of the ICCPR First Optional Protocol states that
no communication shall be received by the UN Human Rights
Committee (HRC) if it concerns a state party to the ICCPR that is
not a party to the protocol. The status of ratification on principal
UN human rights treaties indicates that thirty-three out of fifty-
four African countries have ratified this protocol, while fifty-two
countries have signed/ratified the ICCPR. Those that have ratified
both the ICCPR and the Optional Protocol are Algeria, Angola,
Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, the Central African Republic,
Chad, Congo, Cote d'lvoire, the Democratic Republic of Congo,
Equatorial Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea,
Lesotho, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritius, Niger,
Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Togo, Uganda, and Zambia.
Four countries —Djibouti, Cape Verde, Namibia, and South
Africa-have ratified both the ICCPR and Protocols 1 and 2.
Sixteen countries have ratified the ICCPR but not the protocols.
They are Botswana, Burundi, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon,
Kenya, Liberia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sudan,
Tunisia, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe. Two countries, Mauritania
and Swaziland, have not ratified even the ICCPR. Therefore, in
total about eighteen African countries are not able to access the
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HRC. This number includes Nigeria, one of the countries under
review in this chapter.
Although most African countries have ratified the major
UN and regional human rights treaties, very few have taken
further steps by domesticating the provisions of these treaties
(Heyns and Vijloen 2001, 483). It is thus more difficult to rely on
rights guaranteed in treaties before national courts. In a review
of nineteen national court cases from seven African countries
(South Africa, Zimbabwe, Namibia, Tanzania, Mauritius,
Uganda, and Nigeria) it was observed that reference was made
to the work of only three UN human rights treaty bodies: the
Human Rights Committee, the Committee on Economic, Social,
and Cultural Rights, and the Committee on Rights of the Child.34
While most of these countries are within the southern region
of the continent and mainly of Commonwealth jurisdiction,
caution should be exercised in not overgeneralizing these
observations. Some national courts may refer to the findings of
the HRC but reach different conclusions.35 At other times they
rely on a dissenting opinion of one of the HRC members to give
a ruling.36 Sometimes different outcomes are reached even while
relying on the same HRC findings.37 Sometimes a worse outcome
is reached. An example is Mbushuu,38 in which the High Court
of Tanzania, relying on the HRC in Randolph Barrett and Clyde
Sutdiffe v. Jamaica?9 not only ruled that the death penalty was
constitutional, but also went ahead to quash the sentences of life
imprisonment imposed by the High Court in favour of death
sentences.40 Judging from the above, one can conclude that the
outcome of national courts relying on international human rights
jurisprudence is unpredictable.
The illusion of institutionalized human rights as universal
and objective is apparent in these cases. One national court stated
that, while "they can derive assistance from public international
law and foreign case law, [they] are in no way bound to follow
it."41 In these cases it becomes clear that a colonial approach to
dealing with human rights violations in colonial institutions in
Africa is not only problematic but also ineffective. While prisons
were brought to Nigeria by the British, and while Nigeria
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continues to be influenced by UK policies in the treatment of
prisoners and the implementation of policies to address problems
with the detention of mentally ill persons, it is apparent from
the study of outcomes of international policy implementations
that the bureaucratic and institutional systems of control are not
functioning in Africa. In addition, a comparative assessment of
the imprisonment of mentally ill persons in the United States
suggests that the human rights issues that mentally ill persons
face in Africa are not a problem of " African governance'' but a
problem of imprisonment institutions and the overreliance on
such institutions for social control.
African Regional Human Rights Protection Mechanisms
The African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (the
African Charter)42 has been ratified by fifty-four member states
of the African Union (AU).43 Article 6 of the charter is similar
in substance to Article 9 of the UDHR and Article 9(1) of the
ICCPR,44 which prohibit arbitrary arrest and detention. Article
7(1) of the African Charter provides for fair hearings in line with
Articles 9(2), 9(3), and 9(4) of the ICCPR.45 However, there is no
comparable provision in the African Charter to Article 9(5) of the
ICCPR,46 which provides for enforceable rights to compensation
for victims of unlawful arrest or detention. Article 2(3a) of
the ICCPR requires the state to ensure that any person whose
rights protected under the covenant are violated has an effective
remedy, notwithstanding that the violation has been committed
by persons acting in an official capacity. What, then, is the effect
of the lack of provision for compensation? No doubt it limits
the scope of remedies available to those whose rights have been
violated in the manner highlighted above.
In the most recent case involving the rights of mentally
ill persons decided by the African Commission (Purohit) three
recommendations were made by the commission after it found
The Gambia in violation of Articles 2, 3, 5, 7(1)(a) and (c), 13(1),
16, and 18(4) of the African Charter. These recommendations are
listed below.
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1. The government of The Gambia should repeal as soon as
possible the Lunacy Detention Act (LDA), and replace
it with a new legislative regime for mental health that
is compatible with the African Charter on Human and
Peoples' Rights and international standards and norms
for the protection of mentally ill or disabled persons.
2. Pending (1), the government of The Gambia should
create an expert body to review the cases of all persons
detained under the LDA, and make appropriate recom-
mendations for their treatment and release.
3. The government of The Gambia should provide adequate
medical and material care for persons suffering from
mental health problems in the territory of The Gambia.
Is it possible that in the future the commission will expand its
recommendations in this area to include compensation for
victims? There is evidence that the African Commission tends
to rely to some extent on the provisions of treaties from both
the United Nations and regional jurisdictions. In Media Rights
Agenda v. Nigeria the commission stated that, "notwithstanding
the fact that neither the African Charter nor the Commission's
Resolution on the Right to Recourse Procedure and Fair Trial
contain[s] any express provision for the right to public trial, the
Commission is empowered by articles 60 and 61 to draw inspiration
from international law on human rights to take into consideration as
subsidiary measures other general or special international conventions,
customs generally accepted as law, general principles of law
recognized by African States as well as legal precedents and
doctrine" (emphasis added).47 For example, in the above case
the commission referred to General Comment No. 13 of the
UN Human Rights Committee on the right to a fair trial and to
Article 14 of the convention in the interpretation of the phrase
"fair hearing." In Legal Resources Foundation v. Zambia** Comment
No. 18 of the HRC was relied upon in defining what constitutes
" non-discrimination."
Beyond the issue of treatment of complaints, another
mechanism available to the commission is a fact-finding mission.
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Article 58 of the charter empowers the commission to draw special
cases relating to serious or massive violations of human and
peoples' rights to the attention of the Assembly of Heads of State
and Government of the OAU (now the AU), which "may then
request the Commission to undertake an in-depth study of these
cases and make a factual report, accompanied by its findings and
recommendation/' Some have criticized this article on the basis
that the ability of the commission to act on complaints from non-
state actors is dependent on prior authorization by the Assembly
of Heads of State and Government of the AU. Also, critics of these
policies argue that, even when the commission acts, its actions are
limited only to carrying out in-depth studies. While policies and
bureaucratic practices in Africa are expanding to implement an
external body to examine human rights violations, the capacity
to act on such violations is trumped by the power that the state
affords to its institutions of control. This situation is similar to
what occurs in Europe and the United States. Following in the
footsteps of colonial governance, African states are working to
implement international laws and tribunals that are " accepted"
by the West, and in doing so are falling into similar traps and
bureaucratic failings.
International Mechanisms for Addressing Issues
Beyond the treaty provisions and instances mentioned above,
other mechanisms are available within the international human
rights sphere: fact-finding missions,49 a special rapporteur, and the
establishment of the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention.
On the issue of acts being in compliance with national/domestic
laws, the working group has clearly stated that its mandate covers
every case of deprivation of liberty if it is inconsistent with both
domestic legislation and international standards. These include
the UDHR and other relevant international instruments accepted
by the state in question. The working group also emphatically
stated that it is necessary that the act is inconsistent with one
of these criteria for it to fall within its jurisdiction. Thus, even if
the act is in compliance with domestic legislation, the working
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group can still address it if it is in violation of an international
standard.50 The working group's classification of cases under
arbitrary detention is also worth noting, especially in view of the
decision of the African Commission in Purohit. The challenge is
how these efforts can be coordinated to complement each other
in order to provide greater safeguards for mentally disabled
persons. The African Commission is working to provide a
working environment in which powers external to specific state
institutions are able, not only to assess and study human rights
violations of mentally ill persons held in prisons, but also to
address the problem in manners that significantly and positively
impact the lives of vulnerable populations in prison.
CONCLUSION
The international and regional human rights mechanisms
dealing with the issue of mentally disabled persons in prison are
comprehensive. Case law jurisprudence is quite progressive too.
However, there is a need to provide more avenues for accessing
and effectively utilizing the regional and international human
rights mechanisms by national courts. These provisions will go
a long way toward providing " effective domestic remedies" as
well as internal oversight mechanisms of the process.
Provisions for compensation should be seen as a viable
remedy for survivors of such violations. Other domestic human
rights protection and promotional mechanisms should be
utilized in addressing the problem of mentally disabled persons
held by the justice system. These protections should fall within
the jurisdiction of national human rights institutions, non-
governmental organizations, and professional bodies such as
the bar associations and the medical associations. The conditions
of detention should be seen as raising, not just the question of
the right to health, and the prohibition of torture or cruel and
inhumane treatment, but also the right to a fair trial or a fair
hearing, and the prohibition of arbitrary arrest and detention. A
collaborative effort between the different sectors of the human
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rights community needs to be implemented in an African
manner, one that shares responsibilities for violations and the
power to ratify these problems.
As a first step there is a need to carry out a pilot project aimed
at decongesting Nigerian prisons (and other African prisons)
of mentally disabled persons: the civil lunatic and the criminal
lunatic. The project should involve a multisectoral/dimensional
approach, including the following:
(1) the release of prisoners labelled "civil lunatics" and
"criminal lunatics";
(2) the transfer/management of such persons to proper
treatment centres (psychiatric hospitals, African NGO
houses that implement communal care of mentally ill
people);
(3) raising the awareness of criminal justice agents, policy-
makers, and the general public to help address the
stigma that mentally ill persons face; and
(4) legislative advocacy to ensure that such violations cease
and to prohibit them from occurring in the future.
All projects and amendments should work with and for
the families and communities of mentally disabled people.
Rehabilitation techniques, campaigns for human rights and equal
access to liberty and high quality of life, and general resource
management that provides for people with special needs are all
natural components of many African societies. In a continent
where community and governance are intimately linked, the
problems that mentally ill persons face today can be dealt with
in a manner that is relevant to our society and thus effective for
those involved. While this chapter has focused heavily on the
international legal components associated with the problems
that mentally ill persons face in African prisons, it is essential to
emphasize that, while knowledge of the international regulations
that deal with human rights violations of mentally ill persons is
essential to understanding the policy-related methods needed
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to deal with existing problems, this knowledge in itself is not
sufficient to address the problems that institutions of control
impose upon vulnerable populations. The legal knowledge
presented in this chapter is meant to provide a resource upon
which those interested in fighting for the rights of mentally ill
persons held in prisons can build. The real struggle does not exist
in policy development. It exists in the implementation of human
rights and in the abolition of circumstances that place mentally
ill people in prison.
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(CC), and the Supreme Court of Nigeria in Onuoha Kalu v. The
State, SCc.24/1996 [1998] 13 NWLR 531, on the constitutionality of
the death penalty; both relied on the decision of the HRC in Ng v.
Canada, Communication No. 469/1991 (November 5,1993).
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38 Mbushuu and Another v. Republic of Tanzania, [1995] 1 LRC 216.
39 Communication No. 270/271/1988 (March 30,1992), 264.
40 Mbushuu, op cit., paras (e-f), 223.
41 Communication No. 470 (July 30,1993) para 39, 687.
42 Adopted by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the
member states on June 27, 1991; it came into force on October 21,
1996.
43 Formerly the Organization of African Unity (OAU).
44 Article 5(1) of ECHR, Article 7(1-3) of the American Convention on
Human Rights.
45 Article 5(2-4) of the ECHR, and Articles 7(4-6) and 8(1) of the
American Convention on Human Rights.
46 See also Article 5(5) of the ECHR. Article 10 of the American
Convention on Human Rights only provides for the right to
compensation where there is a miscarriage of justice in sentencing.
47 Communication No. 224/ 98.
48 Communication No. 211/98.
49 In 1999 such a mission was carried out by the Special Rapporteur on
Violence against Women (Radhika Coomaraswamy) to the United
States. She recommended, among other things, a study of national
mental health policy and the imprisonment of women with mental
health problems.
50 UN doc E/CN.4/1999/63 para 60.
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SECTION IV
RESISTANCE
In addressing issues of colonialism and the continued
implementation of colonial institutions in "former" European
colonies in Africa, it is important to recognize that Africans have
resisted these oppressions and continue to resist them. This
section presents two main types of resistance: the first is political,
and the second is academic.
Colonialism functioned on both these levels. During their
occupation of African territories Europeans utilized a sociopolitical
level of oppression. Entire social structures, government policies,
and racist policies were imported into Africa from Europe
in exchange for the export of African economic and material
resources. Fela Kuti was a Nigerian political musician who
recognized the absurdity of such an "exchange" and challenged
the illusions of European superiority that colonialism proposed.
Fela's resistance was a political one implemented through social
and educational activism.
As colonialists invaded African territories, they relied
on academic institutions to provide scientific and legitimate
propaganda to justify and facilitate such crimes. Although the
process through which such "knowledge" was produced was
socially legitimate and politically empowered through allegiances
to academic institutions it was not accurate. In contemporary
academic institutions, the scientism that empowered colonialists
lingers in the social sciences. Within the specific context of penal
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colonialism the study of academic legal pluralisms provides an
avenue through which the process of producing faulty knowledge
about Africa can be reviewed; in addition, the proposed use of
non-essentialism presents an opportunity to implement academic
resistance. This type of resistance provides an opportunity to
dissociate from a form of knowledge production that not only
facilitated atrocities in the past, but also continues to facilitate
and justify contemporary oppressions.
CHAPTER 17







Colonialism in West Africa imposed foreign legal systems upon
ethnically and structurally diverse regions that functioned in
complex, precolonial, non-Western contexts. Colonial legal
systems played a key role in the process of colonization because
they defined and (il)legalized business transactions and codes
of conduct among colonizers and colonized, and eventually
came to (il)legalize interactions among colonized populations
(Bentsi-Enchill 1969); this recent colonial era has left West Africa
functioning in complex sociolegal settings. This chapter focuses
on women in the contemporary northern Nigerian context:
their interactions with pluralities of law in northern Nigeria,
and the modes of resistance1 they employ in facing colonial and
patriarchal oppressions.
Legal centralism and legal pluralism have emerged as the two
main paradigms2 through which legal theories are constructed
(Manji 2000). Each paradigm indoctrinates a foundation of
assumptions about law and society, forming frameworks of
ideological assumptions and guidelines for methodological
activities that establish a "code of conduct" in which theorists
who assess law and society construct sociolegal theories.
The legal centralist paradigm encompasses those theories
that implement an "authoritative conception of law," insisting
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that the label of "law" must be confined exclusively to the
laws of the state:3 "that there is no distinction between law and
positive morality, and that there is no ultimate unifying source of
norms in a legal system" (Manji 2000, 631). In assuming that the
"norms" of the powerful are also the "norms" of the oppressed,
legal centralists impose a form of thinking that is elitist and
inaccurate. They are predominantly a group of scholars trained
in legal positivism, and tend to assume that "the state and
the system of lawyers, courts, and prisons is the only form of
9rdering," and thus study "law" by studying legal institutions
(Merry 1988, 874).
The legal pluralist paradigm encompasses those legal
theories recognizing that "two or more legal systems coexist
in the same social field" (Merry 1988, 870), and add that there
exists a "large range of normative orders which, although they
enjoy no connection to the state, are nonetheless described
as law" (Manji 2000, 632). This school of thought is open to
recognizing that "norms" are differentially created and rejects
the oversimplifications imposed by legal centralists. Based
on the categorizations of these two "paradigms," Manji (2000,
631) concludes that legal pluralism is most relevant to studying
and appropriately representing women, specifically women
in Africa. In general, post colonial settings imply an inherently
legal pluralistic context (Bentsi-Enchill 1969) due to the colonial
experiences that transported foreign European legal systems
into Africa. In assessing the specific circumstances through
which women interact with law in northern Nigeria, that
generalization appears to be applicable. The monolithic and
simplified assumptions of the legal centralist paradigm not only
are inapplicable to women in northern Nigeria, but also seem to
be inappropriate for addressing the complexities within which
societies in that region interact with law and society.
Legal Pluralism in Nigeria: Historical Context
On October 1, 1960, Nigeria gained independence from the
occupation of the United Kingdom's colonial government. After
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decades of military dictatorships, and a plethora of military
coups, a new Constitution was adopted in 1999, marking the
appearance of structural transition to civilian government.
Nigeria is the most populous nation in Africa. With a population
exceeding 140 million, the controversial 2006 census4 reported
that 71.7 million males and 68.3 million females live in the
country. The Nigerian government's official statement on ethnic
populations affirms that Nigeria is home to more than 250 ethnic
groups: "Three of them, the Hausa [predominantly living in
the north], Igbo [predominantly living in the east], and Yoruba
[predominantly living in the south], are the major groups, and
constitute over 40 per cent of the population/'5 In relation to
religious affiliations, fifty percent of the nation identify as Muslim,
forty percent identify as Christian, and ten percent identify with
traditional African religions (World Fact Book 2007).6 The legal
system in Nigeria is "officially" implemented within a pluralistic
framework based on English common law, Islamic sharia law
(in some northern states), and traditional law modelled after
precolonial African systems of justice.
The plurality of state legal institutions in Nigeria is a function
not only of the colonial imposition of "new legal systems" but also
of how colonial systems institutionalized traditional law. As the
British began to colonize northern Nigeria in the early twentieth
century, Hausa states underwent sharp changes through which
the "Protectorate of Northern Nigeria" was adopted in 1903.
This protectorate implemented an "indirect rule" policy that
indoctrinated the philosophy that, "whenever possible, the
metropolitan power should seek to recognize rule through
traditional authorities in accordance with the indigenous social
and political institutions and mores" (Callaway and Creevey
1994,14). As a result Christian missionaries were denied access to
northern Nigeria, and as a political function Islam became more
entrenched in Hausa society. Islam became the avenue through
which traditional autonomy could be maintained. "Thus," as
Callaway and Creevey note, "the colonial state provided the
stable conditions necessary for African Islamic cultures to grow
and deepen. Under Hausa/Fulani rule and British protection,
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the Islamic (sharia) courts were at the heart of that culture" (14).
As customary/local law in West Africa (including Islamic law)
became institutionalized into Western structures and conceptions
of what "law" should look like and do, a residual rule was
formed. This policy stated that, in legal situations in which no
expressed rule is applicable, the colonial court would have the
jurisprudence to govern the situation according to the principles
of "justice, equity, and good conscience" (Bentsi-Enchill 1969,
30). Since Nigeria was "created" as a colonial nation-state, this
residual rule disappeared in western/eastern Nigeria, but was
kept in the north with the specific purpose of regulating sharia
laws. Through this context emerged contemporary sharia courts
and the state-endorsed formality of legal pluralism in northern
Nigeria.
Nigerian Population Demographics
The Nigerian population is young, with only 2.9 percent of the
population reaching the age of sixty-five and 43.4 percent of the
population being below the age of fourteen. In 2004 the average
age for males in the country was 18.2 years, while the average
age for females was 17.9 years. Males in Nigeria comprise a slight
majority of the population; they also experience a slightly higher
infant mortality rate and a slightly lower life expectancy rate (44.7
years) compared with females (45.8 years). The fertility rate is high
in Nigeria, with the average woman in 2004 giving birth to about
five children. In 2003 the majority of the Nigerian population
was recorded as being literate (68 percent), with 60.6 percent of
women and 75.7 percent of men in the nation knowing how to
read and write.7 In 2003 the Nigerian government announced the
privatization of all oil refineries, resulting in economic structural
growth in 2004, headed by increased oil and natural gas exports.
Despite such growth, 60 percent of the population continues to
live below the poverty line. With a labour force exceeding fifty
million people, 70 percent of whom rely on agriculture, 10 percent
on industry, and 20 percent on services, the push to expand oil
and natural gas exports while continuing to neglect agricultural
resources is problematic.8
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Aside from such problems, and more specifically in relation to
gender dynamics in northern Nigeria, women have a unique and
strained relationship with law; nonetheless, they have managed
to work against these obstacles by establishing networks and
regulations through which they can achieve some autonomy. I
will use legal pluralism, an academic framework that recognizes
different levels of control and law in society, to illustrate these
networks and to contextualize the laws used by/against women
in northern Nigeria. Upon reviewing the literature on women
in northern Nigeria and the three main frameworks of legal
pluralism, I will offer an assessment of legal pluralism to identify
which framework is best equipped to understand and properly
represent women and their relationships to law in northern
Nigeria.
WOMEN OF NORTHERN NIGERIA AND THE
STATE: TRENDS IN ETHNOGRAPHIC RESEARCH
Since colonialism Western researchers have gained more access
to conduct research in northern Nigerian societies. This intimate
link between research and colonialism had a significant impact on
the type of research produced by Western researchers. Whereas
early works researched the relationships between colonizer and
colonized, in the 1970s research began to focus more specifically
on women in the north and their relationship to the state. Three
topics of research have become prominent: sharia courts (what
Westerners would call family and employment law), purdah (the
practice of secluding women from public life), and prostitution.
Western researchers tend to draw attention to the negative,
gendered impacts of purdah and sharia, and have recently
begun to work toward achieving an understanding of women's
efforts to resist both; in so doing, they have come to emphasize
female agency, and have begun to identify "law" as existing
among women and not "law" as emerging only through state
institutions.
Ayua (1998), Wall (1998), and Werthmann (2002) have
conducted ethnographic research assessing women's experiences
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and struggles with sharia law. Relying on family planning
and land ownership issues, they bring forth concerns about
sociolegal status, emphasizing that the struggles of women are
related to patriarchal legal structures and cultural attitudes.
The foundations of such structures are closely related to the
implantation and institutidnalization of colonialism. While
scholars have written about purdah for decades, recent work
conducted by Callaway and Creevey (1994,2003), Coles (1988), and
Pittin (2002) emphasizes informal networks created by women to
expand their access to opportunities in the socioeconomic realm.
Emerging is a body of work on women's labour, focusing on
both "formal" legal prohibitions and "informal" yet engrained
networks, created by women to regulate prostitution and other
forms of work. As these researchers conduct interviews and
surveys, they present a literature emphasizing legal and cultural
contexts that have been shown to influence interactions (or lack
thereof) between women and the state.
According to Garland (2001), formal social control includes
state-run institutions and state-set definitions of deviance.
In addition, formal social control includes state-prescribed
reactions to deviance (punishments, sanctions, regulations, and
so on). In contrast, informal social control includes "the learned,
unreflexive, habitual practices of mutual supervision, scolding,
sanctioning/and shaming carried out, as a matter of course, by
community members" (159).
The categorization of law and social control into formal
and informal is a function of the dichotomized frameworks in
which the majority of Western legal scholars conduct research.
Although accepted as the "norm" in Western academic contexts,
these divisions do not always reflect accurately the social and
legal realities that Western researchers are attempting to assess.
For women in northern Nigeria cultural behaviours (informal?)
combine with sharia laws (formal?) to construct their living
conditions. Women have created networks of interaction and
female-established opportunity to combat obstacles and achieve
some autonomy in their lives. Although defined as informal
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in most Western research, the accuracy of this category is
questionable. What a Western scholar might define as informal
in his or her textbook or published article can be formal for a
woman in northern Nigeria.
In this presentation of women in northern Nigeria I have
chosen to focus on socioeconomic circumstances because it is in
this realm that women's empowerment and interactions with
law are most visible; in addition, sharia cases involving women
often include a dispute over socioeconomic/financial issues.
With the implementation of purdah, economic activities by
women, though formally limited, appear to function informally
in highly organized networks. In contrasting and interrelating
what Western scholars refer to as formal and informal in this
specific context, a more comprehensive understanding of
women, law, and resistance in northern Nigeria can be achieved.
Whereas Cohen (2004) explains that the status of Nigerian
women accountable to sharia courts is almost always defined
through their relationships to men, Werthmann (2002) illustrates
how these formal networks are challenged and transformed
through informal applications by women in the region. At the
root of much of this analysis is an understanding of the cultural
and religious contexts within which women live.
Women in northern Nigeria are predominantly of Hausa9
descent, and, though not all Hausa people are Muslim, most are.
As a result much of Hausa society is deeply influenced by Islam
and the ways in which it is interpreted: since the introduction of
Islam in Nigeria, in the early fourteenth century, " Islam has been
deeply intertwined with pre-Islamic Hausa cultural and religious
tradition" (Robson 2002, 183). Thus, structures and institutions
that are predominantly defined by Islam have come to form
major tenets in Hausa culture and practice. On a 'formal' level of
social control, Bentsi-Enchill (1969) explains that, when the British
colonized West Africa, traditional systems of law functioned
alongside colonial ones. At this time a reliance on Islam was
constructed in Hausa societies to keep a distance from the colonial
occupiers. Islam became the preferred "traditional, customary"
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law through which autonomy from the British invaders could be
established. As this institutionalization of tradition and culture
occurred, informal networks came to function alongside the
newly formed colonial ones, and in combination these elements
continue to structure women's interactions with the law.
On a formal level, sharia laws exist and are implemented
through sharia courts. On cultural, social, and, at times, religious
levels purdah is used to regulate women's living conditions.
While purdah is not a stipulation under sharia to be used by
all women in the region, the cultural tenets of Hausa society
place many women within purdah. The interactions between
purdah practices and sharia laws create an atmosphere in which
women's relationships with the law are created and guided
through an interaction of formal (legal) and informal (cultural,
social, religious) interactions.
An example of these formal-informal interactions exists in
marriage and divorce regulations. According to sharia laws, a
man is able to legally have up to four wives at the same time.
In conjunction, divorce is legally made easily available to men.
Wall (1998, 349) implies that in Hausa society divorce is not only
differentially available to men through sharia but also culturally
encouraged: "A Hausa proverb bluntly states: Zamanka kai kadai
ya fi zama da mugunyar mace ('Living by yourself is better than
living with an evil woman').... Although a man could never live
alone and retain any status in Hausa society, this contempt for an
'evil woman' is reflected in the ease with which men... can divorce
a woman." Furthermore, sharia laws emphasize women's status
through reproduction: if a child is not produced in marriage,
the man may demand a partial refund of the dowry provided to
his ex-wife's father at the time of marriage. These are examples
of how the informal cultural practices and attitudes reinforce
formal sharia laws in regard to divorce.
Despite the lack of formal access to divorce, women have
informal methods to initiate it. Some move out of the husband's
home and back into the father's home in an act of defiance
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known as yaji ("hot pepper"): "The embarrassment that such an
act of defiance causes the husband" may force him to resolve the
dispute in the woman's favour, or it may force him to divorce her
(Wall 1998,349). In this instance formal laws of divorce are either
initiated or regulated by women through actions not defined or
regulated by law: even though the law does not empower women
to initiate divorce, through action and understanding of cultural
dynamics they empower themselves when necessary. In such
instances it becomes clear that the formal/informal dichotomies
imposed by scholars to aid in their production of knowledge
consist of an oversimplification that distorts social realities.
In attempts to comprehend such complex contexts,
issues of power become important.10 Instead of focusing on a
methodology that attempts to understand these issues through
the implementation of predetermined formal and informal
categories, I turn to a methodology that aims to understand them
through an assessment of context. The context I have chosen to
study is the socioeconomic one, for through an understanding of
social and material wealth one can begin to understand power.
A specific area of focus has been on ownership of land and
possession titles on homes. In northern Nigeria women are
limited in their access to ownership. Robson (2002, 184) reports
that, "while women dominate domestic spaces, they rarely own
the homes they live in.... Few women become wealthy enough to
invest in land and/or property and some inherit property/land,
but Islamic (maliki) inheritance laws, practiced in Hausaland,
generally discriminate against women." Although Islamic laws
preserve women's formal rights to ownership of land, these
rights are often ignored through informal mechanisms of social
control, encouraging discrimination against women. Ayua (1998,
237-238) states that "this pattern of behavior has tended to make
women as second-class citizens. Most... have resigned themselves
to their fate and have accepted the humiliating status accorded
them by society. The few others... who would want to assert their
rights or fight for them are discouraged for fear of being branded
social deviants or rebels."
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As a result of these dynamics women in Hausaland
have created their own means of attaining wealth. Many of
these are what Western scholars might refer to as informal
mechanisms of conduct and control. Under sharia laws the
socioeconomic standing of women is recorded through their
fathers' or husbands' status, but women's controlled networks
allow women to recognize "each other's abilities, skills, and
economic successes, but this recognition does not translate into
[formal] socioeconomic status" (Callaway and Creevey 1994,95).
Nonetheless, this lack of formal status does not translate into
total disregard or disempowerment. In fact, a closer analysis of
the issues illustrates that the lack of formal status accords more
control to women, due to their distance from the state and the
"under the radar" freedoms that such distance can provide.
In addition to sharia laws and cultural ideologies about
gender that impact how these laws become implemented, women
are further impacted through the practice of purdah. The US
Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor reported that
"purdah, the practice of keeping girls and women in seclusion
from men outside the family, continued in parts of the country
[far north], which restricted the freedom of movement of women"
(US Department of State 2005, section l.f). Barkow (1972, 322)
further explains that, in the context of contemporary Hausa
societies, seclusion also "means that women are expected to be
indoors during the daylight hours and to obscure their faces if
they venture outside the compound. Few men refuse their wives
permission to visit other compounds freely each evening, or to
travel long distances to attend the ceremonies of kin."
The historical roots of purdah are well documented. The
practice was introduced in the latter part of the fifteenth century
"by the Sarkin Kano (the chief of Kano). At the time only wealthy
rulers secluded their wives, and seclusion was not so much for
Islamic religious reasons but for the social status attained by
virtue of displaying their economic ability to dispense with their
wives' productive labor" (Robson 2002,184). An increase in the
seclusion of women occurred at the beginning of colonial rule
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(Werthmann 2002,120). Much as sharia was used to implement
legal distance from colonialists, purdah appears to be a practice
implemented in the north to maintain physical distance from
colonialists and missionaries. In addition to limitations on
physical activity, Robson (2002, 183) offers an analysis of the
symbolic implications of purdah: "Seclusion can be thought of as
a spatial boundary defining gender," explaining that the physical
setting is a manifestation of attitudes in Hausaland about the
natures of men and women. Women are segregated from the
public sphere during their reproductive years, and, while this
practice can produce Eurocentric stereotypes and assessments of
gender relations in Hausaland, my analysis of purdah focuses
on its physical implications. I provide information about women
in purdah and do not delve into an assessment of symbolism,
not because symbolic elements are not important, but because
such elements should be provided by women in purdah, not by
researchers who are trained in Western academic institutions.
Out of the political and cultural stances that implement
purdah emerges the physical construction of homes. The
architectural designs of living compounds in the north make
possible the implementation of purdah. Large walls surrounding
each living complex are one element of the physical realms of
seclusion. Within each living compound separate buildings
(usually small huts) are arranged as rooms around a centralized
open space known as the courtyard. Huts in which married
women reside are designated no-entry spaces. The compound
is accessed through an entrance hut with slanted pathways
preventing direct vision into the courtyard or the huts that
surround it (Robson 2002,184). Yet secluded women in northern
Nigeria have established "their own networks to regulate
women's tasks and to arbitrate conflicts over the decisions they
make and the goods they control" (Callaway and Creevey 1994,
38). Through these networks women achieve some autonomy.
Coles (1988) conducted an ethnographic study in Kaduna
(a large state in northern Nigeria), and found that between 1981
and 1985 all the women she spoke to (125 in total) participated in
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economic activities providing for their families; she recorded an
increase in the amounts of money women were contributing to
family maintenance, coinciding with depletions11 in the Nigerian
economy at the time. These activities were never recorded in
official statistics, due to their separateness from the public sector.
Werthmann (2002) conducted a qualitative study of Hausa
women living in Kano12 in a modern housing estate referred to as
the bariki ("barracks"), provided for police officers by the state.
She spoke to the wives and female family members of police
officers. Women who live in the bariki are segregated in their
respective living compounds and emerge only to participate
in all female celebrations or for specific social events that their
husbands have given them permission to attend. Upon receiving
this permission women are allowed to leave their living quarters,
unescorted by their husbands, to visit close kin, attend naming
ceremonies and weddings, visit relatives who are in dire health,
attend funerals, and visit the hospital if they or their children
are in need of medical attention (120). When a new woman
moves into the bariki she is " successfully integrated into local
networks such as the mutual borrowing of goods and money,...
the exchange of gifts on ceremonial occasions,... and rotating
credit associations" (115).
First contact for a newcomer is usually with her immediate
neighbours, who greet her over the wall or send their children
to welcome her to the neighbourhood. Werthmann (2002) also
reports that polygamy is common and that many girls are
married at a young age.13 It is not expected that such marriages
will last long; it is common and void of stigma to believe that "it
is only the second, third or fourth marriage that may develop into
a permanent bond between a man and a woman" (116). Upon
divorce legal custody is most often given to the father; thus, many
children are raised by female relatives of the father. Divorced
women return to their fathers' homes and spend at least three
months in seclusion before they can legally get married again
(Barkow 1972, 320). This time span is decided and implemented
through sharia law (Wall 1998, 349).
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When a woman gets married she enters seclusion under
purdah. It is the job of unmarried prepubescent girls to help run
the household and to hawk products (foods or crafts) prepared
by married women in purdah (Barkow 1972, 319). In this context
custody issues enter the economic realm. For segregated women
losing custody of a child brings forth great financial restraints,
since only young girls and postmenopausal women are able to
participate in public spaces. Robson (2002,183-184) suggests that
this enforced "invisibility" of women during their "reproductive
years'7 brings to light an oppressive gender ideology. While
she outlines the importance of an independent income, and
shows that women are frustrated by the lack of access to job
opportunities, other researchers focus on details of economic
activities undertaken by women to combat these conditions.
Quantitative research in Zaria State in northern Nigeria
records that the food-processing industries, run primarily by
women, function through small-scale enterprises, with simple
technology and a consumer-friendly orientation. Husbands
and children provide women with necessary materials (readily
available in village markets) for food grain production. While
many women lack access to formal educational institutions,
Simmons (1975, 156) identifies cooking as an educational skill
taught to all females in this region, adding that "the amount
of equipment and capital needed to take up employment in
the [food-processing] industry is minimal. While weaving or
trading... may demand relatively large investments... food
processing can be profitably done in fairly small amounts with
normal household utensils/' She found that, "in hundreds of
villages, hamlets, towns and cities of northern Nigeria, many tons
of grains, grain legumes, and starchy roots are processed for sale
as convenient ready-to-eat foods" (147). These factors illustrate
that Hausa women do participate in income-generating activities.
In relation to starting up, Cohen (2004,66) explains that a woman
is "given initial capital in the form of her marriage payment,
to which she is entitled by the Shari'a and with which she can
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start business/' Many of these businesses, as Simmons (1975)
described, include household activities: "preparing and selling
cooked food, doing laundry, sewing, hairdressing, taking care of
children, weaving straw floor mats, pounding grain, chopping up
ingredients for each other, or making charcoal or incense. Older
women may develop a small-scale trade in such items as soap,
kola nuts, or cloth; a few will be midwives. Wealthier women
may engage in the trade of jewelry, shoes or imported wax
prints. In all cases, though, the activity is essentially carried on
from behind the walls of seclusion" (Callaway and Creevey 1994,
102). In addition to participating in income-generating activities,
Callaway and Creevey note, custom stipulates that women
regulate expenditures for all household incomes; thus, capital is
accumulated through "the small amounts of money which she
'cuts7 for herself from the household money, which her husband
hands over daily" (1994, 66-67). In polygamous households co-
wives establish agreements defining how much money each
will receive when it is her turn to control household incomes. In
accumulating these reserves of cash women establish or expand
their businesses. Often considered extensions of "common
household activities," they can be classified as informal, but in
relation to the accumulation of wealth the monetary gain remains
unrecorded in formal statistics.
In addressing dominant methods of income generation in
Hausaland, it is essential to present those areas of revenue in
which women do participate in the public space. One such area
is prostitution. In this realm there exist networks through which
prostitution can be implemented in female-controlled settings
known as karuwai ("courtesan") in Katsina State in northern
Nigeria. Karuwai networks developed historically among Hausa
women in northern Nigeria, and continue to incorporate an
autonomous setting in which houses owned and occupied by
women are used to ensure their physical and financial safety in
their work. "With the loss of women's state-wide political power,
control over women became fragmented, but was generally
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allocated to husbands, fathers and other senior male kin. The
karuwai, however, lived away from these authority figures/'
and functioned in a formal realm only in their active avoidance
of confrontations with authorities (Pittin 2002, 178-179). In this
instance resistance to domination by one system is found through
the implementation and use of another.
Despite establishing autonomy from patriarchal figures,
prostitutes cannot accumulate great wealth. Thus, while a
housewife's ability to accumulate wealth surpasses that of
a prostitute, housewives cannot invest or expand wealth by
entering into competition with men in public places. Prostitutes,
with access to public spaces, can compete with men and invest
earnings, but are not given opportunities to accumulate great
wealth (Cohen 2004, 67). Despite these difficulties, women
have established networks of function to produce significant
socioeconomic power.
In light of these conditions legal pluralism arises as a relevant
framework in which women's relationship (or lack thereof) to
the state can be studied because it incorporates recognition of
different levels of sociolegal functions. Focusing only on formal
'Taw" and "status" is misrepresentative, because women do not
live within those realms: "I did not vote during the last elections
because I saw no need for it. My success in life depends on
what I do with my hands and not what anybody promises me,
so I prefer to be left alone. Politics is not for women. It is for
men —men who can lie and those who have the time" (quoted
in Callaway and Creevey 2003, 595). In this context it becomes
essential to incorporate a level of analysis that recognizes law as
it functions in what Western scholars have named the informal
realm (purdah, informal business networks), and how that
functioning interacts with laws in what Western scholars have
named the formal realm (sharia).
While studies of informal networks have been conducted
to assess the socioeconomic activities that women participate in
throughout Hausaland, further analysis of the relationships they
develop between "law" and "society" needs to be implemented.
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In this social field it appears that the plurality of systems of
governance and the layers of normative orders that exist for
women are all relevant. The elimination of formal or informal
categories in conducting research in the region would produce
more accurate information, due to the inherently fluid and plural
nature of life and law for women in Hausaland.
LEGAL PLURALISM: THREE FRAMEWORKS
A presentation and assessment of three legal pluralist frameworks
will help us to ascertain which approach is most appropriate for
achieving a comprehensive understanding of women and their
relationships to law in northern Nigeria. In presenting legal
pluralist frameworks it is necessary to define them according to
their emerging academic contexts, methodological assumptions,
and definitions of law. Within the paradigm of legal pluralism
I present three main ideological frameworks. In 1988 Merry
identified two: classical legal pluralists and new legal pluralists.
More recently Tamanaha (2000) presented a third framework:
non-essentialist legal pluralism. Each framework incorporates
varied practices in presenting and assessing legal pluralism,
based on respective assumptions about law and methodological
approaches to studying law and/in society. I will use their
different approaches to identify the pluralistic applicability
of both the definitions of law in the theoretical sphere and the
methods available to researchers working to identify boundaries
of research, while attaining access to the circumstances that
function in social fields in relation to law.
Classical Legal Pluralism
The emergence of legal pluralism as an academic field of study
is intimately linked with colonialism. It was through the process
of colonialism that a more visible form of legal pluralism was
produced for Western legal scholars. This occurred through
the implantation of colonial laws in African societies with pre-
existing laws, increasing the visibility of plurality, and producing
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an academic opportunity and awareness through which the
plurality of legal systems in one society could be studied. In
addition, it was during the process of colonialism that the study
of legal pluralism became established academically. While it was
accepted that Western law is law, one of the main goals of classical
legal pluralism was to identify and differentially recognize (or
not recognize) non-Western legal systems.
In this chapter I focus solely on British colonialism in West
Africa to assess the emergence of legal pluralism; in doing so I
will briefly present the " logistics" of pluralism. It is important
to note first that British colonies established before the middle
of the seventeenth century in Africa implemented a form of
legality quite different from those established after the American
Revolution; these new legal policies indicate that, within
classical legal pluralism, there are several forms of legality to be
assessed.
According to Bentsi-Enchill (1969, 3), British colonies
established in Africa early in the seventeenth century used British-
based international law to legalize " matters of general Imperial
concern covering such matters as shipping, nationality, aliens,
coinage, bankruptcy, and matters requiring legislation outside the
powers of the local legislature/' Colonies acquired by settlement
at this time began through business ventures that resulted
in the establishment of large expatriate populations, which
implemented British laws to legalize and facilitate business
transactions. After the American Revolution laws granting
British subjects rights to gain "representation" in African
governments and powers to pass legislation were enacted; as
Bentsi-Enchill notes (3), these laws were facilitated by the fact that
"African aboriginal inhabitants" of colonial settlements were not
recognized under international law as having any rights. Under
this legislation occupied African territories came under "absolute
disposition of the Crown," but there was no presumption
that private laws extended to the "aboriginal inhabitants" of
these colonies. The assumption at the time was that local laws
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functioned in a manner that related well to local populations, but
were unsuitable in meeting the "needs" of European settlers.
Consequently Freeman v. Fairlie (1828) concluded that
British or Christian settlers were to adhere to British laws, while
"locals" could continue to adhere to customary laws, "with some
particular exceptions that were called for by commercial policy,
or the convenience of mutual intercourse" (Bentsi-Enchill 1969,
4). Further legislation stated that locals could continue to rely
on precolonial laws "until 'the Sovereign7 through her judges"
enacted laws to replace them (5). During this process legal
pluralism began to be formally established, whereby British
law was enacted to differentially institutionalize and recognize
(or not recognize) different systems of local law. Merry (1988)
documents the literature that addresses "customary law" and
highlights the fact that "custom" became "law" as a function of
colonialism.
In attempts to colonize Africa, the British transformed
social control mechanisms in Africa societies into words and
structures that mirrored Western notions of "systems" of law;
thus, as colonialists "communicated" with African populations,
they created "customary laws" according to those "versions of
customary law which meshed best with their own ideology of
land ownership as well as other legal relations" (Merry 1988,
875). Not recognizing such contexts, Western legal scholars who
studied classical legal pluralism in Africa relied on an established
colonial "vision of a traditional, unchanging African past ruled
by long-established customs" (876). Such visions are distorted
and resulted in the inaccurate production of knowledge about
legal pluralism in West Africa.
In his assessment of colonialism from an African perspective
Bentsi-Enchill (1969) states that British invasions of West Africa
marked the establishment of British colonial endeavours on the
continent. In Nigeria local or customary laws were mirrored
after a court ordinance entitled "Application of Native Law and
Custom," outlining the boundaries within which these laws
could function:
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1. Nothing in this Ordinance shall deprive the Courts
[British courts] of the right to observe and enforce the
observance, or shall deprive any person of the benefit, of
any native law or custom existing in The Gambia,14 such
law or custom not being repugnant to natural justice,
equity and good conscience, not incompatible whether
directly or by necessary implication with any law for the
time being in force.
2. Such laws and customs shall be deemed applicable in
causes and matters where the parties thereto are natives
and also in cases and matters between natives and non-
natives [Europeans] where it may appear15 to the Court
that substantial injustice would be done to either party
by a strict adherence to the rules of English law. (quoted
in Bentsi-Enchill 1969, 7)
Bentsi-Enchill makes three key observations in relation to this
law. First, he states that it gave the British courts supremacy in
deciding when customary laws would or would not be applied.
Second, since the overwhelming majority of the population (the
"natives") was being ruled by customary laws, British courts were
able to expand the jurisdiction within which their control applied
through this recognition of "customary" in their laws. And third,
the British government used this recognition of customary laws
to grant itself the power to decide what was, and what was not,
law according to African customs and social structures.
These laws eventually came to create what was referred to as
the "West African formulation," which was implanted in the rest
of the continent as colonialism expanded. The manner in which
legal pluralism became recognized legally occurred within
the above-described politically motivated, Eurosupremacist,
imperialist, colonial dimensions, and from within this context
grew the academic study of legal pluralism.
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Assumptions and Ideological Framework
Bohannon (1967), Gluckman (1973), Hoebel (1954), and
Malinowski (1959) have been identified as key scholars in
classical legal pluralism, a framework receiving its "classical"
title in the 1970s. Prior to this researchers did not identify with
different schools of thought in the study of legal pluralism. Legal
pluralism initially was the study of colonized societies, and of
the legal interactions between colonial and non-colonial legal
systems. Merry (1988, 872) defines classical legal pluralism as
"the analysis of the intersection of indigenous and European
law," which prior to the 1970s was applied only to colonial
and post colonial societies. Much of what has become defined as
classical legal pluralism was deemed so by new legal pluralists.
In their separation from classical legal pluralism they worked to
critically define classical assumptions and methodologies. That
process of separation included an identification of the "classical"
to distinguish it from the "new" legal pluralism. A lack of
understanding of this "definitional" process created a lack of
understanding of "classical" legal pluralists as they are viewed
in contemporary legal pluralist literature, mainly because those
defined as "classical legal pluralists" never named themselves as
such. In recognizing this dilemma I present the works of classical
legal pluralists from the initial Western academic realizations
that legality exists in plurality in society. I present classical legal
pluralism as conducted prior to the emergence of new legal
pluralism to address the imposition of definitions employed by
new legal pluralists.
Defining Law
Classical legal pluralism is the first framework of sociolegal
studies that endeavoured to study several legal systems as
they exist in the same society at the same time. Classical legal
pluralists were the first Western scholars who employed a
framework assuming that a variety of legal systems can and do
exist in the same society at the same time. Gluckman's (1973)
conception of pluralism represents the framework within which
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classical legal pluralists worked. Gluckman identified the "most
crucial concepts of law" as "elastic or of multiple meaning"
and concluded that the essence of law "can absorb a variety of
different presumptions" (393).
This variety is the legal pluralism that classical legal
pluralists worked to identify. Hoebel (1940) added that law can
only emerge from formal "politically organized societies."16
Within the classical legal pluralist framework scholars worked
to identify what "politically organized societies" looked like and
what types of laws they produced. In addition, Bohannon (1967)
and Gluckman (1965) were in constant discussion about the
linguistic approach to presenting customary laws in the English
language.17
Their debate over linguistics18 is indicative of the dichotomized
framework within which the classical legal pluralists functioned:
they relied heavily on the process of categorization in forming
knowledge. Their disagreements were over how those categories
should be approached and defined. Bohannon and Gluckman
often disagreed over the boundaries within which definitions for
customary law should fall (Nader 1969). The details of the debate
were elaborate and based on lengthy ethnographic experiences
throughout Africa, but those details are not the central focus
of this analysis. The presentation of their debate illustrates the
commonalities that tie Bohannon (1967) and Gluckman (1965)
together, within the classical legal pluralist framework: the
implicit assumptions that both held were related to the "essence"
of law as a categorical entity; while the specifics of the categories
may be disputable (as in their debate), a preconceived notion of
law that is dependent on two categories (state law and customary
. law) was not. The classical legal pluralist framework relies on the
existence of categories and in doing so employs a dichotomized
approach to understanding legal pluralism: customary versus
state law, native versus Western societal organization, and so on.
This framework requires that more than one "legal system" fit
into one of its preidentified categories of "law" for legal pluralism
to exist.
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Classical legal pluralists rely on categories to identify
plurality in legal systems; two levels of analysis exist in this
process. On one level classical legal pluralists relied on a
consensus model whereby "law" in all societies could be defined
according to generalizable components; on a second level law
could be described as manifesting in society through two main
categories, customary (relating to non-Western legal systems) or
colonial (state) structures (relating to Western legal systems). A
representative definition of the requirements that are necessary
in defining "law" as it was viewed by classical legal pluralists
was presented by Gulliver (1963,1): "In any society, there must,
by definition, exist regularized procedures... to deal with alleged
breaches of norms and injuries.... There must be ways by which
it can be established whether in fact a breach occurred, and
what is the extent of the injuries; and there must be means of
determining and enforcing decisions which provide a settlement
of the dispute, and perhaps also means which tend to prevent
recurrence of the matter." This definition emphasizes procedural
elements of law, while relying on the unproven assumption that
social norms exist. Associations of "formality" with Western
structures of organization and of "informality" with non-Western
structures of organization are a resounding theme in the classical
legal pluralist definitions of law.
Malinowski's (1959,15) work on "savage justice" presented
a definition of customary law widely used in classical legal
pluralist theories. Malinowski emphasized a view of non-
Western laws as based on "obligation" (informal) and of Western
laws as based on "authority" (formal). These formal/informal
dichotomies continue to influence many aspects of contemporary
legal pluralist scholarship. Implicit in these categorizations are a
supremacist attitude toward formal (Western), and a primitivist
attitude toward informal (African) social structures and legal
organizations.
African legal scholars at the time presented a very different
picture of law than the one presented by Western classical
legal pluralists: "The African peoples are... at varying degrees
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of political, cultural, and economic development. Since law
is inevitably interlocked with all these phases of social life, it
naturally manifests itself in different ways and conditions, and
so we sometimes get variation in details, if not in essentials, as
we pass from one society to another" (Elias 1956, 8). Elias also
emphasized (293) that some African societies function through
non-centralized political authority (as kinships), some function
through strong centralized political authorities (with military,
administrative, and judicial branches), while some function as
"loosely knit confederations'' (with semi-independent chiefdoms
with one "supreme" king presiding over them). From this
perspective it becomes difficult to classify law within Western
legal pluralist assumptions about formal Western categories and
informal non-Western categories. Despite these contradictions,
the strongly dichotomized nature of the classical framework
prevailed, and aided in keeping its theorists functioning in a
categorical mindset that aimed to classify law into predefined
categories and proceeded to compare/contrast these categories.
Llewellyn and Hoebel (1941, 39-40) state that the only
differences between modern (Western) and primitive (non-
Western) laws are the "technicalities" through which normative
orders are enforced: "The only thing about technical law which
is different in the sense of comparable is that it has a technical
field of discourse," and, if those technical and institutional tools
were to be put aside, then the essence of "law" that transcends all
manifestations of "law" would "become at once familiar instead
of different." This view presents the basic approach to defining
law in classical legal pluralism. It is a categorical definition
that relies on the existence and positive attributes of consensus
(similarities), and de facto19 assumes that conflicts or differences
are "problematic."
Bohannon (1967, 27) insisted that the "essence of law" can
be found in "four legal attributes: authority, obligation, intent
for universal application, and sanction." He further claimed
that these attributes are present in both "Western/state" and
"tribal/customary" legal systems. From these categorizations
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emerged a definition of law focusing on consensus, assumed
generalizability, and official states and/or political organization
to produce and implement law.
Methodological Framework
The methodological framework of classical legal pluralism relies
on an "unbiased observer" role for researchers. Hoebel (1954,17)
states that "in the study of a social system and its law by the
specialist it is his job to abstract the postulates from the behavior
he sees and from what he hears/7 Hoebel (29) and Malinowski
(1959,15) both stress that the multifaceted nature of law requires
an eclectic and elastic approach to researching law and society.
Hoebel (36) placed great emphasis on "phonetic training"
(learning the language of the society under study) and "note-
taking/7 He also presented the "case method" through which
specific cases are gathered, followed by a search for thematic
and generalizable illustrations of "facts," leading to realistic
jurisprudence. Implicit to the case method is the assumption that
what cannot be generalized within the predetermined thematic
categories of law does not qualify as law.
Malinowski (1959, 14), in line with Hoebel's (1954)
methodological procedures, stressed the need to conduct research
with goals to "arrive at a satisfactory classification of norms
and rules of a primitive community," and, in doing so, to draw
distinctions between customary laws and other customs that do
not translate to law in "primitive" societies. The categorical view
of law in this framework impacts the manner in which one can
assess law: first, in assuming that separate categories of types of
law exist and, second, in assuming that researchers can observe/
record these categories.
Gender Analyses
Classical legal pluralists relied heavily on the formal status of
women in assessing the roles of women in relation to law in
colonized regions; the majority of the work conducted within this
framework studied women as wives, widows, or slaves when
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slavery was legal (Hill20 1972). This placed the understanding
of women's interactions with law within these rigid and
unrepresentative boundaries. Gluckman (1965,223-225) presents
the role of women in " primitive" African societies as relating
mainly to rituals and bewitching. In addition, he presents the
role of women as "manipulated" in the political realm to solve
political conflicts through the presentation of opportunities for
men to rule and gain kinship. In another study Gluckman (1973,
216) presents the stereotypical view of African gender roles as he
tells a story in which an African man claims, "like all Whites, I
[Gluckman] spoil women." This attitude is not problematic from
within the "formal" superior and "informal" inferior categories of
law, for if the African legal systems of governance are assumed to
be inferior, then it would only be natural for scholars who adhere
to such ideology to assume their own personal and cultural
"superiorities" in relation to the "other" men and societies they
are studying.
Gulliver (1963) presents a highly submissive image of
African women in his account of customary courts in Tanzania.
Hoebel (1954) and Malinowski (1959) made no specific mention
of women in their presentations of methodological assessments
in classical legal pluralism. In contrast to these negative
stereotypes presented by Western scholars, Elias (1956, 101),
upon presenting specific examples in diverse contexts, asserts
that an African "woman's life is passed differently from that of
men and has its own sphere, but the woman's position amongst
most tribes cannot be regarded as depressed or slavish." Despite
such attempts at destabilizing the Western conceptions of Africa
and Africans, Western scholars continued to present information
that portrayed their biases and racisms toward the continent.
The negative views of African women presented in classical
legal pluralist literature contrast with the views of Cheyenne
married women presented by Llewellyn and Hoebel (1941).
Women in these contexts are shown to function within the
sociolegal capacities of respect and honour, though oppressed in
the social realm. These categorizations of women from different
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'non-white' societies fall neatly within the racial hierarchies
created by European colonialists: these racist hierarchies placed
"white" people at the top, "black" people at the bottom, and
"red" people slightly above "black" people. In accordance with
such categorizations Western scholars present images of African
women as the "most oppressed" in their "black societies," "red
women" as slightly better off, and "white women" as the least
oppressed because their "white men" spoil them. Although
contemporary scholars do not refer to racial categories in such
obvious and obviously racist manners, they continue to adhere
to a hierarchical ideology assuming that "white" structures and
values are less oppressive than "non-white" structures and values.
The stereotypes associated with gender inequality continue to be
perpetuated in contemporary frameworks that assess women
and the law in Africa, as shown in the presentation of Western
assessments of what occurs in northern Nigeria today.
In making this point I am not stating that women are not
oppressed in Nigeria; I am pointing out that, although women
struggle against patriarchal conditions in both Western and non-
Western societies, the prevailing assumption is that women in
Africa suffer more serious types of oppression and subjugation.
I assert that such normative judgments are based on Western
standards of gender equality. They are also based on the
Western need to categorize everything, including oppressions.
Included in the need to categorize is the need to implement
hierarchical understandings: one type of oppression is better
or worse than another. The very nature of the methodology
employed by Western scholars, specifically those who practised
classical legal pluralism, relies on both predetermined categories
and hierarchies. Ironically, it is assumed that reliance on such
methodologies allows researchers to be "unbiased" in their
approaches to scholarship.
New Legal Pluralism
Merry (1988), Nader (1969), and Pospisil (1967), starting in the
1960s and continuing until the present, represent some of the
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most influential new legal pluralist scholarship. Much of their
work is based on dissatisfaction with classical definitions of law
and methodological approaches. New legal pluralists recognize
that the imposition of European colonial law in Africa created "a
plurality of legal orders21 but [assert that classical legal pluralists]
overlooked, to a large extent, the complexity of previous legal
orders" (Merry 1988, 870). In addition, new legal pluralists state
that the literature that addresses " customary law" in Africa is
problematic because "custom" became "law" as a function of
colonialism (875). New legal pluralists assert that, in attempts
to colonize Africa, the British transformed social control
mechanisms in African societies into words and structures
that mirrored Western notions of "systems" of law; thus, as
colonialists "communicated" with indigenous populations,
they created "customary laws" according to those "versions of
customary law which meshed best with their own ideology of
land ownership as well as other legal relations" (875). New legal
pluralists reject these impositions, urging scholars to recognize
that these classical constructions of law create knowledge about
legal pluralism that is not accurate.
The main ideological shift that spurred the emergence of
new legal pluralism occurred when legal pluralism "expanded
from a concept that refers to the relations between colonized and
colonizer to relationships between dominant and subordinate
groups" (Merry 1988, 872). Nader (1969, 2) asserts that the shift
from classical to new legal pluralism was based on a shift from
a focus on legal theory as pursued through an anthropology of
law to a focus on "law in culture and society as it is affected by
and affects the individuals who make the law both similar and
different." Implementation of these shifts in academic approaches
to legal pluralism also included the emergence of a postmodern
conception of law: the deconstruction of law is one of the main
contributions arising through the new legal pluralist framework
(Santos 1987). In addition, new legal pluralism presented
inequality and power relations as central elements in the study
of law and legal pluralism (Greenhouse 1994).
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Assumptions and Ideological Framework
Emerging in a framework that expands definitions and boun-
daries for research, new legal pluralists incorporated a basic
assumption that the deconstruction of "law" is integral to
this framework. The deconstruction of law begins with an
understanding that law emerges both through the state and
through "nonlegal forms of normative ordering" (Merry 1988,
870). In this recognition lies the implicit understanding that
"law" is not always what the state defines as such. Santos (1987,
297), in deconstructing law from a postmodern standpoint, states
that the limitations that plagued classical legal pluralism can be
addressed through an assessment of legal pluralism that rejects
the dichotomization of formal/informal elements of law: he
asserts that "it is time to see the formal in the informal and the
informal in the formal."
Greenhouse (1994,12) places these deconstructionist notions
of studying law within a politics of equality that she views as
transcending all sociolegal analyses. She states that classical legal
pluralists were "optimistic... of law's ability to deliver justice and
community to divided nations," and contrasts them with new
legal pluralists in the 1960s and 1970s who "drew fundamentally
on tacit emotional understandings of equality as integral to the
process of sociolegal research itself." Greenhouse also states that
new legal pluralists have begun to pursue a study of equality
outside the traditional realm of state-defined laws. This expansion
in focus is due to a recognition that state legal systems function
to disenfranchise and silence; in challenging the unitary power
of states in defining law, new legal pluralists began to set new
boundaries in defining law, stating that laws emerge from the
state and a plurality of social-cultural foundations.
In attempts to truly grasp the essence of law new legal
pluralists incorporated a framework of study that made cultures
central to the study of law, thereby reinforcing the notion that
the state is not the only producer of "normative thinking and
power" (Weisbrod 2002, 5). The study of culture as it relates to
the production and implementation of law incorporates a power-
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related context. It assumes that "culture always involves power,
and so is partly responsible for the differences in individuals' and
groups7 abilities to define and meet their needs'7 (Valdes 2004,
272). In studying culture and forms of law that emerge outside
the realm of the state new legal pluralism began to incorporate
a study of resistance as a function of understanding law. In
essence this framework emphasizes the "role of law in furthering
cultural transformations/7 and in the posfcolonial context has
come to study how colonialism "transformed and controlled
these subjects [dominated groups] and how these subjects have
mobilized the imposed legal system in resistance77 (Merry 2000,
18).
In addition to extending definitions/foundations of law,
new legal pluralists implemented an extension in geographical
locations of legal pluralist societies. They began to recognize
so-called "noncolonized societies, particularly to the advanced
and industrial countries of Europe and the United States/7 as
legally pluralist societies (Merry 1988, 872). Such recognition,
while considered progressive in its shift in focus, bringing
Western societies under the pluralist microscope, is problematic
in its definitions of colonialism. The United States, defined as a
"noncolonized77 society by new legal pluralists, was established
as a land mass upon which several Western European nations
created "colonies.77 As these colonies began to war with each
other, the British established an expansion in colonies. When the
members of these colonies "separated77 themselves from England
they proceeded to impose a Eurocentric and predominantly
white social structure upon North America. Their separation in
government from the British did not end colonialism in North
America, but merely transformed it. Such transformations
continue to manifest themselves physically in the occupation
of these lands, which, unlike occupation in Africa, in North
America have become "homelands.77 Nonetheless, there are new
legal pluralists who study colonialism of the Americas.
As new legal pluralism expanded, an awareness of the
different types of colonialism was incorporated into analyses:
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"The instance of American colonialism differs from many of
the British examples by its emphasis on incorporation rather
than exclusion" (Merry 2000, 258). While British colonialism
included the incorporation of "dual" legal systems that "sought
to construct boundaries between colonizer and colonized,"
American colonialism worked to incorporate and thus civilize
colonized populations. This "incorporation" framework was key
in laying foundations upon which Europeans can continue their
control over North American land and peoples. While the British
imposed legal pluralism in a manner that eventually resulted
in the withdrawal of occupation, the Americans found a form
of colonialism that did not require eventual withdrawal from
colonized lands.
Much of the framework of analysis for new legal pluralism
involves expansion. That expansion included for some a study
of colonialism in the Americas. In addition to expanding the
geographical location of the social field,22 new legal pluralists
expanded the framework for understanding law to include
the "informal" sector. This framework also expanded research
on legal systems, recognizing that colonialism is an invasive
manner in which legal systems are used to define, dominate, and
control lands foreign to Europe. These expansions have aided in
incorporating an understanding recognizing that the study of
legal pluralism includes research into a diverse set of structures
and practices.
Defining Law
The definition of law in new legal pluralist scholarship, in
accordance with the expansion themes, states that "not all law
takes place in courts.... The concern is to document other forms
of social regulation, that draw on symbols of law, to a greater
or lesser extent, but operate in its shadows, its parking lots, and
even down the street in mediation offices"; it also emphasizes that
"other forms of regulation outside law constitute law" (Merry
1988, 874). This definition relies heavily on culture as central to
defining law. Culture in this school of thought is viewed as a
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fluid, changing, interrelated phenomenon, emerging through an
intermixing of tradition and everyday interactions among people
living in the same social setting (Comaroff and Comaroff 1993).
These interactions (defined as culture) create and implement
law.
New legal pluralists rely on a definition of law that has
a predetermined essence, emerging in formal and informal
elements. Pospisil (1967, 24) defines legal systems as capable
of existing mainly through interactions among subgroups who
live at all levels in society and who, combined, make up society:
" Every such subgroup owes its existence in a large degree to a
legal system that is its own and that regulates the behavior of
its members." He challenges centralist notions of law that place
law solely within the context of the state, because they present
a definition of law without incorporating the role of social
interactions in defining and implementing law.
In composing new and broader definitions of "law," new
legal pluralists present a broader and more flexible conception
of customary law as compared with classical legal pluralists.
Engel (1980, 429) defines customary law as emerging "wherever
patterns of repeated interaction among people necessarily lead to
mutual expectations and interdependencies that serve to regulate
conduct," and emphasizes that this occurs in both non-Western
and Western settings.
This definition is heavily reliant on the role of culture in
defining law, and, while the definition of culture is disputed, there
appears to be a definition of legal cultures that is widely accepted:
the legal culture of a society is produced through a "synthesis
of formal and customary elements," continually changing and
evolving "in response to changing circumstances," concluding
that "the totality of norms and behavior of the local citizenry"
comprises the legal culture of that community (Engel 1980, 431).
Still existing in this definition of law are categorical constructions
of law. New legal pluralists, while challenging the construction
of these categories and deeming them "too narrow," proceeded
to expand the number of categories in which law can be defined.
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They did not challenge the categorical nature through which
classical legal pluralists produced knowledge about "law"; they
challenged only the relevance of the categories used.
Working specifically within the African context, Helium
(2002) presents an understanding of law that emphasizes
new legal pluralist works to deconstruct law. She observes
the construction of a tension between the implementation of
"international standards of human rights" and the "inequalities"
imposed through African customary laws, and she adds that,
while it is often assumed that legal pluralism in contemporary
Africa is an attempt to revive or preserve traditional African
legal structures, it is seldom recognized that "in many countries
a number of the discriminatory customary rules that were created
by the colonial courts have been upheld" (637; emphasis added).
Merry (1988) and Nader and Grande (2002) provide a foundation
for this deconstruction, expanding the boundaries through
which law can emerge and be defined. While new legal pluralists
deconstruct the assumed "nature" of law that tends to place the
centrality of law in the state,23 they also examine what has been
referred to as "customary" law, and study the colonial roots that
named and shaped it. The categories used in new legal pluralist
work place the centrality of law in society, not the state.
Methodological Framework
Based on the increased number of categories in which law can
exist, a new methodological framework was implemented by
new legal pluralists. The goal of this new methodology was to
access informal mechanisms of social control and creations of law.
Pospisil (1967, 8) proposed that, if the point of reference of law
and society shifted from "society as a whole" to "the individual
subgroups that exist within society," researchers would discover
"radically different bodies of 'law' prevailing among these small
units." Collier's work (1968) operationalized this proposition
with an ethnography conducted in Chiapas, Mexico. In studying
the rituals of marriage Collier documented the courtship, dowry,
and ceremonial elements of the process (six categories in total
leading up to the wedding ceremony), and thus illustrated
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that the cultural meanings and practices associated with each
ritual contribute to and facilitate the final contractual union of
marriage.
In bringing forth the subgroups of associated actors and
actions Collier (1968) was able to better explain the process
through which marriage laws are practised in Zinacantan,
Chiapas, Mexico. Her work emphasized the informality of law as
it emerged in diverse contexts and exemplified the interrelational,
subgroup emphasis in this framework that centralized culture
to assess law. In the methodological framework of new legal
pluralism the researcher must enter a social field in search of both
the formal and the informal elements of law, looking to discover
and record a wide array of elements that merge to create law.
Gender Analyses
It is important to note that the rise of new legal pluralism
coincided with the increased participation of female scholars in
the field: as women came to study law and society from a legal
pluralist perspective gender analyses in social fields became more
prominent, as the roles of women and their relationships with
law came under consideration. In Merry's (2000) ethnographic
work women encompass a much different role than what was
offered in the classical legal pluralist paradigm. Merry places
gender as one element24 of understanding colonial processes. She
assesses gender relations to illuminate the types of transitions
occurring in law and culture through colonialism (111). Merry
illustrates how in precolonial Hawaii women had leadership/
decision-making roles, and explains how the transitions that
made male power dominant in Hawaii's sociolegal structures
were linked to the emergence of capitalism (property ownership
as wealth) and the secularization of the state: "This meant a shift
from the sovereignty of the chiefs [many of them women] to the
sovereignty of men of property/' with the result that "only men
were viewed as entitled to govern themselves" (110-111).
In this contextual framework gender relations are not
viewed as markers for civilization in societies, as was done in
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classical legal pluralism. In new legal pluralist frameworks
gender is used as a variable through which the processes that
guide cultural and legal relations can be better understood and
identified. In addition, the recognition of normative orders and
informal methods of social control as law in this paradigm allows
new legal pluralists to access a more relevant understanding of
the role of women as members of patriarchal societies run by
patriarchal, colonialist laws.
This gendered approach to legal pluralism is linked to
the new legal pluralist assessment of " inequality" as central
to an understanding of law (Greenhouse 1994). In expanding
on definitions of law, and in implementing a methodological
framework that used " subgroups" for access to social fields,
new legal pluralists expanded on the understanding that
"law" is experienced differently by different subgroups. In
this methodological framework there is room to present and
understand the experiences of women with law, culture, and
society.
Contemporary Applications of the Classical Legal Pluralist
Framework
In contemporary legal pluralist scholarship new legal pluralism
is dominant, yet several strands of classical legal pluralism
continue to function. Despite the racist and sexist foundations of
classical legal pluralism, and despite the problematic associations
between classical legal pluralism and colonialism in Africa,
this form of scholarship continues to influence contemporary
scholars. Normative legal pluralism presents one such field of
study. Assessing the significance of the ideological advancements
of new legal pluralism within an "operational context," La Torre
(1999,193) states that "normative legal pluralism can be operative
only within certain limits. Otherwise it will be transformed into
descriptive pluralism, interesting perhaps for the sociologist but
useless for the lawyer and the citizen who are called to orient
their conduct in a specific situation."
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Normative legal pluralism, according to La Torre (1999),
functions within a form of legal monism that studies and utilizes
pluralities as they exist within "the rule of law/7 This approach
prefers to place pluralism within the realm of the state and to
keep the definitions of law within a hierarchical realm. The
methodological framework in this type of pluralism incorporates
Moore's (1973) semi-autonomous social fields. Moore states
that "Taw' is a short term for a very complex aggregation of
principles, norms, ideas, rules, practices, and the activities
of agencies of legislation, administration, adjudication and
enforcement, backed by political power and legitimacy" (719). In
the complexity of the state and its interactions with society this
form of legal scholarship defines legal plurality.
Whereas La Torre (1999) presents a contemporary assessment
of how classical legal pluralism is applied in contemporary
conceptions of the state, Moore (1973) advocates a return to
Malinowski's focus not only on "rules" but also on how rules
are made valid and implemented in society, reaffirming the
customary elements of law. In relation to methodological
frameworks, Moore disagrees with the new legal pluralist
definitions of law in her assertion that the "semi-autonomous
field" in which law can be studied encompasses a relationship
between the state and society, and does not place the emergence
of law in that relationship. The social field functions in a semi-
autonomous context: "It can generate rules and customs and
symbols internally, but... it is also vulnerable to rules and
decisions and other forces emanating from the larger world by
which it is surrounded" (720).
Moore (1973) recognizes the threat of force and fear
associated with the punitive structures of state law, and
emphasizes the legitimacy and power of other forms of law (not
imposed or defined by legal institutions) as having impact on
the people functioning within a semi-autonomous field. In this
sense she rejects Pospisil's concept of law as emerging from
the relationships and interactions among subgroups, and, in
line with much of the criticism of new legal pluralists, asserts
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that they "see law everywhere" and, in their deconstructions of
law, confuse definitions of what law is with functions of social
control.
In addition to presenting a critique of new legal pluralism
this form of contemporary classical legal pluralism illustrates,
in a more familiar setting, the ideological assumptions of
classical legal pluralism. It is a framework that functions in a
highly dichotomized and categorical manner (mirroring how
colonialists defined and addressed African social structures),
presenting information about "colonial state law" as separate from
"customary tribal laws," "formal" (state) laws as separate from
"informal" (community-oriented) laws, and, as La Torre (1999)
points out, "sociological" and "legal" scholars as encompassing
separate, not interrelated, functions.
Despite such attempts to emphasize the dichotomies used
by academia to produce knowledge, the emphasis within
normative legal pluralism on state law as "plural" creates a
scholarly link between legal centralists and legal pluralists,
illustrating the existence within academia of the interrelations
between paradigmatic affiliations and highlighting that, when
these categories pre-exist, one (state laws in La Torre's case) will
inherently be perceived as more relevant or more powerful than
the other (community laws in La Torre's case). The function of
dichotomy is to implement a predetermined and academically
constructed hierarchy. In attempts to deconstruct "law" new
legal pluralists redefined dichotomies and expanded the realm
within which such categories can exist, but they, like past and
contemporary classical legal pluralists, did not challenge the
methodological structures that reinforce and continue to assume
the existence of generalizable dichotomies in the emergence of
law in society.
In acknowledging and understanding the dichotomized
and categorical structure within which classical and new legal
pluralists function, one can achieve a greater understanding of
the theoretical approaches and conclusions reached in relation
to legal pluralist scholarship. One can also begin to achieve
an understanding of the academic institution's tools, which
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"professionalize" the definitions of law and keep them within
a framework that mirrors the state's dichotomizing processes of
social control.
The same academic frameworks that professionalized the
processes of colonialism through the dichotomization of people
into races continue to dichotomize the definition of "law," and
thereby to aid in justifying past and present brutalities. The
explanations employed by classical and normative legal scholars
present an academic opportunity for Western scholars to continue
to speak about Africa in manners that are racist and white
supremacist. While new legal pluralists appear to have "better
intentions," they too aid in the implementation of a hierarchy
that places African social structures in an inferior position that
is "informal,"25 and colonial, European, American structures in
a constructed superior one that incorporates both the "informal"
and the "formal" elements of civilization. It is generally assumed
in Western scholarship that the formal elements of African
societies either have never existed or, if they did exist, were
permanently destroyed by colonialism.
Non-Essentialist Legal Pluralism
Much as the emergence of new legal pluralism was rooted in
dissatisfaction with classical legal pluralism, non-essentialist legal
pluralism is now emerging due to dissatisfaction with new legal
pluralism. Tamanaha (2000) is prominent in the presentation of a
non-essentialist legal pluralist framework. Building on Teubner's
(1997) critique of how the deconstruction of law was pursued
in new legal pluralism, Tamanaha presents a non-essentialist
approach to legal pluralism that focuses on implementing a
more successful deconstruction of law. The main component is
a mode of analysis that rejects the assumption that law has any
predetermined "essence."
Teubner (1997b, 773) states that the methods through which
law has been deconstructed have been unsuccessful and claims
that the deconstruction of law manifests itself like a dance,
caught in a "performative contradiction" that critiques law on
330 | Colonial Systems of Control
stage but fails to challenge it behind the scenes. Tamanaha (2000)
associates this failure with the new legal pluralist assumption
that law has an " essence" that can be predetermined in academic
institutions and then sought out in the social field.
A non-essentialist framework presents a legal pluralism
that places law within the minds and actions of people: law is
what the people define as such. Non-essentialists, like new legal
pluralists, reject the assumption that law is created, controlled, and
implemented by the state alone. Furthermore, non-essentialism
challenges the very assumption that "law" has an essence that
can be predetermined by researchers. Non-essentialist researchers
assume "nothing" before communicating with people in the
social field under research.
Teubner's (1992) assessment of legal pluralism was identified
by Tamanaha (2000, 306) as "the point of departure for the non-
essentialist approach to law." Teubner (1997a, 15) identifies two
problems with the new legal pluralists' approach to law. The first
is their broad approach to law, which renders them incapable of
distinguishing between law and other forms of social control,
and the second is their narrow approach to law, which limits its
functions to social control and maintenance of order. In these
criticisms non-essentialists begin to question how legal pluralists
have produced knowledge and make notes of the reoccurring
inadequacies. From these notes emerges the non-essentialist
legal pluralist paradigm.
Assumptions and Ideological framework
A non-essentialist version of legal pluralism defines plurality in
manifestations of institutional or non-institutional, systemic or
or non-systemic, seen-through or not-seen-through patterns of
behaviour, sometimes implemented through force, sometimes not
implemented through force. Thus, non-essentialist legal plurality
"involves different phenomena going by the label Law, whereas
[new or classical] legal pluralism usually involves a multiplicity
of one basic phenomenon, Law (as defined)" (Tamanaha 2000,
315). One of the main criticisms of new legal pluralists is that
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they "find law everywhere/' This critique results from the
expanded essence by which new legal pluralists define law. Non-
essentialism implements an ideological framework that does not
prioritize assumed (expanded/depleted) essences of law, but
works to build a fluid, flexible, and changing definition of law.
Nader (1969) presents a discussion that took place during
a Law and Society Association meeting on whether "law and
society" should be changed to "law in society." In this debate
the definition of "law" was challenged as scholars disputed the
point of departure for law: does law emerge apart from society,
or does law emerge from within society? Nader explains that the
suggestion to shift from and to in was met with defensive retorts.
The resulting discussion brought out implicit assumptions that
new legal pluralists hold about law: "Somehow, law is conceived
of as in reality being a system independent of society and
culture" (8). This may be a point of overlap from classical to new
legal pluralists, with theorists working within both frameworks
insisting that law has essence and thus is studied along with, and
not in, society.
A non-essentialist approach to legal pluralism would
incorporate a law-m-society perspective. Tamanaha (2001, 120)
challenges essentialist legal pluralisms by challenging "the mirror
thesis." The mirror thesis asserts that law is a reflection of society
and implies that, while law "reflects" a society's morals and
values, it exists separately from society through its institutions,
which implement an agreed-upon social contract. The mirror
thesis assumes that, first, society is governed by the social
contract (emerging through law) and that, second, there exists a
moral consensus that can be identified and implemented through
law. Tamanaha deconstructs the mirror thesis by challenging
the existence of a moral consensus in society, while illustrating
the "law" as an institution that has yet to be proven dominant
in governing social interactions. He does so by presenting an
awareness of the contextualized diversities within and between
societies, and how these differences manifest in diverse reactions
to legal systems. He concludes that, "extensive as the consequent
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changes to society and law might be, the result of these changes
is not necessarily that law and society move entirely in sync;
often mismatch, rather than mirror, remains" (120).
Classical and new legal pluralists provided a foundation
for the emergence of the "mismatch" hypothesis, as was clear
in the observation that the concrete "lived law" is different from
the abstract "written law" expressed in legal texts (Ehrlich 1936,
501). The distinction between the "real" and the "ideal" elements
of law is said to have created a foundation upon which the
emergence of "a socially oriented legal pluralism" could emerge
(Melissaris 2004, 59). Yet with this foundation Ehrlich (1936, 57)
established an essentialist view of law within the legal pluralism
framework, asserting that the essence of law is its dispute-
resolving functions. Tamanaha (2001) found these foundations
of legal pluralism inaccurate, adding that these foundations
have been limited through an essentialism that skews pluralist
approaches to studying law.
Defining Law
In non-essentialist legal pluralism "law" is viewed as a socially,
politically, and culturally constructed phenomenon, and, outside
the actions and beliefs of people, does not essentially exist. Thus,
to study "law" one must study the behaviours and interactions
of people in specific social settings: law is what behaviours/
interactions prescribe as such. Legal plurality in this framework
is recognized as occurring when more than one form of "law" is
recognized and is seen in the social practices of a group. What
makes this non-essentialist approach to studying legal pluralism
different from that of new legal pluralists is rejection of the notion
of law as "fundamentally functional in nature" (Tamanaha 2000,
308).
While the functions and functionality of law are central to
essentialist legal pluralisms, a non-essentialist view of law does
not assume that "law" is essential to the functions and survival
of society. Parnell (2003,1) provides an approach to studying law
that is representative of the non-essentialist framework: "Both
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crime and law are created in culture as people negotiate social
change. At the same time, crime and law may arise as separate
culture-making processes and become linked to each other in
a wide array of associations/' He also explains that there are
circumstances in which an official law may not have been broken
yet the perception of the occurrence of a crime may be prevalent.
In addition, rule implementations may occur outside the realm
of the state, and may or may not include the use of force.
A non-essentialist framework incorporates the ability to
identify these complexities as a central element of understanding
law in its various contexts, manifestations, and implications. Non-
essentialism asserts that, "despite the shared label 'Law/ these
are diverse phenomena, not variations of a single phenomenon,
and each one of these does many different things and/or is used
to do many things" (Tamanaha 2000, 313).
"Law" is not the "rules" that guide society; "law" is the
interactions that take place to create, implement, and guide
social interactions. In light of these complexities non-essentialist
legal pluralism concludes that functionality is not central26 to all
"law." Failing to understand this complexity is a failure to define
law, not because researchers are not searching well, but because
law has no essence: the "essence" they are searching for does not
exist.
Non-essentialism suggests that legal pluralists have "made
up" law in academic institutions and have proceeded to try to
locate it in society. Furthermore, the constructions of law in
essentialist legal pluralism tend to mirror the assumptions about
law that the state has presented: that it is functional, that it is
necessary, that it always plays a social control function, that it
can exist outside the realm of social interactions, that it is defined
by institutions and codes, that it exists only in categorical, rigid
entities, and that it is most powerful (power defined in formality)
when backed by the state because state power trumps all other
forms of organization in a society. Non-essentialists challenge all
these assumptions and assert that the only way to "define" or
"find" law in society is to assume that "law" has no essence.
334 | Colonial Systems of Control
Methodological Framework
In light of the realization that law has no essence, how does one go
about "defining law"? The process is laid out in the emergence of a
non-essentialist methodological framework. First, non-essentialist
legal pluralists employ a methodological framework that rejects
the implementation by researchers of predetermined categories
of law in society. This framework incorporates Teubner's (1992)
approach to "locating" law through an autopoietic approach:
relying on linguistic foundations and suggesting that the use
of a binary code that limits an assessment of law to verbalized
"legal/illegal" entities are sufficient for defining law. Thus, law
is what people define as "legal" and "illegal." Law in this context
is different between groups in the same society, is different
between societies, and is different over time.
Second, in addressing the nature of the relationship between
law and society, this framework brings the study of law into
society — not the study of society into law, as is done in essentialist
legal pluralist frameworks. The use of this framework allows for
the ability to locate law, not only by looking for it in society, but
also by asking those 'under study' to define "law." Law is what the
people say is law (Tamanaha 2000; Teubner 1997a).
Third, non-essentialists assume that the only essential
feature of non-essentialism is the lack of essence. According to
Tamanaha (2000), "essence" is the predetermined assumption(s)
that researchers bring with them into the society they are
studying. Thus, non-essentialists assume only that law has no
essence. With this as a starting point Tamanaha urges researchers
to start without a predetermined definition of law, proceed to
look for areas in which social interactions occur and, on finding
such areas, incorporate a research method that asks people to
verbalize "law" in that setting. The key research questions posed
to people in the social field would include what is law, and is that
law? By implementing a strategy of cumulative observation and
data-gathering, non-essentialism identifies law as researchers
gather people's responses to such questions (Tamanaha 2000).
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As conceptions of law begin to take shape within a society, it
is important to recognize that these conceptions are fluid,
interdependent, and not separate. Conceptions in this framework
are not "dichotomized" entities, as categories are in essentialist
frameworks (such as customary law or state law in the classical
framework, or formal or informal social control in the new
legal pluralist framework). Conceptions here overlap, are
interdependent, and change through interactions among people
in varying situations/settings. What is formal for a specific group
may be informal for another group, and what is considered "law"
by some may not be so considered by others.
Fourth, in relation to the technical application of non-
essentialist research there is the issue of who identifies law and
how many people need to view something as "law" before it
becomes recognized as such. Tamanaha (2000, 319) sets a low
threshold and never explicitly offers answers to these questions.
In reference to "who," he does say "any group within the social
arena," and adds that they would have to claim it as "law" for
it to be defined as law, and that the definition would emerge
through their actions/behaviours among other people in the
(sub)group. In line with the ideological foundations of this
framework, an answer to "how many" formed before entering
the social field would transform the non-essentialist researcher
into an essentialist one. One thing is clear: due to reliance on
social interactions to identify law, a unitary source (such as a
penal code) cannot create or implement law.
Fifth, Tamanaha (2000) states that sociolegal theorists should
not "shrink away" from the possibility of identifying plural forms
of law, explaining that fears that "too many" social practices
become identified as law under this framework are unfounded,
because people do not lightly or widely use the label "law."
A main obstacle recognized by non-essentialist legal
pluralists includes the academic applicability of the proposed
approach to identifying law. Tamanaha (2000) recognizes that,
because the definition of law is contingent upon the social field,
not upon academic discourse, non-essentialism may offend
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"conventional" social scientific expectations: in non-essentialist
frameworks there occurs a shift in power from the academic
researchers' professional identity and assumed expertise in
defining law to the people in society through which law emerges.
Thus, obstacles to the progression of non-essentialist research
include the humbling of academic sources of knowledge and are
not limited to non-essentialist methodological frameworks.
Gender Analyses
In the non-essentialist framework the role of gender would require
an assessment of law as it is defined and used by women in the
social setting. Manji (1999) presented an assessment of women
and law in post colonial Africa that incorporated resistance as a
central theme of study. In this incorporation Manji utilized a non-
essentialist framework that defined law according to women's
experiences, not according to preconceived notions of law. By
doing so she was able to identify resistance as central to their
relationships with law, and thus proceeded to represent gender
in the study of law and society appropriately within the realm of a
larger social structure that is patriarchal. A non-essentialist study
of gender in law and society is able to incorporate legal pluralism
as it is used by women, and does not place "law" or normative
systems as defined in academia as central to theoretical goals.
Within the context of northern Nigeria non-essentialist
researchers would have to ask women what they define as
law: if normative orders emerge as law according to women, if
communication methods emerge as law according to women,
or if their socioeconomic dealings emerge as law according to
women, then they are law. A non-essentialist analysis in northern
Nigeria would allow women to inform the researcher of what is
or is not law. Given the circumstances under which women live
and the obstacles they face in achieving status/socioeconomic
wealth in the international patriarchal order, non-essentialism
appears most relevant in accessing knowledge and appropriately
representing women's interactions with law.
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ASSESSMENT OF LEGAL PLURALISM:
APPLICABILITY TO NON-WESTERN CONTEXTS
In presenting the three main legal pluralist frameworks it becomes
evident that their diverse approaches to law and society provide
different opportunities for research; in addition, the relevance
of each framework differs as different societies enter into the
academic search for knowledge. The following is an analysis of
the three frameworks in relation to the African context. Included
is an assessment of the definition of law in each framework,
and of the relevance of these definitions to women and law in
northern Nigeria.
Based on the heavy reliance on formal definitions of law
and social status in classical legal pluralism, it appears that this
framework of analysis is not equipped to access the networks that
women create and work within in northern Nigeria. This inability
is evident in the deficient assessments of gender prevalent
throughout classical legal pluralist work. While new legal
pluralists emphasize the importance of accessing informal social
control networks in the study of law and society, this framework
does not implement an understanding of law that identifies the
fluidity and interdependence of formal and informal networks of
social control. In the northern Nigerian social setting formal social
control mechanisms (sharia, colonial laws) have given rise to the
informal (and at times formal from the women's perspectives)
networks created by women. It is thus important to implement a
legal pluralist framework capable of identifying that connection
while allowing women in the region the opportunity to explain
their social settings, their networks, their actions, and their laws.
Given these circumstances, it appears that non-essentialist
legal pluralism provides a framework that allows researchers
to place the definition of law within the methodological realm
as well as the ideological realm of scholarly work. Through
non-essentialist legal pluralism the definitions of law can be
brought forth in the interactions that women in northern Nigeria
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experience, not through reliance on classical definitions of law
or on a preconceived definition of what constitutes law, as is the
case in new legal pluralist scholarship. A non-essentialist legal
pluralist approach to studying law in society allows scholars to
learn about law according to Hausa women in northern Nigeria
and, in doing so, better represent Hausa society, and provide a
more comprehensive and accurate assessment of women and
law in the region.
In general this framework appears to be most relevant
for understanding law in non-Western contexts, and for
accessing knowledge that lies outside the boundaries of
Western definitions, experiences, and academic assumptions. It
implements an understanding of law that is complex and allows
researchers to enter a social field that is radically different from
their own with the preconceived understanding that "law" as
they have known or experienced it may not be "law" as people
in non-Western settings have known or experienced it. Masaji
(1998, 232) suggests that a "non-Western legal pluralism may be
seen in theory as one form of the dual structure of state law and
minor law or coexistence of modern law with traditional law.
Its reality is, however, never reduced to the simple structure or
coexistence, but is built up with other systems of law." A non-
essentialist approach to law may be able to further explain this
coexistence: listening to women living with purdah/sharia will
illuminate their perceptions of these contexts, bringing forth
their definitions of law as it emerges through their experiences/
interactions. Resisting the urge to categorize and thus westernize
their experiences may allow academia to present relevant and
accurate understandings of their lives.
A macrolevel context of posfcolonial African social structures
illustrates that legal pluralism in the African context is the study
of legal systems as they interact with, are created by, and overlap
with society and social interactions: it is not merely an interaction
that occurs between African and non-African legal systems,
but also an interaction between legal systems created by states
and normative orders implemented by the people. In northern
Women, Law, and Resistance in Northern Nigeria | 339
Nigeria women appear to have implemented normative orders
that contradict and, at times, defy both African and British legal
expectations and definitions of status. An approach to studying
law in these settings that does not incorporate an understanding
of these interactions, due to a reliance on law as owning an
essence separate from the perceptions and actions of women, is
ill equipped to address the interrelationships that form law.
An understanding of legal pluralism must allow for an
understanding that law for Hausa women in the north may have
an essence that is different from, or even contradicts, the assumed
essence that classical and new legal pluralists assign to law. I
believe that women in northern Nigeria can be best understood
within this context: their interactions with the law are more a
function of colonialism than they are a function of the Nigerian
state and sharia laws. It comes down to a function of survival
that takes place daily on a continent that has seen much upheaval
but has maintained its identities and cultures. A non-essentialist
approach to women's interactions with law creates an academic
opportunity whereby these complexities can be brought forth: in
listening to women's definitions scholars will be able to identify
"law" as it exists for women, and not law as it is expected to exist
for Western scholars.
While elites in contemporary Africa define "modernization"
and key elements for "nation-building" through "development"
as important, and equate such progress to the implementation of
a unified legal system (usually based on Western legal models)
(Okoth-Ogendo 1979,165), research on the socioeconomic actions
of women in northern Nigeria has shown that "development"
is not always capable of being recorded officially or defined
through Western academic boundaries. While the "official" legal
functions continue to westernize conceptions of women's lives,
it is important to academically understand that these "official"
manifestations are met with resistance through a rejection of law
and the creation of new laws when necessary.
The shifts in academic discourse that non-essentialism
provides are not "important" for the women in northern
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Nigeria; they are important for scholars who need to keep their
academic disciplines relevant. If social science academics are
truly embracing the quest to produce relevant knowledge, then
they must place the social above the science. They must learn to
"let go" of the conceptions that academia has formed and begin
to really look at the society they are trying to understand. They
must work to create a science that is relevant to the social before
they worry about using a science that their fellow misinformed
scholars will accept or reject.
Fortunately, more scholars are beginning to discover that
women in Africa rely, on more than formal law for their day-
to-day survival: "African norms and values are incompatible
with the norms and values applying in the West" (Helium 2002,
636). This realization should not only alter the way scholars
understand law in Africa, but also alter their methodological
approaches to research in Africa. In realizing the fundamental
differences in experience, in history, in culture, and in social
setting, academics must begin to approach research in the region
from a non-essentialist perspective, not to deny the existence of
"essence" in law, but to deny the Western assumption that law
has a predetermined "essence" that they bring forth through
their own constructions of law and society.
Academic attempts to essentialize law and to impose a
preconceived definition of law that guides researchers have
resulted in an academia that is not relevant or appropriate
for accessing knowledge about women in northern Nigeria.
The incorporation of a non-essentialist perspective is key to
strengthening academic tools and abilities to address the diversity
that is a function of pluralism. In recognizing that many systems
of law exist a non-essentialist legal pluralism also recognizes
that these many systems exist differently, according to different
people in different settings, and elicit different reactions. These
differences can best be understood through an abandonment of
reliance on "essence" as existing in law. Sharia is not just codes
and implementations of rules, but also an experience of law by
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women in northern Nigeria, and, although sharia codes remain
constant, the experience of sharia for men and women creates
a different law with different functions and implications. Non-
essentialist legal pluralism, unlike other frameworks, allows for
an understanding of these differences.
While non-essentialism is most relevant for research on
women and law in northern Nigeria, obstacles do exist in its
applicability and ideology. First, it is assumed in this framework
that researchers can enter a social field without preconceived
notions and biases. The "objective researcher" assumption is
dangerous, because it does not take into account the impact of the
presence of a researcher on a social setting, and because it posits
that researchers can transcend the human element and relinquish
bias while conducting research. Second, non-essentialism
does not account for the transformations that take place when
recording information: upon " defining law" according to people
in the social field, how does a researcher avoid transforming
these definitions in the process of presenting them in scholarly
works? Does a researcher impose "essence" upon law when he
or she translates social realities into academic materials?
These types of obstacles are not insurmountable. In
my opinion non-essentialism adds complexity to academic
endeavours and, in doing so, brings the complexity of law in
society into a more appropriate arena for academic discussion.
Non-essentialism may make research "more difficult" and may
impose a level of self-reflexivity upon researchers that appears
to be lacking in academia, but these impositions may expand the
scope of knowledge available to academic disciplines.
A complex social reality that is unstable, fluid, and
interchanging requires complex academic approaches that may
not be "perfectly" definable, generalizable, or predictable. Above
all, the production of knowledge in sociolegal disciplines needs
to shift from unquestioned and taken-for-granted assumptions
about "law" and "society," and to rely more heavily on the
interactions in society without which law could never exist. I
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believe that more researchers need to confront the fact that without
social interactions there would be no law, but that without law
social interactions would continue; thus, social interactions take
precedence in defining law and not vice versa.
Women and Resistance in Northern Nigeria
Some scholars have stated that the policies of colonial and
contemporary African states toward women have ranged from
mild lenience in instances where their activities contributed to
the economic structures of the nation to forthright domination
and attack when women proved themselves "uncontainable"
(Jackson 1987). Manji (1999, 443) explains that "a corollary of
the failure of the African ruling elites to achieve hegemony —
and the consequent use of authoritarianism and force rather
than consensus to achieve compliance — has been the search by
subordinate groups within the state for means to resist its coercive
tendencies/' Such situations have been met with two main forms
of resistance that are most relevant to women in Africa.
The first form of resistance is the practice of "exit," whereby
withdrawal avoids confrontation with violent state policies
and actions. This withdrawal is accomplished through the
creation of a private27 realm in which non-state systems of
law are employed. Both Fatton (1989) and Hirschmann (1981)
address "exit" as a mechanism of resistance employed in many
contemporary African nation-states. Parpart and Straudt (1989)
provide examples more specific to women's relationships with
African nation-states. They record activities in which women
participate that the state finds difficult to regulate. These activities
include "illegal" trading, creation of cooperatives, participation
in prostitution, and implementation of informal mechanisms of
communication and networks of support that aid in maintaining
autonomy from the state.
While the "exit" strategy appears to be easier to implement
in urban settings, rural settings incorporate a second form of
resistance: a "secrecy and concealment" strategy, whereby
women are able to create and implement their own laws and
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governance techniques for economic and political survival (Manji
1999, 447). This form of resistance employs "exit," but does so in
ways that are less accessible to the majority of those not included
in the participating subgroups. In rural settings anonymity is not
enjoyed as it is in urban settings; thus, this form of resistance
involves arrangements and agreements that, at times, are
unspoken yet, upon implementation, are clearly established.
In identifying these two main forms of resistance, it becomes
clear that it would be difficult and potentially impossible to build a
legal pluralistic theory relevant to women in contemporary Africa
without the incorporation of an understanding of resistance.
Legal pluralism in these settings is largely a function of resistance
to oppressive state laws that continue to mirror colonial modes of
governance: "To summarize, writing on women and the state in
colonial and post-colonial Africa indicates that the relationship
of women to the state has been at best ambivalent, and at worst
characterized by actual and symbolic coercion," resulting in
a distancing by women from the state, either through physical
exit or through symbolic exit in secrecy and concealment (Manji
1999, 448). Thus, Manji concludes that the implementation of
legal centralist theories would be highly problematic, due to
their reliance on the state to define laws. I would add that the
implementation of any "essentialist" conceptions of law in these
social fields is just as problematic. Preconceived conceptions of
"law," especially ones arising from Western academic standards
and cultural contexts, might theoretically "appear different,"
compared with legal centralist theories, but would misrepresent
situations and reach conclusions that are just as problematic.
Examples of such problematic conclusions are found in the
contradictions reached through different forms of academic
assessments. In discussing land rights and legal ownership of
property in northern Nigeria, Ayua (1998, 237-238) reports that
Islamic laws preserve women's rights to ownership of land, but
notes that these rights are often ignored. She concludes that "this
pattern of behavior has tended to make women second-class
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citizens. Most of the women have resigned themselves to their
fate and have accepted the humiliating status accorded them by
society. The few others... who would want to assert their rights
or fight for them are discouraged for fear of being branded
social deviants or rebels/' These conclusions come in direct
contradiction of assessments of women's roles, actions, and
identities from a non-state-oriented form of legality. Examples
of women's participation in the informal and "socially moral"
socioeconomic sector have been presented in contradiction to such
disempowered conclusions about women in northern Nigeria.
Void of an understanding of resistance strategies, assessments of
law in northern Nigeria present a highly disempowered picture.
In studying resistance and organizational strategies among
factory workers in Kano, a state in northern Nigeria, it was
found that female involvement in the formal labour process was
sufficient to form a class consciousness, but it did not extend to
a formal consciousness of gender discrimination. It was thus
concluded that, "in order for this class consciousness to generate
a gender dimension built into it, the women must also be able
to understand that the additional disadvantages which they
suffer have to do with their gender, an experience which sets
them aside from their male colleagues" (Abdullah 1997, 65). On
a formal level Abdullah asserts that a gendered understanding
does not emerge into formal strategies of organization to fight
patriarchal oppression.
On a more informal level Shebi (1997) identifies liberation
for women in Nigeria as beginning with empowerment
through identity, role, and development. As women work on
developing their identities through autonomous networks and
organizations, Shebi places a symbolic value on "the start of
liberation for our women, liberation from the inhibiting identity
and role of our culture, which men have imposed on them and
which has enslaved them for ages" (133). It becomes apparent
that the views held in relation to women, resistance, and their
relationship to law are greatly influenced by the understanding
(or lack of understanding) of resistance. It also becomes evident
Women, Law, and Resistance in Northern Nigeria | 345
that in the formal realm women are viewed as largely oppressed
and degraded, while in the informal realm they appear to be self-
regulating and autonomous. These contradictory conclusions
destabilize the academic approach to studying law in northern
Nigeria, and illustrate that the conclusions reached rely heavily
on the focus and orientation of the researchers.
Legal centralist and classical legal pluralist paradigms, with a
heavy focus on formal law (state and customary), are not equipped
to assess the "informal" lives that women lead. On the other
hand, the new legal pluralist framework, while encompassing
the ability to recognize and address the "informalities" and their
relevance, may not be equipped to address the oppressions that
do occur due to formal legal policies and implementations. In
addition, the formal/informal dichotomies employed by legal
centralists as well as by classical and new legal pluralists present
academic frameworks so reliant on categories and divisions that
they become unable to learn about the complexities of law in
northern Nigerian societies.
A non-essentialist legal pluralist methodology works best in
this setting, for it allows women in northern Nigeria to present
the relevance of informality while addressing the elements of
formal oppressions they face. In entering the social field without
preconceived definitions of what constitutes "law," and what is
"formal" or "informal," researchers in this framework are more
able to portray representative understandings of the relationships
between women and law.
CONCLUSION: THE RELEVANCE OF NON-
ESSENTIALIST LEGAL PLURALISM FOR RESEARCH
ON WOMEN IN NORTHERN NIGERIA
For women in northern Nigeria the boundaries between formal
and informal social control are blurred. Sharia and the practice of
purdah work in conjunction with cultural, social, and economic
factors. It appears that all forms of social control/law in this
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setting are fluid and interchangeable: they do not exist as separate
academic categories. In addition, women in northern Nigeria lead
lives that are radically different from those of women elsewhere
in the nation: Hausa women in the north live in social and at
times formal political seclusion. In northern Nigeria women in
rural settings face different circumstances than women in urban
settings. In such differences lies a methodological dilemma only
if an academic framework looks to dichotomize and generalize
findings. Any attempt to understand women and law in Nigeria
may require a specialized approach to producing knowledge,
with an acceptance that diversity in social settings and experiences
does not equate to "problems" in methodology.
The most appropriate ideological framework to address these
issues appears to be a non-essentialist one. It rejects the need to
rely on dichotomies between categories and does not work to
generalize its findings. Non-essentialist researchers approaching
this social field, with an understanding that law's essence exists
solely in the experiences and beliefs held by women in the region,
will be able to approach such overlapping "categories" more
readily. Because non-essentialism encompasses a realm of goals
focused on "identifying" (not defining) law, any generalizations
beyond that have yet to be established by the people whom
researchers are attempting to understand. In this framework
of analysis women in northern Nigeria are able to present their
experiences with law according to their specific social, cultural,
political, and legal circumstances.
It has been shown that the assumption that generalizations
and themes can aid in creating a better understanding of
social realities and their intersections with law is based on a
presupposition that there exist implied collective social realities,
that there are "themes" that govern social life. These assumptions
reduce an understanding of "society" to a monolithic as opposed
to a complex and diverse entity. At times discussions about "law"
seem to disconnect from social realities in society. Researchers
become overridden by the "essence" of their ideological
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assumptions and lose touch with "law" as it is created in society.
Discarding that "essence" may allow for more representative
research and theories.
Classical, new, and non-essentialist legal pluralisms have
been presented in this chapter according to the ideological
foundations of their frameworks, the definitions of law they
employ, the boundaries they set in defining their methodological
expectations, and, finally, the applicability of their theories to
women living in contemporary northern Nigeria. Tamanaha's
(2000,2001) non-essentialist version of legal pluralism provides a
theoretical framework that is flexible enough to allow for research
to define law, to attribute power appropriately to different
forms of law (as is relevant to the specific social settings), and to
create opportunities for understanding that are analytically and
instrumentally sound within the legal pluralist paradigm.
Non-essentialist legal pluralism appears to be most relevant
for research on women and law in northern Nigeria because
of the flexibility it affords in definitions of law, and the power
it relinquishes from academic professionalizations of law
to the lived realities and experiences of Hausa women who
produce and implement law in Hausaland. The applicability
of non-essentialist methods has not been attempted on a wide
academic scale, and, as the number of scholars who undertake
non-essentialist research expands, the lack of structure in this
framework may result in conclusions that are difficult to compare.
This may result in the production of knowledge that is difficult
for academic institutions to understand.
These problems clearly fall within the realm of academia
and are not directly correlated to problems in "society"; thus,
changes need to occur in academia, and perhaps, if those shifts
are sufficient, social problems and social triumphs can begin to be
better understood in the "social sciences." Until then the majority
of scholarly works emerging in Western academic settings will
continue to misrepresent, misunderstand, and wrongfully
analyze African social settings.
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NOTES
1 Resistance in this context is non-conforming responses to attempts
to control, dominate, and subjugate.
2 Kuhn states that theorists " whose research is based on shared
paradigms are committed to the same rules and standards of
scientific practice. That commitment and the apparent consensus
it produces are prerequisites for normal science, i.e., for the genesis
and continuation of a particular tradition" (1962,11).
3 "State" being a single structure with unifying institutional
bureaucracies.
4 The census is controversial since many ethnic groups believe that
their populations were not properly accounted for in the official
population reports. The north/south divide has been increasing
with the most recent assertions that Kaduna (in the north) has a
larger population than Lagos (in the south).
5 Seehttp://www.nigeria.gov.ng/NR/exeres/05758900-C8A9-4055-
87Cl-9A6766C59879.htm. [Consulted October 25, 2007].
6 See https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/
geos/ni.html. [Consulted October 25, 2007.] Again, these "official"
statistics are disputed in Nigeria: with both Christians and Muslims
claiming a majority population, and more people adhering to
"traditional" spiritual practices, but doing so in secrecy due to the
stigma associated with missionary and colonial dehumanization of
African spiritual practices.
7 These "official" figures have been disputed by the US Bureau of
Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, which found in its human
rights report (2005) that 58 percent of women were literate (US
Department of State 2005).
8 Population demographics are cited from http://www.odci.gov/
cia/ publications/ f actbook/ geos/ ni.html.
9 The Hausa are one of the three dominant ethnic groups in Nigeria.
Historically, they resided in what is now Niger and the northern
regions of Nigeria, Benin, Togo, and Ghana. The majority of Hausa
people in Nigeria continue to live in the northern region, and thus
the northern states are often referred to as Hausaland.
10 Power in this context is formal, and is measured through wealth
and access to land/home ownership rights.
11 As the Nigerian naira became less valuable, prices were increased
throughout the nation, and economic difficulties for families were
on the rise.
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12 Kano is one of HausalancTs largest urban centres. It is one of the
oldest and most populated cities in Nigeria.
13 She did not report a specific age. Wall (1998) did report in her study
of Hausa women that some girls who are premenstrual are married
in some Hausa societies.
14 The same law was substituted word for word when Nigeria was
created.
15 The onus of proof was on the party who wanted to use customary
laws to prove that English law would result in substantial injustice
(Bentsi-Enchill 1969, 28).
16 Classical legal pluralists (e.g., Hoebel and Gluckman) concluded
that societies without political organization (as they recognized it)
were societies lacking in law. Bohannon (1967) asserts that different
categories, when implemented, would reveal law among tribal
societies and organizations.
17 With Bohannon accusing Gluckman of distorting reality by relying
too heavily on English in his work, and Gluckman responding
that his audience is English and accusing Bohannon of alienating
scholars (Gluckman 1973).
18 Gluckman insisted that the English language was sufficient for
categorizing non-Western legal systems, while Bohannon insisted
that much of the essence of non-Western legal systems is lost or
transformed in translations into English. Bohannon encouraged
researchers to learn the language used in the region of study and
to use that language when presenting categories of law. Gluckman
insisted that this was impractical and unnecessary.
19 As a function of the dichotomized framework in which it functions.
20 Hill is one of the very few women who participated in classical legal
pluralist research.
21 As recognized by classical legal pluralists.
22 New legal pluralists expanded legal pluralist research to include
Western nations. They concluded that colonialism in Africa may
have provided "obvious" legal plurality, as colonial law came
to exist alongside customary law, but they added that, with the
expansion of the definition of law to be centralized in "culture/'
legal pluralism is a reality in all societies, including the North
American ones.
23 This is done in both classical legal pluralism and legal centralism.
24 The three subgroups that she presents are property ownership,
maleness, and race.
25 Few new legal pluralists present an understanding of African
social structures as "formal," mainly because the term "formal"
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has historically been associated with colonial structures. It was
constructed as such by classical legal pluralists. While new legal
pluralists have challenged these constructions by emphasizing
the relevance of the " informal/7 they do not deconstruct the very
existence of "formal" and "informal" categories.
26 Not all social interactions are "functional"; some are dysfunctional,
some uneventful, some minor, some major, and so on.
27 Private here is identified as fields functioning outside the realm of
public, state-defined and state-regulated social fields.
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Fela Kuti: 77 albums, 27 wives, over 200 court appearances.
Harassed, beaten, tortured, jailed. Twice-born father of Afro-
beat. Spiritualist, Pan-Africanist. Commune King. Composer,
saxophonist, keyboardist, dancer. Would-be candidate for the
Nigerian Presidency. There will never be another like him.
-Guralnick and Wolk (2002)
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"BEAST OF NO NATION" (BY FELA)
Ahhhh
Let's get now into another underground spiritual game.
Just go dey help me dey answer you go dey say: aya kata
Oh yah
O fey shey loo
Aya kata
Mo fey shey 'gbon
Aya kata
O fey shey loo
Aya kata
Mo fey shey 'gbon
Aya kata
0 fey shey wa'
Aya kata
Mo fey shey g'bein
Aya kata
Basket mouth wan' start to leak again-o
Basket mouth wan' open mouth again-o
Abis you don forget to say I sing-eo
Basket mouth wan' open mouth again-o
1 sing you say
I go open my mouth like basket-eo
Malag be agbere
Basket mouth wan' open mouth again-o...
Fela weitin you go sing about-o
They go worry me...
They go worry me —Worry me worry...
They go worry me
They want to make I sing about prison
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"BEAST OF NO NATION" (TRANSLATED)
Fela is getting ready to narrate...
Let's get down to another spiritual level: try to understand
what I am saying
Just help me by answering: things are not good
Let's start...
They used a punch to beat me up
Things are not good - oh no...
They used a punch to finish me off
Things are not good — oh no...
They used a punch to beat me up
Things are not good — oh no...
They used a punch to finish me off
Things are not good — oh no...
They used a punch to shake me up
Things are not good - oh no...
They used a punch to finish me off
Things are not good — oh no...
My mouth wants to leak info again
Fela wants to speak again
Have you (gov't) forgotten that I sing
Fela will start to talk again
You (gov't) know that I sing
I will start to talk a lot in my songs again
And I don't care what people will think
Fela will start to talk again
Fela, what are you going to sing about
The people keep asking me
Fela what are you going to sing about
The people are bothering me
The people want me to sing about prison
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... They want to know about prison life
They go worry me...
The time where I dey for prison
I call 'em inside world
The time where I dey outside prison
I call 'em outside world
Now craze world, no be outside world
Craze world
No be outside world the police dey
Craze world
No be outside the soldier dey
Craze world
No be outside the court them dey
Craze world
No be outside the bad street dey
Craze world
No be outside the judge them dey
Craze world
Now craze world be that
Craze world
No be outside Buhari dey
Craze world
Now craze man be that
Craze world
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... They want to learn about prison life
They are asking him for information...
When I am inside the prison
I call it the inside world
When I am in Nigerian society
I call it the outside world
Nigerian society is the crazy world
Crazy world
Police are in the outside world, right?
Crazy world
Soldiers are in the outside world, right?
Crazy world
Courts are in the outside world, right?
Crazy world
Dangerous streets on the outside, right?
Crazy world
Judges are in the outside world, right?
Crazy world
Now that is the crazy world
Crazy world
Nigerian president is in outside world?
Crazy world
Now that is a crazy man.
Crazy world
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Animal in craze man skin-e
Craze world
Now craze world be that
Craze world
No be outside Idiagbon dey
Craze world
Now craze man be that
Craze world.
Animal in craze man skin-e
Craze world
MUSIC AS A TOOL FOR RESISTING STATE-
IMPOSED OPPRESSIONS
Music was used as a culturally appropriate tool of political
resistance by Fela Kuti in Nigeria during an era of military
regimes. Within the historical and spiritual contexts of Fela's
work, the power of this tool is understood both as empowering
for the people and as threatening to the state. This is true in
Nigeria, and in other nations where people continue to resist
state authoritarianism, and the implementation of racist and
colonial, structural and institutional, inequalities. In Nigeria
cultural resistance to colonial structures thrives in music.
Antonio Gramsci in his Prison Notebooks emphasized the power
of cultural resistance and placed it as " central to political change,
as it concerns the creation of alternative social meanings and
values which challenge the dominant ideology of the ruling
class" (Ghunna 1996-97, 7). In Nigeria, a land of extremes and
immense diversity, music pulls people together, and creates
avenues for connectivity and communication.
Artists who produce socially significant texts that critique
authoritarian state regimes and structures in their lyrics play a
key role in resisting state violence: "Cultural struggle is about
raising the political awareness of the mass population, exposing
the apologists for injustice and inequality, and creating an
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An animal hiding in a crazy man's skin
Crazy world
Outside is the crazy world
Crazy world
Tunde Idiagbon (chief of staff) is in the outside world, right?
Crazy world
That is a crazy man
Crazy world
An animal disguised in crazy man's skin
Crazy world
alternative set of values and different perspectives of the world"
(Ghunna 1996-97, 7). Fela's music represents such alternative
values. His songs provide an avenue through which oppression
can be both discussed and criticized, and thus destabilized.
HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL CONTEXT OF
NIGERIA
Nigerian history is full of upheaval and turmoil. Two hundred
years of commercial slave trading in West Africa yielded
devastating results. Between 1500 and 1700 Africans went from
being a minority in the world's slave population to being a
majority. It has been estimated that "eleven or twelve million
of the... eighteen million or more slaves exported from Africa...
came from West and Central Africa/' and this number is evident
in the "continuing influence of West African culture in the
Caribbean and North America" (Africa Policy 1996). In 1914
Nigeria became a country under British colonial rule, achieving
independence in 1960 through political negotiations, not war
(Nigerian Government 1999). The lack of a violent struggle
brought about a peaceful transition, which legally is post colonial
but economically is not. European and North American nations
continue to have immense access to African resources. This access
has resulted in much upheaval and unrest in Nigeria.
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After legal independence approximately thirty years of
military rule plagued the country, with dictatorships accompanied
by flagrant human rights violations that instituted colonial
economics and politics. Fela's life started during colonial times,
spanned the era of military regimes, and ended two years before
democracy was achieved with President Obasanjo (a former
military dictator who ordered the 1977 raids on Fela's home
and the murder of his mother) as Nigeria's president. It is from
within this context that Fela's political stance was constructed
and presented in his music.
MUSICAL CONTEXT: FELA'S AFRO-BEAT AS
EMPOWERING AND ACCESSIBLE
Initially, Fela sang non-political songs in Yoruba and English,
"but he soon started to sing anti-establishment songs, which
very quickly brought him in collision with both imperialism
and their local agents in power at home" (Ogunde 1998,1). Fela
coined the term "Afrobeat" and created a sound to define it. It
was inspired by dissatisfaction with High Life, a form of music
that dominated African recordings at the time. He was disturbed
by the European emphasis on loping beats and singular guitars
in High Life, as opposed to the rhythmic drums and brass-based
beats of African sounds. He began using "jazz,... syncopated call
and response vocals and brass," and a "raw and natural honesty
and energy" that came to define Afrobeat, both as a form of music
and as a political avenue for commentary (Connelly 1999).
Rader (2003, 185) explains that for political artists "forging
their own artistic language is not simply an aesthetic, it is also an
ethic." There is a sense of empowerment in the artistic creation
of a voice, and through Afrobeat Fela empowered his voice and
inspired African people who could relate to it to listen to his
music. Through the re-emergence of African sounds in music
Fela inspired people to relate more closely to African culture and
African pride.
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SPIRITUAL CONTEXT: EMPHASIZING AFRICAN
CONCEPTIONS OF RECORDING HISTORY
The abiku in Yoruba traditions refers to ideas of reincarnation.
More specifically, abiku refers to the concept of reincarnation as it
emerges in Yoruba spirituality: "The Yoruba refer to the denizen,
back from the chthonic region and born again, as abiku.... The
metaphysical idea of Abiku... and the notion of rebirth serve as a
master-narrative of the parent-child relationship in Pan-African
socio-political contexts and literary texts" (Ogunyemi 2002,
663). Within the context of abiku social memory is passed down
through generations in the spirits that reincarnate and inhabit
the bodies of abiku children. Fela was identified as an abiku child
by his family. It was believed that he possessed his grandfather's
spirit. Through that possession he had the experiences and the
wisdom that the spirit carried. This is important in relation to
the oral culture of many West African traditions. "Since abiku/
ogbanje [ogbanje is the Igbo concept of reincarnation] evokes the
past, with its separations and instability, the concept can serve
as a springboard for examining issues of memory" (Ogunyemi
2002, 663). Within the context of Fela's songs the assessment and
denouncement of oppression exists in links between precolonial,
colonial, and "post"colonial Africa. Being abiku, Fela had the
ability to relay history as well as the impact of the past on present
situations in Africa. He presented his songs on contemporary
oppression as a connected continuation of the past.
LINGUISTIC CONTEXT: FELA'S LAGOSIAN ENGLISH
In Fela's songs language is crucial. "Apart from his musical
progressiveness he mixed up elements of at least three
languages... Standard Nigerian English,... Nigerian Pidgin
English and... Yoruba" (Coester 1998,1). Code-mixing or code-
changing, as defined linguistically, includes the incorporation and
intertwining of languages, something Fela did often in his lyrics.
When addressing the elite he used Standard Nigerian English;
when addressing civil society he used Nigerian Pidgin English;
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when addressing Yoruba political issues he used Yoruba. Often,
as he changed back and forth between dialects and languages,
Fela mixed them and created new words that drew his three
audiences together. These new words came to represent modes
of expression distinct to Lagos State, and became associated
primarily with Nigerian urban life and culture: Ay a kata, Ay a kotu,
Ay a keetee are words that Fela created, and they have come to be
expressions of suffering, oppression, and struggle in Lagos.
Fela's songs continue to influence the way Lagosians speak
and have come to illustrate Lagosian life. Maier (2000, 24)
explains that Lagos is "a place full of frustration borne by millions
of people who moved to the city in search of riches, but only
found poverty, power cuts, water shortages, and breathtaking
mounds of garbage. The city's heart literally beats to pulsating
rhythms and angry lyrics against the thieves in power from
the Afro-beat musician and political activist, Fela Kuti." On the
national scale there are current political attempts to make pidgin
English the official mode of communication in Nigeria because
traditional English is viewed as elitist (mastered by those who
are Euro-educated) and representative of the " slavery method of
communication" in a manner that reimplants colonial structures
in the country (Bala Habu 2004, 4). Fela's heavy reliance on
pidgin to communicate through song expanded the boundaries
of his audience while reinforcing the importance of identity
through language. Instead of shunning pidgin and relying on
British English to communicate, Fela used British English only
to emphasize the elitist and oppressive elements of European
relations with Africa. His politicization of language through
songs has provided support for the movement to abolish British
English as the official form of communication in Nigeria.
MUSIC IN AFRICAN SOCIETIES
Fela's native language, Yoruba, has been described as a "musical"
one, with a "richness and rhythmic quality" that encompass a
naturally musical feel to its sounds and expressions (Morales
2003,151). In addition, as Morales notes, it has been stated that,
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within the African and Caribbean contexts, "the interdependence
of music/dance/gesture to language is strong.... By listening
carefully to the musician and writer from these cultures, one
can discern this connectivity" (150). Also, "South African writer
Mongane Wally Serote points out how pervasive music is in the
African culture: 'one grew up, was brought up by music really.
It... articulated one's dilemma, one's hopes'" (148).
Because music is such a key aspect of many African cultures
and lifestyles, the use of music for sociopolitical commentary
became a particularly powerful tool for Fela; it is within this
understanding that the Nigerian state's reactions to Fela can be
better contextualized. The state was threatened by him because
his anti-state politics reached many people, and those who felt
powerless could relate to his messages and analyses. Using
music and song to communicate provided Fela with an avenue
natural to the lifestyle, upbringing, and culture of many Africans.
In addition, the history of song and music in many parts of
Africa (South Africa being the most documented) illustrates that
Africans have used music and lyrics to communicate during
difficult times, to denounce oppressive leaders, and to encourage
resistance to brutality.
ORAL HISTORY AS AN AFRICAN TRADITION
In the 1960s scholars began to use "local oral traditions as a
source for reconstructing the pre-colonial African past.... Such
sources placed emphasis on African perspectives, thus providing
a much-needed balance to Euro-centric accounts then prevalent"
(Lee 2004, 83-84). This emphasis on African voices reinforces the
relevance of Fela's firsthand presentation of Nigerian experiences.
The emphasis on oral traditions is relevant to his use of the
narrative in presenting his stories, both by legitimizing his mode
of expression and by emphasizing its necessity. In oral historical
research methodological constraints are observed through the
researchers' influence on the people they are interviewing
(Lundberg 2003, 68). Issues relating to translation, expression,
and researcher bias become pertinent. In Fela's case the songs
366 | Colonial Systems of Control
are a form of oral history, recording the implications of military
regimes from the perspective of the average citizen in Nigeria.
Issues related to transcription and researcher bias become
minimized in this form of oral history, since the information is
already recorded in song. In her assessment of oral historical
research methods Lundberg (2003) refers to a ceremonial song
that recorded and passed down through generations a historic
voyage that a First Nations people undertook in resistance to
colonization. In this song it becomes evident that historical
records, in Native American history (similar in Nigerian history),
are not only based on events but also focused on recording the
experiences associated with such events.
Fela's songs take people through specific experiences. The
spiritual game Fela refers to in his songs invites his audiences
to remove themselves from immediacy and to place themselves
within the journeys he is narrating to them. As an abiku he
represents both narrator and ancestor in his songs. As a musician
he is able to invite large numbers of people to experience that
journey.
FORMS OF POLITICAL RESISTANCE IN FELA'S
SONGS
While many of Fela's songs illustrate his style and mode of
resistance, I focus here on " Beast of No Nation" (see above for
excerpts) to highlight his techniques and political messages.
Most of his songs are presented in a narrative format, a style that
engages his audience in a conversation about politics, colonialism,
and oppression. " Beast of No Nation" illustrates his role as both
political narrator and oppressed character. This is the first song
Fela released after his imprisonment. In it he refers to himself, the
oppressed character, as a basket mouth with the ability to leak
words; this leaking makes him a target of the Nigerian military
regime.
In this narrative Fela is conversing with his audience, using
his voice to repeat the questions they ask him and then using
his background singers to answer these questions. He says that
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the people keep asking him why he continues to spill words if
the result continues to be beatings, arrests, and imprisonments
by the military government. In response Fela explains that it is
not he who speaks but politicians who speak lies to the people.
The use of narratives in this song reveals how he uses music as
a political tool of resistance. Fela mocks the state for its attempts
to silence him, he dubs himself "basket mouth," and he reverses
people's questions about his thoughts and experiences to bring
their attention back to the state.
In response to questions about his experiences in prison Fela
uses this song to explain that the outside world has the police,
the courts, the corruption, and the lying politicians. Prison, he
explains, is an inside world where that madness exists only as
an extension of the madness in society. He urges Nigerians to
see the madness of their own society, and to work to challenge
and change it. Fela uses this song to present his strength despite
imprisonment and to point fingers at political, social, and
economic structures that oppress the people. His strength lies
not only in refusing to be silenced, but also in exposing those
who have tried to silence him.
By presenting narratives that mirror or address experiences
specific to Nigerian society, Fela piques the interest of his
audiences and captures their attention. He brings their own
understandings of and experiences with oppression to a level
of awareness that addresses global oppression and colonialist
histories. In a political context these elements combined become
threatening. Not only can Nigerian people relate to him, but also
they can relate on a level that is interpersonal. His songs have
the potential for what the Nigerian nation-state would consider
disastrous, as Fela explains in "Beast of No Nation" — disastrous
because his audience is large and, through his songs, is becoming
more educated about and aware of the conditions that oppress
them.
Rader (2003,180) defines engaged resistance as having two
necessary elements. One involves a "unified act of resistance,"
and the second involves acts of "expression and communication
that are fundamentally linked to... histories, cultures and beliefs."
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Fela's music often pulled people together in several formats.
While Fela was alive people conversed with each other about his
newest releases and his political messages. His concerts came to
mirror organized rallies and always involved a large segment of
spoken words in which he addressed the most recent political
and economic scandals in Nigeria. After the military government
killed his mother Fela wrote a song outlining their actions and
organized a rally throughout the streets of Lagos, during which
he presented this song for the first time to his fans. Included
in this rally was a replica of his mother's coffin. The rally was
alsoa re-enactment of his mother's funeral, which ended at the
military barracks, where Fela left her coffin before the gates: you
killed her, you bury her, was the message. This rally/funeral
drew tens of thousands of protesters. After Fela died in 1997 his
own funeral was attended by approximately one million people
(Connelly 1999).
Fela's music provided a resonance that addressed Nigerian
historical, cultural, and spiritual systems. In addition to education
and political conversation through song, Fela used humour as a
tool of resistance. "Humor remains one of the most successful
and most frequent modes of... resistance. Laughing at the enemy
is a way to make him less dangerous, more human" (Rader
2003,183). Fela debased the authority of the military regimes by
exposing them as people vulnerable to criticism and ridicule. He
thus challenged their perceived invincible status.
ART AS POLITICAL EDUCATION AND EXPOSITION
In assessing Mona Hatoum's visual art as resistance to oppression
of the Palestinian people Jabri (2001, 38) states that it "presents
what Michel Foucault refers to as a 'critical ontology of the self.'
It encompasses both a critique of the present and an awareness
of the place of history in the constitution of the self." This
presentation of the self within the context of the history that led
up to the creation of that oppressed self is key in understanding
Fela's themes and modes of resistance through song: Fela draws
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a macrolevel picture that enables his oppressed audiences
to better understand their conditions. Within these modes of
expression the power of resistance lies not only in exposing
Nigerian sociopolitical, economic, and historical realities, but
also in making the links between them.
In addressing resistance through political art forms Jabri
(2001, 39) states that there is "a vulnerability associated with this
space so the viewer is no longer a mere passive onlooker, but
is deeply involved. The viewer enters a zone of questions and
interrogations. The subject comes to bear witness, has to bear
witness, and it is in this moment that the ethical emerges. It is
in this moment of reflection that the subject acquires a critical
attitude, an ethos built on creativity and critique." This analysis
describes the power of the narrative and interactive style in
Fela's songs and performances. Fela often engaged his audiences
during live performances. In his recorded music he always relied
on his backup singers to answer his questions and probe at his
ideas. He engaged in conversations with them as he sang and
recorded his music of resistance. This engagement drew those
who listened to his music into a conversation, forcing them to
communicate with him as he sang; listeners ceased to be passive
and became deeply involved in the messages of the songs.
Jabri (2001,40) also states that political art" represents a form
of resistance that Foucault refers to as a permanent critique of
the present... articulating] a political subjectivity.... Each work
contains a remembered past,... while in and through this history,
the present in all its tensions, all its dangers, is opened out to
the viewing public/' Fela's sung narratives draw people into that
space of political instability that forces them to address political
problems. His stories about everyday life and struggle in Nigeria
are personal and accurate. These details, in conjunction with
the historical-political context, comprise a strong message that,
when understood on the grander scale of oppression and within
the context of continued exploitation of Africans, is angering,
emotional, and personal, and constitutes the necessity of
resistance.
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CHINESE AND CUBAN STATE REACTIONS TO
POLITICAL MUSIC
In assessing the Nigerian nation-state's reaction to Fela Kuti it is
important to provide perspective through an analysis of other
nation-states' reactions to dissident musicians. I present two
main responses: one matches the reaction of the Nigerian nation-
state (China), while the other counters it (Cuba).
On April 27, 1998, Wu Ruojjie, a Chinese rock musician,
was sentenced to three years in a "'labor re-education' camp
for disclosing the arrest of four poets in southwest China." He
was sentenced for "divulging state secrets" in a song (Huang
2003, 183). Wu associated himself with the student democracy
movement in China and sang about the Tiananmen Square
massacres. He belongs to a community of political rock musicians
who challenge the Chinese nation-state through their songs.
Cui Jian, the father of this community, wrote songs in which he
defined music as a weapon, stating in one song that his guitar
is a knife. Out of this community and leadership emerged Wu's
political use of music as resistance through exposure, education,
and political dialogue and commentary. In China it is recognized
that the promotion of political resistance is unsafe. As Huang
notes, "the cruel lessons of the Tiananmen massacre have taught
rockers that implementation of genuine political challenges is
hazardous to one's health" (191).
In Nigeria the repercussions of musical rebellion were
also apparent. Fela faced much opposition and attack from the
Nigerian military regimes during his life. In resistance to such
reactions, Fela established the Kala-kuta Republic: the land on
which he lived and performed was transformed into a republic,
which incorporated laws and social control mechanisms, and
functioned as a political, musical community. In November 1975,
the Kala-kuta Republic encountered an attack, which included a
raid that destroyed much of the property, severe beatings, and
the rape of women found inside the compound (Connelly 1999).
Two years later a "ruthless invasion" of the rebuilt Kala-kuta
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Republic was undertaken by "' unknown soldiers/ who maimed
and raped its inhabitants, and looted and burned the place
down" (Ogunde 1998, 2). One thousand soldiers were present
that day (Connelly 1999). Regardless, Fela remained politically
vocal and unrelenting until death. His attitude to music was
framed as a responsibility: if one had the talent to produce song,
then one had a responsibility to use that talent to promote social
change and freedom. Fela did not allow the consequences of
such resistance efforts, although dangerous and at times lethal,
to deter him from using his musical talents to progress the fight
for freedom.
As the hardships of political resistance come with
responsibility, this responsibility is accompanied by status,
making the entertainer also an intellectual. Huang addresses
this status when he points out that in China "rockers enjoy the
status of culture creators" (2003,191). An important element of
that status is not only access to an audience willing to listen to
the music, and thus the messages presented through the music,
but also the ability to stimulate awareness of key political issues.
Thus, while resistance through song has been challenged and
discouraged through nation-state attacks and violent attempts
at silencing musical dissidents, this avenue also provides
tremendous opportunities to reach great numbers of people and
affords musicians much access to the intellectual realm through
which culture can be formed.
Rebellion through music, with such immense opportunities,
has been used to challenge many elements of contemporary social
structures that contribute to oppressive living conditions. This
is illustrated in the musical rebellion initiated in China against
patriarchy. A female rocker band named Cobra uses music to
politically challenge oppressive gender roles: "China's all-female
band, Cobra,... transgresses conventional Chinese gender roles"
both in appearance and in social orientation (Huang 2003,198).
While Fela Kuti and Wu Ruojjie used music to address state-
imposed institutional and cultural oppressions, other bands
may have a different focus, choosing to structure their music to
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address diverse elements of oppressive sociopolitical structures.
As each band addresses issues specific to its experiences with
oppression, it is hoped that collectively their work will address
a large segment of social struggles against oppressive living
conditions. As such movements begin to come together, music
as a political tool for resistance and change becomes one of the
more effective tools to challenge the comfortable status quo
established in varying types of nation-states. This is a status
quo that institutionalizes racism and classism, in manners
that assume these oppressions are natural and necessary in all
societies. Through the music the assumed naturalness of these
oppressions is challenged and revealed as inhumane, and thereby
unnatural to human societies.
In Cuba political rap was inspired by African American
activists who visited Cuba and spoke a language of "black
militancy that was appealing to Cuban youth" (Fernandes 2003,
578). Rap music became a method of criticizing the Cuban state
for ignoring and perpetuating racial inequalities in the country
(580). Two forms of rap emerged: the underground and the
commercial. Underground rappers use rap " as a vehicle to criticize
the silencing of race issues in post-revolutionary society... [and
to] challenge stereotypes of blacks as criminals... [while talking]
about the repercussions of slavery in the contemporary period"
(584). Commercial rappers promote "alternative strategies of
survival such as consumerism and hustling, thereby challenging
new regimes of labor discipline and standards of revolutionary
morality" (584).
Initially, Cuban rap emerged at a local, grassroots level.
In the 1990s the Cuban state provided institutional resources
to promote it and allowed multinational recording companies
access to Cuban talent (Fernandes 2003, 578). This was an
"important avenue of transnational participation" for the Cuban
state, providing access to the US economy (578). Knowing that
the capitalist economy buys out challenges to the oppressive
status quo, Castro opted to use capitalism to co-opt revolutionary
music: "While hip-hop in the US started as an urban underground
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movement, it is now a major political product distributed by five of
the largest multinational music labels" (578). Initially, the Cuban
government attempted to implement this co-optation strategy,
promoted "as a way of diluting the radical component of the
genre" (585). While this worked for some rap artists in Cuba, a
specific segment rejected such attempts at silence. Underground
rap groups that rejected these changes were approached by
Cuban state authorities, and in July 2001 they were provided
with state-sponsored resources for the production of their
music. "While initially the Cuban state attempted to sideline
underground rappers by supporting the commercial element,
the state is increasingly relating to the former, praising them
for their rejection of commercialism" (585). "The image of Cuba
as a mixed-race nation with African roots" is promoted, thus
"inscribing the imagery of Africa into the revolutionary project,
helping to construct internal unity," while criticizing the United
States for its racial disparities and capitalist structures (585). In
this instance capitalism was used to silence those whom it could
buy out, and Cuban state resources were used to buy out those
who could not be bought by American money. For underground
artists their success in the Cuban music industry provided Cuba
with an image of diversity, which promoted the revolutionary
history of the country.
Co-optation and silencing strategies in relation to
revolutionary music differ according to each nation-state's
resources and cultures of control. In China and Nigeria silence
is promoted through the military and imprisonment. In Nigeria
these strategies are congruent with the militarization of Nigerian
society, which occurred during colonialism. In Cuba strategies
included access to commercialism to silence those who could be
bought, while promoting anti-capitalist music to divert attention
away from racial inequalities within the nation. In the United
States the consumer culture and the heavy reliance on capitalism
allow the nation-state to encourage those who do not promote
revolution through music, while limiting resources for those
who do promote resistance through music. The realities of life
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in a consumer economy prevail to silence those who do not have
the resources to produce revolutionary music. Fela, coming from
a rich and politically powerful family, chose to use his resources
to promote resistance through song. His family was not powerful
enough to immunize him from Nigerian military and criminal
justice brutalities; nonetheless, he persevered and did not allow
his messages or his songs to be co-opted.
THE POWER OF RESISTANCE
Music as a tool of political resistance has been used internationally
and historically. Under apartheid in South Africa music was used
as a means of communication about oppression during times
when communication among black and "coloured" peoples
was controlled and punishable. Under the official institution of
slavery in the United States black people used music to pass on
messages and to plan rebellions. During the implementation of
the chain gang the continued extortion of labour from African
Americans was resisted through song: men on the chain gang
used song to regulate the rhythm of their work, and they were
able to successfully slow down the pace of work in a manner that
went unnoticed by prison guards. In more recent times music
has emerged as a mode of communication among oppressed
peoples, and has promoted resistance through education and
political dialogue.
Music, when used politically, provides a method of peaceful
resistance to violent oppression. The violent reactions to political
music illustrate how threatening this form of resistance is to
the status quo. The capitalist silencing of revolutionary music
illustrates the effort afforded to silence or co-opt resistance.
Despite such attempts to maintain the colonial status quo, music
continues to be a relevant avenue to promote empowerment for
the oppressed. On the national level one can see the relevance of
such efforts. Fela's music was localized in a manner that drew
in his Nigerian audiences and allowed them the opportunity to
view their oppressive living conditions through an empowered
lens. On the international level music as a form of resistance
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unites nations of oppressed peoples and creates international
communities of artists who establish solidarity through song.
Within the context of a group, and within the community-
building elements of international musical revolutionaries,
political artists are able to pursue resistance together. In the
creation of international communities that transcend colonial
and genocidal efforts to build contemporary nation-states,
political musicians both promote resistance locally and challenge
oppression globally.
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This book presents information that illuminates the criminal
and colonial foundations and structures of the penal system. In
light of such information it is important to present information
about African justice models, and bring forth efforts in African
nations to rely less on penal colonial institutions and more on
community-oriented methods of social control. In presenting
this section it is necessary to address the obstacles that stand in
the way of progress. The first obstacle is a psychological one:
for generations global societies have been bombarded with the
constant and inaccurate assumption that the penal system is
the only option available for addressing conflict in society. The
second obstacle is a structural one: the penal system has become
an entrenched and powerful system of control. It is powerful
not only in its ability to harm target populations, but also in the
muscle it provides for the state in implementing a racist and
classist status quo.
Despite such conditions, there are those who " emancipate
themselves from mental slavery/' and there are initiatives in the
works to decrease reliance on penal institutions, and to search
for ways to implement non-European and non-colonial methods
of social function. Penal abolitionism is a movement that works
to challenge both the psychological and the structural powers
of the penal system. This section provides the Nigerian context
in which African models of justice emerge. It also provides
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contemporary examples of alternatives to the penal system as they
are being used in Africa — these are alternatives to a Eurocentric
justice system, and are necessary for the restructuring and
strengthening of African societies. In reverting to African social
function mechanisms African societies are rejecting not only
colonialism, but also the so-called superior and civilized identity
that colonialists brought to Africa.
CHAPTER 19
ALTERNATIVES TO IMPRISONMENT:
COMMUNITY SERVICE ORDERS IN
AFRICA
Chukwuma Ume
Many developing countries are finding it very difficult to
manage their prisons. Over populated penal institutions can
often only provide inadequate conditions to inmates, both
physically and psychologically. Prisoners have to be detained
for long periods on remand, and prisons are frequently unable
to carry out the task of training and rehabilitation, despite these
being stated as aims in the national statutory texts which govern
them. At the same time, rising crime rates, especially in large
conurbations, make these inadequacies all the more worrying.
Minor offenders are brought into close proximity with more
hardened criminals without there being any real possibility for
their rehabilitation into society and employment.
— Magistrate Odette Luce Bourvier,
Technical Adviser to the Senegalese Minister of Justice
INTRODUCTION
The observations above are apt to describe penal institutions
in most developing countries, Nigeria included. Indeed,
they categorically sum up the problems that have bedevilled
imprisonment and, by extension, entire criminal justice
administrations on the African continent, particularly in Nigeria.
To this end one may ask the following questions.
379
380 | Colonial Systems of Control
• Does the status quo offer justice and security to the
people?
• To what extent have the agents of the criminal justice
system, particularly of the prisons, been able to
administer justice and enhance social cohesion, as
expected of them statutorily?
To unravel these questions and many other salient ones, this
chapter presents a brief account of the prison service in Nigeria.
The concept and implementation of community service orders
are presented as a practical alternative to imprisonment. The
chapter also puts forward the rationale for the call for more viable
and functional alternatives to imprisonment (ATI). In addition,
the chapter draws on lessons from African countries where such
ATI measures have been implemented. The chapter ends with
suggestions for the criminal justice system in Nigeria.
Details of the prison service in Nigeria have been provided
in previous chapters (see also Agomoh, Adeyemi, and Ogbebor
2001; Ume and Saleh-Hanna 2005). Suffice it to say here that
the institution of imprisonment, like most public institutions
in Nigeria, is part of our colonial heritage, intended to pursue,
promote, and protect the then colonial interests. Thus, it was
not only punitive but also lacked any systematic and well-
developed programmes for rehabilitation and reintegration of
ex-prisoners into the larger society upon discharge. Remarkably,
though regrettably, this ugly trend had a spillover effect into
our "post"colonial era; hence, prison officers not amenable to
change are often described by prisoners as "colonial warders,"
associating their current behaviours with the colonial militarized
mentality in their dealings with prisoners.
Colonial warders are not an anomaly in Nigerian prison
institutions but a function of them. When colonialists imposed
their systems of justice upon Africa they recognized (minimally)
that colonial justice systems existed alongside "native" ones.
Upon so-called independence, policies were passed to "unify"
colonial and native justice systems. This unification included
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the increasing formalization and superiority of colonial justice
systems compared with African ones. In Nigeria this unification
was facilitated through the Gobir reports, which concluded that
there was a need to unify the various prison commands in Nigeria:
the "federal" and "native" authorities were unified on April 1,
1968. Subsequent reorganizations in the prison administration
led to the promulgation of Prison Decree No. 9 in 1972 (Agomoh,
Adeyemi, and Ogbebor 2001). The decree ordered, among other
things, the following cardinal functions of the prison service:
(1) to keep safe custody of persons legally interned;
(2) to identify the causes of their anti-social behaviour,
treat, and reform them to become law-abiding citizens
of a free society;
(3) to train them toward their rehabilitation on discharge;
and
(4) to generate revenue for the government through prison
farms and industries.
Achievement of these lofty ideals has been at all times poor and
questionable. This is the case in societies that have used prisons
for centuries, and it certainly is the case in African societies that




Imprisonment in Nigeria has become a haven for human rights
abuses, with countless custody deaths and acts that degrade
human dignity. With a prison population that has exceeded sixty-
five percent in awaiting-trial prisoners, conditions have reached
epic brutality. People who ordinarily would be productively
engaged in contributing to the functions and development of a
balanced and healthy society are languishing in prisons. These
ugly prison conditions are not solely attributable to the prison
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department, but are also the result of various agencies and
social institutions. Some of the problems of the prison service in
Nigeria, especially those of overcrowding, inadequate facilities,
and poor treatment of prisoners, suggest that the prison in
Nigeria occupies the back burner and is the dumping ground
for the larger problems with criminal justice administration in
the country. Unfortunately, too, efforts toward eradicating some
of these problems, or reducing the number of prisoners through
" special arrangements" such as legal aid and presidential or state
pardons, have made little or no impact.
Consequently the prison service lacks both deterrent and
reformative values. Yet, at a National Conference on Alternatives
to Imprisonment in Nigeria in 2000, it was asserted that the
government spends a lot of money on food, clothing, shelter,
and other needs of prisoners. It was stated that the government
spends as much as Nl,825,000,000 annually on feeding inmates.
This figure does not include the costs of medication, clothing,
and accommodation. This institution is not only unjust and
brutal in its treatment of prisoners, but also expensive. Although
this expense is immense in Nigeria, it does not come near
the expenses incurred with the administration of justice in
industrialized nations.
Julita Lemgruber (1998), the former director of prisons in Rio
de Janeiro, presented an argument along these lines. She noted
that industrialized nations "go on incarcerating many people who
commit petty crimes." To illustrate the problematic nature of such
practices, she pointed out that there were some "noteworthy"
cases illustrating recklessness in the administration of criminal
justice. These cases included a woman who served a sentence
of two and a half years for stealing two packages of disposable
diapers from a supermarket; a man who was sentenced to a
prison term of more than four years for stealing a fighting cock
(cock fights are illegal in Brazil); people who have served time
for stealing twelve heads of lettuce or five heads of cabbage or
twelve roof tiles; and so on. The items stolen do not justify, in
terms of danger to the public or financial loss to the community,
the use of imprisonment. Lemgruber explained that two packages
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of disposable diapers cost about US$ 14, while the woman who
served time for these thefts ended up costing the taxpayer US$
16,000. Many more thousands are spent to keep petty thieves
behind bars who could well be dealt with differently. In her
assessment of the financial restraints and conditions of penal
systems Lemgruber explained that countries such as Brazil or
other developing nations are not in a position where they can (or
should want to) afford the maintenance of large numbers of their
citizens in prisons.
This understanding is not arguable in the "developing"
world. It is an understood fact that the prison system is
financially unreasonable, ineffective, and problematically colo-
nial. In assessing the colonial structures of control that prisons
represent it has been observed that prisons are not community-
oriented. The penal system is self-contained and looks inward.
For instance, when people are put in prison they have left
their world behind. This impact of imprisonment works to
destabilize both the individual and the community, which has
been dichotomized by these institutions of control. Within the
institution overcrowding, lack of nutritional diets, boredom, and
the internal pains experienced with the loss of freedom are major
issues that destabilize the humanity of this form of social control.
From an African perspective the real pains of imprisonment
include separation from family and friends, the loss of jobs and
homes, the fear of being forgotten, and the anxiety in thinking
about whether one will fit into society upon eventual release.
Thus, imprisonment is recognized as a physiologically,
psychologically, and emotionally destructive institution; in
addition, it is socially damaging, culturally abhorrent, and
penologically disastrous. Buttressing this view, Adeyemi
(2000) stated that, in addition to the apparent inefficiency of
imprisonment as a deterrent and the increasing financial burden
it imposes on African countries, there is a growing resurgence
in the African region of its culturally aberrant and abhorrent
disposition. Hence the compelling need to look for viable
alternatives of social control.
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ALTERNATIVES TO IMPRISONMENT
Alternatives to imprisonment, as construed in this chapter,
are measures used in the administration of justice that are not
penal, alternatives to addressing conflict that do not criminalize
or ostracize individuals while working to build and strengthen,
not dichotomize and weaken, the community. Although
fledgling, these concepts are not alien to Africa; rather, they are
autochthonous. To underscore this assertion, Elias (1969) explains
that, "in the traditional African societies, imprisonment as a form
of punishment was almost unknown.... There [was] no room for
institutionalized forms of punishment such as imprisonment for
preventive detention.... Offenders were often left in the care of
their families or extended families once the appropriate penalty
had been imposed" (Adeyemi 2000). It therefore follows logically
and is safe to say that an African system of justice to a large extent
abhors imprisonment, and is not "criminal" but restorative and
transformative.
Upholding the argument, Adeyemi (2000) pointed out
that the use of imprisonment imprints on the ex-prisoner and
his family a social stigma; in addition, imprisonment closes
avenues for employment, rented accommodation, marriage,
and the establishment of a family, and it encompasses other
forms of social ostracism that are not coherent in Nigeria or
conducive to the development of our society. Quoting Meek's
"Law and Authority in a Nigerian Tribe" and Gunn's "Pagan
Peoples of the Central Area of Northern Nigeria," Adeyemi
illustrated his argument with examples from the Ibo and Kagoro
peoples, who never had any form of imprisonment prior to the
arrival of the British. According to Adeyemi, the disdain of the
Nigerian people was further epitomized by the attitude that
colonialists and Western legal scholars held toward what they
termed "native courts." This attitude is evident in the instruction
issued to Nigerians by Lord Lugard: when he discovered that
the natives continued to employ restitution for theft, instead
of imprisonment, he is recorded as having "instructed" native
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courts that restitution for stolen property or an abducted person
was not a sufficient penalty. According to Lugard, punishment
should always be added to restitution. Remarkably, the native
courts refused to comply with such instructions and resorted
to compensation, compensatory fines, and fines as appropriate
measures instead of imprisonment (Elias 1969).
This clear and emphatic rejection of imprisonment by the
native courts, even in the face of instructions from the governor
general of the Nigerian nation-state, indicates the odium toward
imprisonment in Nigerian society — it was understood then, and
on many levels is understood today, that the penal and criminal
systems of control are seemingly incompatible with Nigerian
traditional conceptions of justice.
Against this backdrop I now present an operational definition
of alternatives to imprisonment as they exist in the African context.
For the purpose of this chapter ATI measures to address conflicts
include suspended sentencing, probation, fines, and community
service. It is believed that an increase in the use of such sanctions
by the criminal justice system would lead to a decrease in the
use of imprisonment. While these measures continue to exist
within the penal context, and are not necessarily congruent with
all forms of community justice, it is advocated that an increase in
these types of sanctions would aid in primarily decongesting the
overcrowded prisons and restoring some semblance of balance to
the communities that continue to lose their citizens to prisons.
Community Service Orders
Community service orders are a cardinal alternative to
imprisonment. Recalling the Kampala Declaration of 1996, which
takes into account the limited effectiveness of imprisonment,
especially for those serving short sentences, and the cost of
imprisonment to the whole society; noting the growing interest
in measures that replace custodial sentences and recognizing
the promising developments across the globe in this regard;
appreciating the importance of the Kampala Declaration,
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which annexed a resolution on international cooperation for
the improvement of prison conditions in developing countries
(United Nations 1997); bearing in mind the United Nations
Standard Minimum Rules for Non-Custodial Measures (Tokyo
Rules 1990); considering that the level of overcrowding in any
prison is inhumane; recalling the African Charter on reaffirming
the dignity inherent in a human being, and the prohibition
of inhumane and degrading treatment; recognizing that a
" stronger/7 more bureaucratic, criminal justice system that
does not prioritize community-based measures only leads to a
growing prison population, as has been illustrated in the United
States, I lend credence to these resolutions and observed facts,
and accordingly state that there exists a strong platform on which
we are calling for the adoption and establishment of alternative
measures to imprisonment in all African countries.
In addition to the researched and policy-oriented support
for the increased use of community service orders in Africa,
the following are more administrative, justice-oriented, and
ideological reasons to support an increase in the use of community
service orders in all African nations.
• Our criminal justice system is comprised of agencies
that work without coordination: African societies are
not bureaucratically structured, and they should not
strive to be.
• The court machinery is overloaded with cases, slow,
and not readily accessible to all. Our options become to
strengthen the system or dispense with our reliance on
it.
• Prisoners are a low priority in Nigeria, as in many other
African countries. Where three-quarters of the prison
population is comprised of poor and powerless people,
prisons are seen as not being worth the time, energy, or
resources needed to improve them.
• Imprisonment is all too regularly used — even for minor
offences and as punishment for first-time offenders. It
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does not function in Africa or elsewhere as a means of
last resort.
• Penal institutions have been shown to be overpowering
in their dynamics within any society, and Africans need
to decentralize and restructure their systems of justice
before the penal system becomes as entrenched in our
society as it for Western, industrialized nations.
• " Development" for Africa is not working to build
societies and social structures that mirror colonial,
European, or Western societies. Development in Africa
is working to re-establish our own social structures. A
reliance on penal institutions as social control continues
to reinforce colonial social structures that have been
destructive and decivilizing.
Community Service Orders in Africa
Efforts toward the implementation of alternatives to imprisonment
in Nigeria, besides the statutory provision of fines and bail
options, are still at embryonic stages (Penal Reform International
2000). However, in some African countries, such as Zimbabwe
(despite much-touted human rights violations and political
instability), Kenya, Uganda, Malawi, Mali, Senegal, and Burkina
Faso, there are strong indications of the use of non-custodial
measures on functional and legitimate levels. These countries
have successfully established the use of community service
orders, which are beginning to consolidate the accruable gains
of less use of imprisonment as a means of administering justice.
Community service orders are being used only for those people
who have been sentenced to imprisonment. This regulation
prohibits community service orders from being employed as
an add-on to the criminal justice system and maintains them
as an alternative to imprisonment. These orders are used for
people who have been given short sentences and for first-time
offenders.
It is worth noting that this innovative approach has hinged
on two major areas: the first includes putting in place appropriate
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structures to implement these orders, while the second involves
comprehensive community involvement that builds on the
strength of societies and incorporates a holistic approach to the
administration of justice. Following I present case studies of two
countries—Zimbabwe and Kenya —that have employed and
benefit from an increased use of community service orders.
Zimbabwean Experience
Since 1993 Zimbabwean law has provided that offenders may
have options other than prison sentences: namely, community
service has been made applicable to all offences that carry a
maximum sentence of one year in prison.1 Community service
has come to be recognized as a system that ensures non-custodial
measures, and generates unpaid labour for community building
and empowerment projects —it has essentially become the
default measure for short-term imprisonment. Accordingly, if a
court must impose imprisonment, in any of the countries that
have implemented community service, the sentencing court
must state specific findings why imprisonment is justified. This
requirement has led to a high level of involvement of the members
of the judiciary, at both the local level and the national level, in a
discussion of both if and when imprisonment is necessary, and in
a continued understanding that alternatives to imprisonment are
legitimate, relevant, and necessary in African societies.
In assessing the contributions and accomplishments of the
community service programme in Zimbabwe I briefly list some
indicators of the benefits that it has presented as an ATI since its
inception in 1993.
• There is a high success rate: 120,000 offenders have
been sentenced to community service since its inception
(Stern 1999). A survey of 6,000 participants revealed that
ninety-four percent have completed their placements
successfully.
• There is a decline in recidivism: a survey of 6,000 offenders
who participated in the community service programme
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showed that only fifty percent had reoffended following
completion of their sentences.
• There has been a decreased prison population since
1993: the prison population has declined from 22,000 to
18,000, notwithstanding an increase in the crime rate.
• There is a reduction in cost: it costs approximately
US$ 120 per month to keep an individual in prison
in Zimbabwe compared with approximately US$ 20
per month for participation in the community service
programme.
• There is public approval/acceptance: being placed in
the community service programme permitted offenders
to keep their jobs and continue to support their families.
This along with other visible results has helped the
programme to gain public approval. Public support is
currently at such a level that requests from placement
agencies to participate in the community service
programme exceed the number of offenders sentenced
to community service.
Kenyan Experience
In Kenya lessons were learned from earlier efforts to introduce
alternative measures. Planning for the community service project
was elaborate and had a well-thought-through implementation
plan (Wahl et al. 2002). In December 1995, following a seminar
report on community service orders and the administration of
criminal justice in Kenya, an interim committee on the subject
was established. The committee looked at the existing penalty,
extramural penal employment (EMPE), and found a number
of problems that affected the performance of this programme.
These problems included lack of clear guidelines, inexperienced
staff, lack of information on offenders sentenced to EMPE, and
poor record-keeping and documentation (Stern 1999). Against
this backdrop the committee, under the auspices of the Ministry
of Justice, devised plans for implementing the recommendations
of the December 1995 seminar. This led to the drafting of a
community service order bill.
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Between August and September 1996 the committee visited
all the prisons in Kenya on a fact-finding mission. Also during
that period committee members made frequent television
appearances to publicize the state of conditions in the prisons
in Kenya. By the end of 1996 they had made study tours of other
jurisdictions, including South Africa, Swaziland, and Zimbabwe.
All of these efforts gave rise to the preparation of new legislation
hinged on the already functional Kenyan probation service.
The new bill envisages that the probation service will hold the
administrative responsibility for implementing community
service orders, while the judiciary will manage the programme.
In 1997 another international conference was convened to
discuss the report of the interim committee and a proposed draft
bill. In late 1997 the cabinet endorsed the bill, and it was passed
by parliament in December 1998. This development marked the
beginning of a renewed and much more purposeful alternative
to custodial measures within the justice system in Kenya. The
new programme encompasses establishing and implementing
treatment programmes, restorative justice, mediation and
reconciliation, probation, fines, parole, bail, and suspended
sentences. All these options are presented and encouraged in
opposition to a reliance on imprisonment in the administration
of justice in Kenya.
Implementation in Nigeria
Given the benefits of community service orders as an ATI in other
African countries, it remains imperative for Nigeria, along with
other African nations, to begin implementing these alternatives.
In doing so African nations are affording themselves the ability
to functionally and legitimately address the many interrelated
problems of the criminal justice system, particularly the prisons,
with their overcrowded cells, infectious diseases, malnourished
and traumatized inmates, and high death rates. Against this
backdrop the following comprise a possible panacea to the
current Nigerian justice system.
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There is the need to demonstrate enough political will to
implement non-custodial approaches to criminal justice.
Legislators need to have a clearer picture of the situation
on the ground to help them make laws to initiate and
back the implementation of ATIs. This could well be
the way out for Nigeria's crisis in penal justice. As all
previous efforts and campaigns toward implementation
of ATIs have yet to receive legislative attention, the
starting point is political support for such measures.
The judiciary in Nigeria has to be in the vanguard of
the implementation stage. In trying to implement
alternatives to imprisonment those who imprison people
in Nigeria need to be involved. Magistrates and judges
need to be trained specifically in this regard. There is
a need for basic guidelines to ensure a standard upon
which magistrates and judges can rely to identify and
treat cases that are apt for non-custodial measures.
The involvement of the judiciary is equally vital for the
social impact of the scheme. Members of the judiciary
need to be involved, not only in sentencing, but also
in appreciating the negative consequences that flow
from imprisonment. By including the judiciary in the
educational elements and philosophies of ATIs we
ensure their commitment to making these programmes
successful.
Wherever possible, and for offences meticulously
specified, community service orders can be built into
Nigerian sentencing options. To assist in this process
the dynamics of successful alternative measures in
other countries should be studied, copied, improved
upon, and applied in Nigeria to suit our socioeconomic,
political, and cultural imperatives.
A national monitoring committee needs to be set up to
fully implement these recommendations. The committee
should include members from the Ministry of Justice,
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the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the police force, prisons,
the Bar Association, the Law Reform Commission, and
relevant non-governmental organizations, as well as
academics/ researchers.
CONCLUSION
The problems of imprisonment and the need to find alternative
forms of social control in Nigeria have been highlighted in
this chapter. Accordingly, a significant reduction in the use of
imprisonment in dispensing justice has been adduced. It is hoped
that the judiciary and other identified stakeholders will commence
a much more purposeful and diligent effort in the administration
of justice, without recourse to the use of imprisonment as the
first port of call. A quick reference could be made to other
African countries where such ATI mechanisms are being used.
Consequently this would lead to the use of other means of justice
that can begin to rely on restitution, compensation, bail, fines,
and innovative community service orders. These alternatives
provide an opportunity both for offenders to take responsibility
for the harms they have caused and for empowerment rather
than dichotomization of the community.
To get to the point of having community service orders in
Nigeria political and non-governmental support is needed in
expediting actions aimed at passing a bill that will in turn enable
implementation of ATIs in Nigeria. While various models of
justice may continue to receive immediate attention and review
to strengthen their existence in African societies, Nigeria needs to
begin seriously considering the benefits of such measures while
working toward the viable and legitimate implementation of
these options. This way we can take a step in the right direction,
recognizing healing for offenders, victims, and the community
at large, and employ mechanisms of social control that are not
alien to Nigeria. The African society we strive to achieve will
give everyone the opportunity for self-development.
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NOTES
1 Implementation of community service orders as an alternative to
imprisonment in Nigeria has not received any legislative motion,
and no bill has been passed for their eventual takeoff.
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This chapter examines the indigenous justice system of the
Igbo of southeast Nigeria from restorative, transformative,
and communitarian principles. The Igbo, like other societies in
Africa/had a well-developed, efficient, and effective mechanism
for maintaining law and order prior to colonialism. These social
control practices and processes were rooted in the traditions,
cultures, and customs of Igbo people. However, the Igbo
system was relegated to the background by the British colonial
authorities, who installed their own versions of "justice": the
common, civil, and criminal legal institutions. The Nigerian
postcolonial government has inherited this practice from the
colonial era and continues to undermine the Igbo indigenous
justice system.
Despite colonial and postcolonial state subjugation, the
Igbo indigenous justice system holds sway, especially in rural
areas, where the majority of the people reside. In line with Igbo
egalitarian worldviews, crime is viewed as a conflict between
community members. As primary stakeholders in the conflict,
victims, offenders, and the community are actively involved in
the definition of harm and the crafting of solutions acceptable
to all stakeholders. The quality and effectiveness of justice are
measured through the well-being of victims and the community.
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Conflict creates opportunities for the education, socialization,
and resocialization of offenders, victims, and all community
members. Conflict also creates an opportunity for the re-
evaluation of community values and socioeconomic conditions.
IGBO PEOPLE AND IGBO SOCIETIES
The Igbo occupy the southeastern part of Nigeria and constitute
one of the three dominant ethnic groups in Nigeria, with a
population of about twenty-three million. The Igbo fall into two
main groups: Riverine and Heartland Igbos. There are more than
thirty dialects of the Igbo language, and there is great variance in
their mutual intelligibility. However, to enhance communication
a central Igbo language has been developed from the various
dialects. This is the language taught in schools and used in
commerce. Like many other Africans, the Igbo are a deeply
spiritual people who believe in "one God, in lesser deities, spirits
and in ancestors who are regarded as lesser deities and may be
worshipped as such. This traditional religion is non-aggressive
or evangelical but involves the use of propitiatory rites designed
to appease the deities or to request their aid in times of need and
crisis" (Awal985,31).
Most Igbo societies are described as acephalous, in that they
operate through a decentralized government. In this political and
administrative arrangement authority is exercised through age
grades, lineage heads, and pressure groups. There are also a few
Igbo kingdoms, namely the Onitsha, Agbaja, Arochukwu, and
Aboh. Despite the hierarchical social and political arrangement
in Igbo societies that incorporate a constitutional monarchy,
villages in these societies remain autonomous, and leadership
is exercised through the Council of Elders. Furthermore,
participatory democracy and the egalitarian outlook of the
people are not affected. Awa (1985, 38) explains that
the typical Igbo governmental system consists of: (1) the Chief
and council of elders at the centre, (2) lineage groups, age
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grades, secret societies, priestly groups, etc., who exercise a
considerable amount of influence over the decision processes
of the community, and (3) the town/village forum. From
the well-known processes by which these institutions take
decisions and exercise power, we know that Igbo people value
participatory and consensus politics, along with checks and
balances. We must note in particular that in consensus politics,
the individual is entitled to express dissent on any issues
that crop up in discussions and the leaders of the institution
concerned must somehow explain away the problem raised so
that all can go along together.
This political arrangement and process are not peculiar to the
Igbo. According to Ayittey (1999,86), in "virtually all the African
tribes, political organization of both types began at the village
level. The village was made up of various extended families or
lineages. Each has its head [the patriarch], chosen according to
its own rules/7
It is important to note that, "at certain levels of political
discourse, women and children were not allowed full
participation" (Elechi (2004, 165). However, women have
access to constitutionally enshrined sanctionary powers that
can be brought into play to offset the dominance of men. In
addition, women have analogous institutions where they
adjudicate on conflicts among themselves. Furthermore, women
are encouraged to bring their marital problems to the village
courts for adjudication. It is also important to note that women
do dominate the informal realms of social control (which in a
communitarian model of justice hold more weight than the
Western professionalized forms of justice), and are gaining more
formal authority and rank in Igbo societies.
From the foregoing, I reiterate that the Igbo, like other
societies in Africa, had a well-developed, efficient, and effective
mechanism for maintaining law and order prior to colonialism.
These social control practices and processes were rooted in the
traditions, cultures, and customs of Igbo people. Deviance or
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conflict is a characteristic of any social group, and the method or
instrument employed to realign recalcitrant individuals speaks
volumes about the civilization of that society. The Igbo indigenous
justice system is in the main restorative, transformative, and
communitarian: strenuous efforts are made to restore social safety
without resorting to punishment. This is because punishment is
believed to undermine the goal of justice, which is primarily the
restoration of social equilibrium. When punishment is employed
in the maintenance of social safety it is as a last resort, used only
after all other efforts have failed to achieve conformity, order,
and community safety.
PRINCIPLES OF THE IGBO INDIGENOUS JUSTICE
SYSTEM
The Igbo indigenous justice system is process-oriented, victim-
centred, and humane, and it applies persuasive and reintegrative
principles in adjudicating justice. A major component of the Igbo
indigenous justice system is that it is participatory, and decisions
are reached through consensus. Everybody has equal access to
and participation in the justice system; furthermore, no one can
arrogate to himself or herself the role of "professional" or "expert,"
thereby subjugating the voices of ordinary community members.
Again, the goal of justice is the restoration of relationships and
social harmony disrupted by the conflict. It is understood in Igbo
justice models that all members of society are experts on their
shared social realities and are thus qualified to participate in the
quest for justice.
My own ethnographic research shows that the indigenous
justice system is better and more effective in addressing issues of
crime and justice in Nigeria. One reason the indigenous justice
system is more effective is because it recognizes that crime is a
violation of people and relationships, not just a violation of "law."
From this perspective accountability should be to the victims
and the community, not to an external system of legal codes
and bureaucratic procedures. As a balanced justice system Igbo
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indigenous justice works to empower, not criminalize, victims,
offenders, and the affected community. The focus of this system
is to actively and meaningfully participate in the identification
and definition of harm, and to have direct involvement in the
search for restoration, healing, responsibility, and prevention. As
a restorative justice system it emphasizes a move away from the
law-and-order model of criminal justice, and encourages steps
toward implementing a human rights model of social justice.
This system of justice has illustrated, first, that social sanctions,
even when devoid of punishment, are sufficient to bring people to
order, and to resolve conflicts and maintain social safety; second,
that justice-making is more viable and effective when enmeshed
in the daily life of local communities, as opposed to centralized
and depersonalized institutions of criminal justice; third, that
democracy is, after all, about the decentralization of power in
governance and the involvement of all segments of society in
decision-making. Thus, the principles and practices of the Igbo
indigenous justice system further support the notion that crime
is a local event, and that a centralized policy of governance is
insufficient in bringing "justice" to the "crime" problem. These
illustrations reinforce democratic principles of governance,
emphasizing and practising within this very important principle
that government, having obtained its mandate to rule from the
people, should also be accountable to the people. As a democratic
system of justice the Igbo indigenous justice system emphasizes
the involvement and empowerment of the people in social
control.
Law-M aking in Igboland
The Igbo indigenous justice system views legal violations
primarily as victimizations of an individual or groups of
individuals, and secondarily as victimizations of the community
and its social order. This approach is vastly different from that of
the Western criminal legal system, which places the state as the
primary victim and officially records the state as the only victim
of crime in court cases. While victims of crime are treated as
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" witnesses'7 (at the most) in Western criminal justice systems, the
Igbo social justice system views victims of crime as participants
in the quest for justice, empowering them to be part of the process
of justice and restoration, as opposed to categorizing them as
bystanders, silent observers, or witnesses open for interrogation
in the "justice" process.
The Igbo also distinguish between crime and tort. These
concepts are therefore used here to describe such phenomena
as they are conventionally understood. I disagree with Western
criminological literature arguing that use of the terms "crime/7
"torts,77 and "laws" to describe such practices in precolonial
Africa is inappropriate. Maine (1969) and Diamond (1973),
pioneer Western researchers of the living habits and social
customs of precolonial peoples in Asia and Africa, argue that
the customary practices of Asians and Africans are erroneously
described as indigenous "laws." The evidence often presented to
support this line of thinking is that precolonial African societies
lacked centralized governments essential to the formulation and
enforcement of laws. The assumption here is that governmental
structures that mirror those used in the West can enact and
enforce laws.
The inability to understand diverse structures of governance
led many Western researchers to erroneously conclude that
societies not structured in a hierarchical and centralized Western
manner were "less civilized," and thus settled conflicts through
violence and blood feuds. They further assumed that, since there
was no recognizable central authority, there was no authority at
all, concluding that victims of crime took matters into their own
hands, and that chaos, not civility, structured and guided non-
Western societies.
Available records suggest that the contrary was the case.
The very principles of Igbo justice models recognize the
interrelationships between the victim, the offender, and the
community, and thus cannot constitute a society that alienates
its victims and does not participate with them in the quest for
justice. In my view Western conclusions on precolonial African
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laws highlight the divergence between restorative and retributive
justice systems. Whereas retributive systems of justice rely on
centralized forms of social control and law-making, restorative
systems of justice do not. Most African justice systems incorporate
restorative and transformative systems of justice, and thus were
not recognized by the Western scholars who were not versed in
these frameworks. This lack of recognition led to the assumption
that there was a lack of justice.
African societies had agencies, groups, and individuals with
authority to make, apply, and enforce laws. Laws served the same
purpose in Africa as in other societies, which Gluckman (cited in
Aubert 1969,163) notes is the " regulation of established and the
creation of new relationships, the protection and maintenance
of certain norms of behavior, the readjustment of disturbed
social relationships, and punishing of offenders against certain
rules/' Eze (cited in Motala 1989, 379) further points out that
"in most traditional African societies the law existed outside
the framework of a state in the modern sense. Obedience to
the law was maintained through custom and religion as well
as established patterns of sanction. These pre-colonial African
societies had a high level of organization in which political,
economic, and social control was maintained/7
Laws and regulations guiding behaviours and interpersonal
relationships, and the procedures for seeking grievances, are
defined by the appropriate authorities in Igboland. Actions that
are prohibited are clearly defined and stated, and the procedures
for enacting and enforcing laws are unambiguously stated by
the institutions of society charged with such responsibilities.
As Ayittey (1999, 91) rightly points out, the African "village
meeting under a big tree" and the European "parliament" were
simply different forms of the same institution of democracy.
What Africans had was participatory democracy; Europeans
introduced parliamentary democracy. A unique characteristic of
Africa's indigenous system of government was that it was open
and inclusive. No one was locked out of the decision-making
process. One did not have to belong to one political party or
402 | Colonial Systems of Control
family to participate in the process; even foreigners were allowed
to participate.
Most Igbo societies are egalitarian, with decentralized
political authority. The power and authority to make and enforce
laws are vested in the Council of Elders. A few Igbo societies
had a hierarchical political arrangement with the power to
make and enforce laws located in the office of the constitutional
monarchy and the elders' council. Laws are distinguishable
by the types and seriousness of the acts they seek to regulate,
such as serious crimes, social obligations, and duties imposed
by custom. As Obi (1963, 27), as cited in Okereafoezeke (2001,
22), rightly observes, the Igbo, like other African societies, are
able to distinguish among " purely social obligations (such as the
duty to honor invitations), duties imposed by custom only (for
example, a father's duty to provide his male children with their
first wives in order of seniority), and legal duties which can be
enforced against the will of the party on whom such a duty
lies." Okereafoezeke further notes that a distinction can be made
between crimes against public security, such as theft, assault,
battery, public nuisance, and violation of rules and regulations
governing masquerade displays. Others include crimes against
public morality, such as incest, adultery, and the murder of a
kinsman, and the defilement of sacred institutions, such as a
shrine. Prior to colonialism and the advent of popular education,
as Okereafoezeke observes (24), the laws and procedures for law
creation and enforcement were mostly unwritten, so "the natives
relied on their individual and collective memories to ascertain
the controlling legal authority on an issue. Because of the high
integrity and honesty among community members, the absence
of written documents as objective statements of the laws was not
a major handicap to ascertaining and applying laws."
The Igbo indigenous justice system respects and promotes
the rights of litigants. This is because respect for and promotion
of human rights are values deeply rooted in African cultural
values. As Gyekye (1996) rightly observes, the African believes
in the sanctity of human life and human dignity, which is an
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expression of the natural and moral rights of the individual.
However, the individual's rights must be appreciated within
a communal context, as Elechi (1999) notes. This is because the
community's rights or interests override those of the individual.
That the community right is supreme does not mean that
the rights of individuals are in jeopardy or compromised as a
result. The individual versus the community rights paradox is
eloquently described by Achebe (2000, 14): "In the worldview
of the Igbo the individual is unique; the town is unique. How
do they bring the competing claims of these two into some kind
of resolution? Their answer is a popular assembly that is small
enough for everybody who wishes to be present to do so and
to 'speak his own mouth/ as they like to phrase it." The African
humane and communitarian values make the welfare of one the
concern of all. The African humanitarian and communitarian
values make it difficult to subjugate anyone or deny his or her
rights. Ifemesia (1978), as cited in Iro (1985, 4), describes Igbo
societies as communitarian and humane. According to Ifemesia,
humane living conditions encompass a "way of life emphatically
centered upon human interests and values, a mode of living
evidently characterized by empathy, and by consideration and
compassion for human beings.... Igbo humanness is deeply
ingrained in the traditional belief that the human being is
supreme in the creation, is the greatest asset one can possess, is
the noblest cause one can live and die for."
The Victim in the Igbo Indigenous Justice System
The victim is central to the Igbo indigenous justice system. Victims
take the lead in bringing offenders to justice, unless the crime
victimized the entire community. Victims may be assisted by
family members and others in the search for justice. Victims are
empowered by being accorded a voice and a role in the judicial
process. The justice system seeks to vindicate the victim, and
protect his or her rights and interests. The restoration of victims
is achieved through their empowerment and by addressing their
needs. Opportunities are provided to victims to tell relevant others
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how the actions of the offenders affected them. This all occurs in
a secure and respectful setting. Victims are further reassured of
protection against further victimization. This approach leads to
validation of the victims' hurts and losses. Furthermore, victims
feel validated when afforded the opportunity to share their
concerns with empathetic listeners. Victims are encouraged to
openly vent their anger and frustration. Respectful and secure
settings do not have to be emotionally sterile and controlled, as is
assumed in Wesetern court settings. In the Igbo process of justice
victim care is a priority because of strong social solidarity and
the prevailing spirit of good neighbourliness in the society in
which these justice models are implemented.
The Offender in the Igbo Indigenous Justice System
Offenders are actively involved in the definition of harm and
the search for resolution to the problem. Ample opportunities
are provided to offenders to feel the impacts of their actions on
the victim and the community. They are also persuaded to be
accountable to the victim and the community for their actions.
Offenders are made to appreciate the fact that their actions
harm more than the individual victims, for they also harm the
community. Offenders are made to realize that they are also
harmed by their own actions. Igbo societies view themselves as
collectives responsible for the well-being of all members of the
community. This responsibility includes offenders who have
contributed to the destabilization of the community through
the imposition of harm. Offenders are held accountable for their
actions and are persuaded to pay compensation to the victims.
This approach is different from that of Western criminal justice
processes, in which offenders pay compensation for their crimes
to the state by serving time in prison or by paying fines.
In Igbo justice processes holding offenders accountable is not
tantamount to punishing them. The goal of justice is to restore,
as much as possible, victims to the positions they were in before
victimization occurred. Compensation to the victim, according
to Nsereko (1992), goes beyond restitution. It also represents a
The Igbo Indigenous Justice System | 405
form of apology and atonement by the offender to the victim
and the community. Restitution to the victim is integral to the
settlement of the disputes because of the understanding in the
community that a victim whose needs are not addressed is a
potential offender.
An offender's accountability includes restoring the victim
to the position he or she was in prior to the offence, limited of
course to the extent to which money or property can solve the
problem. Offenders are further made to show remorse for their
actions through apology and atonement to the victim and the
community. The Igbo people believe that no offence is so serious
that it cannot be atoned for with a commensurate sacrifice and
reparation. It is generally believed in Igboland that human
beings are inherently good, but may be driven to violate societal
norms by evil forces or circumstances beyond their control.
Conflict resolution therefore becomes an opportunity for the
education, socialization, and resocialization of offenders, victims,
and other community members. Conflict resolution becomes an
opportunity to probe the underlying socioeconomic causes of the
individual offender's actions.
Family members of offenders are held accountable for the
actions of one of their own. They are either chastised or made to
appreciate where they failed as parents or family members. In
this inclusion of family also lies the distribution of responsibility
necessary in properly addressing harm in a manner that will
avoid future harms. The incident could not have occurred in an
isolated context (because society is communitarian), and thus the
solution cannot be found in isolation of responsibility. Where the
offender is unable to pay restitution to the victim the family is
held responsible. It is important to note that, in a system of justice
that does not rely on revenge and harmful punishment to deal
with conflict, the dispersion of responsibility is not problematic,
as it is in a system of justice that chooses to hurt and violate those
who have offended.
In holding the offender and his or her family responsible
for the offender's actions strenuous effort is made not to sever
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the connection between the offender, the family, and other
community members. The prevailing culture is such that the
actions of the offender can be condemned while a message of
love and respect is extended to the offender. The basis for this
thinking is the belief in the community that justice-making is an
opportunity to promote repair, reconciliation, and reassurance.
The mainstay of the people's economy is agriculture.
Agrarian economy is labour-intensive, and as such no body is
expendable. All efforts are made to reintegrate offenders into
the community to remain productive members. Furthermore,
violations indicate a failure of responsibility by the offender on
the one hand and the community on the other. The reasoning is
that it takes a village to raise a child. Community members also
acknowledge and accept their responsibility for failing in raising
a responsible and productive citizen. Justice-making therefore
becomes an opportunity for the re-evaluation of community
values, culture, and political, social, and economic conditions.
Justice and fairness are enhanced as decision-makers become
conscious of their own vulnerability, as they could be at the
receiving end of justice in the future.
The Community in the Igbo Indigenous Justice System
The Igbo indigenous justice system recognizes the community
as also affected by criminal behaviour. Since crime is a local
event, and an intraethnic and intraclass affair, community peace
and harmony are undermined when there is conflict between
community members. Crime creates fear in the community. It can
lead to isolation and distrust, which further weaken community
bonds. The community response is therefore critical to bringing
about desired restoration and reconciliation, failing which will
further polarize the community. Due to these understandings
the community is actively involved in the definition of harm
and the search for a resolution acceptable to all stakeholders.
The community's goal in intervening in a conflict is to reform
the offender and reintegrate him or her into the community.
There is an implicitly recognized need to restore order, stability,
reassurance, and faith in the community.
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As previously stated, the Igbo indigenous justice system
can differentiate between individual victimization and offences
where the entire community comes to be or feel victimized. When
the matter is strictly between two people or groups of people the
community becomes actively involved by assisting the litigants
to find a quick resolution to their conflict. The understanding
is that if the conflict is not quickly resolved it may escalate,
and undermine societal order, peace, and harmony. If it is a
matter where the entire community is a victim, the offender is
prosecuted at the community's tribunal. In the following sections
I review how the Igbo and other Africans handle cases of murder
and theft to appreciate the principles and practices of the Igbo
indigenous justice system.
Responding to Law Violations in Igboland
All behaviours that violate the society's laws and regulations
attract one form of sanction or another. In the Western legal context
sanctions are primarily structured to impose harm upon the
offender, based mainly on the assumptions that people inherently
want to harm others and thus that the law functions to deter such
animalistic tendencies. In the Igbo model of justice sanctions are
primarily a method through which harm can be addressed within
the understanding that all people are inherently good, but at times
make mistakes, lose control, or slip up. While not all sanctions
in Igbo justice processes avoid harming an offender, harm (such
as execution) is only imposed if the community, the victim, and
the offender's family all agree that it is necessary. From within
this context (and implicit difference in approach to humanity)
the institutions of Igbo society charged with enforcing laws see
it as their obligation to respond appropriately to behaviours that
violate the norms of society. Failing to do that would be an open
invitation to chaos in the community. As Dike (1986,17) rightly
observes, " control of the activities of individuals and groups
within Igbo societies is therefore of paramount importance at
all times, hence the existence of a multiplicity of institutions
and organizations for enforcing compliance with Igbo societal
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norms. Such institutions include the masquerade societies, age
grades as well as the assemblies of lineage elders who hold the
Ofo [the symbol of legitimate authority and justice] and perform
important political roles."
Murder
Murder is a very serious crime in Igboland. Igbos distinguish
between murder and manslaughter. Within these distinctions
the nature of the crime determines the community's response.
Murder is generally viewed as a crime against the victim and the
victim's family, and thus murder cases are mediated between the
victim's family and the offender's family within the normative
framework of the community. An agreement can be reached
whereby the offender's family is made to pay compensation to
the victim's family. This payment is decided upon according
to the contributions that the murdered victim made to the
survival of his or her family. The cost of burying the victim is
also the responsibility of the offender. These compensations are
meant to address the logistical losses incurred by the murder.
In addressing such losses Igbo justice is not undermining the
emotional elements of harm involved with the violent taking
of life, but working to address the situation in a manner that
brings about the least suffering possible for surviving family
members—by addressing immediate financial struggles that
the murder has imposed, the surviving family members are
better equipped to face other burdens (emotional, psychological,
traumatic) imposed on them. In addition to restitution, murder
evokes a diverse array of sanctions in Igbo justice models.
In Afikpo (Igbo) society, according to Elechi (1999), if the
murder occurs in the course of a robbery, it is viewed as a crime
against the Afikpo community as a whole. The circumstances of
the act will determine the community's response. If the offender
is a repeat offender and/or perceived as dangerous, and a major
threat to life and property in the community, he or she could
attract the community's harshest response. A conviction will
result in capital punishment in which the offender is buried alive,
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with an iroko tree planted to mark the grave to act as a general
deterrent to others. Before such sentences can be carried out the
matrilineal relatives of the offender have to sanction it. In some
cases murderers are expelled from the community.
The killing of a kinsman is viewed more seriously. It is an
abomination, for which the remedy is cleansing and expiation
rather than punishment. As Amadi (1982,58) observes, "in many
tribes the killing of a kinsman, the antithesis of caring for him,
was not only a crime but also an abomination. After the murderer
had been executed his family would perform sacrifices and rites
to remove the stain of evil and ward off the anger of the gods."
Amadi further notes that the murder victim's family and the
murderer's family met to negotiate appropriate compensation.
Reparation negotiations were always under the watchful eyes of
the entire community. The bargaining was always supervised by
the elders of the community to ensure that retribution was not
excessive.
In some African societies the murderer was forced to commit
suicide. In some cases the murderer's son, wife/husband,
or other relation was executed in his or her place if he or she
escaped the long arm of the law. Some African communities force
the murderer to die the same way the victim died. In still others
the murderer is persuaded to compensate the victim's family by
providing a close relation as a replacement for the victim. Amadi
(1982,15-16) notes that
The Kwale (Igbo) required a girl as replacement and twenty
bags of cowries as compensation. The Kakkakari tribe required
the murderer to substitute either two girls or a girl and a boy.
The Gamawa required fourteen slaves as recompense. In
some tribes, like the Gade, the Arago, the Burra and Ikwerre,
bargaining was possible, and the death penalty could be
commuted to a heavy fine, usually involving replacement by
a slave or free-born. In tribes like the Ikwo (Igbo) the murderer
was simply handed over to the family of the deceased, which
was free to do whatever it liked with him.
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As can be seen from the foregoing, the punishment for
murder varied from one African community to another, from one
era to the next. Even among the Igbo community responses for
murder varied greatly from one town to the other. For example,
the Orlu (Igbo) used execution by hanging if the murderer
was apprehended immediately after the crime was committed.
However, if the murderer was able to escape justice and stay
away for three years, he or she could return to the community
as a free person. Yet other societies, such as the Kadara, " treated
murderers fairly lightly. They isolated them for a month or so,
and that was the end of the affair" (Amadi 1982,16).
The community's response to murder also varies depending
on whether the offender and the victim are from the same place. In
societies where bargaining between the victim's family and that
of the offender is the norm the outcome might be different when
the murderer is a stranger. In such a case the stranger will likely
be killed or taken into slavery unless the victim's community
and the murderer's community have some bilateral arrangement
or understanding on how such cases can be handled. However,
should the unknown murderer escape arrest, the communities of
the offender and the victim can enter into arbitration, whereby
compensation to the victim's family will be sufficient.
Sorcery and Magic
Most cases of murder in Africa originate from sorcery, magic,
and witchcraft. It is not always easy to distinguish among
them, notes Parrinder (1973,113), as cited in Elechi (1999, 275),
because in Africa it is difficult to distinguish between "material
and spiritual.... Hence the distinction of magic and medicine is
difficult to make, and the two words can both be used, provided
that their wide connotation is borne in mind." Magic can have
medicinal value and can be used for fortification purposes. It can
also be used to both protect and harm people. Thus, crimes of
sorcery, murder, incest, and bestiality are viewed very seriously
in many African societies.
One explanation is that Africans are highly religious and
blame every misfortune on either the gods or an enemy (Elechi
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1999). Africans blame accidents, sudden deaths, delayed
pregnancies, and prolonged labour or illness on the work of
witches. Witches and wizards are thought to have supernatural
powers, and can wreak havoc at will. Amadi (1982, 22) explains
why witches are feared in Africa:
Witches were believed to have the power of metamorphosis;
that is, it was thought that they could change at will into non-
human creatures like bats, leopards, mosquitoes, crocodiles.
While in these guises, they could harm their neighbors. One
method of killing that was widely attributed to witches was
vampirism or blood-sucking. At night, using their mysterious
powers, they were said to pass through closed doors to get to
their sleeping victims, whose blood they drank. The victims
became progressively weaker and might eventually die unless
the aid of an experienced medicine man was sought. Sometimes
witches left marks on the bodies of their victims.
The crime of sorcery is understood to be perpetuated through
supernatural powers, and as such it is difficult to prove. This
accounts for why it is not easy to convict anybody accused of
sorcery, and for the resort to oath-taking as a way of establishing
guilt or innocence. The punishment for sorcery is also left in the
hands of the gods to avenge. In Afikpo, for example, according
to Elechi (1999), the community will order someone suspected
of sorcery to swear to an oath. But this is the case where the
victim is still alive. Where the victim is dead the alleged offender
is tried by ordeal, where he or she is persuaded to drink some
of the water used to wash the corpse of the victim. The belief
is that, if the accused is guilty, he or she will die within a year
after drinking this water. If the alleged sorcerer survives after
drinking the water, then he or she is presumed innocent. After
the oath-taking is administered the case is washed off the hands
of those mediating and is placed in the hands of the gods. The
understanding is that the gods will vindicate the innocent and
punish the guilty by killing them.
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Theft
Theft is a very serious offence, and attracts the community's
harshest punishment of fines and ridicule in Afikpo, according
to Elechi (1999). Theft leaves a lasting stigma on the offender
and his or her family. The victim of theft is not awarded any
compensation beyond what he or she lost. This practice is not
peculiar to Afikpo. According to Amadi (1982,16), "for the people
of Alanso, Okposi, Afikpo and parts of Owerri it was enough
for a thief to return the stolen goods/' It is important to point
out, however, that it is not every act of acquiring someone else's
possessions without the owner's consent that constitutes theft.
Food and other commodities taken for sustenance are acceptable,
provided the person taking them does not intend to sell them.
Describing other Nigerian ethnic groups with similar behavioural
ethics, Amadi states that "among the Nupe stealing food was not
punishable if the offender consumed what he stole on the spot.
The Jawara tribe pardoned an offender if he pleaded hunger as
a reason for stealing. In Ikwerre and parts of Igbo it was quite
normal for one person to take a few nuts from another's bunch
of palm fruits heaped by the wayside. The quantity of nuts taken
was not expected to exceed what could normally be consumed
by an individual or, in the case of a woman, what was needed to
yield enough oil for a pot of soup" (16).
Elechi (1999) and Amadi (1982) observe that the punishment
for theft varied greatly from one African community to another.
The penalty for theft in Igara, for example, entailed the offender
paying restitution to the victim at double the value of the goods
stolen. In Jawara the penalty for theft was five times the worth
of the original commodity stolen. In Oratta it was sufficient for
the thief to return the stolen goods to the owner, but the thief
was also made to pay a fine to the community and to endure
public disgrace. The public spectacle included forcing the thief
to climb a palm tree where all members of the community could
see him or her. The Ohaffia and Ibibio people painted the thief's
face black and paraded him or her through the community. The
thief was sometimes forced to dance to a song sung by children
and women of the village.
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For some communities the punishment meted out to a
thief depended on where the theft took place. The Aro (Igbo)
would execute an offender who stole in the market instead of
imposing the customary penalty of a fine. One explanation of this
discrepancy is that the market holds great value for the Aros, for
whom trading is the most common vocation. In the same vein,
people who stole yams at the farms and barns in Afikpo had one
of their hands cut off. The mainstay of the Afikpo economy is
agriculture, and the yam is the staple food of the people. Some
repeat offenders who were considered a threat to life and property
were sold as slaves. Amadi (1982, 17) states that "the people of
Arago, Bassa, Awka, Ndoki, Western Ijaw, Ibibio, Igbira, to name
but a few, routinely sold off thieves into slavery/'
Secret Societies in Igboland
Not every dispute or violation of the norms and laws is amenable
to easy resolution. Complex cases are referred to secret societies,
which are believed to have supernatural powers, and so are able
to tell who is telling the truth and who is lying. When a secret
society is invoked it is believed that every litigant or witness will
tell the truth, as failure to do so before the masquerade can attract
the punishment of death. Umozurike (1981, 12), describing the
secret society of the Aro, notes that "the ekpe hardly fails when it
is invoked to intervene in a dispute. Its fairness is usually assured
because of its mystical powers to inflict evil on lying witnesses
as well as on corrupt judges/' In this context spirituality ensures
truth in African societies. This is similar to the use of the Bible to
swear on in court for witnesses who take the stand. While some
of the rituals of African societies and justice models may seem
unusual to Western observers, it is important to recognize that all
societies have rituals and processes in which members of those
societies participate.
In Afikpo the Okumkpo, a masquerade organized through the
men's secret society, is a major agent of social control. While its
role may be entertainment, the goal is really to address disputes
or cases of a complicated and delicate nature. These are cases
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that are not amenable to regular court processes, yet they need
to be addressed in the interests of village peace and harmony.
Cases that the masquerade dramatizes include murder in which
the accused may have sworn to the oath and survived, yet public
opinion is strong that he or she is guilty of the offence, but was
able to escape death through either manipulating the system or
possessing other charms (spiritual powers) that counteract the
power of the oath. Other cases that the masquerades address
include the abuse of power by elders in their administrative and
judicial functions. The masquerade performance is a trial in the
court of public opinion within a humorous setting. The acts and
songs are loaded with moral rectitude. They also play the role
of investigating cases, and their evidence cannot be challenged.
Because the masquerade performers wear masks they enjoy
certain immunity from prosecution in whatever they say or do
during the masquerade.
CONCLUSION
This chapter reviewed the Igbo indigenous justice system from
restorative, transformative, and communitarian principles. In
line with Igbo worldviews, crime is viewed as a conflict between
community members. As primary stakeholders in the conflict,
victims, offenders, and the community are actively involved in
the definition of harm, and the crafting of solutions acceptable
to all stakeholders. The quality and effectiveness of justice are
measured through the well-being of victims and the community.
Conflict creates opportunities for the education, socialization,
and resocialization of victims, offenders, and all community
members. Conflict is also an opportunity for the re-evaluation
of community values and socioeconomic conditions. The Igbo
indigenous justice system is process-oriented, victim-centred, and
humane, and it applies persuasive and reintegrative principles in
adjudicating most cases brought to justice processes. The overall
goal of justice is restoration, not only of the victim, but also of the
community.
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CHAPTER 21
PENAL ABOLITIONIST THEORIES AND
IDEOLOGIES
Viviane Saleh-Hanna
PENAL ABOLITIONISM: A RADICAL CRIMINOLOGY
Penal abolitionist academic discourse emerges through the
critical criminological academic context, with subparadigmatic
affiliations to radical criminology. The emergence of radical
criminology occurred when critical criminology could no longer
fully satisfy all the theories that emerged as critical of the social
order. Radical criminology builds upon critical criminological
attempts to question mainstream criminological discourse. While
critical criminologists work to expose the oppressive status quo
that mainstream (mainly classical and positivist) criminology
scientifically works to maintain, radical criminologists present
a level of analysis that promotes a more accurate questioning
of crime and the (dys)functions of law: "The groundbreaking
argument for redefining crime from a radical perspective was
made by Herman and Julia Schwendinger.... They argued that
criminologists should be concerned with violations of human
rights as well as with behaviors traditionally proscribed by the
criminal law. Since then, radicals have compiled quite a list of
socially injurious behaviors and would-be-crimes" (Lynch and
Groves 1989, 32).
Penal abolitionism falls within the realm of the radical
perspective because it promotes radical revisions to the social
order, both in relation to the distribution of power and in relation
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418 | Colonial Systems of Control
to attitudinal social functioning. In addition, penal abolitionism
problematizes the structures that promote crime while not
recognizing harm. Most abolitionists advocate a mental as well as
a social revolution that should not only result in the destroying of
penal structures as the only form of justice, but also promote the
rebuilding of a society that is able to function without resorting
to revenge-oriented reactions to harm.
Penal abolitionists also fall within the realm of radical
criminology because they are generally under the assumption
that "with very few exceptions... the concept of crime as such,
the ontological reality of crime, has not been challenged"
(Hulsman 1986, 28). Two questions about the penal abolitionist
perspective are whether it is a theory of crime and whether it
can or does address the nature of crime. Here I will illustrate
that penal abolitionism is a theory that radically addresses the
nature of crime, but in that assessment rejects the categorization
of its perspectives as a theory of crime. This rejection is based
on the abolitionist definition of crime: "Crime does not exist. Only
acts exist, acts often given different meanings within various
social frameworks. Acts, and the meaning given to them, are our
data. Our challenge is to follow the destiny of .acts through the
universe of meanings. Particularly, what are the social conditions
that encourage or prevent giving the acts the meaning of being
crime?" (Christie 2003,3). From this perspective crime is a socially
constructed category, and it is the nature of this construction that
is assessed from the penal abolitionist perspective.
Reiman (1990, 81) explains the importance of addressing
the process of criminalization in attempting to understand the
nature of crime. His assessment of this process is that it "makes
certain that the offender at the end of the road in prison is likely
to be a member of the lowest social and economic groups in the
country.... For the same criminal behavior, the poor are more likely
to be arrested, they are more likely to be charged; if charged,
more likely to be convicted; if convicted, more likely to be
sentenced to prison; and if sentenced to prison, more likely to
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be given longer terms than members of the middle and upper
classes/7 This definition of crime illustrates that the abolitionist
assessment of crime is rooted, not in the individual, but in the
state and social structures that criminalize oppressed groups.
In addition to addressing class-based issues, radical scholars
(predominantly African, African American, and other academics
of colour) also work to establish the links between criminalization
and racialization of criminal justice.
THE PENAL SYSTEM: SLAVERY, IMPRISONMENT,
AND THE JUSTIFICATION OF RACIST
INSTITUTIONS
The overrepresentation of people of colour in prisons in the
United States, and around the world, is blatant proof of the
racism that exists within and is perpetuated through the criminal
justice system. A brief historical analysis of the penal system
in relation to Euro-American slavery of African people aids in
both the historical and the economic contextualization of the
racist structures of penal systems. In 1850 the US penal system
incarcerated nearly 6,700 people, almost none of whom were
black. At the time black people were more valuable economically
outside the prison walls —they were " already imprisoned for life
on plantations as chattel slaves" (Acoli 1995, 5). As Acoli notes,
following the Civil War and at the so-called end of slavery "vast
numbers of black males were imprisoned for everything from
not signing slave-like labor contracts with plantation owners
to looking the wrong way at some White person, or for some
similar petty crime" (6). Five years after the formal institution
of slavery was abolished black representation in the prison
population rose from almost zero to thirty-three percent: "Many
of these prisoners were hired out to Whites at less than slave
wages" (6). Eventually, "convict leasing" was phased out, and it
came to be replaced by "one of the most brutal forms of convict
forced labor in the United States, the chain gang" (Browne 1996,
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64). Control of unpaid black labour shifted from the official
institution of slavery to the official institution of imprisonment,
initially used to maintain private and white family-owned
business enterprises. Eventually, the US government came to
recognize that in building a nation black labour could be used
through the chain gang at no expense to the state. Convict labour
became profitable and politically popular in many southern
states, as Browne notes: "The fundamental 'reform' in abolishing
convict leasing and replacing this system with chain gangs was
that the state now owned the convicts and their labor" (64). This
form of exploitation and economic manipulation continues to
exist, and grow, through prison industries in the contemporary
US economy. The chain gang has been revived in Alabama, and
since 1995 "several other states have responded positively to the
idea.... Arizona has already begun modeling the program in their
own prisons" (69).
The economic value of prisoners used as workers expands
beyond chain gangs, though, and all sorts of intense labour
and forced work exist today. "The Prison Industry Authority
(PIA) is a multi-million dollar industry that is dependent on the
productivity of prisoners in California. As inmates are classified
for placement in an institution, they are surveyed for almost 50
different work skills, from appliance repair to x-ray technician, to
determine which institution they should be placed in" (Browne
1996,65). A close analysis of prison labour illustrates that convict
labour plans are not about job training and education, but about
profit and industry. While the Department of Corrections in
California maintains that prisoners work on a voluntary basis, it
is clear, according to Browne, that those who refuse to work serve
sentences that are twice as long as those who do work because
"each day worked reduces a prisoner's sentence by one day" (65).
Those who refuse to work, or work less, receive no privileges or
fewer privileges through a classification process called the Work/
Privilege Group. Under this programme, prisoners who refuse to
work are not entitled to family visits, are given smaller limits
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for canteen withdrawals, can make telephone calls only in cases
of emergency (at prison staff discretion), and are not allowed
access to recreational or entertainment segments of the prison:
"These extreme coercive tactics contradict the claim that labor is
voluntary" (65). These conditions bring forth the expanding role
the economics of penality plays in the implantation of criminal
justice in the United States. One Canadian lifer summarizes the
economic and inhumane aspects of the conditions of the "prison
industrial complex" effectively in one sentence. He states that
"they [corrections] count you like diamonds and treat you like
shit" ("John" 1997, 29).
THE CRIME CONTROL INDUSTRY: FINANCIAL
AND ACADEMIC PROFITS
Some scholars link "the rise of the penitentiary to the economic
concerns. In this view, not only was the penitentiary an
economically effective and self-sustaining institution, but the
practice of institutionalization was thought to have economic
benefits for society as well" "(Welch 1995, 252). The financial
domain within penality is seldom discussed in popular
discourse; it is well documented, though, in the critical and
radical criminological realm.
In his discussion of power and punishment Foucault asserts
that the success of the prison lies in its reproduction of delinquents,
who serve as raw material and provide the necessary energy
that keeps the prisons running (1972, 39). Christie develops this
argument in relation to the industrial aspect of crime control:
"Societies of the Western type face two major problems: Wealth
is everywhere unequally distributed. So is access to paid work....
The crime control industry is suited for coping with both.
This industry provides profit for work while at the same time
producing control of those who otherwise might have disturbed
the social process" (1993,13).
Christie further outlines the profit-making aspect of crime
control and presents an alternative view of the functions of
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penal systems. In his analysis the profit-driven system is vastly
different from a security-focused system that works to provide
safety within communities. In politicizing crime control and
discussing the industrial aspect of penology Christie lays out one
of the largest obstacles in the path of penal abolition. He points
out that an "urge for expansion is built into industrial thinking"
and that this mentality is similar to the penal system's policy
implications (1993,13).
Within the North American context Cayley points out that
"levels of crime and levels of imprisonment show no regular
or predictable relationship.... In both Canada and the United
States, [crime] has gone down for a number of years without any
abatement in the growth of [the] prison population" (1998, 5).
One can conclude that a large section of the prison population
is dependent on political decisions and economic growth.
Comparing crime control to other industries, Christie concludes
that "the crime control industry is in the most privileged
position. There is no lack of raw material—crime seems to be
endless in supply. Endless also are the demands for the service,
as well as the willingness to pay for what is seen as security"
(1993, 13). Looking at the bigger picture, it becomes harder to
accept the failure of the penal system as a consequence of bad
people behaving in bad ways. It becomes clear that Western
industrialized nations rely on a 'criminal' class to build their
economies, and that penal systems function to maintain a status
quo that keeps some people rich and the majority poor. These
class-based structures are defined through race, both within the
boundaries of Western industrialized nation-states and globally,
as nations ruled by white people interact with nations ruled by
people of colour.
CONTEMPORARY PENAL SYSTEMS: UPHOLDING
HISTORICAL SLAVE LABOUR AND COLONIAL
LEGACIES
The penitentiary is the ultimate penal structure as society knows
it today. Supposedly the prison functions to punish, to protect,
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to rehabilitate, and to transform, among other things. In terms
of the everyday functions of the prison, ironically enough, it is
maintained by the same people whom it oppresses. In the prison
"inmates have produced all of the work that supports the prison
system, such as making the clothes, washing the clothes, and
building the cell equipment, day room furniture, lockers, and
mess hall tables" (Browne 1996,66). Browne also notes that, aside
from building and maintaining the prison's physical structure,
prisoners have also made " shoes, bedding, clothing, detergents,
stationery products, license plates and furniture for all state
agencies. In addition, convict laborers have provided 'special
services7 such as dental lab work, micro graphics, and printing"
(66). All of these tasks are generally assigned to male prisoners.
In line with patriarchal gender stereotypes "the women's
prison industries have generally been in the areas of re-upholstery,
fabric production, laundry, and data entry. In men's prisons all of
this work is done, as well as metal production, wood production,
and the operation of farms, dairies, and slaughterhouses"
(Browne 1996, 66). These processes and tasks add up to a multi-
million-dollar industry. The prison is not only saving money
when prisoners build, maintain, and clean the prison, but also
making money when labour outside the realm of the prison is
brought into the oppressive, unequal power dynamics of the
penitentiary. Browne mentions that "this enormous, multi-
million-dollar industry was purportedly created to address
the problem of 'inmate idleness'... by helping in rehabilitation,
building effective work habits, and providing job training. Yet a
prisoner who spends a ten-year sentence processing stationery
products on an assembly line or washing laundry has not learned
any highly employable skill [outside the prison industry], nor has
been mentally or emotionally challenged through this service to
the state" (66).
In essence prisoners are taught skills that will provide
them with experience to work in prison, for prison, and only
within the conditions that are prescribed and enforced by
prison. Such realities illustrate that the penal system in the
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United States functions through a racist and capitalist agenda.
Based on a history that relied on the slave labour of Africans,
the contemporary criminal justice system in the United States
upholds its own legacy. In relation to penal systems in Africa
history is more closely linked to colonialism and European
invasions that worked to control and destabilize African
societies. Contemporary implementations of penal systems in
Africa uphold those European modes of social control that work
to divide and conquer populations. They uphold the legacy of
colonialism that worked to destabilize and delegitimize African
social structures and cultures.
ABOLITIONIST MOVEMENTS: EXTENSIONS OF
RACIST HISTORIES
The assessment of crime and penal systems of control has a long
history in academic disciplines. As a starting point"abolitionists
raise questions like: What logic, and ethic, makes it so certain that
punishment has priority over peacemaking?" (Christie 2003, 80).
This line of assessment touches on not only the administration
of justice, but also the nature of society, the nature of human
behaviour, and the nature of crime. Abolitionist literature in the
Western academic realm can be traced back to 1919, to a Dutch
penal scholar, Clara Wichmann, who wrote about "the class
interests that guide the process of criminalization" (van
Swaaningen 1997, 57).l Her views mirrored Bonger's (1967)
rejection of the notion of deterrence, arguing that the
implementation of penal punishments in attempts to control
social behaviour is irrational and counterproductive. Bonger's
work delegitimized the very concept of social control through
fear, emphasizing that human behaviour is not and cannot be
controlled through a system that threatens to punish those who
do not follow the so-called social contract that the state assumes
relevant to society. Wichmann's assessment of Bonger's work
was critical of his omission of "the selectivity of criminalization in
the legislative process" and the fact that Bonger had not "argued
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against apparent cases of class justice" (van Swaaningen 1997,57).
Her perspectives were rooted in the early critical paradigmatic
affiliations that incorporated a Marxist- and Engels-oriented
promotion of socialism.
Wichmann considered the classical scholars' concepts of
crime and punishment to be "far too limited. With the unfounded
suggestion of a direct causal relation between crime and
punishment, the political character of criminality is obscured:
poverty and repression do not receive the label 'crime/ but the
consequences of poverty and repression" do (van Swaaningen
1997,57). This analysis provided a foundation for the abolitionist
perspective, which views crime as an oppressive categorization
of the powerless, and punishment as an oppressive method of
social control.2 It is assumed here that penal-oriented methods of
social control that rely on punishment and revenge ideological
frameworks work to maintain the status quo, not to maintain (or
even create) social order.
In 1919 Wichmann connected her political ideas with her
criminal law profession to form the CMS (which translates as the
Action Committee against the Prevailing Opinions on Crime and
Punishment). "The CMS was a political platform which found
its basis in various revolutionary groups, and strove for penal
abolition. Opposition to the state's right to punish is as old as the
state itself" (van Swaaningen 1997, 54). The premise of the CMS
manifesto, as it related to the nature of crime and crime control,
is very much rooted in an analysis of state power dynamics and
social control of the powerless classes.
Emerging directly after World War I, the CMS saw links
between penal and military systems, "and regarded both as
man-created institutions of pointless and repressive cruelty"
(van Swaaningen 1997, 55). Quinney's assessment of the penal
justice model falls in line with that assessment. Quinney states
that, "when we recognize that the criminal justice system is the
moral equivalent of the war machine, we realize that resistance
to one goes hand in hand with resistance to the other" (1991,
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12). Within such assertions lie concepts about society and social
control that are the foundations of radical criminology.
The concept (not just the application) of penal punishment
was viewed by Wichmann as both counterproductive and
inhumane: "By retaliating against the evil of crime with the evil
of punishment, the threshold of answering violence with violence
is continually lowered. Punishment is a form of unresponsive
violence, and CMS rejected, following Tolstoy, its legitimacy —
both as retribution and as rehabilitation" (van Swaaningen
1997, 55). Morris further defines those "evils" of punishment as
unjust (racist and classist), and concludes that in the US version
of criminal justice "money talks and everybody else does time"
(1995, 7).
These conclusions arise from a general critique of capitalist
social structures that rely heavily on the existence of a surplus
labour population that can be exploited to build capital for profit.
The recognition that the penal system is a function of those
structures is a central tenet of penal abolitionist ideologies. Penal
abolitionism focuses on the function of the criminalization process
as maintaining a status quo of oppression for the majority and
profit for the minority. The influence of Wichmann's CMS and
the ideology presented in it can be seen in contemporary penal
abolitionist literature, both in the assessments of punishment
and systems of social control, and in the role that the process
of criminalization plays in the production of an ideology that
legitimizes and normalizes oppression.
In 1912 Wichmann's dissertation, entitled "Reflections on
the Historical Foundations of the Present-Day Transformation
of Penality," emphasized the "current manifestations of
crime" as "inherent in the capitalist structure of society" (van
Swaaningen 1997,55). This emphasis on the correlation between
capitalist structures and crime is presented clearly in Christie's
(1993) assessment of crime as functionally relevant to capitalist
structures.
In her dissertation Wichmann reached the conclusion that
"the socioeconomic conditions under which crime emerges, as
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well as the treatment of delinquents, need a better solution than
repression'7 (van Swaaningen 1997, 55). This conclusion has
academically evolved into the contemporary penal abolitionist
view of the nature of crime as a process of criminalization that
continues to repress the most powerless populations in each
society: the poor in Nigeria, African Americans in the United
States, and First Nations people in Canada.
In understanding these components of the criminalization
process penal abolitionists today assert that " there is no such
thing as crime: not just the contents of what is at a given time
and place defined into that category, but the category of crime
itself does not exist outside the context of 'criminalization/
'Crime' as a category is reliant upon historical 'inventions' to
criminalize what the capitalist economy identifies as the 'surplus
population'" (Steinert 1986,26). The definition of acts as criminal
is based not on harmful acts, or on dangerous people, or even
on acts that break the social contract. Crime is in fact a social
construction, to be analyzed as myth presented as reality in
everyday life (Hess 1986).
"As a myth, crime serves to maintain political power relations
and lends legitimacy to the expansion of the crime control
apparatus and the intensification of surveillance and control. It
justifies inequality and relative injustices. Thus, the bigger the
social problems are, the greater the need for the crime myth" (De
Haan 1996, 357-358). From within this assessment emerges the
functional element of crime as perpetuating and legitimizing the
social structures that Wichmann found so problematic. In this
context harmful behaviours are not all recognized as criminal.
Harmful acts committed by corporations and nation-states are
not crimes. Crime, criminalization, and penal sanctions are
saved for those people whom the state sees fit to punish, for
those populations that the capitalist structures can oppress in
order to maintain a white and dominant status quo. Whereas
some criminalized acts are violent, much of what has been
deemed criminal is not. From an abolitionist perspective criminal
428 | Colonial Systems of Control
justice is violent in structure, in ideology, in institutions, and in
implementation.
Nineteenth-century European scholars (Nietzsche, Guyau,
Tolstoy, Kropotkin) put forth penal abolitionist arguments that
continue to inspire "the rejection of criminal law as an expression
of violence" (van Swaaningen 1997,54-55). The term "abolition"
has come to be viewed in more contemporary times to describe
those people who are opposed to the use of the death penalty.
In addition, the prison abolitionist movement in the United
States and Canada has come to be viewed as an extension of the
movement to abolish slavery. This extension is well documented
and, on the most basic level, best illustrated in the Thirteenth
Amendment to the US Constitution:
Amendment 13 Abolition Of Slavery Ratified Dec. 6,1865:
Section 1. Neither Slavery, nor involuntary servitude, except as
a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly
convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place
subject to their jurisdiction.
Section 2. Congress shall have power to enforce this article by
appropriate legislation, (emphases added)
The penal system was able to step up and take responsibility
for the extension of slavery from historical into contemporary
times: mass incarceration of such large numbers of the direct
descendants of slaves by such large numbers of the direct descendants
of slave-owners and other people of European descent visibly and
economically mirrors historical slavery. These obvious facts
and extensions are lost in the contemporary criminal justice
system's shift in language. Where black used to mean "slave,"
it now means "criminal." However, as white people shift the
language they use to refer to black people, and the institutions
they employ to control and exploit them, little else changes. In
both eras justifications and explanations presented to implement
the continued exploitation of black people have been accepted by
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the vast majority of Europeans and people of European descent
living in Western, so-called civilized societies.
In the "developing" world the abolitionist movements
came to represent the move to physically remove European
governments from African soil. In more recent times penal
abolitionist movements in Africa can be viewed as an extension
of the movement to abolish colonization: in fighting to remove
colonial institutions of control one continues to fight colonialism
in Africa.
In light of these social realities, and against the
overwhelming opposition that abolitionists face in all areas of
society, Scheerer (1986, 7) presented an analysis of the history of
abolitionist movements and concluded that "the great victories
of abolitionism are slowly passing into oblivion, and with them
goes the experience that there has never been a major social
transformation in the history of mankind that had not been
looked upon as unrealistic, idiotic, or Utopian by the large
majority of experts even a few years before the unthinkable
became a reality." The standard criticism that can be heard all
through the history of abolitionism relates to abolitionist goals
comprising merely a moral position of little theoretical value and
material foundation, much less policy impact.
A discussion on the abolition of slavery with the average
white American in the 1700s would have included a diatribe
accusing abolitionists of being unrealistic, idealistic, and crazy.
"The same is being said today in view of penal abolitionist
activists and academics. It is a standard reply to theoretical works
of abolitionists such as Nils Christie, Louk Hulsman, Thomas
Mathiesen, and Heinz Steinart" (Scheerer 1986, 8), and it is a
standard and well-rehearsed reply to any activist or community
organizer who engages in discussion with mainstream society
about penal abolitionism." But there is a blind spot in this criticism,
as it fails to give an explanation for the sudden popularity of
abolitionist positions in some European countries. Abolitionist
books find a receptive audience; the basic ideas of abolishing
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prisons and/or even the criminal justice system, utterly Utopian
as they seem to the majority, seem to be quite stimulating to a
sizeable minority not only in the university class rooms" (8).
A PENAL ABOLITIONIST'S DEFINITION OF CRIME
This section provides a presentation and assessment of
contemporary penal abolitionist discussions and discourses on
crime. According to De Haan (1996,355), "the term 'abolitionism'
stands for a social movement, a theoretical perspective and
a political strategy." In this assessment of abolitionism I will
put aside the penal abolitionist political strategies and social
movements to allow for an in-depth presentation of the penal
abolitionist theoretical perspective.
Emerging from the critical paradigm, penal abolitionists
embrace a constructionist view of "crime":3 "Abolitionists regard
crime primarily as a result of the social order and are convinced
that punishment is not the appropriate reaction" (De Haan 1996,
355). That social order is defined within the context of power
and conflict. It is assumed within the abolitionist perspective
that conflict is related to power: both interpersonal conflicts that
result in harm and structurally imposed conflicts that result in
crime.
The study of crime from a penal abolitionist perspective does
not necessarily address violence or deviance or delinquency.
According to abolitionist discourse, these issues are important,
need to be addressed, and do get addressed by abolitionists
(peacemaking criminologists, transformative justice theorists,
restorative justice theorists, and others), but the importance of
these issues does not automatically qualify them all as criminal.
Crime does not and cannot represent social and interpersonal
harms, because crime is a construction of the state's reality. Crime
is defined by state laws and relies heavily on the implementation
of those laws: an understanding and assessment of state behaviour
leads to an understanding and assessment of crime. To properly
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represent and illustrate the penal abolitionist theoretical model
of crime, we must first address the terms being used, and the
need to differentiate between crime and violence.
Abolitionists are firm in the conviction that violent acts
are not necessarily criminal acts (consider acts of violence in
self-defence, victimless crimes, state executions), but the fact
that they are not criminal does not preclude them from being
violent. Thus, violence and harm do not define crime. Pepinsky
and Jesilow (1992, 28) confirm this view by explaining that
"crime is not purely and simply harmful behavior. To begin
with, the law is rather arbitrary about what kinds of harm are
regarded as crime. It can be considered criminal to refuse to kill,
as conscientious objectors have discovered during wartime. It
can legally be tolerated to kill, in self-defense or in defense of
property/' As a result of these observations, and in line with this
logic, abolitionists conclude that crime is defined through the
process of criminalization, and that this process is not immersed
in morality or safety. It is immersed in the maintenance of a
racist, classist, and oppressive status quo.
Chambliss (1996, 227) states that "there is little evidence to
support the view that the criminal law is a body of rules which
reflect strongly held moral dictates of the society. Occasionally
we find a study on the creation of criminal law which traces legal
innovations to the 'moral indignation' of a particular social class."
Pepinsky and Jesilow (1992, 28) further explain that "common
sense and compassion are often missing in the law's definition
of what is permissible"; thus, one begins to question and assess
the role of criminalization. If it is not found in the professed role
of social safety or in the implementation of a non-existing moral
consensus, abolitionists conclude, it is found in the unprofessed
goal of state-imposed social and economic controls.
Criminalization is found in the attempts to institutionalize
and exploit powerless populations for the progression of capitalist
economic structures. Abolitionists also conclude that the true
nature of crime does not lie in prediction and risk assessment of
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future criminals. Abolitionists assert that the predictive process
is fruitless because it has been shown time and time again that
future criminals are those whom the future will oppress. Whether
that oppression comes by means of the classism, racism, sexism,
ageism, or any other "ism" of the social structure is not focal:
what is focal and necessary in understanding the true nature of
crime, according to abolitionists, is a proper understanding of
criminalization.
Abolitionists hold the view that violence is much more
complex and much more widespread than the simple and
mythical concept of "crime" can define or address. Thus, violence
cannot be appropriately defined or dealt with from within the
confines of the penal frameworks and/or institutions. In other
words, violence cannot be defined or represented within the
poorly constructed concept of crime. Violence is better defined
and more appropriately represented from within the experiences
of those involved with and affected by violence. Based on
this line of reasoning, crime represents the state's functional
conceptualization of harm and thus is best understood within the
confines of these conceptualizations. These confines lie within
the state's interests, and the socioeconomic and racist structures
that the state imposes to advance those interests. "One advantage
of this definition is its affirmation that criminality is not an
intrinsic quality or an inherent character of the behavior; it is a
label that is attached to the behavior. It also emphasizes the roles
of authority and coercion in defining certain acts as criminal"
(Fattahl997,35).
In presenting the penal abolitionist definition of crime it
is not representative to state that crime does not encompass a
violent element, but it is representative to say that the violent
or harmful elements in crime are not the defining components
in categorizing certain acts as criminal. Instead, the unequal
distribution of power in society is the key element in defining
crime (as illustrated by Reiman 1990, 80-85).
Within this view of crime the abolitionist perspective, as
the conscientious objector in criminological literature, puts
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"into question the validity of the guilt-and-punishment frame
of reference as well as hitherto well-accepted beliefs about the
relevance of terms like crime, dangerousness, and many others.
In this respect... abolitionism much resembles the labeling
perspective, which in its refusal to accept the traditional biases
of criminology did much to reveal the inadequacy of usual
questions and answers" (Scheerer 1986,10).
The assumptions held by penal abolitionists in relation to
the state point "to the basic problem as one of non-useful-ness....
There is no longer any reason to trust that the welfare state
will provide work for all. Society is gradually changing from
having a shared — common — rationality into one of individual
rationality" (Christie 1993, 63). Individual rationality cannot
hold a consensus view of social order because with individuality
comes diversity, and with diversity comes the inherent potential
for conflict. The penal structure denies society the ability to
deal with the existence of diversity in its monopoly, both in the
administration of justice and in the conceptualization of crime
as representative of social conflict: "the essence of state power is
not just the particular way it deploys its forces of criminalization
and punishment but its initial normalizing power, that is, its
radical monopoly to define what is right" (Cohen 1992,229). This
monopoly defines the power of penal systems more so than the
actual relevance of penal structures and institutions of control.
Abolitionists recognize that actions deemed criminal
function to advance the interests of the state (as illustrated by
Pepinsky and Jesilow 1992). The same actions undertaken by
an individual and carried out on behalf of that individual's
interests, not the interests of the state (or corporate agencies that
progress the state's capitalist structures), are criminal. The few
exceptions to this differential application of legality in regard
to violent behaviour, those few times that corporate or state-
affiliated individuals are criminalized for their actions, serve
only to legitimize the grander structure by providing a few
scapegoats to present an illusion of equality under the law. In
doing so the state is able to legitimize its power, and continue
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the unequal and racist distribution of criminality. In line with
Christie's perspective, crime thus functions to provide the raw
material that fuels the crime control industry; it is an industry
with stocks in power and control, and it fits well within the
framework of economic advancement in the social structures of
white capitalism.
To summarize the penal abolitionist theoretical model of
crime: the state uses the law to define acts as criminal, and it is
the state, not the individual, that has a direct correlation to crime,
for without laws to break there would be no crimes to assess.
Within this perspective a study of deviant individual human
behaviour cannot be related to the study of crime, because crime
does not wholly and unconditionally define human-perpetrated
violence, and human-perpetrated violence does not wholly
and unconditionally define crime; therefore, in studying crime
from a behavioural perspective, the focus of abolitionists is the
behaviour of the state, not the behaviour of the individual. In
studying violence (as separate from studying crime) abolitionists
assess and address human behaviour. It is within that realm
that alternative forms of social control and microlevel analyses
of harm are utilized. The term "crime" is not functional within
this assessment because it is a state-perpetrated act, not an
individually perpetrated act. Crime is not necessarily violent.
The process of criminalization is.
HOW DOES SOCIETY CREATE CRIME?
In adopting a constructionist view of crime penal abolitionists
assume that society creates crime. According to Cohen (1992,
46), before society can create crime it must first be structured
in a manner that allows for the existence of certain segments
of the population "that are more likely to contribute to the
crime rate than others. There is no need to make any sweeping
deterministic claims about 'poverty causing crime/... No
amount of sophisticated research and theory can hide the fact
that in Western industrial society, the bulk of officially recorded
crime is committed by those at the bottom of the socioeconomic
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ladder." In capitalist societies, where money dictates power, it
is logical to conclude that the economic variable is present in
the determination of power, and thus it is confirmed that those
with the least amount of power are those who will become
criminalized.
Quinney (2001,207) further explains this concept, which links
societal organization with criminalization: " All behavior may be
understood in reference to the organization of society.... Basic
to such a perspective are the assumptions that, first, behavior
becomes structured in a segmented society and that, second,
some segments impose their order on others by formulating and
applying criminal definitions/' An application of the context of
power to this logic affirms that the criminalization process is not
about safety but about maintenance of the status quo.
Within the assertion that society produces crime the penal
abolitionist perspective does not deny that crime "has something
to do with differences in opportunity" and the relative
vulnerability of the criminalizable group "to the machinery of
social control: arrest, sentencing, punishment7' (Cohen 1992, 47).
Furthermore, as Cohen notes, society will continue to generate
crime by problematizing specific segments of its population,
while promoting the very values that generate it: "individualism,
masculinity, [and] competitiveness" are highly encouraged
traits in contemporary social structures, and are essential for the
building of wealth and power, but they are also "the same ones
that generate crime" (47).
Last but not least, society creates crime by creating law:
"By definition, true of all societies,... we make the rules whose
infraction constitutes crime. Crime is simply a behavior that
violates the criminal law. It is a category that is not fixed or
immutable. By definition a major cause of crime is the law itself"
(Cohen 1992, 47). Caulfield (1991, 232-233) suggests that the
role of the criminologist in this element of crime production in
societies is not neutral. It is not just the legislators who create
laws that are involved with the creation of crime, but also
the criminologists who promote theories of crime that lack a
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problematization of the criminalization process. Criminologists
aid in defining criminals as an enemy population, and in doing
so criminologists serve to divert attention away from what the
state is doing, away from the state's harmful behaviours; thus,
criminologists serve to legitimize and maintain society's ability
to create crime.
THREE TYPES OF ABOLITIONISTS
Within the criminological4 realm there are three types of
abolitionists: the prison abolitionists, the gradual penal
abolitionists, and the immediate penal abolitionists. Prison
abolitionists focus on the institution of imprisonment. Gradual
penal abolitionists assert that legitimate alternatives to penal
systems of control and conflict resolution (prisons, courts, police,
parole) will result in the eventual delegitimization of the penal
system, leading to penal abolition. Absolute abolitionists assert
that the immediate and unconditional removal of penal structures
is essential in the progression of freedom, and in the fight against
racism and classism. These competing and conflicting forms of
abolition exist together within the abolitionist movement.
As each type of ideology and opinion works to advance
its visions, what at times appears as conflicting represents a
continuum of understanding within which people work and
conduct research. Morris explains that "being an abolitionist is
not a finished state.... Abolitionists can be gradualists, or believe
in immediate abolition. Some... began as prison abolitionists and
have moved to penal abolition: realizing that bad as prisons are,
as long as the goal of the system is revenge, prisons or something
equally bad must follow" (1995,52).
The difference between prison and penal abolitionists lies in
ideological frameworks. The former focus on the administrative
failures and oppressive elements of the prison as an institution.
The latter extend the notion of abolition to include structures that
have implemented and allowed the prison to exist for as long as it
has. Penal structures and mentalities have kept the prison going,
and if it is to be abolished, and the structures are not abolished
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with it, the rise of newer, more oppressive, and potentially more
inhumane institutions will likely occur. This likelihood was
evident in the abolition of slavery followed by racialized mass
incarceration in the United States. The abolition of the institution
of slavery was not sufficient.
Within the capitalist and racist structures of Western societies
institutional abolitions do not challenge the grander structures
that benefit from oppression and brutality. The shift from prison
to penal abolitionism (in the 1980s) gave rise to the opportunity
for a more thorough analysis of social structures, the concept
of penality, criminalization processes, and the assumptions
made about human nature and society within these processes.
A focus on institutional abolition (prison abolition) is relevant,
but it is not enough. Abolitionist movements in contemporary
times must begin to address grander structural issues in order
to succeed in abolishing oppression, not just abolishing specific
institutions that oppress. In addressing the grander structures
of oppression, the abolition of institutions of oppression (such
as slavery) cannot result in their replacement by transformed
oppressive institutions (such as prisons).
Mathiesen (1974, 212) explains abolition as a process with
both short-term arid long-term goals: "Not only is it necessary, in
order to attain a long-term goal of abolition, that you stubbornly
insist on abolition on a short-term basis and in the immediate
present; conversely it is just as important, in order to insist on
abolitions in the immediate present, that you have a more long-
term goal of abolition to work for/7 According to this perspective,
absolutist and gradualist abolitionists play their own roles in
the progression of a vision. While gradualist abolitionists tend
to focus on the long-term vision, promoting the inclusion of
legitimate and separate models of justice and conflict resolution,
immediate abolitionists focus on the short-term perspective, and
assert that there is no room for alternatives within the present
oppressive penal structure. Absolute abolitionists insist that any
alternatives erected at this time will only be co-opted because
the present social order, the present justice model, has claimed a
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monopoly on harm. Many of these long- and short-term visions
are rooted in a process that defies the mainstream, and promotes
underrepresented questions about the distribution of power,
the nature of humanity, and the social order within which we
(criminals, academics, state bureaucrats, frontline workers,
victims of violence) all live.
PENAL ABOLITION: A MINORITY POSITION
Within the realm of critical criminology, and its role as
conscientious objector in the discipline of studying crime, the
penal abolitionist perspective puts forth questions about crime
and penality that are challenging, not only in questioning
the status quo, but also in problematizing it. Cohen (1992, 47)
states that "the behavioral questions, the ones criminologists are
obsessed with—'Why did they do it?'—might be dead-end ones
when compared with the definitional questions: Why is that rule
there? How is it enforced? What are the consequences of this
enforcement?" Christie adds that,
with a perspective on crime as an endless natural resource,
we can raise the questions which are rarely made explicit. We
can ask: When is enough, enough or, eventually, when is it too
little crime? And following that, what is the suitable amount of
control through the penal apparatus—eventually, what is the
suitable number of officially stigmatized sinners? How large
can we let the penal system grow, or conversely, how small can
we have it, if we need it at all? Is it possible to establish upper,
and eventually lower, limits to the amount of punishment that
ought to be applied in modern society? And lastly, for those of
us working close to this field, is it possible for us to influence
what happens? (2003,101)
In light of these challenges and proposed questions, the
role and contribution of penal abolitionism in the criminological
field become clearer. Although it is a perspective that most find
Penal Abolitionist Theories and Ideologies | 439
obscure or idealistic, or not academic, to mention a few of the
reactions that penal abolitionism has elicited, and although it
is a perspective that few take the time to study and fewer take
the time to research, it is also a perspective that thrives in its
marginality and embraces the role of a 'minority position' in
academia. It is the diversity in this field that makes it relevant, for
if there was a total monopoly on the production of knowledge,
mainstream academia would become an official branch of the
state's social control apparatus. It is in the power games that
seem to inherently infuse the politics of diversity that the penal
abolitionist perspective, much like disenfranchised populations
in society, finds itself.
CRITIQUES OF PENAL ABOLITIONISM
Given its disenfranchised position in the field, penal abolitionism
is often held up to criticism and, when referred to at all, referred
to within the context of explain yourself more than within the
context of who are you and what do you stand for? It is also a position
that is lumped into the crazy radicals stereotype, often perceived
as holding a uniform identity, because through a mainstream
lens 'minorities' all look the same and do the same things. The
power games that oppress exploited populations in society do
not oppress the 'minority' populations in academia; they may
briefly silence them, but it is during those moments of silence (to
mainstream ears, not among the minority) that observation of
the mainstream is exercised, and true contemplation of a strategy
to implement change is done.
Within this context, I address the issues that arise when a
critique of penal abolitionism is presented. Christie explains
that "the most radical among them [abolitionists] want to
eliminate penal law and formal punishment altogether. But
there are several major problems with that position" (2003, 80).
He explains that absolute abolitionists, those whdm Morris
referred to as immediate abolitionists, those who advocate for
the eradication of the penal system in its entirety, are in essence
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taking away the opportunity of retributive justice (revenge) for
victims of harm who may want to use it. Absolute abolitionists
tend to address this critique through a presentation of victims'
needs that outlines the need for revenge as occurring early in the
stages of surviving victimization. In most cases those who seek
to address the harms they have encountered are encouraged to
address violence in non-violent manners.
It is only through the criminal justice system that violence
is encouraged and revenge offered as a solution to harm. The
answer to this question that some victims may want revenge is
different for gradual abolitionists: the value of retaining options
is essential. The gradual abolitionist would suggest that other
models for achieving justice be implemented as totally separate
from the penal structure but just as legitimate. It is hypothesized
that, if the general population can come to realize that there are
" other less painful and more productive ways" of dealing with
harm, they will turn to these options. It is also hypothesized that
the penal system, set up alongside other legitimate options for
conflict resolution, and thus opening itself up to comparison,
would eventually prove itself obsolete.
Absolute abolitionists criticize this assertion, claiming that
penal structures work to legitimize penality and co-opt any
other legitimate options for conflict resolution—alternatives
cannot exist alongside the penal structure. In response gradualist
abolitionism asserts that the power of resistance is infinite, and
turn to non-Western nations for examples of societies that do
not rely heavily on an oppressive penal regime. A study of legal
pluralism aids in addressing these questions and working toward
solutions to these debates.
Christie also put forth the critique that, "in enthusiasm
for mediation, it is important not to forget that rituals and
arrangements in penal courts might have important protective
functions. When tensions run high, maybe even immediate
violence threatens, the solemn and often utterly tedious and dull
rituals in the penal apparatus might have a calming effect" (2003,
81). While this argument may hold true within classical and
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positivist assumptions about the nature of society, it is important
to emphasize again the principles of peacemaking and a reaction
to conflict that understands that, "if violence is admitted and
addressed, it is less likely to be destructive than if it is repressed"
(Mindell 1995, 223); thus, the numbing of volatile situations
through the implementation of dull and tedious proceedings
does not diffuse the flame, but only represses it, creating a greater
chance for larger explosions later.
An often misunderstood feature of penal abolitionism
relates to the perceived goal of achieving an idealistic society
void of violence and harm. Van Swaaningen (1997, 25) explains
that "Wichmann and Bonger both rejected the notion of an ideal
society or the idea that crime will ever disappear. They concluded
that 'truly educational reactions cannot be of a punitive nature,
but should indeed offer positive stimuli to the individual's
personal development'"; to do this properly, peacemaking
principles need to be pursued. According to Kohn (1996, 55, 58),
effective discipline has been associated with conformity and
obedience, while rewards and punishments have been associated
with control, not order. Also, it is the predictability of rules that
invokes comfort in knowing what to do — it is the categorization
of reactions to conflict that provides safety in rule-setting, not the
actual existence or implementation of the rules themselves (70).
Utopian expectations lie in the categorical definition of conflict
and categorical response to it. Conflict is seldom rational, seldom
organized, and seldom predictable; it is the opposite of these
principles that makes it conflict, so a response that is categorical and
rule-oriented is Utopian} the promotion of more flexible options to
deal with conflict and the realization that we cannot continue to
believe that, "if you scare people enough, they will comply" are
not.
It is important to note that penal abolitionism is not a rejection
of the existence of violence, but a rejection of the counterproductive
nature of punishment. In that rejection abolitionists recognize
that punishment is more than an administrative principle; it is
an ideology. That ideology is elemental in contemporary social
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structures and their oppressive status quos: those structures that
legitimize classism, racism, sexism, heterosexism, and ageism
also legitimize the penal mentality, which in turn allows the
penal system to exist. The enforcement of penality as a method of
social control imposes a criminal form of justice that is oppressive,
idealistic in its expectations of deterrence, and unrealistic in its
expectations of creating safety.
Wichmann emphasized what later came to be Mathiesen's
(1974) notion of the "unfinished/7 a rejection of the notion of
completeness. Wichmann stated that "crime has always been and
will always remain. Its massive character is, however, not self-
evident and can be limited by social measures. The realization of
socialism will first of all change the nature of crime, and perhaps
also diminish the level of crime as a whole" (van Swaaningen 1997,
58). In this respect Wichmann's analysis and propositions are
much like Bonger's and Engel's, rooted in a critique of capitalist
structures. In this analysis conflict does not disappear; instead it
appears in a manner that avoids demonization, stigmatization,
and fear, while promoting the values of taking responsibility and
maintaining social balance.
The most verbalized concern about penal abolitionism is the
basic: so what do you propose to do instead? Knopp (1991,181)
explains that "the pressure is always excessive for abolitionists to
produce a plan, a plan that solves every problem and deals with
every criminal act before abolition can be considered. But it is not
necessary to have a finished blueprint; it is not necessary to know
the last step before taking the first step. The first step toward
abolition is to break with the old system and help conceptualize
the new."
Within the penal abolitionist framework the finished,
the determined, and the predictable tenets hold elements of
repression and inflexibility; thus, when a plan is called for,
abolitionists respond from within the ideology of Mathiesen's
unfinished. Pepinsky (1991, 315) presents a response to this
concern that explains the logic behind such responses. He
explains that "peacemaking means being ever open to surprise
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and discovery of good and bad, successes and failures.... There
are, as Ms. Knopp notes, no final solutions for a peacemaker. To
act on a 'solution' is to stop listening and responding to one's
impact on others. It is a tip-off that warmaking entrepreneurs
typically promise to solve 'all your problems.'"
The lack of an absolute answer does not justify the
unnecessary evils of penal repression. In attempts to delegitimize
abolitionism the mainstream and the privileged rely on a
silencing of the questions, putting forth a demand for a solution.
That very demand for a solution, while admitting a problem with
penal justice, refocuses the discussion from an understanding of
these problems to an answer to the unasked critical questions of
penality.
As Mathiesen (1974, 13) points out, "abolition is a point
of departure." Abolitionism is not absolutism. Absolutism is a
tenet of the positivist, classical, and mainstream criminological
disciplines. Absolutism promotes a dichotomized, right-and-
wrong assessment of social reality and social problems. In the
critical and radical criminological paradigms these tenets are not
prioritized; thus, according to abolitionism, "there is no reason to
expect any terminated condition of final abolition; for example,
no country can count on attaining a terminated condition of final
revolution; a retrospective consolidation of abolition which has
been attained—for example a revolution in a country — is the same
as finishing the abolition and in large measure returning to the
old. The maintenance of abolition implies that there is constantly
more to abolish, that one looks ahead towards a new and still more
long-term objective of abolition" (Mathiesen 1974, 211-212).
The most recognized principles among academics who are
not abolitionists are those related to the policy implications
and suggestions made by abolitionist researchers. The least
recognized but most fundamental aspects of the abolitionist
perspective lie in a recognition of crime as a legal, not a social,
concept, and in the assessment of the power dynamics involved
in state politics and oppressive social structures. Based on these
theoretical foundations, the emergence of a penal abolitionist
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administrative policy occurs. Penal abolitionists do not just call
for the abolition of the penal system. The perspective provides
a logic, a mode of reasoning, a theoretical model concluding
• that abolition of penality is imperative in the quest to deal with
violence and inequality.
How do penal abolitionists use scientific data to support
theoretical foundations and conclusions? Abolitionists hesitate
to glorify and follow in the footsteps of Western philosophical
traditions. "They are suspicious of the, both legal and
sociological, custom not to be satisfied with anything before all
particular events have been neatly arranged in mental drawers
of classification schemes/' and the cause of these suspicions "is
the experience that classifications are treated as if they were
realities.... Hence if there is such a thing as crime it can only exist
as something one can immediately see, i.e. a very specific act7'
(Scheerer 1986,11). In relation to notions of empiricism theoretical
abolitionists identify well with what Takeyoshi Kawashima once
called empirical immediacy. "To the Japanese," as Scheerer
notes, "each thing has its own characteristics which differentiate
it from other things. So it cannot be seen as falling within a class.
The reflexive approach to crime and criminal justice evident in
abolitionist thinking might reveal a structure quite similar to
this kind of Eastern thinking. Both distrust and abstract general
classifications... stress a limited social nexus, thus preventing the
rise of universals" (11).
Abolitionists recognize that there is a sense of comfort that
comes with predictability and categorization, but they also
recognize that the process of generalization, while convenient for
the scientific production of knowledge, is not convenient when
the quest is to properly represent the society one is attempting to
assess. This radically different perspective, which is not popular
among or understandable to most Western researchers, results in
a criticism of the abolitionist perspective by "numerous scholars
who find it rather strange to their own way of perceiving things"
(Scheerer 1986,11). Aside from a conceptual gap between penal
abolitionist and classical/positivist methodological boundaries,
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a functional gap also exists. The functional gap is illustrated
through a presentation of Mathiesen's action research proposal.
Mathiesen explains that, " since all research involves
influencing of the system which is being investigated, and since
all information which is disclosed constitutes a 'response' to such
influence, all research may be said to be 'action research'" (1974,
29). The influences that he is referring to are not limited to crime
policy: they may result in that (ideally), but in addition research
on crime impacts and influences the social construction of crime
as a category, and sometimes impacts public attitudes toward the
criminalized population. These realizations about the functions
of research extend well beyond discussions among academics
and enter the realm of social existence. The transition from
traditional research to action research provides the researcher
with the opportunity to engage in resistance. As Mathiesen
points out, "the bases for resistance... are among the many which
contribute to the maintenance of a relationship between research
and politics through which both activities are exposed to internal
binding, internal strangulation. The conscious breaking down of
the boundary between them may possibly create the foundation
for research and politics being more of a liberated field for all
the people; research being liberated by politics, and politics
by research. At least, this may be an ideal goal" (36). It is this
direct and implied abolitionist link between theory, research,
and politics that causes many scholars to dismiss the academic
nature of the abolitionist perspective. But within the rejection of
the ability to achieve objectivity in research the link is legitimate
and necessary from a radical criminological approach.
While the majority of the literature on abolitionism focuses
on destructuring the present oppressive social order, there is
also a focus on the dehumanization of individuals in both the
academic- and the state-oriented categorizations and assessments
of the 'criminal' or at-risk-of-becoming-criminal populations.
The scientific process, as implemented through positivism and
mainstream criminology, aims to advance knowledge with little
consideration of the dehumanized elements it brings upon the
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subjects of their research. This may not be done consciously, but
is implemented through a miscalculation of the amount of power
that academia possesses in its role as a producer of knowledge.
While the policy implications for criminal justice
administrative sanctions are not always clear, it is important
to realize that the academic criminological culture has claimed
expertise in crime, and with that expertise comes responsibility.
According to penal abolitionism, that responsibility is not
primarily to science but to society. Science is regarded as a tool
to be used in the progression of knowledge and ultimately in the
progression of quality of life. When science is used to legitimize
oppression through an unquestioned acceptance and justification
of the criminalization process, especially within the contemporary
context of the criminalized population's demographics (race, age,
and class seem to be the most crucial determinants of inclusion
in the criminal population), the typical abolitionist cannot help
but cringe.
Scientific studies that undertake analysis of the criminal
population, but do not incorporate the context of power and
social order, or do not incorporate a critical assessment of
the criminalization process, are, in the view of abolitionists,
participating in the legitimization of oppression through
a scientification of the dehumanization of the powerless.
Objectivity in research, according to abolitionism, is rejected
as not only unrealistic but also unnecessary. In addition,
the professionalization of justice is problematic because it
disempowers the people directly involved in conflict and sends
the message that people cannot properly define or deal with their
own problems. Likewise, the professionalization of knowledge is
problematic because it loses touch with the people who are being
used to produce this knowledge. Following these assumptions,
abolitionists undertake research in a manner very different from
traditional positivist and classical criminological paradigms.
Abolitionist Use of Quantitative Data
In rejecting the notion of objectivity abplitionists recognize
that official crime statistics used in positivist and (neo)classical
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research studies can tell a very different story when viewed
through an abolitionist lens. Through this lens official statistics
represent the behaviour of the state, not the behaviour of
individuals. The number of arrests made each year, the number
of people in prison, and the number of cases a court processes
do not represent social behaviour: they are records of the state's
behaviour, and are relied on as clear, accurate descriptions of
what the state did, whom it criminalized, and how it dealt with
them. Chambliss and Nagasawa's concluding remarks in a 1969
study affirm penal abolitionist views of the roles and functions of
official crime data: "The findings of this study... lend support to
the argument that official statistics may tell us a good deal about
the activities of agencies responsible for generating statistics,
but they tell us very little about the distribution of criminal or
delinquent activities in the population" (77).
Self-reported data, according to abolitionism, are not
necessarily different from officially reported data in their
implications and validity, because self-reported data rely
heavily on state definitions of harm—if anything, self-reported
data illustrate how much crime the state did or did not detect,
and serve as a measure of effectiveness for the state's penal
institutions: how much crime the state detected compared with
how much crime the general population participated in.
Christie provides a good example of how quantitative data
are used within the penal abolitionist perspective. He explains
that the United States currently has 2.1 million prisoners, 730
prisoners per 100,000 inhabitants. "The increase [in the prison
population] has been unbelievable since 1975. The growth has
slowed down recently, but has not come to a complete stop" (2003,
53). He adds that, with 4.7 million people on bail, probation, and
parole, "6.8 million of the US population in 2003 is under some
sort of control of the institution of penal law" (53).
In this context the use of official statistics has little to do with
measuring or representing violence in society, and has a lot to
do with measuring the amount of control a state exercises over
people through its use of criminal justice. Christie (1993) points
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out that 2.4 percent of the entire US population, and 3.1 percent
of the population over the age of fifteen, are under some form
of control by the penal system. He also provides cross-national
statistics that illustrate the disproportionately high number
of people in prison in the United States compared with other
countries on a per-capita population basis. His conclusion is
not that citizens of the United States are more violent but that
the US government participates in imprisoning its citizens more
than other nation-states. This shift in focus is instrumental in
the abolitionist framework. Instead of relying on government
statistics to assess the behaviours of the people, abolitionists more
appropriately use government statistics to assess the behaviours
of the government.
Abolitionist Use of Qualitative Data
Because crime is a socially constructed notion, and because
society's behaviour cannot be assessed through a study of state-
gathered evidence, quantitative data sets produced by the state
represent state behaviour; while official data are used to reveal
the flaws of the state (racism, classism, and so on), ethnography
is used to put forth a firsthand presentation of experiences
with violence, harm, and/or criminalization. A widely used
quantitative tool in the penal abolitionist perspective is the use
of writing by prisoners when attempting to discuss or assess the
processes of criminalization and, more specifically, portray the
experience of imprisonment. The Journal of Prisoners on Prisons
gathers articles written by prisoners from all over the world, and
publishes them for use in university classrooms, distribution to
imprisoned peoples all over the world and sale in bookstores. It
is an underlying philosophy in the abolitionist methodological
realm that, to portray criminal experiences, it is best to hear about
them from the sources.
Ethnographies in the penal abolitionist perspective are best
presented as biographies or autobiographies. Davies explains
that "it is important to recognize the existence of a philosophy
of incarceration which is specifically located in the experience
of having been in prison" (1990, 21). He further divulges that in
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his presentation of prison writings "my interest is not with how
we rationalize having prisons, nor how prisons fit into a general
conception of social order, but how, being prisoners, we come
to terms with our own incarceration7' (21). He contextualizes
his intentions by stating that, "if we are to be more than
reflectively impotent... the writings must be placed within our
own communities, with a connectedness that is able to deal with
social structures not simply as alien impositions, but as human
creations that must be remade, transformed. And to do that we
have to rethink our entire sense of human relationships" (240).
In his assessment he is referring specifically to the role of prison
writing; I extend this philosophy beyond prisoners' work and
into how qualitative data are used in the penal abolitionist realm.
The intention is to capture the experiences of criminalization,
victimization, and marginalization, as opposed to using these
experiences to explain any specific theory of crime.
Maintaining the penal abolitionists' emphasis on firsthand
experience as the most reliable voice, Ruth Morris's (2000) book
Stories of Transformative Justice is an example of an abolitionist
work that captures stories and experiences in a manner that is
personal. Morris presents firsthand accounts of her experiences
with transformative justice, and combines these experiences with
records of actions taken and successes achieved on the road to
abolition. She presents stories of transformative justice as told by
the people who experienced them, and she places herself within
this ethnography, including her experiences with transformative
justice alongside the experiences of those whom she interviewed.
This method of placing the researcher within the research not
only deprofessionalizes the role of the researcher, but also
humanizes the people interviewed. It also equalizes the power
balance between researcher and researched, and relates well
with Mathiesen's conceptualization of action research.
The role and function of ethnographic research in penal
abolitionist methodological works is well articulated in
Gaucher's (2002) analysis of the task of the Journal of Prisoners
on Prisons. Gaucher states that "the analysis and commentary
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of prisoners in this anthology represent a counter-inscription
to these developments [expansion in prison populations and
the crime control industry] and the arguments that legitimize
them. Located firmly within the long-established tradition of
prison literature... , they collectively represent the prisoner-
intellectual's responses to the current conjecture, as informed by
the experience of criminalization and incarceration in the 1990s" (5;
emphasis added). It is in this philosophy that the humanization
of the criminalized population as pursued in penal abolitionist
methodological works is presented, in the hope of contradicting
the dehumanization of 'the criminal population' enforced
through positivist and (neo)classical assumptions of objectivity
and deluded conceptions of the researcher as apolitical.
CONTRADICTIONS IN PARADIGMATIC
METHODOLOGIES
Mathiesen's assessment of the role of research in abolitionism
incorporates a bottom-up, unfinished perspective, as opposed to
a top-down, completed framework. Mathiesen states that "it is
assumed that the refined theory will, through new hypotheses,
lead to a new and refined disclosure of information, in a feed-
back process with theory. In this way, research is in principle
an unfinished process.... It is this character of being in principle
unfinished that may give vitality to research. In this respect,
research perhaps resembles art, and is not unlike a series of other
activities in society —in the world of labor and leisure—which
are not in principle finished" (1974, 29).
Within this paradigm's theoretical models "theory and
practice should always be reciprocal, and the incentive for
innovation is formed by social movements" (van Swaaningen
1997, 54). In essence the penal abolitionist perspective emerged
out of dissatisfaction with the penal system. It incorporated (and
continues to incorporate) a mode of knowledge production that
is in direct contradiction with the very structures it opposes:
individual determinism, generalization of individual experiences,
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and the inherent dehumanization processes involved with such
structures.
It has been shown how the acceptance of an unfinished
philosophy in abolitionism is incorporated into the methodo-
logical tools used within the perspective. It is through the
presentation of personal experience within a framework that
highlights the scale to which penal repression can rise (as
illustrated in Christie's assessment of quantitative crime data)
that the penal abolitionist methodologies function. It is with
the expressed goal of humanization and empowerment that this
perspective carries out research.
THE PRODUCTION OF KNOWLEDGE: ACHIEVING
CONCLUSIONS
In this chapter I have presented a definition of the penal
abolitionist perspective as a theory of the nature of crime,
embracing a social constructionist definition of crime and
encompassing a peacemaking definition of the view of human
nature. I have illustrated through the form of analysis chosen
here that contextualization of knowledge is as relevant to the
production of knowledge as is the contextualization of socially
constructed categories to the production of crime. My presen-
tation of knowledge production in the penal abolitionist
perspective illustrates how penal abolitionism uses data to
support both its theoretical conclusion and its ideological
framework. Penal abolitionism encompasses a destructuring
impulse. I have illustrated how a starting point for destructuring
the concept of crime may well be within the structuralized nature
of knowledge.
Cohen (1992, 89) states that one may wonder why the study
of crime, "a subject so obviously grounded in the real world/'
should put effort into
mapping out the histories and present contexts in which
knowledge is produced rather than in getting along with the
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real business. The answer is paradoxical: some measure of self-
consciousness about how knowledge is produced and diffused
is needed to assess what proportion of this knowledge speaks
only to itself. This is true even for the natural world; as Sir Arthur
Eddington, an astronomer, once told his colleagues, "we have
found a strange footprint on the shores of the unknown. We
have devised profound theories, one after another, to account
for its origins. At last, we have succeeded in reconstructing the
creation that made the footprint. And lo! It is our own/7
Penal abolitionism assumes that, a realization that the footprint
is "our own/' the notion of crime as a social construction will be
emphasized in the academic field of criminal justice. Only then
will the conceptualization of crime shift from understanding it
as a phenomenon of human behaviour to understanding it as a
process of criminalization imposed by the state.
For that to happen the grander social structures need radical
revamping, and in some cases abolition, as is the case for penal
structures. Abolition in this structural sense extends beyond
the institutions of penal control and into the mental structures
that allow these institutions to exist. These mental structures are
currently grounded in a categorical, deterministic, and completed
framework that is both oppressive and counterproductive.
Unfortunately the academic structures associated with the
study of crime are themselves dichotomized. A move away
from paradigmatic divisions would be ideal, even though their
present positions are contradictory and volatile, presenting an
atmosphere for the study of crime that is at least structurally
representative of the contradictory and volatile nature of the
subject at hand. Kuhn presents an assessment of the paradigmatic
trap that is relevant to these observations:
Without commitment to a paradigm there could be no normal
science. Furthermore, that commitment must extend to areas
and to degrees of precision for which there is no full precedent.
If it did not, the paradigm could provide no puzzles that had not
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already been solved. Besides, it is not only normal science that
depends upon commitment to a paradigm. If existing theory
binds the scientist only with respect to existing applications,
then there can be no surprises, anomalies or crises. But these are
just the signposts that point the way to extraordinary science.
If positivistic restrictions on the range of a theory's legitimate
applicability are taken literally, the mechanism that tells the
scientific community what problems may lead to fundamental
change must cease to function. And when that occurs, the
community will inevitably return to something much like its
pre-paradigm state, a condition in which all members practice
science but in which their gross product scarcely resembles
science at all. Is it really any wonder that the price of significant
scientific advance is a commitment that runs the risk of being
wrong? (1996,100-101)
Fortunately (or unfortunately), in the social sciences, the
risk of being wrong is minimized. The subject that we study,
the complete nature of crime, is so complex, so ambiguous, and
so susceptible to myriad influences and explanations that the
possibilities are endless yet relevant. The key to grasping these
possibilities lies in the ability to assess theories of crime according
to their contextualized paradigmatic cultural affiliations, and
the relevant conflicting basic assumptions held in relation to
humanity and society. The key to advancing knowledge on
crime lies not in proving or disproving theory, but in abolishing
the perceived ability to unify the nature of crime.
NOTES
1 In presenting Wichmann's ideology I rely on van Swaaningen's
translation of her works.
2 Much of Wichmann's work was heavily influenced by Marx's
notions of revolution, both in the social realm and in the scientific
realm, as well as his view of socialism (Marx 1956, 25).
3 "Crime" is presented in many abolitionist texts with quotation
marks to emphasize its constructed nature.
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4 The term is meant to encompass both criminology and criminal
justice disciplines.
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This book has presented the ideological and practical problems
of criminal justice in Nigeria. Colonial impositions prevail in
Africa, and will continue to do so as long as British colonial
criminal justice systems continue to exist there. Having outlined
the problems associated with the penal system in Nigeria, and
having illustrated the structural and ideological issues that exist
along with the penal system in general, I find it necessary to
provide an ideological and activist context within which such
issues can be addressed. This is best accomplished through
penal abolitionism, penal being a representation of all institutions
legally yet violently used to convict and imprison oppressed
people all around the globe (prisons, courts, police, probation,
parole), and abolitionism being a movement that questions the
relevance of these institutions and calls for the destructuring of
such violent structures, while working to implement methods of
conflict resolution that are socially relevant and non-violent.
Following a long line of academic literature, and growing
through activist affiliations, this chapter outlines penal
abolitionism as it was presented to the Nigerian community in
efforts to organize the Tenth International Conference on Penal
Abolition in Nigeria. While in the previous chapter I presented the
scholarly history of penal abolition, in this chapter I present penal
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abolitionism in my own words, through my own understanding
of the abolitionist movement, highlighting the questions and
issues associated with the current penal crises that Nigeria and
other nations, all over the "developed" and "developing" world,
are facing.
WHAT IS PENAL ABOLITION?
Penal abolition is the name given to the social/political activist
movement, theory, and lifestyle that rejects the use of penal
sanctions to deal with human conflict. It is a complex phenomenon
that not only redefines reality as many know it, but also rejects
the assumptions we make about conflict, social safety, and
crime control. Using penal punishment as a solution to harm is
viewed as oppressive and counterproductive; in addition, penal
sanctions are rejected as the only and necessary reaction to crime.
Deterrence is recognized as a failed attempt to scare people into
not breaking rules, and isolation is recognized as a creator of
greater problems — community safety is not promoted through
either penal structures or ideologies. Penal abolitionists work to
define problems in a manner more relevant to the community
and to reach more realistic forms of conflict resolution.
Penal abolitionist ideologies recognize that societies have
existed and were able to function without penal sanctions in
the past, and thus contemporary society, though mentally and
structurally reliant on the penal system, is capable of functioning
without such a violent system. The challenge lies in finding
a non-penal, anti-violent, non-oppressive structure that is
compatible with contemporary social needs. This challenge is
far from impossible to meet, and at this point, during times of
overcrowded, inhumane, dehumanized penal institutions and
policies, it is a necessity.
Penal abolitionists recognize that the penal mindset is
ingrained in many factors of everyday existence and functioning,
and thus realize that the battle is both concrete (fighting against
human rights violations) and abstract (revolutionizing thoughts
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and challenging assumptions). In working to change the way
human beings have been conditioned and socialized to think and
react, penal abolitionists believe that an essential starting point
is a new awareness of the words we use to communicate with
each other.
A PENAL ABOLITIONIST DICTIONARY
Crime
This word is not used in penal abolitionist discourse; it is rejected
based on the social stigma it imposes on all those labelled
criminal. Instead of focusing on crime penal abolitionists focus
on harms; they attempt to empower the community in defining
its own problems and thus dealing with them on its own terms. In
addition, " crime7' is a term that is state-imposed; it is a word that
defines thousands of very different acts and somehow implies
that all these acts are connected enough to elicit one solution.
Abolitionists reject this notion, reinforcing the belief that there is
no single solution to the diverse social problems resulting from
and elicited through what we today refer to as crime.
Harms
Harms are actions that intentionally cause pain (physical,
emotional, sexual, mental, financial or other) for another person.
These acts are the primary focus for penal abolitionists who
work to deconstruct the notion of crime. All other acts that do
not implicitly and directly result in harm should not be defined
as criminal; such acts should be decriminalized and dealt with in
their appropriate spheres. For example, drug use: a person who
chooses to use drugs is free to do so as long as he or she is not
harming anyone in the process; if a user develops an addiction
needing formal attention, then that person needs medical or social
attention (whatever the specific situation defines as necessary),
not justice-oriented intervention. It is important to highlight the
separation of moral judgements from justice judgements in this
redefinition of harm.
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Community
The concept of community is all-inclusive and interconnected.
One cannot separate the community by building a wall and
involuntarily placing people behind it. Prisoners continue to be
part of our community, despite their physical separation; they
become a feared and very mysterious segment, but still remain
a segment of the community. Under this definition the prison
can be compared to an ostrich sticking its head in the sand and
assuming that its problems will disappear because it can no
longer see them. Of course, if the ostrich leaves its head in the
sand for too long, it will inevitably suffocate.
Safety
"Safety" is a term that can be defined in two main spheres:
individual and social safety. Individual safety involves personal,
private issues, while collective individual safeties lead to
social safety. A key word associated with safety is cohesiveness.
Abolitionists emphasize that all members of the human race have
a right to a safe, cohesive, and empowered existence. This belief
does not justify the imposition of institutional violence (prison,
death penalty, corporal punishment) in the name of safety. Safety
is the responsibility of the individual, the community, and the
overall social structure — it is a responsibility, not a legitimization.
It is about social interactions rather than state interventions. In
allowing a community to establish agency one empowers that
community to be safe. While the criminal justice system promotes
security, penal abolitionists identify security as a false sense of
safety that does not provide communities with opportunities to
coexist. A security perspective relies heavily on the demonization
of "other" populations, while a safety perspective relies heavily
on the democratization of society in a manner that promotes
coexistence and equal access to opportunities and resources.
Violence
Penal abolitionists have a broad view of violence. Violence
involves acts of harm and is not limited to individuals.
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According to penal abolitionists, violence is much more
prevalent than most people like to admit. Violence from a penal
abolitionist standpoint is expanded to include actions of the
state, corporations, institutions, and social structures (such as
capitalism). Penal abolitionists recognize that violence at state,
corporate, and institutional levels (war, genocide, embezzlement,
imposed poverty) affects far more lives than do individual acts
of violence (armed robbery, homicide, assault). Abolitionists also
recognize that the same organizations that harm the community
at the highest levels of human cost are defining individual-level
harms as the most problematic. This redirection of fear and focus
allows state and economic institutions to maintain a status quo
that redirects attention away from their own acts of violence.
When violence perpetrated and funded by the state through its
institutions (death penalty, war, corporate violence) is brought
forth it is often presented to the public as a necessary evil. Penal
abolitionists recognize that all harms and evils are unnecessary
at all levels—no justifications (with the exception of self-defence
in extreme circumstances) are accepted for the imposition of
violence.
Responsibility
This is a very important concept for penal abolitionists. The
abolitionist notion of responsibility expects that all persons who
partake in violent, harmful behaviours should accept direct
responsibility for their actions in non-violent, non-harmful ways.
The penal system as it exists today does not allow people who
have committed wrongs to take responsibility for them. Instead
the penal system claims ownership of their actions and takes
responsibility for their lives. Penal abolitionists are vehement
in their pursuit of social justice and believe that it begins with
the proper recognition of all harms, followed by properly repre-
sented, relevant, necessary actions, as defined by the voiced
needs of all affected victims, offenders, and other community
members.
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Victim
This term is not meant to disempower people or relegate them to
a helpless position, but it is important in the recognition of harms
imposed and violations experienced. Like "crime/' the term
" victim" encompasses too many experiences, and thus its use loses
the true essence of a harm suffered. Abolitionists rely more on the
term "survivor" because of the negative connotations the penal
mindset has imposed on the term "victim." "Survivor" implies
progress and gives the person credit for overcoming to whatever
degree the violation(s). Much as the penal system has stigmatized
criminals, that stigmatization has been extended to disempower
victims. In resistance to such implications abolitionists seek to
use different terms that may elicit an awareness of the diversity
available for defining, dealing with, and addressing harm and
conflict.
Offender
An offender is a person who directly or indirectly, through action
or inaction, has harmed another person. Penal abolitionists
believe that those who have hurt others need to take full
responsibility and can only do so if they come to understand the
consequences of their behaviours for those they have hurt. In the
pursuit of social justice penal abolitionists focus on restitution,
reconciliation, and social coexistence. It is important to stress that
all of those things do not necessarily imply forgiveness — such
expectations are not imposed upon survivors of harm. At the
same time abolitionists stress that, once a harm has occurred,
the person harmed as well as the person who has harmed are
now connected at least through that event (if not through many
more events that led up to the harm); thus, in addressing the
harm imposed and endured, a proper recognition of that act and
its context must be achieved. Thereafter direct action toward
resolving/reimbursing/restituting the harm may be pursued.
When the harm is irreversible (murder, rape) penal abolitionists
focus on the needs of those who have survived the harm. Such
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needs can only be identified by those directly involved and
should not be assumed identifiable by the state or its criminal
justice apparatuses. In recognition of individuality and diversity
among people's needs and reactions to harm, penal abolitionists
take a situation-by-situation approach, and thus call for the
creation of a response system that is flexible and empowering
enough to allow the humans within it to achieve justice.
Social Stability
Social stability is the ultimate goal. Abolitionists assume that
human nature thrives with a sense of acceptance, a sense of
belonging and self-worth, and the opportunity to be comfortable
and safe. Most human actions (positive, negative, violent, non-
violent) are the results of attempts to achieve those goals based
on personal and social perceptions of happiness (by acquiring
power, money, status, trophies, education, family, possessions
and so on). Realizing and accepting that all humans have
needs may lead to a greater, more positive understanding of
the nature of human behaviour and eventually may lead to
communities that can coexist. In assuming that all people have
needs the common ground of a society is based on the building
of a structure that functions to provide for the needs of all its
citizens. The present social and cultural assumptions do not
rely on a need-based understanding of human behaviour. The
present social order assumes that human nature is hedonistic,
or selfish, or determined by negative influences surrounding
us. Such negative assumptions, while accepted by most to
describe "others/7 we do not hold to be true about ourselves.
If more people begin to understand that "others" are not that
different from "us," then the fractured state of contemporary
society might begin to heal. The anger, hatred and fears that
communities of privilege hold toward those who are oppressed
may begin to dissolve, and the call for state-sanctioned revenge
in addressing conflicts and inequalities may begin to be revealed
as unreasonable and violent.
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IDEOLOGIES OF PENAL ABOLITIONISM
What Penal Abolition Is Not
Penal abolition is often perceived as an easy way out for
'criminals'. It is not. If anything, penal abolitionists demand
that people who have hurt other people need to take proper
responsibility for their actions. In facing the realities of their
actions (and not in disappearing behind prison walls), and in
understanding what they have done, offenders need to actively
participate in transforming, restituting, or resolving each specific
situation. At the same time abolitionists are not revenge-oriented
and do not advocate harming those who have harmed others in
order to teach them not to harm.
Penal abolitionism is not a movement to solve the problems
of the world by coming up with an easy solution. Problems
cannot be solved without collaboration, and all those involved
in the problem should be included in the solution. The present
penal system works in an exclusive, not an inclusive, framework.
Often people say, " Abolition sounds like a good idea, we know
the penal system is not helping society deal with violence,
but what do you propose to do in its place?" The abolitionist
response to this expectation is "Work with me, and we will
figure it out together." There are no easy solutions, and there is
no one answer, structure, or alternative that can replace the penal
structure. To ask for one solution is to ask for a structure that is
just as counterproductive and inhumane as the penal system is
now.
Penal abolition is not an impossible dream—to believe
something is impossible is to render it impossible. Penal abolition
is relevant not only in small communities, but also in large cities.
People often argue that in a small town or village it is easier
to create and maintain the type of community that can work
without penal sanctions, but in a large city the environment is
too impersonal, too disconnected, and too big to really have any
sense of true community. Penal abolitionists recognize that with
more people the challenge of establishing community spirit is
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bigger, but they also recognize that with more people around
there are more resources for support and network-building.
It is about celebrating diversity and personalizing human
interactions. It is about breaking down capitalist barriers and
fighting the depersonalized state of many large cities. In a way
abolitionists view community as a non-concrete phenomenon
that can exist anywhere people really want it to exist. Geography
does not limit community. Communities are made up of people
who share similar interests, goals, ideals, and visions. With
this concept of community penal abolitionism can thrive in all
settings.
Penal abolition is not about the removal of all social controls,
but about the implantation of a social system that is not violent or
based on fear. It is about unity, equality, and coexistence. Penal
abolitionism is about destructuring oppressive penal regimes/
structures, and creating a cohesive, safe society that accepts all,
belongs to all, and functions to serve all.
Abolition versus Reform
Only reforms that work toward abolition are considered
productive within the penal abolitionist movement. It has been
a trend in penal reform that all attempts to humanize the penal
system have been co-opted into its inhumane structure, and only
work to strengthen its existence and expand its power. Thus
only reforms that exist outside the realm of the penal structure
are pursued by penal abolitionists. They work to advance the
vision of an empowered, enlightened community, and only
when sections of power are handed over is a reform truly an
alternative, and not a simple add-on to the already too powerful,
revenge-oriented penal system.
Restoration versus Transformation
Penal abolitionists do not generally support notions of restoration,
mainly because to restore is not necessarily to change. If harm
occurs and the community works to restore the survivors to the
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state they were in before the harm occurred, and they succeed
in this restoration, then all they have really done is restored
them to a situation that allowed the harm to happen in the first
place. Transformation looks at why the harm occurred and
deals with the poisons that allowed it to grow into harm (social
alienation, capitalist greed, poverty, racism, classism, sexism,
heterosexism, ageism, and so on). In addition, penal abolitionists
do not always believe that restoration is realistic. When a harm
occurs the survivor of that harm will never again be the person
s(he) was before the harm occurred. Penal abolitionists look at
the processes of transformation that are necessary in dealing
with the harm, and work to integrate its consequences into the
person's life in a way that is tolerable, livable, and, if possible,
positive and productive.
Prison versus Penal Abolition
Penal abolitionists recognize that abolishing the prison is not
necessarily sufficient in abolishing penal oppression. The real
problem is the penal mindset that allows the prison to exist:
abolishing the prison without abolishing this mentality and
structure would only open society up to the possibility of
different yet still brutal penal oppressions. Because the prison
is so concrete and so open about its oppressive elements, it is
an easy target. The goal is to understand how the prison and
other penal institutions (police, courts, probation, parole) are
legitimized: the prison is the end result of what really needs to
be questioned, revealed, and abolished.
It is primarily a revolution of the mind taking place in the
current consciousness of the people. This revolution must occur
if productive structural changes are to be properly implemented.
Penal abolitionists do recognize that the society we live in today
has created a situation in which people, and the socioeconomic
and political power structures they live within, are constantly
hurting and violating each other. Change needs to start within
the mind, the soul, and the essence of each human being before
it can take any real shape on a larger structural level. Without a
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revolution of the mind any and all penal reforms will continue to
be co-opted by a legitimate and legal yet violent penal system.
Penal abolitionism does recognize a dire need for structural
reforms: too many people languish within the claws of a violent
penal system, and too many people suffer from violence in
the community. Penal abolition is about the creation of real
alternatives to revenge, institutionalized violence, and penal
powers. The community needs to be empowered to create
and choose its own versions of justice, and only then will the
reliance on criminal justice be truly recognized for its brutal,
counterproductive, dehumanizing elements.
THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON PENAL
ABOLITION
The International Conference on Penal Abolition (ICOPA)
represents one of the most visible elements of the penal abolitionist
movement. Initially ICOPA was the International Conference on
Prison Abolition. In 1987 ICOPA in Montreal resolved to change
the name to the International Conference on Penal Abolition,
incorporating an understanding that the abolition of prison
does not deal with the penal system's revenge-oriented, violent
structures. To abolish the prison is not to address the problematic
nature of the penal system's framework of criminal justice. The
ICOPA movement has travelled the world, starting in Montreal
in 1983 and returning several times to Canada over the years.
ICOPA was also held in the Netherlands, Poland, the United
States, Spain, Costa Rica, and New Zealand before finding its
way to West Africa. In presenting how ICOPA X was organized
in Nigeria an example of the methods used by abolitionists to
work toward achieving penal abolition can be analyzed.
ICOPA X Struggles and Triumphs
The Tenth International Conference on Penal Abolition (ICOPA
X) was held in Nigeria, breaking new ground as the first ICOPA
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to be hosted by an African nation. The decision to host ICOPA in
Nigeria was controversial. Racism is a violent and silenced topic,
even in the penal abolitionist movement. Up until ICOPA IX, in
Toronto in 2000, the penal abolitionist movement lacked African
or African American representation. Participants in ICOPA
IX included members from Critical Resistance, an anti-racist
activist organization from the United States. In bringing forth
issues of racism within ICOPA and emphasizing ICOPA's lack
of representation of people of African descent these participants
challenged the contemporary abolitionist movement, and
worked to expand its parameters and membership. They also
brought in a more emphatic awareness of the links between
the movement to abolish slavery and the contemporary penal
abolitionist movement. From this perspective racism is central
to oppression.
The efforts to bring in stronger African and African American
representation resulted in the decision to hand ICOPA over
to Nigerian representatives. This decision was met with much
resistance and fear, and resulted in the initiation of a discussion
(which continues) about splitting up ICOPA into different
meetings that would accommodate its diversity. Despite such
difficult conversations and conflicts, the vast majority of ICOPA
founders and organizers were in support of ICOPA in Nigeria.
Although racism did arise, they were loudly voiced by a small
number of people, and unfortunately countered and silenced by
the majority of ICOPA's participants and organizers.
The main issue, as I have come to understand it, is this: the
social structures within which we all live are dichotomized and
divisive; in addition, the penal system is vast and exploits many
different populations in many different ways. As we work to
build a strong penal abolitionist movement, strong emotions are
bound to be felt and voiced. The need to represent all voices and
experiences in a manner that does not compete (who is being
oppressed the most or the least) will be a challenge because the
contemporary order demands a quantification of results and a
comparative paradigm that generalizes conclusions.
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In working to build a stronger and more effective abolitionist
movement ICOPA must provide a space that represents all
peoples affected by the penal system, in a manner that allows
them to voice their opinions of and frustrations with the penal
system. Furthermore, ICOPA participants must learn to accept
the fact that, despite their radical positions, and their battles
against oppression and penal colonialism, they too are impacted
by the negative structures of contemporary racist societies. In
accepting that we cannot all do the same thing, or have the same
experience with the penal system, we might be able to move
forward in a manner that is strengthened, and not weakened, by
our diversities. What ties us together in the end is the abolitionist
goal.
While I work to bring into ICOPA African and African
American voices, I also work to respect those who bring in the
voices of the poor and/or imprisoned, the young, and women.
To begin competing with each other for space in ICOPA would
be to fall into a social control trap. Avoiding this trap in the future
will include a conscious effort to respect, as opposed to feeling
threatened by, each other's differences and knowledges. In the
end most people in the world are affected negatively by penal
colonialism. If ICOPA is able to focus more on this fact it may
be more open to learning about penal abolition from colonized
peoples. The underrepresentation of black voices in ICOPA is an
issue that must be more readily changed.
Despite all these obstacles, the abolitionist movement has
strengths. ICOPA in Nigeria was attended by people who are
long-time supporters of the conference and the movement. In
addition, many who could not attend due to financial restraints
remained in touch and provided support. Some long-time
supporters of ICOPA chose not to attend the Nigerian conference;
those who were unable to resolve their own issues with racism
stopped communicating with ICOPA participants during the
time ICOPA spent in Africa.
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This experience of racism within ICOPA in Toronto made it
clear to me that the abolitionist movement is not immune to the
social ills that plague the society it is attempting to change. Racism
continues to challenge and destabilize communities all over the
world. In my opinion, and from my experiences, racism is at the
root of many issues of oppression and inequality, and ICOPA
participants were forced to face these realities; some learned from
the experience, and some became defensive. Despite such issues
with racism and internal struggles, ICOPA did prevail in Nigeria,
and the message of abolition was brought at a critical time into
an African context. ICOPA had much to learn from West Africa:
hosting ICOPA on the land with a long history of European slave
trading and colonialism was an excellent way, not only to expand
the understanding of abolition, but also to address the racisms
that ICOPA was and still is struggling against.
Organizing ICOPA X
Prior to ICOPA X public awareness and community mobilization
were pursued nationally in Nigeria. The goal was to make
Nigerians more aware of the penal abolitionist movement and
the journey that ICOPA had taken through the years. Public
awareness was pursued through a media campaign that involved
several local and national television broadcasts, a nationwide
radio programme that allowed for call-in discussions, and print
media promotions in Nigerian newspapers and one African
magazine. In addition, ICOPA X was announced and discussed at
many Human Rights Network meetings.1 One non-governmental
organization, the Nigerian Youth Leadership Movement led by
Ezekiel Ogundare, took an interest in the central issues and the
ideas surrounding ICOPA, and, on its own initiative, held a penal
abolitionist workshop to raise awareness in its own community
in April 2001.
ICOPA X participants comprised a diverse and dynamic
group. Participants came from Ghana, The Gambia, Liberia, New
Zealand, the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom. In
addition, Nigerians representing the three major ethnic groups
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and many of the minority groups from different regions in the
country were in attendance. Nigerian participants for ICOPA X
included University of Lagos students from the law, psychology,
and sociology departments; several representatives from non-
governmental human rights organizations; academics; activists;
lawyers; high- and low-ranking prison officers; high-ranking
police officers; National (Nigerian) Human Rights Commission
representatives; representatives from the National House of
Assembly; ex-prisoners; Nigerian military personnel; poets;
musicians; and interested Nigerian youths. The international
participants were mainly academics and activists, while
continental participants included high-ranking prison officers
from neighbouring West African countries, ex-prisoners,
human rights NGO representatives, and musicians. The Local
Organizing Committee was comprised of PRAWA staff, student
volunteers, and youths from the local community in Lagos. The
entire participant list for ICOPA X was approximately 100 people:
about 65 University of Lagos students and community members,
about 15 international participants, and about 20 Nigerian non-
governmental and governmental representatives.
ICOPA X: Abuja Panel
On August 23,2002, ICOPA X was launched in Abuja, the capital
of Nigeria, with a Policy Makers Panel in the Nigerian National
Assembly. The purpose of the panel was to raise awareness
about ICOPA and the notion of penal abolition among Nigerian
governmental officials, while bringing forth issues surrounding
the death penalty and the need for its removal from the criminal
code in Nigeria. This panel was booked weeks in advance,
yet there was a slight and unexpected problem in scheduling
that day: a week before the panel took place the Nigerian
government called a meeting on the day of the panel to discuss
the impeachment of the president of Nigeria on charges of
corruption and embezzlement. This resulted in a few hours
of delay, and participants in the panel did not know whether
the panel would take place at all. Upon finishing the meeting,
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which directly addressed corruption in Nigeria, government
officials who had committed to participating in the ICOPA panel
did come to it. The panel commenced with several members,
including the chairperson, from the House of Representatives
Committee on Human Rights and Legal Matters, high-ranking
police and prison officials, human rights activists, university
professors, and representatives from the British Embassy.
Following presentations about the concepts of penal abolition,
African justice models as they existed prior to, during, and after
colonialism, and a critical outlook on the current colonial penal
system in Nigeria, discussions, questions, and debates began.
A debate about the relevance of the death penalty in Nigeria
ensued, and a pinnacle was reached when the question of
statistics on executions in the country was brought up. Sitting
on the panel as a PRAWA representative, I asked "when was the
last time an execution was carried out in the country/' Professor
Adeyemi, dean of law at the University of Lagos, suggested that
the Nigerian Prison Service representatives were likely in the
best position to answer the question. In response a high-ranking
representative of the prison service explained that all over the
country state governors refused to sign execution warrants and
that this refusal resulted in life sentences on death row for many
prisoners. He added that inevitably ending in prisoners' deaths,
this form of the death penalty is prolonged and indirect. As for
when the last execution actually took place, he stated that "There
are a lot of silent executions in Nigeria, as my friend who is
present will tell you," and he pointed at the police officer sitting
beside him. The officer confirmed that "silent executions" do
take place and stated his belief that they are a necessary measure
in Nigerian society. These executions are carried out in police
cells after arrests and prior to court appearances. This debate
led to a discussion on deterrence and how ineffective it is. Hal
Pepinsky, a professor of criminal justice at Indiana University
and one of the international participants at ICOPA X, responded
that deterrence in the United States, with its structured and
well-funded criminal justice system, does not work either, and
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he pointed out that the harsher a punishment is, the less people
relate to it and follow the law it is trying to implement.
Adeyemi gave a detailed presentation on penal policies
and African alternatives. He spoke about the researched public
opinion of criminal justice in Nigeria and the widespread
distrust of criminal justice in Nigeria, which results in "jungle
justice" on many of Nigeria's streets. He defined jungle justice
as being comprised of vigilante groups who literally hunt down
armed robbers and kill them publicly. An issue that arises in
these situations, aside from the gross inhumanity of these public
and graphic killings, is that tribalism and politics are usually in
control of such vigilante groups. Adeyemi proceeded to give an
in-depth analysis of traditional (precolonial) Nigerian justice
and stressed that it did not rely on the death penalty or other
violent means of resolving conflict or dealing with harm: "It was
restorative in terms of social equilibrium: it recognized that you
can't solve conflict with conflict, and reconciliation was widely
used."
Adeyemi spoke about crime as conflict and thus the solution
to crime as encompassed by conflict resolution. He referred to
instances in which the death penalty was used in African history.
He stressed that, contrary to Western opinion, the death penalty
in the majority of precolonial African societies was used as a
last resort, in cases of extreme reoffending and danger to the
community: only after banishment was not successful in keeping
a community safe was an execution implemented. Adeyemi also
noted that executions were used when the crime could not be
dealt with rationally (as with accusations entailing the misuse
of witchcraft). After providing more details on historical and
contemporary issues of justice he ended by urging, "It is high
time that we come back to embracing traditional justice."
Adeyemi's presentation prompted comments by the
representative of the Nigerian Prison Service related to root
causes of crime. He spoke about the social problems that
criminalize people on a national scale and the Nigerian society
on an international scale. He pointed out that capital sentences
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increase crime in the large divisions they cause by marginalizing,
stereotyping, and demonizing entire populations of people: the
prisoners he worked with every day are one of the most socially
feared populations in the country. He stated that the panel needed
to talk less about those stereotypes, and more about alternatives
and penal abolition.
In response the police officer on the panel spoke about the
fact that mediation as an alternative to penality is easier among
homogeneous populations, and he thought that Nigeria has what
he called 'the stranger element' with the hundreds of different
ethnic groups and languages that exist. He spoke about the
churches, the mosques and the chiefs interfering in the justice
process and initiating out-of-court settlements. He complained
about victims who want compensation for the crimes they have
suffered and expect the police to provide such compensation.
He continued to stress the need for deterrence in light of the
high rates of violence in Nigeria, specifically associated with the
trafficking of women and children, and with armed robberies. He
stressed that long terms of imprisonment will have no benefit as
an alternative to the death penalty in Nigeria because, unlike in
Western nations, the criminal justice system's budget is not vast.
These budget restrictions are clear when one assesses the court
system and finds that 62.4 percent of the prison population has
never been to court and may wait an indefinite number of years
before being taken to court, or getting legal representation. It
became clear in this discussion that the police hold a much more
conservative view of the penal system than the prison officials
do in Nigeria. An informal discussion after the panel revealed
to me that the prison administration feels an African sense of
responsibility toward the prisoners whom they have been hired
to care for. In this instance African culture transcended, at least in
ideology, the penal institution's attempts to westernize Africa.
Discussions were rounded off with comments from the
Honourable Ibrahim Zailani of the House of Representatives. He
stated that, " While Nigeria may not be ready to abolish the death
penalty, this panel has made it clear that [more culturally and
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socially appropriate] alternatives need to be put in place of the
penal system in Nigeria/' He asked that PRAWA and ICOPA
X assist in putting together a committee to help the House of
Representatives in drafting legislation to put before the house,
promoting the implementation and recognition of alternatives to
imprisonment and penality. Contact information was exchanged,
and communication started about forming this committee and
drafting the legislation.
ICOPA X: Lagos Conference
From August 24 to August 29, 2002, ICOPA X was hosted by
PRAWA at the University of Lagos. On Saturday, August 24,
ICOPA participants attended the Black Heritage Festival held
at CMS on Lagos Island. The festival is an annual event held
in Nigeria in memory of the oppressive history of slavery and
colonization, and to reinforce black pride, promote peace in
Africa, recall that the abolition of such oppressive forces is
possible, and stress that the African people have survived massive
atrocities. The opening ceremonies of this event were held at the
Race Course Stadium, a large and expensive stadium built by
the British colonial government for horse-racing, an event that is
not necessarily popular in Nigeria. The stadium has never been
used for horse-racing. It came to represent the inappropriateness
and the extravagant lifestyles of colonialists. It was later used
as the venue for the independence ceremony from the British
when institutionalized colonial rule was abolished in Nigeria.
The opening ceremonies of the Black Heritage Festival attended
by ICOPA X participants included a celebration of the abolition
of institutionalized slave trading of West Africans. Dances and
festive costumes from all over the country paraded before the
public and the oba ("king") of Lagos Island.
The second day of ICOPA X, August 25, was dedicated to
the memory of Dr. Ruth Morris. She was a Canadian/American,
prison/peace, Quaker activist and one of the original organizers
of ICOPA I, held in Montreal in 1983. Ruth was an activist
volunteer in her children's schools and began to visit prisons
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through a Quaker programme. She also began to bail men out
while they were awaiting trial, and taking them into her home
for shelter and support. Throughout her life she advocated for
the rights of some of the most stigmatized prisoners and ex-
prisoners in society. Ruth was a leading international theorist
of what she called "transformative justice/7 She was the author
of many books and information pamphlets in the area of penal
abolition and transformative justice. She led the organization
of ICOPA IX in Toronto in May 2000, and sadly she died in
September 2001. An optional church service in her memory was
organized at Yaba Glory Worship Centre, followed by visits
to the Kirikiri medium and maximum security prisons, where
ICOPA X participants shared meals and music in solidarity with
prisoners. About 1,000 prisoners ate and participated in song
with ICOPA X participants that day. In the evening a candlelight
vigil was held at the Lagoon Front in memory of Ruth. People
gathered with lit candles, and spoke about her life and her work.
Songs were shared after a moment of silence in her memory.
The official ICOPA X opening ceremony was held on Monday,
August 26, at the University of Lagos Conference Centre. It was
followed by presentations by Professor Julia Sudbury of the
Department of Ethnic Studies at Mills University, California,
highlighting the racist and economic elements of the US justice
system, while emphasizing the importance of an international
abolitionist movement that will work in unity to abolish the
atrocities occurring through penal systems around the globe.
Justice S. A. Brobbey from the Court of Appeal in Ghana ended
with a presentation about human rights issues in relation to the
criminal justice system's failures in West Africa. The theme was
established early: the penal system is malfunctioning around the
globe, and alternatives are desperately needed.
Presentations throughout the conference included an
assessment of the psychological consequences of torture, the
implementation of transformative and community justice
programmes around the globe, and the successes of, and obstacles
to, resistance movements. A powerful moment during one of the
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sessions included Chino Hardin, with the Prison Moratorium
Project in New York. She discussed the problems with the US
criminal justice and narrated personal experiences from her time
in US youth jails. This session challenged the general stereotypes
of crime and criminals that abide in Nigerian society. Hardin
spoke about her years as a member of a street organization (what
is referred to in mainstream society as a street gang) and the
armed robberies in which she was involved. In Nigeria armed
robbers are feared more than any other category of people and
are viewed as the most dangerous threat to social safety. The
Nigerian participants' reaction to Chino, whom they had spent
time with prior to this session, was open-minded, and, upon
seeing her accomplishments, hearing about her hardships in
prisons, and listening to her call for abolition, many later stated
that their stereotypes about armed robbers had been greatly
challenged.
Tuesday, August 27, was dedicated to a focus on alternative
models to the penal system, both in theory and in practice.
Traditional African models of justice were presented and
discussed in detail, with Professor Oko Elechi outlining the
historical aspects of general African indigenous justice systems
and the links of most of them to transformative justice ideology.
He stressed that most contemporary justice systems are Euro- and
male-centred, and are not natural to African societies in general.
An understanding of these misogynistic and racist components
of the dominant European forms of justice was accentuated with
presentations about the Maori struggle in New Zealand and the
inappropriateness of the colonial justice system in dealing with
conflict in colonized ("non-European") communities.
These criticisms were followed by a plenary focusing on
practical alternatives to the penal system. The peacemaking
perspective was explored and accentuated with presentations by
members of the Alternatives to Violence Project (AVP) in Nigeria
and their work with the International Committee of the Red Cross
(ICRC). The AVP presentation focused on the Nigerian situation
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and the role of conflict resolution within the context of communal
conflicts. lyke Chiemeka, on behalf of the AVP, emphasized the
fact that violence is inevitable in every society and that the key to
managing violence is the chosen approach. He gave an analysis
of what he called the chaotic Nigerian society and said that how
a society chooses to manage its conflicts is what constitutes its
civilization. He gave examples of Nigerian issues that have led to
violence and demonstrated how the AVP resolved such conflicts
non-violently. His presentation was complemented by that of
Ellen Flanders from the United States, one of the founders of
the AVP. She shared some of her experiences with the AVP and
presented examples of how it has transcended violence in many
parts of the world.
PRAWA employees participated in ICOPA X, not only
through organizational efforts, but also in presentations. In a
paper entitled "Alternatives to Imprisonment Measures: Lessons
from Africa" Saib Feyisetan, head of the Communications and
Media Department at PRAWA, presented on behalf of Chukwuma
Ume, a PRAWA employee in the Prison Officers Human Rights
Training Programme. This presentation highlighted some
parts of the Nigerian Constitution that relate to prison and
punishment, and the international laws that guide the treatment
of prisoners. Feyisetan also spoke about the links between present
African prisons and colonization. He emphasized the fact that
alternatives to imprisonment are not foreign or new concepts in
Africa; rather, they are a part of the heritage and history of the
continent. He gave examples of successful implementations of
alternatives to imprisonment in Zimbabwe, Kenya, and Nigeria.
Moses Blokanjay Jackson2 spoke about the immediate need
for alternatives to the penal system in Liberia. He belongs to a
non-governmental organization called Volunteers for the Care
of Abused and Abandoned Children. He presented a contextual
account of the war in Liberia, and national and international
government links to the conflicts there. He spoke about the power
and economic imbalances in Liberia, and highlighted the fact
that sanctioned war measures only further the wealth of the rich,
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while driving the poor further into poverty. He explained that the
situation in Liberia, promoted by political and economic motives,
forces the poor to survive only by relying heavily on the rich.
He gave a diverse set of examples to support these statements,
from the exploited exportation of the diamonds industry to the
forced prostitution of women and children in Liberia. Within
such a context, he stated, a justice system promoted by the state
(those in power and in control of the nation's wealth) is not only
dangerous, but also futile. With this sort of context and with a
better understanding of the history of the conflicts in Liberia, it
became clear that a colonial penal system is not only ineffective
because of the current war, but will continue to be inappropriate
after the war is subdued.
Highlighting the West African transformative justice context,
Justice Brobbey from Ghana spoke about the implementation
and successful functioning of the Victim-Offender Mediation
Model in Ghana. He started his presentation by stating that
there are two recognized justice systems in Ghana: those that
are formal (run by the state) and those that are informal (run by
the community). He said that people often resort to the informal
sector of justice mainly due to convenience, accessibility, time,
and financial restraints. He highlighted the formal system's
restrictions through the court processes and the flexibility of the
informal system through arbitration/mediation. He gave details
of the problematic nature of the formal justice system in Ghana
and contrasted it with the informal processes that the majority of
the people pursue.
Dr. Senghor Aboubakar from The Gambia presented a paper
on behalf of Hanna Foster of the African Centre for Democracy
and Human Rights. The paper outlined the Victim-Offender
Mediation Model being implemented in The Gambia. He spoke
about the community's open response to it. He stated that The
Gambia is a small country of about 1.4 million people, and the
number of people in prison is thus relatively small. He pointed
out that going to court or the police in The Gambia is considered
taboo because people simply cannot embrace the idea. He
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spoke about the African Centre for Democracy and Human
Rights mediation services and stated that they have been used
in resolving many forms of conflicts ranging from individual
conflicts within the home to larger conflicts in society.
It was noted that, ironically, the majority of justice projects
in Africa are funded by European donors. Prior to European
funds, African justice models existed throughout the continent
during colonization and continue to be found. European funds
aid in formalizing African justice models, and this formalization
creates the danger of co-optation, opening colonial avenues for
the creation of a more systematized and inflexible model that
might mirror the malfunctioning and culturally inappropriate
colonial criminal justice systems in Africa.
In the evening of August 27, ICOPA X participants went to
the new Afrika shrine in Ikeja, Lagos, for a special concert by Femi
Anikulapo Kuti entitled Exposing Oppression through Musical
Expression. Femi Kuti is the son of the late musician/activist
Fela Anikulapo Kuti. Fela's legend in Nigeria and Africa exhibits
the oppression and inhumanity of colonization and the ensuing
military regimes in Nigeria. Fela's mother was murdered by the
head of the military state at the time, Olusegun Obasanjo. Despite
being a former military dictator, Obasanjo was named the first
"democratically elected" president of Nigeria in 1999. Despite
rampant corruption and the entrenched institutionalization
of poverty that he reinforced for the overwhelming majority
of Nigerians, he remained in that position until 2007. He was
replaced by Umaru Yar'Adua in July 2007. This is telling, since
Umaru Yar'Adua is Shehu Yar'Adua's younger brother. Shehu
Yar'Adua was Obasanjo's vice president during Obasanjo's
military dictatorship. Fela was imprisoned several times by
Obasanjo and Shehu Yar'Adua for his outspoken opposition to
their military regime.
Femi grew up watching the police arrest and beat his
father. Fela's original Afrika shrine was destroyed twice by the
government. Femi performed for ICOPA X participants as well as
the Nigerian public, for whom he made admission to the rebuilt
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Afrika shrine free and open to all for the night. The African
drums, dances, and instrumental were also accompanied by
Femi's speeches on the history of Nigeria's oppressive states,
and the present-day hardships and exploitations of the general
population, due to corporate and state-initiated embezzlement
of Nigeria's resources and the unequal distribution of wealth.
ICOPA X participants danced, sang, and listened to Femi Kuti's
saxophone and his band's accompanying instrumentals, and they
enjoyed the true African hospitality of one of Nigeria's leading
musicians.
Wednesday, August 28, was dedicated to remembering the
abolition of official European slave-trading enterprises in West
Africa. About 100 ICOPA X participants went to the National
Museum in Onikan, Lagos, and saw ancient African artifacts and
tools. It was noticed that many of the most precious artifacts,
such as the Benin bronzes and several ivory masks, had to be
represented by present-day replicas because the originals,
without the consent of Nigerian authorities, are being held in
British museums for what is called proper preservation. Also in
the museum was a display of past military and present rulers.
On display was the car in which Murtala Muhammad was
assassinated. He was the head of state of Nigeria who preceded
Obasanjo's military rule in 1979, and his assassination was
followed by numerous military coups. The car was in a room
surrounded by pictures of past military dictators and their
governors/ generals.
After the museum ICOPA X participants travelled to
Badagary, a small town on the outskirts of Lagos State. It is
located on shores where slave-trading took place. Visits in
Badagary included one of the gravesites of an African chief who
participated in trading slaves to Europeans. Near his grave the
shackles he used to capture and enslave people were on display.
Participants walked from his grave to the Gate of No Return,
which marked the spot where boats loaded for departure to the
Americas and Europe. Across the street from the bronze gate,
with its sculptures of white men whipping West Africans who
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had been stripped and shackled, were the Brazilian Baracoons.
These baracoons consisted of forty slave cells used to hold people
as they waited for slave ships to depart. All but two of the cells
have been converted into residential homes for the descendants
of the chief of that village who collaborated with Europeans and
their colonies in North and South America. Inside this compound
participants visited men's and women's cells. Upon learning that
forty people were held in each cell forty participants, mainly
students and several international participants, piled in and
closed the small wooden doors. The space was very tight, and air
was restricted. For a brief moment confinement was experienced
in the same holding cell that had imprisoned and sold millions
of slaves. On the way out of the cell was a picture of the chief
who owned the cells, and the gifts and clothes he was given in
return for his slave-trading contributions. These gifts included
glass plates and one cup, velvet robes, and a wooden trunk. The
atmosphere was tense as the realities of historical oppression
were confronted physically and emotionally. The materials
used in exchange for Africans were minuscule and cheap; how
these artifacts could be equated with human lives was beyond
comprehension.
The day rounded off with poetry readings by Dr. Tony Marino,
a medical doctor, published poet, and human rights activist in
Ibadan, Nigeria. Poems were also read by some Nigerian youths,
and music was played by several international and national
participants. After the poetry reading Marino donated books for
prisoners in Lagos State. An emotional day was capped off with
a sense of sadness, but a glimmer of hope in notions of resistance
and solidarity through poetry and song. Although the day was
intense and difficult, many felt that it would impact them for
a long time. An understanding of the need to fight oppressive
social and penal structures had been personalized.
The last day of ICOPA X focused on the financial context
of criminal justice. Gerald Onwusi, a human rights lawyer in
Nigeria, presented a detailed assessment of the oil conflicts in
Nigeria's delta region. He spoke about the late political activist
Ken Saro-Wiwa and the many others who have lost their lives
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in attempts to protect their communities and their lives from
the effects of oil exploitation. He spoke about the people who
hide behind company names to commit crimes against the
community, and stated the need for civil justice to intervene and
sue those involved to ensure that they face consequences for their
misdeeds. In his paper Onwusi suggested that communities that
are affected should be compensated. He mentioned the example
of what the US companies have come to call the "super fund/7
said to be created for the purpose of paying compensation to
the people of Nigerian oil communities. Unfortunately Onwusi
did not highlight the fact that these funds are never sufficient
in the face of the damage done to the communities and to the
environment, and only serve as short-term solutions to long-
term problems of exploitation, environmental damage, and
community breakdown. He concluded by stating that people
should know their rights and exercise them through such
schemes of compensation, emphasizing the need to rely on the
penal system to secure financial compensation for oil-related
conflicts in Nigeria.
Hispresentationwasfollowedbyonethatdirectly contradicted
his conclusions. Jane Hemesson, retired commandant of the Prison
Training School, retired state controller of prisons, and present
deputy director of PRAWA, spoke about the financial context of
the criminal justice system in Nigeria. She spoke about the large
sums of money being spent on the maintenance of prisons in
Nigeria and mentioned that eleven new prisons are in the process
of being built in the country. She supported penal abolitionism
and stressed the counterproductive financial element of a justice
system that does not serve the Nigerian people. She referred to
the country's massive natural resources and wealth, and stated
that the growing budgets of both the prison and the police in
Nigeria have begun to present a drain on the national budget,
and this problem is in need of direct and immediate attention.
Conference presentations were concluded with a session
focusing on the brutalities of imprisonment, and included
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presentations of papers written by prisoners (presented on
their behalf by ex-prisoners or prisoners' rights activists) and
ex-prisoners. The first presentation was written by Tiyo Attalah
Salah El, serving a life sentence in a US prison. His paper was
presented by Professor Hal Pepinsky and included details of the
injustices implemented by the US penal system within the context
of power imbalances related to class, race, and gender. He spoke
about the indefensibility of the penal system, and addressed
issues related to the inadequacy and inappropriateness of reform
when faced with the inhumane and oppressive penal structure.
Following this presentation Clever Akporherhe and Felix Obi
spoke about their experiences in Nigerian prisons, and Faith
Nolan presented a paper on behalf of Osadolor Eribo, who was
still in prison at the time.
Sam Edokwa also presented a paper during this session. He
is an ex-prisoner who is a soldier in the Nigerian army. He was
arrested in 1996 on a civilian matter, picked up by the police,
and—without any presentation of evidence against him —put in
prison. He was held in prison as an awaiting-trial prisoner for
three years and in the end was never convicted of any offence.
His speech was short because military personnel came with him
for the presentation. He was in full military uniform during
his speech and, despite the presence of his military 'superiors',
managed to emphasize the lack of implementation of the
UN human rights standards for the treatment of prisoners in
Nigerian prisons. Edokwa had to take time off work to present
at ICOPA, hence the military uniform and escorts, but he gave
an accurate presentation of his time as a prisoner and his contact
with the police force. Before and after his presentation, when
he was not in uniform and escorted by military personnel, he
became heavily involved in abolitionist discussions, promoting
the ideology and advocating for implementation of alternatives
to the system that are separate from the penal structure and not
within state control. His presence at ICOPA X was valuable and
represented a great deal of resistance to many oppressive forces.
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ICOPA X: CONCLUSIONS AND REALIZATIONS
Throughout the conference there were many intense discussions
among participants. Many of the Nigerian students in attendance
expressed concerns about the nonchalant attitudes of Nigerian
lawyers and judges toward the suffering of prisoners. The stories
shared by (ex-)prisoners, and the justifications for inhumanity
presented by several criminal justice practitioners (mainly laying
blame for system malfunctions on criminal justice branches for
which they were not working), prompted discussions among
participants between presentations and over lunch breaks. One
of the Nigerian lawyers present reacted by telling a large group
of students that " Nigeria has just entered into democracy after
thirty years of military dictatorship/7 and thus their expectations
for their nation's development were premature and set too high.
A heated debate on the politics of injustice ensued. As at other
times throughout ICOPA X, a small minority of those employed
by the criminal justice system were challenged or threatened
by the criticisms and facts presented. It also seemed that the
more students heard, the more disturbed they were by the
injustices occurring in and through the Nigerian criminal justice
system. While many did not trust the system or the state, the
details presented still shocked them. These students continue to
voice their concerns about criminal justice in Nigeria. The new
generation of young adults is at odds with a minority of the older
generation of criminal justice practitioners, and some of the older
generation of activists and academics. This made for some really
interactive sessions and debates: ICOPA X days and nights were
packed with many loud, heated, and at times hostile discussions.
These discussions did not break up the group dynamic at ICOPA
X. In true African spirit, those who disagreed chose to spend more
time in discussion, despite recognizing possibly irreconcilable
differences.
It was a powerful experience, emphasizing to me that the
path to peace and equality is not quiet; it is full of stories of
brutality, and it is packed with disagreements. When the people
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repossess the power to define and resolve their own conflicts
they are bound to disagree, and that disagreement is essential.
I have come to understand that silence is a tool of oppression.
Speaking out is a tool of resistance. Some speak through song,
some speak through stories, some speak through writing,3 some
speak through research, and some speak through action. ICOPA
X spoke loudly in West Africa those few days.
The stories shared during ICOPA X, and the experiences
I had in Nigeria, were intense and at times violent. The (ex-)
prisoners, community members, and activists I met in Nigeria
struggle every day, not only to become free, but also to survive
on a basic level in extremely harsh living conditions. Nigeria
is a rich nation. Africa is rich in resources. What keeps one of
the richest, most abundant continents poor? It became clear
to me in Nigeria that globally racist and oppressive economic
structures, built during racist and violent eras of colonialism
and slave-trading, continue to thrive at the expense of an entire
continent. While history set the stage for the current situations
and oppressions in Africa, many privileged societies choose
conveniently to ignore the racist and violent foundations of their
comforts. The racist and oppressive penal structures of Western
societies continue to be taken for granted as civil and common
forms of law. Penal structures actually represent the visible
reality of the criminal forms of justice that colonial institutions
implement. Their very existence on African soil brings to light
the continuation of colonial rule in Africa. Penal institutions
in Africa serve as a constant reminder of the criminal acts of
colonialism and slave-trading that Europeans participated in
historically; they also illuminate the continued participation in
such acts by descendants of colonialists, who continue to exploit
Africa and work toward the implementation of a stronger penal
system on African soil.
The actions and circumstances that have led up to the
contemporary conditions in which Africans and people of colour
all over the globe live are racist and violent. Conflict, it seems,
is inevitable; violence becomes natural within a structure that
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is unnatural, inhumane and repressive. Resistance, I have come
to learn, lies in a commitment to build solidarity among those
who are oppressed, predominantly and unquestionably people
who are 'not white'. Upon building a stronger community
focused on fighting such conditions, communities of colour
can begin to work with allies who are white, but who choose
to use their privilege to destabilize it. Solidarity occurs with the
implementation of a respected diversity, an understanding that
differences are not only acceptable, but also essential for the
human social condition. Within the spirit of such diversity lies
the understanding that institutions and systems of control are too
rigid, and thus structurally too oppressive, in their interactions
with the people of a flexible and diverse society.
For disempowered populations these oppressions are a
reality, all-encompassing and devastating. For those who are
privileged, who are empowered, who do have opportunities to
speak out and create possibilities for change, it is not a choice but
a responsibility to work toward freedom. It is a responsibility
to fight to destabilize the conditions and structures that
thrive in violence and build comforts for a minority rich (and
predominantly white) population through the bloodshed and
exploitation of the majority. The fight for freedom from penal
oppression and colonial global structures is essential at times like
this. In these times of barbaric criminal justice the current human
condition demands that the current global order transform. A
revolution of the mind, body, and spirit of contemporary social,
political, and economic structures must occur. In the meantime
disempowered, oppressed, and silenced populations continue
to fight back and resist colonialism through criminal justice in
Africa. The experiences, facts, and analyses shared in this book
illuminate such acts of resistance, and hopefully can stimulate
a discussion that is not controlled by deluded propaganda. The
past is not the past, racism continues to thrive today, and there
are options available to change the miserable realities of this
global colonized and racist condition.
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NOTES
1 Meetings are held the last Friday of every month ironically, in the
British Council office in Lagos. The purpose of the meetings is to
gather human rights activists and non-governmental organizations
in Lagos, in order to network and build a community organized
enough to implement political and social changes.
2 One of the continental participants at ICOPA. A human rights
activist in Liberia, Moses spoke frequently about the civil war that
his country is experiencing.
3 The Journal of Prisoners on Prisons presents this opportunity to
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